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## NINE ENTRESHIEUR

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in international law. Mere suspicion is not evidence, and doubts should be resolved in favour of neutral commerce, not against it.

Cargoes had, in fact, been seized 'because of a belief that, though not originally so intended by the shippers, they will ultimately reach' the enemy. A consignment of conditional contraband shipped to a neutral port does not raise a presumption of enemy destination; such a presumption is directly opposed to Lord Salisbury's statement as to foodstuffs (applicable to all conditional contraband) which, 'though having a hostile destination, can be considered as contraband only if they are for the enemy forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used. It must be shown that was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure.' As to concealed contraband, it is conceded that there is a right to detain neutral ships when there is sufficient evidence to justify belief that contraband articles are in their cargoes; but the ships cannot be taken into port and there detained 'for the purpose of searching generally for contraband, or upon presumptions created by special municipal enactment which are clearly at variance with international law and practice.' Many of the industries of the United States are suffering 'because their products are denied long-established markets in European countries which, though neutral, are contiguous to the nations at war.' The effect on trade is not entirely cured by reimbursements for damages suffered when an enemy destination has not been established; 'the injury is to American commerce as a whole t through the hazard of the enterprise and the repeated diversion al of goods from established markets.'

Resolved into its simplest expression the complaint is aed criticism of the way in which the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' a has been applied by the British Government; but there is also the veiled criticism of the doctrine itself; and, by way of furthe se. complaint, it is pointed out that the embargoes which havrobeen declared in certain countries have proved insufficient tich prevent the doctrine being applied. As to the principle asserte ich that doubts are to be resolved in favour of neutral commerce, aed has no warrant in common-sense, for it puts a premium on tless neutral trader's ingenuity, an ingenuity which has itself giv had rise to the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' Seeing that colcilimerce is in the balance against a nation's existence, the dolified must obvio y be resolved in favour of the more important cously The Note is also open to the general criticism than in sideratio 3 is base he position of the vendor and ignores the purch rules criterion of destination must often be found inre no f the neutral purchaser of which the neutral vehr the orant.

erim reply was sent by the British Government or

7th of January. It begins with a cordial concurrence in the general principle that a belligerent should not interfere with trade between neutrals unless such interference is necessary to protect the belligerent's national safety, and then only to the extent to which this is necessary; with this qualification, however, that we shall endeavour to keep our action within the limits of this principle, on the understanding that it admits our right to interfere when such interference is, not with bona-fide trade between the United States and another neutral country, but with trade in contraband destined for the enemy's country, and we are ready, whenever our action may unintentionally exceed this principle, to make redress.

The figures showing the export of copper from the United States in 1913 and 1914 to Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland ('countries which, though neutral, are contiguous to the nations at war') are then compared, and their astonishing increases duly noted. The conclusion is very clear.

With such figures the presumption is very strong that the bulk of the copper consigned to these countries has recently been intended not for their own use, but for that of a belligerent who cannot import it direct.

Granted the soundness of the American proposition, the British case falls within it; the 'imperative necessity for the safety of the country' has arisen. As to concealed contraband the case is even clearer. Cotton is not on the list of contraband. information has reached the Government that 'precisely because we have declared our intention of not interfering with cotton, ships carrying cotton will be specially selected to carry concealed contraband; and we have been warned that copper will be concealed in bales of cotton.' For this there is only one remedy: the cargo must be examined and the bales weighed; further, this cannot be done at sea, therefore the ship must be brought into The general justification of the action of the British Government is couched in these weighty words, which go to the foundations of the whole law of contraband and the right of search: 'We are confronted with the growing danger that neutral ountries contiguous to the enemy will become, on a scale itherto unprecedented, a base of supplies for the armed forces our enemies and for materials for manufacturing armanent. . . . We endeavour, in the interest of our own national fety, to prevent this danger by intercepting good; really destined the enemy, without interfering with those which re bona-fide utral.' The extraordinary procedure adopted by tes Government of prohibiting the publication anifests hin thirty days after the departure of vessels fro ts, obviously increased the difficulties of the Bri rican pt in exercising its right of search in even the mo umstances. If I am right in my view that t

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neutrals is to do nothing, for the simple reason that any action may be of assistance to one of the belligerents, it must be confessed that this order comes perilously near to a breach of neutrality.

The reply deals also with the seizure of foodstuffs, but it is unnecessary, in view of subsequent action taken in regard to them, to refer to this part of the document. It also mentions a somewhat unusual complaint, not included in the American Note, of our own embargo on rubber, imposed in consequence of a new trade in exporting rubber from the United States in suspiciously large quantities to neutral countries, which had sprung up since the war. The complaint is not very intelligible, because it looks at embargo from the wrong point of view.

The full reply of the British Government was dated the 10th of February. It contained the very important declaration that our action against neutral vessels 'has been limited to vessels on their way to enemy ports or ports in neutral countries adjacent to the theatre of war, because it is only through such ports that the enemy introduces the supplies which he requires for carrying on the war.' In other words, the importance of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' at the present time is emphasised; and its necessity is demonstrated by a further review of trade statistics, which led to the inevitable conclusion 'that not only has the trade of the United States with the neutral countries in Europe been maintained as compared with previous years, but also that a substantial part of this trade was, in fact, trade intended for the enemy countries going through neutral ports by routes to which it was previously unaccustomed.'

But even more important is the opinion deliberately expressed that international law, like even to other judge-made law, is a live body of principles which to only of must keep abreast of the times. Its rules are not ar, if sent t devised as occasions arise, but are based on principles ustrial ravve developed with the progress of the world. Any apparent changes in the law which Great Britain has introduced are not arbitrary inventions which have in view merely the crushing of Germany, but are justified by well-known princit co, applied to new conditions. The process of adaptation is round one. The advent of steam-power had a notable influg goods whe development of the law, for the facilities introduc other of thners and railways, while they simplified the task it springs I trader in contraband, had enormously magnifixs In order hes of the belligerent. The question in issue SOI which the lalmost primitive fashion. Are the rules whiles are searcher ishts of belligerents, when there were no own min m when the transit of contraband over the other, jeand a belligerent State has been made so

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easy? The answer is not an absolute negative; it is that the old principles are vital and will warrant extension to meet the new occasions.

But to explain the reasons for a step which has already been taken and to find sound reasons for a step which has to be taken are two different things. The first requires reasoning power, the second imagination; and I find this in the position boldly taken up and courageously insisted on, that the growth in size of ocean liners has rendered a further amplification of the old rules necessary. They must be brought into port for examination.

The American loves the cut and thrust of argument, and must at once have acknowledged that the reference to the fact that the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' originated with the Judges of the United States was not a tu quoque, but a brilliant illustration of the principle of development of the law. It is abundantly clear from every paragraph of this remarkable reply that this doctrine has become the one principle worth fighting for now, for our national safety depends on it. And the American will appreciate the delicacy of the compliment which can find no stronger arguments than those used by the Judges of the United States Prize Courts when they established it.

The earlier American Note of the 7th of November had contended that 'the conclusion of the right of search should rest upon the evidence found on the ship under investigation, and not upon circumstances ascertained from external sources.' But the major premiss is that the actual destination of the vessel to the neutral port is only the cloak for the real destination of the cargo to the enemy; and the citation from the judgment in the case of the Bermuda is a complete answer:

The final destination of the 'n this particular voyage was left so skilfully open . . . that i lese wei; quite easy to prove, with that certainty which American Coraw of core, the intention, which it seemed plain must have really exist ith the ordo prove it required that truth should be collated from a variety of sources, darkened and disguised; from others opened as the cause advanced, and by accident only; from coincidences undesigned, and facts that we e circumstantial. Collocations and comparisons, in short, brought lamar their collective force in aid of evidence that was more direct. of U.

To introduce the rigid rules of esse which secessary to a common-law action in a question which pted b but an inquiry, would obviously cripple lication doctrine of 'continuous voyages'; the ocsels fro doctrine deals have by force of circums the Bra important source of supply of those comn the mo gerent must at all hazards prevent his & that t if we go back to the root-principle, the every part of it depend on the right of sel

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w-suit at all, ess of the rn most

argument is necessary to justify the principle laid down in this case, nor for the provisions of the Order in Council of the 29th of October which throw the burden of proof of his innocence on the neutral owner of contraband.

I now come to the Note to Germany of the 12th of February, delivered in consequence of the notification of her under-sea policy, and for which 'Warning' is the only appropriate term. The statement of the principles set at defiance is introduced by the satirical formula 'It is unnecessary to remind,' the whole object of the Note being to remind the German Government that the interference with the freedom of the sea is limited to search and blockade, any that in the absence of blockade the belligerent nationality or contraband character of the cargo must be determined before a vessel may be destroyed.

To this Note came the German reply which set forth England's iniquities and violations of international law, which were in startling contrast to the scrupulous observance of 'valid international rules regarding naval warfare ' by Germany. There is a complacent reference to the American Note to Great Britain of the 28th of December, which sets out the details of our iniquities 'sufficiently, though not exhaustively'; but the main interest of the document is its method of dealing with the duties of neutral States towards Germany.

I putrals have been unable to prevent the interruption of their commer, with Germany, which is contrary to international laws.

rmany is as good as cut off from her overseas supply by the silent or protesting toleration of neutrals not only in regard to such goods as are absolute contraband, but also in regard to such as, according to the acknowledged law before the war, are only conditional contraband or not contraband at all. Great Britais, on the other hand, is, with the toleration of neutral Governments, 1ct only supplied with such goods as are not contraband or only conditional contraband, but with goods which are regarded by Great Britair, if sent to Germany, as absolute contraband—namely, provisions, incustrial rays material, etc.—and even with goods which have always inclubitably been regarded as absolute con-

There follows a reference 'with greatest emphasis' to the enormous traffic in arms, 't ch is being 'carried on between American firms and German's nemies'; after which come two sentences most typical other contents:

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it sprineds that the practice of right and the tolera-In ord involve no formal violation of neutrality. . . . which of neutrals to take no steps to protect their searclermany, and even to allow themselves to be own in of conscious wilful restriction of their trade, othe have a perfect right, which they unfortunately ise contraband trade, especially in arms, with out ind just

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The involutions of these astonishing sentences are worthy of the White Queen at her best, and it is quite a difficult exercise to arrive at their meaning. So far as I have been able to get at it, it is something like this: Trade is free; you neutral traders have a right to trade with Germany as with Great Britain; why don't you? That would be the 'practice of right.' Germany has as much right to have you trade with her as Great Britain has; why do you deny her that right? You allow yourselves rather 'to be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction' (in other words, you submit to having your cargoes seized by Great Britain). Of course you have the right to take no steps to protect your legitimate trade with Germany, and you take none (in other words, you refuse to resist the seizures of your cargoes by force); that is 'the toleration of wrong.' And so you cease to trade with Germany. But you have also a perfect right to cease trading in contraband (especially in arms) with Great Britain. Why don't you? In her case you do not allow yourselves 'to be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction.' To all of which the neutral traders reply: When you begin to make an appreciable attack upon our trade with Great Britain and seize our cargoes, then you may be sure that we shall be influenced 'in the direction of conscious wilful restriction' of that trade also. But until that time arrives, we regret that we cannot take the risk of having to run the gauntlet of the British Fleet. In all seriousness these mysterious sentences mean no more than that Germany has lost such influence upon the sea as she ever had, and the neutral trader has made a note of it and governs himself accordingly. Therefore the traffic in arms, in spite of her pathetic protests, must go on.

So much for the Notes g of to Answers, and I pass to the realm of international law v of sour recent debate in Parliament a noble Lord suggested the advanced, of German disregard of it, we need not be 'too fastidious that we application of its principles. Even at the best of times, before war shook things to their foundations, the layman was disposed to look on it as a thing of shreds and patches. I am sure he would be surprised to hear that the principles are coherent, and the our ere is a thread of simple common-sense running through good reangious doctrines. The fate of the Empire depends on the awhice red the Government takes on these important questiced b e bur on this action being strictly in accordance with thation anife nations have agreed to. I make no apology, therels from ricag once more the well-beaten track, for I take it Br. rn-iness of the good citizen to know what he is he ma in

A sketch of the view of international law prese that to in some letters by the present writer to the Daily D

order to help him I shall begin at the very beginning. And the beginning is War.

At the outbreak of war the nations are divided into two classes: those that are fighting and those that are not. To give them their scientific names, they are belligerents and neutrals. With the laws of war I do not concern myself, but only with those principles by which neutrals are supposed to govern them-

selves in order to a loid being swept into the vortex.

The only means by which this most desirable object can be achieved is by stendfastly bearing in mind the natural consequence of meddling in other people's frays. It gives rise to the very simple maximr' He who joins himself to my enemy makes himself my enemy and may be treated as such.' For the world's peace the doctrine 'He who is not with me is against me' finds no place in the maxims of nations. Now there is a rootprinciple of neutrality, and if it is once let go all the subordinate principles will fly off and become isolated bodies careering through intellectual space, and doing an incalculable amount of damage. This principle is, that neutrality is a state appertaining to the Governments of the non-belligerent countries, and to the Governments alone. Azuni says 4 that 'the state of neutrality is not, nor can be, a new state, but a continuation of a former one, by the Sovereign who has no wish to change it.' neutrality has nothing whatever to do with the individual, and all the puzzles which confuse the public mind arise from the fact that the word 'neutral' is applied indiscriminately to Governments and to individuals. The importance of appreciating this is manifest, for if it is unsound the German case in which the contrary doctrine appears and reappears over and over again is right; if it is sound that ca is tumbles to pieces. It is the persistence with which the G rman Foreign Office has dragged the opposite contention in by sthe heels on every possible occasion which makes it so necessaryt to insist on the recognition of this The burden of teneir reply to the United States, the condition on which they will abandon their evil under-water practices, is that this pri miple should be given up, and the neutral trade in arms with coor enemies declared illegal. If it could be thought for a go art that the United States was likely to be thought for a good rt that the United States was likely to other contains it, then the peace of the world would it spriscBut, unfortunately for the Germans, the indeed be irh In ore at what the principle means, and the place Americans and which alonal system, for them to give even the it holdsome slightshis sear ceis possible.

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own re entrality mean? That the Government othanyte must do nothing to assist either belliouzes, or men, or money. It is not difficult to in kaded Letters of Historicus, p. 127.

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understand why neutrality is not applicable to the individuals of the non-belligerent States. Nations subsist by international commerce, and there is no reason why, because two of them go to war, all their trade with the others should be cut off. Therefore we get at once to this axiom, that war does not affect neutral trade with either belligerent, but the traders in neutral countries are entitled to carry on business with them. And so the neutral

trader makes his first appearance on the scene.

But to adopt the language of the day, Krieg ist Krieg; and if the neutral trader has rights so also have the belligerents, and the doctrine of contraband of war gives expression to them, though few doctrines have been so loosely put into words. think I am fairly stating the prevalent and mistaken opinion when I put it thus: That it is a breach of neutrality to trade in contraband, and that it is the duty of a neutral State to prevent its subjects from so trading. The Germans, in adopting this popular idea, are juggling with the word 'neutrality,' and they do so in a way which is almost pathetic; yet their version of what they are pleased to call 'true neutrality' is so near to plausibleness that I must be at pains to elaborate the real principle. A belligerent has a perfect right to apply the maxim 'Who helps my enemy becomes my enemy 'to the neutral trader. But seeing that he is an unarmed civilian he cannot be made to fight. remedy against him is therefore confiscation of his goods. special way in which the trader can help the enemy is by supplying him with munitions of war arlad other means of carrying on the fight. In order that there may be no mistake a more particular list of things which help the enemy is made out, called 'Contraband of War.' Now the belligerent has no right, much less any power, to prevent the traster from selling these things to his enemy; but he gives him fair vedarning that if he sends them by sea cruisers will be on the look-out for his vessels, and they will be detained and searched and the contraband cargo seized. If the trader turns to his Government and invokes its protection, talking about the 'freedwa of the sea' and the common highway of the nations,' he tlf l get for only answer You are assisting 'The threat is justified and I cannot hel good not prevent you the enemy and must take your chances which eear, for then taking that chance, nor can I order icted b agerent, and I should be interfering in favour of thation I can do that would be a breach of neutrality or rels fro rnt, and for you is to see that you get fair playte Br. e law proper damages if you are innocent.' Soehe mo ade in its first shape: the neutral trader is fr, that t with either or both belligerents to any?

anything else; butcif houtrades ain Grant Kangri Collection, Haridwar of losing his cargo. The justification for

simplest language. The belligerent has obviously no right, merely because he is at war, to order neutral traders not to carry contraband to the enemy, nor even to expect that they will not. Neither can he insist that the neutral trader's Government should intervene on his behalf, and so commit a breach of neutrality towards the other belligerent.

Certain subsidiary questions arise at this point. First, the familiar distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. This follows in direct sequence from what has already been said. The belligerent is not fighting the civil population, but only the enemy Government and its forces. This compels him to interfere with neutral trade in everything that enables that Government to maintain its forces. But how to draw the line between things destined for the civil population and those destined for the forces? For things destined for the civilian may be serviceable to those forces. There must be a more or less arbitrary list of both kinds of contraband periodigerent riprinciple governing conditional contraband being foundiple that Salisbury's dictum as to foodcontraband being found iple that Salisbury's dictum as to rood-stuffs already referred to based howas followed by Sir Edward Grey's statement that we ble contraband did not intend to

I confess that there are is my considerations which challenge the logic of the distinction because is ween absolute and conditional contraband, and give it more the character of a humanitarian concession. It introduces a new bone of contention between belligerents and neutral traders, and it opens up the grave danger of concealed contraband in cargoes which are themselves innocent: the concealment of copper, for example, in bales of cotton. In view of the more rigorous rule of blockade where the distinction disappears, it seems rather to be a preliminary measure in the process of throttling the enemy; the first turn of the screw, and a suggestion of sterner measures which are in store.

It is important to note that the determination of what is contraband, what absolute and what conditional, is left to each belligerent. Seeing that no law is possible on the subject, that agreement has got no further than the unratified Declaration of London, and that it could not be for the enemy to decide, there is no one but the bell orent left. But it rests on a better reason. to goods master of his own fray; he can direct the Each belligerego to good scretion, and can strike his blows where he other of ar in mind what he could be attack at other in ar in mind what he could do, the concession it sprin, hall only be controlled it. pleases; In orders is clearly a recovery rig-some ces is clearly a reservation of strength rather which imposes There is no rule which imposes sea any belligerent; he may exert all his strength Oize all his enemy's property if he is able; the kade expressly provides for it; the only thing

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that is required of him is that, until he proceeds to extremes, he

must be careful how he interferes with neutral property.

Another point requires explanation. Of course all enemy ships upon the seas are lawful prize. But it strikes one at once that here is a departure from the principle that you do not make war upon the civil population, for merchant ships are civilian property. The neutral trader has, however, been looked after, for the Declaration of Paris has proclaimed that 'neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.' But in the converse case, it would not seem reasonable that enemy property in neutral ships should escape capture. But the Declaration of Paris steps in with the arbitrary rule that 'the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.' It cannot be said that this rule has done much to safeguard the 'freedom of the sea' for neutral vessels, for there is no doubt that guns consigned to it. Germany discovered on an Ameril Germann a voyage from Galvepolston to Pernambuco would be laword 'neized; and if the guns do snay be seized the vessel may bic; yetned and searched. But theyractical considerations work in favity ' if the neutral trader. Not ness'l the hosts of the Allied Fleetsrateould be sufficient for the

stupendous work which would be ly volved in putting this rule into practice; therefore good sense neas decreed that the destination of a ship to an enemy port shall be adopted as the practical working factor in its application, at least in the case of conditional contraband. But this has engendered the idea, which certainly is no part of the rule in its naked simplicity, that neutral ships sailing to neutral ports can carry enemy cargoes of contraband with impunity. Enemy destination is supposed alone to afford a presumption that there is contraband for the enemy on board; but if there were any doubt that the idea is erroneous, the words 'whatever be their destination,' in a judgment of Lord Stowell's, to which I shall presently refer, describing the ships over which a belligerent may exercise his rights at sea, must dispel it.

I have talked of the belligerent right of seizure. But civilised nations, recognising that in the most elementary statement of the case not all neutral cargoes even with an enemy destination are liable to seizure, have realised the nechity of establishing a tribunal by which this question of liable po and consequent garne cargoes to confiscation can be decided. With the righ areidrawing the escape there came into being at once the duty I ald inco decision from the summary process which the rnt, and ably adopt. The question of liability might e law one of fact, law might be involved, a Court wa ade as to its constitution there were only three alte judges, obviously impossible; neutral judges, or

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Court, not very practicable; there remained nothing but judges of the belligerent country. Hence the anomaly of the Prize Court sitting in the seizing country's territory, presided over by judges of that country. An anomaly, because it is contrary to the elementary rule that no man shall be a judge in his own cause; yet the judgment of a Prize Court is a judgment in rem, it passes property, and is accepted as binding against all the world by the Courts of all other countries. There have been in the past complaints of the decisions; sometimes they have been followed by diplomatic representations. But in these times when -I imagine for the first time in history-a civilised Governmont has been deliberately charged with having recourse to lying,

ply is a bright spot in the international horizon to think ne system of Prize Courts has produced judges who, as the has recognised, have been among the greatest.

t the detention of neutral ships at sea, and the seizure of intraband that they carry to the enemy, can be put much pa c than a mere belligerent right; nor does it spring solely Sovethe vindictive principle that the neutral aiding the enemy own les an enemy; it is based on the supreme right of selfbelife. It is the inevitable counterpoise to the right of the privil trader to continue trading even in contraband, in spite ar. The importance of this right of the neutral trader is the Isure of the importance of this right of the belligerent. And Is right of the neutral trader itself was put on the large comrcial ground by Mr. Huskisson: 'Of what use would be our eill in building ships, manufacturing arms, and preparing istruments of war, if equally to sell them to all belligerents were a breach of neutrality? '5 But it can be put on a still larger ground. Without it the small nations would go to the wall. If there were such a doctrine as Germany now contends for, a great country with unlimited resources could speedily annihilate all the weak nations one after the other. There is no such doctrine Da go hen war is declared the werring nations are to fight it to goods which awn resources only. It is not the duty of neutral other of the bellige ing and let the best man win. Sentiment In order to prevent neutral ship stion. The neutral trader may which the belligerents treat a estly desires should win; but the searched at sea, it prohibits teme penalty of confiscation in his own ports. The embargo thevitably fade into the background. otherwise have searched tellisle matter is that the two great war out of the neutral count deavne neutral trader to trade in contra-! Illigerent nations to seize his cargoes. indirectly into the justified in lettings of Histhimple principle that the neutral trader A San in Lord opject only to the risk of seizure. 'The

i re of Historicus, pp. 133, 170.

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right of the neutral to transport,' says Kent, 'and of the hostile Power to seize, are conflicting rights, and neither party can charge the other with a criminal act.'

But the principle of seizure is still in a very crude state; and seeing that all cargoes destined for the enemy are not liable to seizure, and that for practical reasons it is neither possible nor advisable to bring in every cargo for adjudication in the Prize Courts, a supplementary right has been devised, known as the right of search. It is the first step in the seizure, and, on the one hand, affords the belligerent an opportunity of letting innocent cargo go free; on the other hand, it gives the owner of the cargo an immediate opportunity of proving its innocent character The right of search is often stated as an independent right, ea, is in reality secondary to the right of seizure, and reference to obviously apply equally to the right of seizure. As to i lvelimited nature I need do no more than quote the wellwords of Lord Stowell in the case of the Swedish convoyBut Not is incontrovertible

that the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be destination, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned compared of a belligerent nation. . . . This right is so clear in principle that man can deny it who admits the legality of maritime capture, beal if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether all is property that can be captured, it is impossible to capture.

On this another rule has been grafted which is suggested the enunciation of the law as to the right of search. That rig must be exercised for the very same reason that the right he been allowed, for otherwise you do not know whether you have the right to seize. From the right of search has therefore developed the duty to search; and it is the omission to recognise this duty that has plunged the German Admiralty into its piratical career.

But the heart of the neutral trader is desperately ingeneral and no sooner had he obtained the inch to which pretrangling siderations made him appear to be entitled the peen described it into the ell of his own manicing miewhat more elastic neutral vessel bound to an energie is a convenient comparison, because the presumption is that inhumanity is silenced by the and that her cargo is probably othe vision of what Paris would is that cargoes on board a vessel bolan had succeeded. It is destined for the enemy, even thou and war admits of no half-nothing easier than to bring them account civilisation; and this with a neutral destination; all that hree to been recognised as them on to the belligerent, eitherliges, orientional limitation another vessel and sending it down that Kangri Collection, Hardwar wally

of the enemy's cruisers, or

and belligerent countries are contiguous, by rail across the border. And the best of the plan is that the trader on the other side of the water, say some innocent trader in copper in the United States, need know nothing about it, so that if by chance the

cargo does get seized he will do all the shouting.

With this problem, devised in some such human fashion, the United States was faced during the Civil War, and the Judges settled it in characteristic and logical manner. They discovered the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' It is nothing more than the simple application of elementary principles, and is arrived at by the elimination of the presumption of innocence which the voyage to the neutral port raised. All presumptions may be ag isd, and this one manifestly. 'Be the destination what it

It he right of search existed; the presumption had only been mercia to grow because it was convenient. If goods destined for may smy reached him by way of a neutral port, that port was part intermediate destination; the ultimate destination was the Sovere and there was a continuous voyage to him from the port prohilment. Therefore the seizure, and therefore the search, own istified, and could not be denied merely because 'the final bellightion of the cargo was left so skilfully open.' But the trader's wits are sharpened by much profit in prospect; he

Jsimpleton, and a consignment of, let us say, copper from bet nited States is not likely to be addressed 'Herr Krupp von aılen, Essen, viâ Rotterdam, by kind favour of Messrs. Petersen pl Co.' Hence a most ingenious argument conducted on the nciple 'You shut your eyes, I'll keep mine open.' A consignent 'to order' perhaps may legitimately be seized, but certainly it one consigned to a specific person in the neutral country. he sophistry is obvious, and behind it the neutral trader

truggling for his profit is plainly discernible.

And now the pendulum swings best and in the doctrine of mbargo the really neutral trader of sinto his own. 'Emrarnis the action taken by a nepreal Government in regard duty as sigh have been declared to be contraband by one or Powers, or inverents; and the point to be emphasised is that in that behalf'; but, the ctrine of 'continuous voyages.' penalty is pointed out with destined to its ports with goods viz. the withdrawal of the Ks contraband being detained and on its road to the enemy, he export of those goods from its to the operation of bellige tisfies the belligerent who would rights are I have endeavouships, that these goods will not go

nd therefore will not get directly or 10 Letters of Historic the enemy, and he therefore feels hips go free; the doctrine of 'conoply. Now the reason for the embargo

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is that the merchants of the neutral country require the commodity for themselves. Suppose, for example, that Spanish merchants require copper for their own use; then in order to ensure cargoes of copper coming direct to Spanish ports without being interfered with at sea by the search of belligerent cruisers, the Spanish Government might put an embargo on copper: that is to say, might prohibit its export. There could be no better evidence that the Spanish merchants were importing the copper for their own trade, and that none of it would get through to the enemy. I can therefore best describe an embargo thus: It is action taken by a neutral Government to protect those of its merchants who do not desire to engage in trade in contraband from the consequences which would result from the actif the those who do. There is only one point in connexion witcher doctrine which requires attention. Is the action thus tal the neutral Government a breach of its neutrality to the belligerent? For, undoubtedly, it does act favourably belligerent who has declared the goods to be contraband. answer is simple. Once admit the strict logic of the docti 'continuous voyages,' it follows that an embargo is a m neither directed against one belligerent nor imposed to the other. It is simply a measure of self-defence, taken in to prevent the national industries from suffering from the doubted belligerent right of detention at sea and possible seizi

And now I come to the last point of all, blockade, which the supreme manifestation of force for the purpose of crushin the enemy. Here all minor considerations vanish. ficial distinction between absolute and conditional contraban disappears; there is no longer any free list; neutral as well a enemy vessels are subject to seizure, whether going to or coming from the blockaded port the humanitarian concession that wan is not made on the civil polytion finds no place; indeed, blockade derives much of its efficacy 1 m the pressure which the process brings to bear on that population. It hangen: as a siege carried on at sea, but under somment of conditions than a land siege. Ititled themy & strangling because all the outery against its led ity is peen described recollection of Paris in 1870, and about an interest comparison, have been in 1914 if the German anity is silenced by the rigorous, almost brutal, but it is wiion of what Paris would measures which come within the chad succeeded. It is measure, extreme though it be, h war admits of no halflegitimate warfare. Nor is there a civilisation; and this as to the time when it may be resorted been recognised as does at the end of the discussion to wentional limitation of the energy the Rubic Romain Fucukat Kangrh Collection, Hardwar turally

ricus. p. 129.

only be resorted to after all other measures had failed. But there is nothing to prevent a war starting with a blockade; nothing, that is to say, in the theory of the subject, though there are any number of practical reasons which make it improbable. I presume, however, that if a great maritime Power were at war with a State which had only a miniature fleet, a blockade of its coasts would be the speediest and therefore the most humane way of bringing it to a conclusion. Certainly there is no rule or custom which prevents a State at war from putting forth its full strength at once.

The ascending scale is easier for purposes of study; the mind grasps smaller things more easily, and they prepare the way for

It reciation of the greater things. But it is not by a process merci; al development that we reach blockade after a study of may and; you do not discriminate in order afterwards to diseven Blockade is treated last more conveniently because it parts the greatest development of force against the enemy; Sovel would have been more logical to have begun at the other own the scale, starting with the greatest exhibition of force, belligting the series of rules emerge in diminishing strength. prive of what remains to be said, it is of great importance to

ate that blockade, which cuts the enemy off absolutely he outer world, lies at one end of the scale of what one bet rent may do to the other, and the seizure of contraband as neutral ship going to an enemy port, which cuts the enemy Put partially, lies at the other end. There can then be no Sulty in justifying what comes in between.

But the most curious point is that it is only when we come to recognition of this extreme manifestation of force that we et with artificial rules. A blockade must be 'effective.' Yet is word, as to the meaning of which in its ordinary use there in be no doubt, is given in treaties and by the authorities a holly artificial meaning. Sometimes it includes the exact con-

war fectiveness, as that 'A blockade is not regarded as duty as ekading force is temporarily withdrawn on account Powers, or kading force is temporarily withdrawn on account in that behalf'; during High the adventurous skipper may penalty is pointed out with the point; but it is necessary, viz. the withdrawal of the Kir have been taken by England, on its road to the enemyckade pressure upon neutral trade to the operation of bellig

rights are I have endeave characterises a blockaded port, that re there is, by the disposition of the ips, stationary or sufficiently near, an

adrons allotted to that service, and duly valid and legitimate, although there be

101 between England and Russi

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no design to attack or reduce by force the port or arsenal to which it is applied, and that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given to neutral Powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade.<sup>9</sup>

I have come to the threshold of a subject of gravest importance, the new policy of the British Government adopted in answer to the 'war-zone' declaration of Germany, and I stop. To devote to it merely the end of an already long article would not be treating it with the consideration which it deserves, and which the question demands. Moreover, it would not be expedient for an ex-official Englishman to discuss the subaband troversially at present; it is sufficient that the measure f the adopted after full and mature consideration by the Goveter that the question is political as well as legal; it must liveto be within the legitimate powers of a belligerent. Presuns judge from what has already happened, there certainly But any amount of nonsense talked and written about it Not the term 'paper-blockade' has come in handily for the he of a paragraph, and some bold spirit has hit upon a brile term, 'Long-distance-blockade.' Also there has been s very wise talk about 'Two wrongs not making a right.' suggest to those who feel irresistibly impelled to disc1 question that they should omit the word 'blockade,' for, have seen, it is a pernicketty term, and all sorts of legal n spring up in its train. I have endeavoured to show that 'block is the extreme manifestation of that force against the en which lies at the root of the authority which has been give the series of principles governing belligerent interference neutral trade, and that these principles are not a mere adve tious set of rules drawn up at odd times as wars occasioned the The manifestation of force has been regulated, and so also 1 been the interference with trade; but the regulation has accept on arbitrary lines. The principles and the rules strangling from the play of natural forces exerted by the peen described from the play of natural forces under somewhat more elastic one side, by the neutral tract; is a convenient comparison, even a compromise. The clar inhumanity is silenced by the ing sparks, rules recognising the vision of what Paris would right of the other. But in the plan had succeeded. It is 'blockade' we find that the rigand war admits of no halfinevitable, take the upper hand, and war admits of no half-appears. And there are two French heep recoming g been recognised as now: 'Qui veut les fins veut les te trentional limitation peut moins.'

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of the enemy's bod lord Grenville cited Lo

P.S.—I must briefly refer to two questions which appear at first sight to conflict with the principles advanced in this article—Foreign Enlistment, and the King's Proclamations of Neutrality.

Before agreeing to the 'Three Rules' which, as I have pointed out, deal solely with 'foreign enlistment,' the British Government declared that they could not assent to the contention that those rules were a statement of principles of international law in force at the time when the Alabama claims arose. This is expressly stated in article 6 of the Treaty of Washington. 'Historicus' cites some American decisions which bear out this view. Further, in one of his Letters <sup>10</sup> he explains the true inwardness of the Foreign Enlistment Act:

The Enlistment Act is directed, not against the animus vendendi, but

against the animus belligerendi.

It prohibits warlike enterprise, but it does not interfere with commercial adventure. A subject of the Crown may sell a ship of war, as he may sell a musket, to either belligerent with impunity; nay, he may even despatch it for sale to the belligerent port. But he may not take part in the overt act of making war upon a people with whom his Sovereign is at peace. The purview of the Foreign Enlistment Act is to prohibit a breach of allegiance on the part of the subject against his own Sovereign, not to prevent transactions in contraband with the belligerent. Its object is to prohibit private war, and not to restrain private commerce.

It is only when it has become the subject of agreement between two or more States that 'foreign enlistment' assumes an international as well as a municipal character. I presume that this municipal character has not been lost by the inclusion of the duty to prevent the fitting out or arming of vessels in article 8 of the Hague Convention of 1907, relating to neutrality.

As to the Proclamations of Neutrality, so much as recites and reinforces the Foreign Enlistment Act need not trouble us; the King's loving subjects are exhorted to comply therewith. The rest of the Proclamations amounts in the first place to a warning to subjects not to do 'any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral Power in a war between other Powers, or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf'; but, as 'Historicus' says, '1' 'The nature of the penalty is pointed out with equal clearness and correctness—viz. the withdrawal of the King's protection from the contraband on its road to the enemy, and an abandonment of the subject to the operation of belligerent rights.' What those belligerent rights are I have endeavoured to explain.

10 Letters of Historicus, p. 168.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 132

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April

## GERMANY, AFRICA, AND THE TERMS OF PEACE

THERE are aspects of the struggle now proceeding with Germany which it is imperative that the reflecting and the influential among us should keep in mind. One of these questions affects Africa: how we are to deal with the Germans in Africa. and, having dealt with them, there and elsewhere, what is to happen in Africa at the termination of the present War. I feel impelled to publish views on the subject because others do not keep silence; and often those others have little or no first-hand knowledge of Africa and its peoples. They may utter proposals like that of some months ago in The Times—to hand over German East Africa to the Japanese—and thus do us infinite harm out in Africa amongst intelligent Africans; or they may be seized with sentimental pity in reflecting on German achievements in exploration, and blandly propose to forego any attack on German Africa as 'unkind' or 'ungenerous.' Or, on the other hand, filled with the Jingo greed of the 'eighties and 'nineties, they may be licking their lips at the prospect of annexing huge new tracts of Africa without the slightest regard for the indigenous natives and their inherent rights and likings.

Others are unwilling that Africa should compete in sentiment with Belgium. They wish the public attention riveted on the woes of Belgium, and for aught they care France should be persuaded to give up Morocco to Germany-if it is Morocco she wants-so that the German troops may be induced to leave Belgium. I want to show in these pages that it is of almost more importance to Great Britain than it is to France that, come what may, Germany shall be kept out of any foothold in Morocco or other parts of North Africa. Also, that no matter what mercy may qualify our terms—the terms of the Allied nations—in regard to European territory belonging to the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and wishing to remain connected with them, it would be a vast mistake, an unjustifiable blunder, to allow German rule to continue in Africa; or, having abolished it, to restore conquered territories to Germany after the War.

It will probably not surprise those who have given close attention to political geography to be reminded that the devastating War now raging broke out fundamentally over African questions. The War was prepared for and provoked by Germany far more with the intention of getting Morocco as one of the results of victory, than even the mediatising of Belgium and the inclusion of the Low Countries within the Customs Union and armament of that Germanic Empire; which, with Morocco as its pivot, was henceforth to dominate the Old World. Utterly frustrated have been those who, like myself, believed and hoped that German ambitions in regard to Morocco were at an end, after the patched-up settlement of 1911-12. Possibly Germany was content at that period to let such ambitions fall into abeyance while she, in company with Austria, strengthened the Germanic hold over the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor. The outcome of the Balkan wars was a disagreeable surprise to her. The virility and war genius developed in Greece, Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria promised—at any rate on the part of Greece and Servia—a stout opposition to any Austro-German advance towards Salonika and Apparently, therefore, Germany armed with Constantinople. greater intensity; and while resolving eventually to assert herself in the Balkans, determined to strike for world-power in the first instance by the rapid annihilation of France during a presumed mood of British neutrality, and to wrest from France as the price of some crushing victory and occupation of Paris the cession to Germany of Morocco in the first instance, and of as much more of French Africa and other oversea possessions as Great Britain might stomach without going to war. I shall not occupy space by giving chapter and verse for this opinion; but if you place side by side the published despatches and telegrams which passed between the German and the British Governments in the two or three days preceding the declaration of war, and the utterances authorised German publicists, such as Bernhardi and Maximilian Harden, you will find that I am absolutely correct in stating that the first object coveted by Germany as the outcome of a successful attack on France-even if it had to be a stage at which she must rest awhile and content herself-was Morocco.

I make this assertion with the greater emphasis because, owing to my interest in African affairs and my long personal co-operation with German officials in Africa, I have been in close touch with the personages and parties who were shaping the German Colonial and Imperial policy between 1909 and 1914. I was invited in 1909 to address the German Colonial Society in London on the subject of a policy of German expansion in Africa and elsewhere which would bring Germany least into conflict with the permissible ambitions and strategical geography of the other

Great Powers. In consequence of this address I was invited in the following year (1910) to give lectures to audiences in Germany—Southern Germany it turned out to be, because Northern Germany would hear nothing from an Englishman who espoused the French cause in North Africa. But in Württemberg and in Bavaria the addresses proved so acceptable in 1910 that they were repeated in 1911, and in 1910 and the two following years I paid other visits to different parts of Germany for the discussion of colonial and African topics.<sup>1</sup>

Down to the spring of 1914 I found the determination to wrest Morocco somehow from France was a motive in German 'colonial' policy which lay deeper and inspired greater efforts than surface ambitions about Congoland or Asia Minor. In my articles and addresses I dealt out full justice to the remarkable ability of the Germans, their great courage, intelligence, and adaptability to local circumstances. But I could not tolerate the idea of their entry into North Africa as a ruling Power. felt in recent years that the slightest concession to them-even such as a coaling station on the coast of Morocco-would entail eventually a losing battle on the part of the French, and that it would be even more fatal to British interests. If Germany had got possession of Morocco, she would have been able before long to bar the British sea route to the Mediterranean, Egypt, and the Suez Canal; and, secondly, she would have menaced most seriously the British sea route to the Cape of Good Hope, the West Indies, and The Germans themselves were good enough South America. geographers to realise that Morocco was the necessary basis on which their world-power must be reared. The occupation and mediatising of Belgium was mainly a step for the subjugation of France. No more French territory was desired-possibly-(unless Great Britain had been too weak to oppose the inclusion of Calais in a mediatised Belgium); for the time being no great exactions would have been made from either Russia or the Balkan States-all that could wait. It was Morocco that Germany wanted, and Morocco of which she will be, I trust, for ever baulked, no matter what may be the degree of victory achieved by the Allied cause in the War now being waged.

With the exception of North Africa, however, no one who has read my works or attended my lectures can have accused me of suggesting an ungenerous treatment of Germany as a colonial Power. At one time, indeed, I was rebuked in a section of the English Press for my pro-German sentiments. The outbreak of the present War and the manner of conducting the War have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The impressions formed on these journeys have already been published in the Nineteenth Century and After and in my little book on Common Sense and Foreign Policy.

naturally changed my outlook very considerably. Whereas down to July 1914 I welcomed every legitimate means of promoting Anglo-German friendship and co-operation, since the destruction of Louvain and the revelation of the long-prepared plots in South Africa I have experienced the same revulsion of sentiment which has changed so many other Englishmen from admirers of Germany to cautious enemies, unable for the rest of their lifetime to trust in the possibility of permanently friendly relations between Britain and the two Great Powers of Central Europe.

This change of pro- into anti-German may easiest be illustrated by a little parable which is mainly founded on fact. twenty years ago there lived in the vicinity of a beautiful town on the south coast a remarkable personage who was actually of German extraction, though to all intents and purposes an Englishman. He was a distinguished graduate of one of our Universities. who had made remarkable and far-reaching discoveries in science, and although of a slightly unamiable disposition his achievements had won him a respect and a regard which were far extended, and which increased as years went on and the magnitude of his scientific work was better appreciated. He was moderately well off, but possessed a peculiar megalomania which manifested itself in an intense desire to interfere with the neighbouring estates. He wished, as a matter of fact, to carve through them a way down to the sea coast. Usually his procedure was to offer rather inadequate sums for the acquisition of coveted strips, or, if possible, to urge litigiously his rights over disputed portions. Suddenly, and almost without warning, his mere disagreeableness and truculence of manner changed into absolute mania. forcible possession of the land he wanted, and shot right and left with a revolver at astonished protesters, besides in his rage doing insensate and unpremeditated damage. Fortunately for him and for his family, his violence had no fatal effects. He was consigned to Broadmoor as of unsound mind, and his family, which was large, compensated the injured persons.

There was much about his behaviour and his actions which excited horror and disgust, and consequently it became the fashion for a time to deny his great abilities and the extent to which we had been indebted to him in the past for his discoveries and his patents. There was an equally strong disposition to visit the sins of the father on the children, to maim their university or their public careers, and deny them all opportunity for applying their talents successfully. But as time rolled by and other causes célèbres absorbed public attention, something like a just balance was achieved. The children of this maniac restored the family name to honour, and in course of time made the fullest possible public amends for their father's outbreak, while once

again impartial men of science gave the devil his due, so to speak.

This altered and disguised version of a twenty-year-old occurrence may be taken as an illustration of the horror caused universally by Germany's unwarrantable attack on border peoples, and explains at the same time why so many of us who had become pro-Germans down to the 1st of August 1914 have found it hard to subscribe to the falsehoods and the semi-falsehoods now being circulated as to the unimportance of Germany in the worlds of science and industry. It explains how eager many of us are to see the end of this War in every sense; and to behold a conquered Germany, to begin with, a chastened, and, as Eden Phillpotts puts it, a 'surgeoned' Germany; but a Germany restored to sanity, and once more playing a leading part in the world's affairs, contributing to the world once more the research work of her first-rate biologists, geographers, philologists, and chemists.

Just as it was necessary to consign the personage in my story to Broadmoor, or some such institution for criminal lunatics (from which I like to think he emerged several years afterwards, cured, co-ordinated, and able to contribute to his sons' research work, and to the building up once again of the family fortunes); and just as he was never again placed in a position to influence students and young people of other families: so after our recent experiences in Asia and Africa, I venture to argue, however merciful the Powers of the world may be in regard to leaving all German-speaking European territory under German control, the German Empire must be deprived of the privilege of educating the backward races of the world. Once peace is made on terms fair to the Allied Powers, commensurate to the frightful losses they have sustained in valuable lives, in money, in historical buildings and works of art, we may hope to see German steamers again plying from port to port in the British, French and Russian Empires, German merchants reopening their houses of business throughout the British Empire, and German industries once again finding in Africa the raw material they require and the markets for their manufactured goods. It would be an altogether short-sighted policy on the part of the rest of Europe to attempt to starve out and eradicate such a splendid people in mind and body as are the various Teutonic nations. But with Christianity must go justice, and with generosity and forgiveness safeguards against any further attempts at a forcible establishment of German rule outside Germany. Therefore I assert, as a necessary condition of our future political geography, that the map of Africa of the future must be without a German possession on it, even though in course of time the German trade with Africa may grow to larger proportions than it attained in the days before the War broke out.

To all who have studied Africa it is painful to write or speak harshly of Germans; so much do we owe to them as pioneers of science in that continent—as, indeed, throughout the world. But we are now compelled to discuss how this mad nation must make amends for its homicidal folly, and what is the measure of punishment and restraint which the rest of Europe—belligerent and neutral—must endeavour for its own safety to impose on the

German Empire.

In the earlier days of the War, before we realised the enormous prepared fighting-strength of Germany and Austria, there was much talk of only signing peace in Berlin or Vienna, of an occupation of all Germany's principal towns by the Allied forces. But as things have developed it may well be that when the German armies have been finally and with much difficulty and terrible loss of life ejected from Belgium and Luxembourg, from Poland and Serbia (which they may once more reach) and Constantinople, from Metz and Mulhouse, the Allies' commanders may decide to lose no more valuable lives in attempting the occupation of Prussia, the Rhineland, or Bavaria; but to beat Germany into peace and disarmament in girdling her frontiers and cutting off her food supply. Indemnities, of course, must be imposed to compensate Belgium, first and foremost, and the people of Western Poland, Serbia, and Eastern France. How is Germany going to pay these hundreds of millions of pounds? She may be bankrupt, she may not have the nerve to confiscate the private estates of the Hohenzollerns and the other ruling families. Her colonies will remain virtually her only asset: her colonies and her vast concessions over Turkey-in-Europe and in Asia. Japan has been compensated already for her share in the world-struggle by the acquisition of the German leases in North China; Russia may eventually recover her thousand or fifteen hundred millions sterling spent on the War by taking Germany's place at Constantinople and in Asia Minor; France will have repurchased by blood her lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. But Belgium? But ourselves? By retaining the whole of German Africa (except the portions of Cameroons-Congo and of Togoland already occupied by France and likely to remain French) we shall secure at any rate some small pledge that our frightful and exhausting expenditure on this War of self-defence will eventually come back to us and enable us to re-capitalise Belgium. In this way we eventually recouped ourselves in the past for war expenditure forced on us by Spain, Holland, or France.

And yet it is precisely these German possessions in Africa

which sentimentalists would have us leave alone or, if already taken, hand back when the War is over! Almost they would seem to argue that the War was of our provoking and of our making! 2 That the incredible miseries and incomputable losses suffered by utterly innocent Belgium are of no importance, are not to be repaid by a defeated Germany. We hear a good deal just now of Germany's utter disregard for the principles of international law, of fundamental Christianity, of the fair play and decency of conduct which all civilised belligerents should observe. Personally, I think all such remonstrances are a vain waste of words: they are like attempts to reason with a mad dog or a mad bull. Germany while she struggles is going to do us the utmost harm she can: she will be without pity, as afterwards without remorse. Well, having regard to her manifest national insanity and her desperate condition, I feel less rancour against her than I do against some of my friends and acquaintances, in and out of scientific societies and the altruist Press, who would willingly wipe her crimes off the slate and not take what means of punishment and restraint we find ready to hand in conquering and retaining her African colonies.

Probing below the surface, I can detect mixed motives in this damping down of a forward African policy: a fear amongst the Morellians that in replacing Germany we may institute unjust conditions of life, labour, and property amongst the real owners of the land in Cameroons, East and South-West Africa—the negro or negroid natives. Such will point to a certain trend in our native policy both in and outside the Union, in Trans-Zambezian Africa—even here and there (they say) in East Africa, and very much so in French Congo. Mr. Morel has never quite forgiven the French for their imitation of the Leopoldian régime in French Congo; he has been swift to detect the unfairnesses in French rule over Algeria, and has asked 'Is this to be repeated in Morocco?' No; certainly not. But I doubt if Mr. Morel knows all North Africa from Morocco to Tripoli as well as I do, whose

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> To counter the stale argument that Germany plunged into this War to fight for a place in the sun, I would point out that the Western Powers and Russia between 1890 and July 1914 had virtually inducted Germany into a Colonial Empire and Spheres of special privilege of nearly 2,000,000 square miles, with about 75,100,000 inhabitants.

In conjunction with this benevolent attitude it is almost amusing to read the proposals incited by it in Germany or among German-Americans. The latest circulated of the informal German proposals for peace are that the War is to terminate by a general absolution all round, no indemnities, and as a reward for withdrawing from Belgium, Germany is to be given the whole of the Belgian Congo. This is equivalent to a burglar who has smashed your conservatory and murdered your servants saying 'I will restore your silver and your wife's jewellery if you will let me take what I choose out of your garden and poultry-yard.'

personal knowledge dates back to 1879, and has been gained by periods of residence in those regions, as well as numerous tourist trips. I have from time to time commented on the less satisfactory results of French intervention in North African affairs, but I have emerged from my long study of North Africa convinced that in the main that region and the world at large owe nearly as great a debt of gratitude to France as is due from South Asia and the world at large for the similar British work in India. Have the Moroccans at any time in their history been able to govern themselves, to preserve and maintain justice, peace, a flourishing commerce, freedom, happiness, or friendly relations with surrounding peoples? No. Would they have attained to these conditions of civilised existence under German rule any better than they have done already under the protection of France? No. Would trade between Morocco and the rest of the world have been any freer under German control than under that of France? Less so. Already the French have been realising the disadvantages of a selfish policy in the trade of Algeria (freedom of trade is guaranteed in Morocco, and is partially in force for some time yet in Tunis).

As to ourselves, I so far appreciate the strength of the arguments of Mr. Morel (though he is sometimes inconsistent, and would not have measures which have to be applied to Congoland equally in force in Southern Nigeria) that I should like to point out, as a corollary to the addition of German South-West Africa, East Africa, and the Western Cameroons to the British Empire, that there must go out to the world and to the intelligent natives of those regions some assurance that Britain steps into Germany's place resolved to maintain in the lands newly added to her Empire absolute free trade, respect for the private property of natives and for tribal property, full liberty for missionaries to reside and to circulate, and a veto against distilled alcohol. Such a proviso brings us up against another class of objectors who are-perhaps without knowing it-advocati diaboli, inward admirers of 'German' methods of overriding native rights, of the German determination (shown clearly in their thirty years of African administration) that the native shall have no rights, no franchise, no voice in his country's administration. He is to obey, and blindly. Subject to that condition, he will be well and jovially treated. The paper constitutions of France in Africa may not always read very well. Often they do not exist, and the 'native' lives under an apparent despotism. But in actual working the French colonies in Africaexcept in the 'concessionnaire' region of French Congo, wherein Mr. Morel's animadversions and those of his correspondents were fully justified-were far more 'pleasantly' governed than were those of Germany or some small portions of the British Empire.

The proof of the pudding is in the eating: if France had not on the whole governed well and kindly her vast African domains, would they have stood by her as they have done in the present War? We may also rest satisfied that our own conduct of African affairs has on the whole been just and wise, since, from the outbreak of the War to the date of writing this article, the loyalty to the British régime among the African Negroes, Negroids, Hamites, Arabs, and Egyptians has been remarkable. We have only met with treachery and ingratitude among a small section of the Whites in South Africa.

So, then, we must brace ourselves for a great effort: we must take over as quickly as may be all German Africa, except the districts that legitimately fall to France (we have no Alsace-Lorraine to recover); and we must govern them with respect for native rights and for such institutions as are not harmful, and with a commercial policy similar to that of all the Crown possessions governed from London: absolute free trade and no preferential duties. Then the world at large will not grudge us the position of guardian and administrator over such great areas of Africa: areas which must be open to the legitimate trade and enterprise of all nations, even of the Germans when they return to sanity.

Some of those who have carped at my drastic proposals to confiscate all the German Colonies, Spheres of Influence, and railway concessions have themselves proposed a counter policy which was crueller and far less realisable. It was to penalise German commerce for a long period after the War, to shut it out of the civilised marts; but apparently to leave Germany free still to trade with her restored oversea possessions. She must be punished for this War, for her crimes against Belgium and France, for her breaches of international law, written and unwritten. But to prevent her trading and yet expect her to pay off huge indemnities would be as absurd as our pre-Dickens policy of locking up debtors, so that they could not work to pay off their debts. We must take away from Germany the nearly 2,000,000 square miles of colonial empiré and exclusive privileges which she had been about to put together with our full consent in 1914. Such a splendid appanage must be divided between the protagonists in this struggle: Britain, France, and Russia; Servia and Montenegro. And the compensation of Belgium must be a charge laid upon all the Allies. Germany must henceforth make shift without colonies, other than those very flourishing colonies she has already established under other flags. Thus her punishment will be short and sharp, in addition to such indemnities and surrenders as I have indicated. But concurrently, her head being shaved, the cathartic administered, the blood-letting no more than

was surgically necessary, she can be received back into the fold of nations; and her next generations will, in her returning prosperity and in the new love and admiration which will once more be provoked by new German achievements in the peaceful arts and industries of life, learn to look back on the dreadful years between 1914 and 1916 as the patient recovered from brain fever views the dark cloud which descended on his reason and blotted out for a brief time his right comprehension of his surroundings.

Since the first part of this article was drafted, and after I had delivered an address before the Royal Geographical Society on the subject of the future of Africa, I received a letter from a Fellow of that Society which is so far typical of the objections raised to the policy I propose, that I venture to quote it, as it represents some of the arguments employed by those who are not necessarily pro-Germans, but who at the present time express an unbalanced leniency in regard to Germany. The writer is 'Colonial-born and very proud of England's Colonial policy in general.'

'I was present' [he writes] 'at your lecture . . . and during the first part . . . I felt "Here is the right spirit in which to solve international problems." But at the later portion my heart sank. If Germany (supposing we win) is to be ousted entirely from Africa, will she not feel, and rightly, a burning sense of injustice that will lead inevitably to future and more terrible wars? You will say "But she is to blame and deserves punishment." No doubt; and I do not say some punishment would not be salutary. But excessive punishment puts us in the wrong and defeats its own end. Now it does seem excessive, and that in a high degree, to exclude all future Germans from any national share in the development of Africa's vast resources, simply because of the egregious madness in the party now dominant. Surely it would be enough so far as Africa is concerned, if she were-say-to cede Metz to France without any African compensation when she knows that if she had listened to reason she might have had a good quid pro quo without any war at all. But that we ourselves should take her colonies is particularly hateful when we have already -have we not ?-about eight times as much as she; and when we said at the beginning of the war that we were not out for gain. . . .

'I had felt so glad when you won the audience round to applaud such good work as Germany had done; but when you showed the map nearly all red and they applauded much more, then I was miserable and should

have been ashamed to look a neutral in the face.

To this should be added—by those who wish to look all round the subject—the recent letters of Mr. E. D. Morel in the *New* Statesman and the editorial notes thereon.

I certainly try to look all round a subject; to consider it from the impartial point of view that we seldom attribute to Divine Providence, because each nationality or clan wishes to annex the Deity to itself and its own petty purposes. But, judged by

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some such tribunal, I cannot think the verdict would be given in favour of the policy outlined by my Colonial correspondent or by Mr. E. D. Morel, and those who think, write, and speak similarly. Germany had become, prior to the War, a nation of 65,000,000 of remarkably vigorous, intelligent, and industrious people. Austria-Hungary, perhaps not to be characterised by quite such favourable adjectives, represented another 45,000,000; but the foreign policies of the two Empires had become so fused and so completely formulated and dictated from Berlin that we may for convenience speak of both these great Central European States (in the present argument) as 'Germany.' Austrians and Hungarians were becoming as much interested in German oversea possessions as Germany was becoming in the Austro-Hungarian influence over the Balkan Peninsula, in Egypt, or in Asia Minor.

Well, somewhat late in their national history Germany-Austria desired areas for oversea expansion: areas they might colonise where the lands were empty or areas in which they could obtain exclusive concessions and gradually build up an exclusive The other Great Powers of German-Austrian commerce. Europe, willingly or unwillingly, had between 1878—when Austria acquired her first rights over Bosnia and Herzegovina and July 1914, recognised the unavoidableness of these 'colonial' desires; and Germany-Austria was rapidly inducted into an external empire which (without discriminating between colony and sphere of influence) I have estimated at an area of 2,000,000 square miles, with a non-German population not far short of 75,000,000—regions which in point of wealth of products and openings for industry might have ranked much higher in the great colonial empires of the world than by mere computation in numbers of square miles. Yet Germany wanted still more, and wanted it chiefly at the hands of France, and to some degree also at the expense of British and Russian interests. In answer to such hints,3 we may suppose (without much stretch of imagination) that France, Britain, and Russia had not opposed a complete veto to any such suggestions, but had said 'We may be prepared to facilitate your progress in certain directions, provided we now have a definite and final guarantee that you are not going to break the peace of the world and attack any one of us at a disadvantage. Therefore, if you want A, B, and C, you must be prepared to cede to, or to arrange with, us the points d, e, and f.' (I write these last in minuscules because they were so very much smaller in proportion of area and value than what is represented

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Given between 1910 and the summer of 1912 at Potsdam interviews, at private visits of French and British statesmen to Germany, and at diplomatic interchanges of opinions during the Conference of London.

by A, B, and C.) Germany scarcely deigns to argue these questions seriously, but having already made her preparations for attack, with at least a year's foresight and with great ingenuity, suddenly plunges the world into war over the question of Serbia (since the earlier Zabern pretext had failed to catch fire): and three days after the declaration of war has commenced the ruin of Belgium.

The result of this action, of this entirely unprovoked outburst on the part of Germany (undertaken, we now know, with the naked ambition of acquiring Morocco and most of the French colonies and of forcing her way to Salonica and Constantinople), has already caused Belgium the loss of about 100,000,000l. sterling in destroyed public and private property and nearly three-quarters of a million of lives out of her small population. It has robbed the world—possibly for ever—of such miracles of art and of historical interest as the buildings of Liége, Flanders, Hainault, and Brabant; it has virtually destroyed the Cathedrals of Reims and of Soissons, and the remarkable public buildings of nearly all the towns in North-East France. France the lives or validity of nearly 500,000 of her best soldiers, and Britain a similar loss already of 100,000. It has inflicted damage on British property to the tune of some 10,000,0001.,4 and caused an enormous drop in the value of securities on which so large a proportion of our middle-aged and elderly population maintain their existence (as the form in which their savings of a lifetime have been stored). Russia has had losses in killed and wounded soldiers exceeding those of France. Those of Serbia and Montenegro must have amounted to at least 200,000—the flower of the army of both countries. All Western Poland has been ravaged and its historical buildings treated like those of Belgium. loss to Polish property must be at least equivalent already to 50,000,000l. sterling. Serbia and Montenegro are, for the time being, virtually ruined, brought to bankruptcy. There is scarcely a public building left standing in Belgrade or in Antivari.

So far the German attack has failed of its main purport, but authentic documents show that on the chance result of a battle here and there in North-East France would have turned far more terrible issues. Paris if occupied would have been completely destroyed as no city has ever been yet in the history of the world, as the alternative to the French submitting to complete German conquest and placing their army and navy at the disposal of Germany for the conquest of Britain. Belgium would have been incorporated for ever in the German Empire, together

<sup>4</sup> Besides doubling our taxation and our cost of living, robbing 50,000 poor families of their breadwinners, and adding 1000,000,000l. eventually to our National Debt.

with Luxembourg; Holland have been mediatised; Italy and Greece have been reduced to the rank of vassal Powers; Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, together with Albania and European Turkey, simply have become German provinces in actuality if not in name. An attempt would then have been made to turn the British out of Egypt and replace them by Germans, to have carried the German conquest to the very borders of India. Preparations had already been made, in the event of the tide of success turning in Germany's favour, for a German annexation of all South Africa, and of as much of East, Central, and West Africa as they could have subjugated.

Even now certain victory is not in sight for the Allies. If we have sustained losses and made sacrifices in our own defence of men and money to the extent suggested, these are probably only a third of the cost we shall have to pay ultimately for our

independence from German domination.

Supposing that the tide of victory turns in our favour and we are able to dictate peace to Germany-Austria, surely justice is to be considered as well as mercy? Surely no sane statesman of any one of the Allied Powers would propose to let Germany off without as far as possible making good what she has destroyed and giving compensation for what is irreplaceable? Yet what are Germany's assets? To attain his ends the German Kaiser has already lost either through death or by invalidity three millions of his best fighting men, best citizens, and best industrials. In a few more months Germany will be virtually bankrupt and her people will be on the verge of starvation. Supposing by that time we are in a position to dictate peace, how out of these faminestricken and exhausted populations are we to obtain immediate money indemnities? Obviously the only things that lie ready to our hand as just compensation to a very small degree for the losses we have sustained are Germany's oversea possessions, either her actual colonies or her spheres of influence and concessions. Even these (I have computed) could only be capitalised at the outside at 100,000,000l. in value, and consequently would at most provide the money indemnities due-less, indeed, than what is really due—to Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro.

We will assume, however, that we have sufficiently reduced Germany to exact from her the retrocession to France of Alsace-Lorraine, and the extrusion of Luxembourg from the German Empire in any shape or form and its transference to the protection of Belgium; Great Britain might claim the Island of Heligoland, which she ceded in 1890, but that would have no monetary value, though it might be just as well, having reclaimed it, to mine it and blow it up completely so that the sea flowed over it and finished it as a naval station for Germany. But we shall

have spent on the most favourable estimates, before peace is in sight, 1,000,000,000l. sterling, in addition to our already heavy National Debt, and we shall have spent this first and foremost to defend ourselves from extinction as an empire, as much as to prevent our Allies from similarly falling a prey to Germany. What have we done to Germany, how have we hindered German expansion or German industries to deserve such a cruel blow? Surely it is only fair for us to expect in course of time to get back this 1,000,000,000l. and wipe off this latest addition to our National Debt? And what have we that we can lay hands on belonging to Germany which will, at any rate, go some way towards the liquidation of this sum? Only her colonies.

It has always seemed to me from the very start of the War that all the frothy talk about dictating peace in Berlin or even Breslau or Vienna did not outline the practical policy the Allies ought to pursue. To reach any great centre of German rule or wealth would be enormously costly in men and supplies. It is far better that the Allies should resolutely expel the Germans from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Poland, and if possible from Alsace-Lorraine; from Asia, Oceania, and all parts of Africa; and then express their situation in the familiar tag 'J'y suis; j'y reste.' They could then continue the silent pressure of starving out Germany and Austria until they ceded these outlying provinces and oversea possessions and agreed to the other conditions of peace.

What should these other conditions be? They should be such as to exact just reparation from the German people for the inexpressible crime of 1914-15 and yet to give that people a chance of returning to sanity, to happiness, prosperity, and an eventual brotherly co-operation with the rest of Europe. We should not ourselves make the mistake of Alsace or of Posen, and take away from the control of the German, Austrian, or Magyar peoples any territory which rightly belongs to them or which, at the wish of the majority of its local inhabitants, prefers to remain German or Hungarian. Certainly we should not waste any more months in front of peace in pleading the cause of nations who have remained neutral after the 1st of April 1915. Danish-speaking Slesvig, wrongly retained after 1865, ought to be restored to Denmark, but we should certainly not protract the War to wrench German-speaking Schleswig from United Germany. Reasonable compensation to Serbia and Montenegro would take the form of the cession to Serbia of Herzegovina, to Montenegro of Cattaro, and to Serbia and Montenegro of the right to deal as they pleased with all Albania except the circumscription of Valona and Epirus. Ruthenia, and Bukowina must be ceded to Russia, on the understanding that Russia adds Galitsia to Russian Poland and makes out of it an autonomous Polish State under a Russian Prince. The retrocession of Posen or of any part of East Prussia to Poland would be too cruel a cut into the vitals of Germany. If the Poles—once a real State of Poland is refounded—do not care to live in Posen under German rule, they must immigrate into autonomous Poland.

Special indemnities must be exacted from Germany to cover the cost of rebuilding the French, Belgian, and Polish towns she has destroyed. Finally, she must consent to an arrangement in regard to the regulation of naval strength and be left with a fleet which will be sufficient to defend the honour of the German flag on the high seas of the world which are not under the control of one of the great civilised Powers. She has shown so completely her disregard for treaties and engagements that henceforth her present enemies can only consider a treaty with Germany valid which is backed by guarantees. My idea of a guarantee that she would keep any agreement she enters into in regard to the armaments question would be that after the conclusion of peace the Allied Powers should pledge themselves that in all territories, colonies, and spheres of influence taken away from Germany and attributed to themselves, German goods and German commerce generally should, so long as she kept her treaty obligations, be treated on the most favoured nation basis—that is to say, not suffer from any differential duties as regards imports or exports. In fact, under these new conditions, Germany would find in the external empire that she and Austria-Hungary have jointly lost almost as good a market for her industries and her commercial enterprise as it was prior to the War. But, if she failed to maintain any agreement she might make in regard to the regulation of naval or military armaments or limits of territory, this clause of the Peace Treaty would fall per se, and German commerce henceforth be at the mercy of the Allied Powers over a very great proportion of the Old World.

Lastly, it is my own most earnest hope that I may live to see Germany and Austria-Hungary once more in the forefront of prosperous civilised States and on friendly terms with the other great nations of Europe. The cutting off of the German colonial empire would cost Germany at most about 50,000,000l. of invested capital, and if no crushing indemnity be in addition fastened on the German people they may soon recover from the losses of the War and find the world's markets as much open to their commerce and industry as ever before. With regard to such inevitable money indemnities as must be part of the conditions of peace—mainly the compensation due to Belgium—I would venture to suggest that since Germany has in the main been led into this

War by the Hohenzollern dynasty (backed by one or two other princely houses) the private property and domains of these ruling families should be seized by the German State and applied to the settlement of the indemnity, which they would just about suffice to meet. When Germany awakens from her dream, from the hypnotic trance into which she has been thrown, and sees things in their proper light, it is on the Hohenzollerns that her hate should justly turn and not on England.

H. H. JOHNSTON.

# WHAT THE GERMANS DID IN EAST AFRICA

DURING the years 1886 to 1888 I happened to be living in Ugogo, a country in Central Africa lying half way between Lake Tanganyika and the East Coast. Later, it was included in German East Africa, but in 1886 it was ruled by native chiefs, whose weakness it was that they owned no man as suzerain.

To this district, in 1887, came three German colonists, agents of the newly formed German East African Company, whose aim it was to open up trade in their new possession. The senior of the party was a man named Krieger, about forty years of age, an experienced traveller and an energetic worker. In all the dealings I had with him, and they were not infrequent, I found him a sensible and straightforward man. The next in seniority was a retired Prussian lieutenant, a polite and pleasant man, but without the force of character of his senior. The last, and youngest, was a fair-haired Saxon, apparently of the mechanic class.

The German Government, I was informed from the coast, had just taken over their immense district of tropical East Africa, and these men were the first pioneers to bring to the people of Ugogo the message of German civilisation.

I was glad to see that they behaved fairly to the natives, though they expected them to work with that German energy and attention to detail which are not exactly the methods of the Central African.

Only on one occasion did they come to blows with the native authorities, and that was due to a pardonable misunderstanding on their part. The natives were enjoying a three days' drinking carousal, and the Germans, unaware of this time-honoured custom, were pressing some not unjustifiable demands. At the best of times an African does not take kindly to being hustled, and when he is just getting into his cups he is apt to resent it quite fiercely. The discussion grew heated, and one of the German native servants, who had made the demand, was shot. The others ran back to the German quarters and Krieger and his party came out to inquire. In a short time there was an animated

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encounter. The natives, half fuddled, but quite frightened, sought the refuge of their mud and wattle huts, and discharged poisoned arrows through the crevices, whilst the Germans replied with explosive bullets. A few of the more daring natives who remained outside were speedily put hors de combat by the German missiles.

My colleague and I soon arrived on the scene and explained the situation to Krieger, and suggested that he should wait until the morning, when the natives would be sober, before he took any further steps. He was most reasonable and agreed to allow us to act as envoys for the natives in the morning. The following day brought return of sobriety to the natives, and with the realisation of what had happened they were quite ready to accept the German terms, and the incident closed.

But whilst Krieger and his companions and many another similar band of veterans were doing their duty well and manfully in the far interior, a very different state of affairs was taking place at the coast, where all the young and inexperienced Germans had been placed in authority. This was the first great mistake made by the German Company. Realising that their agents in the far interior would be quite removed from their supervision, whilst those on the coast would be directly under it, they sent their experienced men inland and kept the younger men near by. In doing this they overlooked the most important fact that the whole interior was occupied by small, uncivilised, badly organised tribes more or less at enmity with one another: so that every mistake or ill-treatment would be little likely to provoke a rising in a people accustomed to the rule that might is right. Even if it did so, the rising would only be a local one. with little likelihood of the disturbance spreading.

At the coast matters were totally different. There lived and ruled the Arabs. Dignified men, accustomed to be treated with deference, Mohammedans, and tenacious of their beliefs and customs, they were not only well organised but counted a numerous following amongst the natives of the coast and islands. It should have been obvious to the Company that these men required careful handling, and that any rising amongst them would spread far and wide, and would be of an importance out of all proportion to anything that could occur in the interior.

The younger Germans, suddenly invested with the most absolute authority, and under the impression that the very name of German would be a shield to them from the consequences of any of their actions, almost ran amok amongst their new subjects. One young upstart, put in charge of a coast town, was in the habit of daily summoning to his breakfast table the dignified Arab governor of the place. He kept him standing in front of

the table, and between his mouthfuls gave him the orders for the day. Other young Germans, acting I have no doubt in complete ignorance of what was the correct thing, were in the habit of walking into the mosques and taking their dogs in with them.

It was these little gaucheries, more than any particular political upset, which started the great conflagration that so rapidly enveloped the whole coast, and made its way as a smouldering fire far up into the interior, and which eventually cost the

Germans so much treasure in both blood and money.

The younger Germans soon found the coast too hot to hold them, and not willing that their services should be prematurely lost to the Fatherland they promptly took dhow to the island of Zanzibar, which glistened so invitingly like a town of marble palaces on the eastern horizon. The Company now appear to have realised their mistake, and promptly recalled to the coast the men whom they so thoughtlessly had banished to the interior. My three friends in Ugogo were amongst the number, and received orders to come; but by this time the whole intervening district from the coast to Ugogo, some two hundred and fifty miles in width, was in a ferment, and they could only travel with safety at night, hiding in the scrub or the long grass during the day time. Deserted by most of their servants they had a very trying time, but, finally, two of them reached the coast alive, Krieger and the lieutenant.

Almost immediately on his arrival Krieger was sent to Kilwa, a coast town south of Zanzibar, and there he was joined by Fischer who had been pioneering on Kilimanjaro, living close to a friend and colleague of my own, who had formed the same good opinion of him that I had of Krieger. Here, with another man and about twenty native soldiers, they were put in charge of the little mud fort, where they were very shortly besieged by the Arabs. For three days they gallantly held their own against overwhelming numbers. Poor Krieger was shot in the thigh early in the proceedings by an Arab sharpshooter, but he bravely continued the fight. At last, when all of the little party had been wounded or killed, the Arabs rushed the fort and massacred the

survivors.

Meanwhile something had been happening incredible to us English people when we first heard of it. A German gunboat had been at anchor in the little bay, close inshore within half a mile of the whole proceedings, of which they must have been interested spectators during those three fatal days. The beleaguered party had signalled again and again for assistance, but the only reply they received was that the commander had received no orders to assist them.

Not long after this the British Admiral in his flagship was

at another coast town a little further north, Bagamoyo, or Dar es Salaam, I forget which, when he saw a group of German natives gathered on the shore and hard pressed by the Arabs. The latter were not actually attacking them, because this time, not a gunboat, but the whole German East African Squadron were close inshore watching. Until the sun went down, and only until then, those unfortunate natives knew they would be safe, and they were buoyed up with hope that before the sun set the ships of their new Fatherland would take them under its care. They learnt afterwards what Fatherland might mean, as we have learnt what Kultur means. The English Admiral had no such pleasant illusions, he knew what the practice of the Germans was, and so signalled to their Admiral 'Are you going to send ashore to help your natives?' 'No,' was the laconic and uncompromising reply. Our Admiral then trained his guns on the beach, and under their protection the staff-captain took the ship's boats ashore and brought the German natives safely to the flagship. Meanwhile, the German squadron looked on. This perhaps was hardly surprising after the events of Kilwa. If German civilians were considered as dirt beneath the feet of German officers, what must have been the status of German natives?

The happenings of to-day suggest one practical point. Will the strong and opulent who, in the German Empire, have been trained to disregard the weak and lowly, divide with them their food in the time of scarcity, or will they hoard it? A great deal depends upon the answer to this momentous question. No Government can discover where all the food supplies lie hid, and a selfish nation may die of starvation in the midst of a sufficiency.

In the final issue, in a long war, the result depends entirely upon how the civil and military population hold together, and I said to myself twenty-seven years ago in Africa, and have often since said to my friends, 'I do not now fear the result of a war with Germany. When it does come, victory will go to the race which holds together to the last, and of which the units will strive to help and save each other without regard to their respective military or civil or social status.'

Such a desertion of compatriots as occurred in the case of Krieger and his friends would be unthinkable to us. We not only strive, at all costs, to save the lives of useful citizens to whatever class they may belong, but we allow and encourage strong and noble lives to sacrifice themselves for the weak and even the ignoble. It looks at first sight as if this were a sentimental and suicidal policy. Actually it is the way, and the only ay, by which can be built up an Empire which shall hold together in the face of all opposition, and shall endure unto the ages.

S. T. PRUEN.

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S. T. PRUEN.

## BISMARCK-AND WILLIAM II .:

#### A CENTENARY REFLECTION

PRINCE OTTO EDUARD LEOPOLD VON BISMARCK, Germany's greatest son, was born on the 1st of April 1815 at Schönhausen. He died on the 30th of July 1898 at Friedrichsruh. Fate has its ironies. Apparently William the Second took the terrible decision which brought about the present War at a Council held at the Neues Palais in Potsdam on the 30th of July 1914, the anniversary of Bismarck's death; and the celebration of the centenary of Bismarck's birth is taking place in the turmoil of a War which seems likely to end in the destruction of Bismarck's life-work and of the Empire which he had laboriously created.

To the broad masses of the English-speaking people, and even to most well-informed men in this country, Prince Bismarck is an unknown and a sinister figure, a mysterious and terrible character, a man of blood and iron, Germany's evil genius, a statesman devoid of human feeling; who by diabolical cunning, unscrupulousness and violence, by the medieval methods of Machiavelli, united Germany; who imprinted his character deeply, and fatally, upon the new Empire, and forced it into a path which inevitably led to the present catastrophe. however, who see in Bismarck a bloodthirsty and unscrupulous schemer of boundless ambition, who believe that the Iron Chancellor is responsible for the present War, and that William the Second and his supporters have merely acted in accordance with Bismarck's teachings, are in error. The principal characteristic of Bismarck's foreign policy was not its daring and unscrupulousness, but its perfect sanity, one might almost say its wise moderation and its cautious restraint. The present War is solely the work of William the Second and of his entourage. Had not the Emperor and his counsellors deliberately thrown to the winds Bismarck's pleadings for a sane policy and his unceasing admonitions, Germany would still be prosperous and at peace. fortunately, statesmanship is little studied in Great Britain. Bismarck, the statesman, is almost unknown even to those who are keenly interested in politics and who have adopted politics or diplomacy as a profession. This is the more to be regretted as Bismarck was probably not only the greatest diplomat but the greatest statesman, in the fullest sense of the word, of whom we know. In his social policy, economic policy, parliamentary policy, and in matters of organisation and administration he was a pioneer, and in all these he was probably as great as he was in the sphere of foreign policy. Unfortunately, statesmanship, the greatest of all human sciences, is completely neglected at the Anglo-Saxon Universities in both hemispheres. If it were taught, as it ought to be, there would be chairs of Bismarckian

statesmanship at every university.

The greatness of a statesman may be seen not by his eloquence and his parliamentary and electoral successes, but by his national achievements. Bismarck created an empire and made a nation. Measured by the positive success of his activity Bismarck was undoubtedly one of the greatest statesmen known to history. In 1862, when Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia, Germany was merely a geographical expression, and Prussia was a weak, poor, small, torn, and disunited State. It consisted of two disjointed halves, which were separated from one another by the independent States of Hanover and Hesse. 18,491,220 inhabitants. It had practically no merchant marine, no manufacturing industries, and very little wealth. The nation and its Government were in conflict. Austria dominated and domineered over Prussia. The country had been shaken to its foundations by the revolution of 1848. Another revolution seemed not impossible. Civil strife was so acute, and the internal difficulties of Prussia were so great when William the First ascended the Prussian throne, that he had actually written out in his own hand his act of resignation. With difficulty Bismarck induced the despairing monarch to tear up that fatal document. King and Parliament were in deadly conflict. Kingship had fallen so low in public esteem that, as Bismarck has told us, scarcely anyone raised his hat to the King in Berlin except a couple of Court hairdressers. Such was the position when Bismarck took office. He resolved to break the power of the pugnacious Prussian Parliament, to strengthen to the utmost the authority and power of the Crown, to deprive Austria of her leadership, to conquer for weak and despised Prussia the supremacy in Germany and in Europe.

Bismarck is unique among statesmen. Gifted with marwellous foresight, he formed the full programme of his entire lifework as a comparatively young and quite inexperienced man, and was able to carry it out in every particular in the course of a long and laborious life. In manuscript notes written down in March 1854, and in a long memorandum sent to Otto von 774

Manteuffel, the then Prime Minister of Prussia, on the 25th of July 1854, both of which are reprinted in Vol. II of the Anhang zu den Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Otto Fürst von Bismarck, we find laid down the complete policy which Bismarck pursued unswervingly to the day of his death. He then advocated, for instance, that Prussia should follow not a German but a purely Prussian policy; that she should make herself supreme in Germany, following, if necessary, an anti-Austrian policy; that she should cut herself off from Austria, and should not support that country if the pursuit of her Balkan ambitions should involve the realm of the Hapsburgs in trouble with Russia. a young student, Bismarck, like many men of his time, dreamed of a United Germany. However, while the vast majority of Germans wished to unite all the German States and the States of Austria-Hungary in some loose form of federation, Bismarck aimed at creating a compact and purely German Germany, a great national and homogeneous State, under Prussia's leadership, expelling Austria out of Germany and leaving to the House of Hapsburg the rule of the alien nations, of the Slavs, Magyars, Roumanians, and Italians. In the beginning of his official career Bismarck advocated the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein with Kiel, desiring to make Prussia a seafaring and naval Power. He recommended the construction of the Baltic and North Sea Canal, and looked hopefully forward to a war with Napoleon the Third, who then dominated Europe, trusting that his overthrow would unite Germany and give to Prussia the hegemony in Germany and Europe.

Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862. ported by the King, he immediately set to work to strengthen the Prussian Army immensely, for he wished to make Prussia independent and powerful with its help. As the Prussian Parliament absolutely refused to vote the large funds required, he governed for years without a Parliament and without a budget, collecting Two years after, in 1864, supported by the taxes by force. Austria, he made war upon Denmark, and took from that country Schleswig-Holstein and Kiel. At that time, Austro-Prussian co-operation was indispensable for achieving Bismarck's aims. As the two Germanic Powers seemed firmly united, and as Russia and France were not ready for war, the States of Europe only protested against the seizure of the Danish territories, but did not intervene. Austria had served Prussia well by enabling her to acquire the coveted Danish territories, but the defeat of the Dual Monarchy was required to make Prussia supreme in Germany and to give her the leadership of the other German States, the adherence of which would immensely strengthen her military condominium in Austro-Prussian The power.

Holstein lent itself admirably to the production of the necessary casus belli. It was duly brought about in 1866. The Prussian people and their parliamentary representatives, who had dreamt of a Greater Germany, embracing Prussia, Austria, and all the smaller States, and who detested Bismarck as an enemy of liberalism and of representative government, protested passionately, but in vain, against the Bruderkrieg, the fratricidal war. Owing to the great increase of the Army, made against the will of the representatives of the people, Prussia defeated Austria, and that country lost her supremacy both in Germany and in Italy. By arms Prussia had established her paramountcy in Germany.

Austria's defeat had freed Prussia from Austria's leadership, had made her independent, had greatly increased her power and prestige, and had loosely attached to Prussia the Central and South German States, who naturally inclined towards the victor. To weld Prussia and the South German States into a firmly united body, to give Prussia for all time the leadership in Germany, and to reconquer the formerly German Alsace-Lorraine Bismarck required a successful war with France, the hereditary enemy. He clearly recognised that only a victory over France could arouse among all the German States and peoples an enthusiasm sufficiently strong to overcome the petty jealousies which

had divided Germany since the dawn of her history.

In six years, from 1864 to 1870, Prussia had, under Bismarck's leadership, fought three most successful wars. She had acquired free access to the sea. She had created an organic connexion between the detached Eastern and Western halves of the Monarchy by incorporating Hanover and Hesse as a result of the war of 1866. She had acquired vast German territories, and had firmly joined to herself the purely German South German States. She had reconquered Alsace-Lorraine, and had won for the King of Prussia the Imperial Crown. Thus, Bismarck had at the same time made Prussia great, had united Germany, and had firmly established the authority of the King. achieved all this against the will of the people and against that of the most influential circles. Even the King himself had always to be persuaded and convinced, cajoled and threatened, to follow Bismarck's lead. Government against the will of the people, as carried on by Bismarck, had proved marvellously suc-The King-Emperor was given the full credit of Bis-Hence, Bismarck's successes had marck's achievements. steadily increased the authority of the monarch. The people had been taught to trust their rulers blindly and unquestioningly, and to treat their shortsighted parliamentary representatives almost with contempt. The belief in authority among the people was greatly strengthened by a patriotic education in the elementary schools, and by making the formerly free universities of Germany and the Press instruments of the Government and of the Imperial will. Thus, the liberal and democratic Germany of former times was destroyed.

Having created Prusso-Germany's greatness, Bismarck wished to establish the country's security for all time. By an economic policy which at the same time was wise and daring, he created a wonderful system of State railways, and a powerful and efficient merchant marine. He converted Germany from a poor and almost purely agricultural State into a wealthy industrial country. He introduced a system of State Insurance which has been copied by many countries, and secured Germany's position among the Powers by the most wonderful system of alliances which the world has seen.

By sparing Austria after her defeat of 1866, Bismarck made possible her reconciliation with Germany. By placing the Dual Monarchy into opposition with Russia at the time of the Russo-Turkish War, he raised the spectre of a Russo-Austrian War. It alarmed Vienna very greatly, and made an Austro-German Alliance not only possible but necessary. Fearing the abiding resentment and hostility of defeated and humiliated France, Bismarck wished to isolate that country. The German-Austrian Alliance did not seem to afford a sufficient guarantee against the formation of an anti-German coalition, in which France would, of course, be the moving spirit. To alienate France and Italy, Bismarck gave to France at the Congress of Berlin Tunis, to which Italy had by far the stronger claim, and thus he involved these two countries in bitter hostility, and a ten years' Customs war. He prompted France to acquire colonies in opposition to England, and at the same time encouraged England to occupy Egypt, to the possession of which France considered herself entitled. Thus, he estranged France and England. Furthermore, England and Russia were made to quarrel over Constantinople and Asia.

France's hostility, combined with Austro-German pressure, forced Italy to join the German-Austrian Alliance. The Triple Alliance was created. Germany could rely on the support of two Great Powers, while France, Russia, and England were isolated. Germany's security seemed thoroughly established. Nevertheless, Bismarck still feared the formation of a coalition hostile to Germany. It is true the Triple Alliance was a purely defensive instrument. Still, Russia might conceivably feel threatened by that combination and endeavour to protect herself by a counter-

alliance with France, Germany's natural enemy.

To prevent Russia and France combining, Bismarck not only

demonstrated to Russia Germany's sincere friendship whenever an opportunity offered, but he concluded with that country a secret but purely defensive alliance which assured Russia that Germany would not aid Austria-Hungary if that country should attack Russia, but, on the contrary, observe towards Russia an attitude of benevolent neutrality. The two treaties completely shackled Austria's freedom of action, and tied that country to the German car of State. They made Austria-Hungary a junior partner in the Alliance. With the two alternative Alliances Bismarck could always play off Austria-Hungary against Russia, or Russia against Austria-Hungary. The initiative in the Triple Alliance was reserved to Germany.

As England was hard pressed by France in Africa, and by Russia in Asia, she naturally inclined towards Germany, and would probably have assisted that country in a war with France and Russia. She was considered to be an unofficial, a semidetached, member of the Triple Alliance. In addition, Roumania, ruled by a Hohenzollern Prince, was attached to the Triple Alliance by treaty, and Turkey could be relied upon to support As Russia and Germany against Russia in time of need. England were friendly to Germany, France was isolated and unable to find an ally. By this wonderful system of alliances, concluded with all the important European nations, which were encouraged to quarrel among themselves, Bismarck dominated and directed all Europe. An anti-German coalition was unthinkable. Germany ruled Europe.

Bismarck pursued not an ambitious policy of domination, but a purely nationalist and a conservative policy. He did not aim at ruling the world. The wars which he had brought about were in truth wars of nationality. They were undertaken solely for the purpose of uniting the divided German nation. They were means to an end, and they were necessary for Germany's unifi-Ever since his youth, Bismarck had wished to see all cation. Germans, except the Roman Catholic Austro-Germans, united in a single State, ruled by the Hohenzollerns. In 1871 he had achieved his ideal. When, by three successful wars, he had accomplished his aim, he considered his work completed. He had created a great German Empire, and he desired the new Empire to keep the peace and to remain a purely German State. Ever since 1871 Bismarck strove to avoid war. It has often been asserted, but it has not been sufficiently proved, that Bismarck intended to attack France in 1875. He denied that intention to the day of his death, unceasingly condemning wars of ambition or precaution, such as that brought about by William the Second.

The future historians of Germany may tell their readers that Vol. LXXVII-No. 458

Bismarck created the German Empire and that William the Second destroyed it. It seems exceedingly strange that Bismarck's successors proved unable to continue Bismarck's work, At the time when the for their task was simple and easy. Iron Chancellor was dismissed the position of the German Empire was impregnable. The Triple Alliance was a rock of strength, and as Austria was kept in check by the German-Russian secret treaty of alliance Berlin retained the initiative. England, Russia, Turkey, and Roumania were firm friends of Germany, and were likely to support that country in case of need. Isolated France was Germany's only enemy. It is true Bismarck had no great successor. He has often been reproached for not having trained a statesman to take his place. However, great statesmen, like great poets, are born, not made. Besides, Germany no longer required a great statesman to continue Bismarck's work, for that farseeing statesman had left to his successors the fullest and the most detailed instructions for their guidance. His policy, like that of every truly great statesman, was distinguished by its simplicity and by its absence of secrecy. No statesman has ever taken his contemporaries more freely and more fully into He laid his policy his confidence than has Prince Bismarck. open to all Germany, and the Germans showed their gratitude and admiration for the founder of the Empire by publishing in full Bismarck's innumerable speeches and addresses, despatches, State papers, newspaper articles, confidential and private correspondence, and his conversations and table-talk in many hun-Modern Germany gave itself over to a dreds of volumes. veritable Bismarck cult. The Bismarck literature of Germany is about as copious as is the Napoleonic literature of France. Bismarck's views on every subject and on every question were studied, not merely by the elect, but by the masses. Memoirs, his political testament, were and are probably as widely read and as frequently quoted in Germany as the Bible and Goethe's Faust.

William the Second came to the throne on the 15th of June 1888. He disagreed with Bismarck on important questions of domestic and foreign policy. He dismissed the founder of Modern Germany on the 22nd of March 1890. After his dismissal, Bismarck watched with concern and anxiety the unceasing, reckless, and neurotic activity of the young Emperor. He feared that the youthful monarch, encouraged by Court flatterers, place-hunters, and adventurers, might endanger, or even destroy, the newly created Empire, and deep pessimism took hold of him. Hoping to save his country, Bismarck devoted the remaining eight years of his life entirely to political teaching. He laid down the principles of his foreign and domestic policy in a large number

of newspaper articles and speeches, he criticised freely and fearlessly the mistakes of his successors, and he gave to his country the essence of his statesmanship, the arcana imperii in his Gedanken und Erinnerungen, his Memoirs, which may be found in every German house.

Bismarck's pessimism as to Germany's future, which impressed numerous Germans who paid him homage in his retirement, was chiefly caused by the unstable, rash, overweening and domineering character of William the Second, by his vanity and by his susceptibility to flattery. I have already quoted in this Review¹ the following two paragraphs from Bismarck's Memoirs, obviously comparing William the Second with his grandfather, but they will bear repetition:

The Emperor William I was completely free from vanity of this kind; on the other hand, he had in a high degree a peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his contemporaries and of posterity. . . . No one would have dared to flatter him openly to his face. In his feeling of royal dignity, he would have thought 'If anyone has the right of praising me to my face, he has also the right of blaming me to my face.' He would not admit either. . .

What I fear is that by following the road in which we are walking our future will be sacrificed to the impulses of the moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity than the obedience of their advisers; if obedience alone is the qualification, then demands will be made on the general ability of the monarch which even a Frederick the Great could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day.

Referring to the misrule of former Prussian kings, Bismarck significantly wrote in his *Memoirs*:

In an absolute monarchy no one except the sovereign can be proved to have any definite share of responsibility for its policy. If the King comes to any unfortunate decisions, no one can judge whether they are due to his own will or to the influence which various personalities of male and female gender—aides-de-camp, courtiers and political intriguers, flatterers, chatterboxes, and tell-tales—may have upon the monarch. In the last resort the royal signature covers everything; how it has been obtained no one ever knows.

William the Second dismissed Bismarck because he thought his own policy wiser than that of his experienced Chancellor. Believing himself a genius, he wished to be his own Chancellor. He had no use for statesmen, for men of genius and of character such as Bismarck, but only for time-serving nonentities, for men without backbone, who were ready to execute without question the Imperial will and every Imperial whim, regardless of the consequences to the country. On the 1st of July 1897 Bismarck commented on the impending retirement of Herr

<sup>&#</sup>x27;The Ultimate Ruin of Germany,' Nineteenth Century and After, September 1914, page 529.

Marschall von Bieberstein from the German Foreign Office. He discreetly pointed out that not Herr von Marschall, but the Emperor himself was to blame for the mistakes of Germany's foreign policy made since Bismarck's dismissal. He wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten:

A number of papers, especially the Kölnische Zeitung, give a good character to Herr von Marschall at the occasion of his impending resignation. . . . We have not noticed that Herr von Marschall has been guided by any political views and principles of his own in carrying out the Imperial orders. We are convinced that he possessed certain principles when he entered the Foreign Office, but we do not believe that he had any opportunity to apply them during his seven years of office. believe that he has merely done his official duties by carrying out the instructions which he received from the Imperial Chancellor on behalf of the Emperor. . . . We do not intend to criticise Germany's policy during the last seven years, but we should be acting unjustly in holding him responsible for that policy. We consider that he had no part in shaping it, that he merely did what he was told.

William the Second has made numerous absolute pronouncements, such as 'You Germans have only one will, and that is My will; there is only one law, and that is My law.' 'Sic volo, sic jubeo.' 'Only one master in this country. That is I, and who opposes Me I shall crush to pieces.' Like another Louis the Fourteenth, William the Second taught the people 'L'état c'est moi.' Bismarck dreaded the Emperor's inclination towards absolutism. He considered his recklessness to be doubly dangerous in view of the great power possessed by the monarch, and the abject flattery and servility prevailing in German Court circles, on the one hand, and in view of the extreme docility of the well-drilled German nation on the other. Hence, Bismarck strove with all his might to create a counterpoise to the Emperor in an enlightened public opinion, in an independent Parliament, and in frank public criticism of the Emperor's policy. He wrote in his Memoirs:

Absolutism would be the ideal form of Government for a European State were not the King and his officials as other men to whom it is not given to reign with superhuman wisdom, insight, and justice. The most experienced and well-meaning absolute rulers are subject to human imperfections, such as an over-estimation of their own wisdom, the influence and eloquence of favourites, not to mention petticoat influences, both legitimate and illegitimate. Monarchy and the most ideal monarch, if in his idealism he is not to be a common danger, stand in need of criticism; the thorns of criticism set him right when he runs the risk of losing

Criticism can only be exercised through the medium of a free Press his way. and of Parliaments in the modern sense of the term.

After his dismissal, Bismarck settled in Friedrichsruh, his country seat, close to Hamburg, and the Hamburger Nachrichten became the principal organ in which he stated his views, in numerous anonymous articles which betray his authorship by

their style. They will be found collected in the seven-volume work of Penzler, and in the two-volume work of Hermann Hofmann, two journalists who edited them, and in the publications of Poschinger, Horst Kohl, Liman, Blum, and other writers on Bismarck. It should be added that the vast majority of the extracts given in this article have not been published in the English language.

In the Hamburger Nachrichten of the 24th of November 1891 Bismarck commented severely on the Emperor's pronouncement 'Suprema lex regis voluntas.' He contrasted it with his first speech from the throne, on the 27th of June 1888, in which the Emperor had promised that he would maintain the existing constitution, and had stated that he was satisfied

with his position as established by it.

On the 11th of December 1891 Bismarck received the Editor of the Eisenbahn Zeitung. Referring to the Emperor's pronouncement 'Sic volo, sic jubeo,' he told the journalist that he saw Germany's salvation in the possession of a strong monarchy and of a Parliament which defended the rights of the people. On the following day, the 12th of December 1891, receiving a deputation of the town of Siegen, Bismarck said:

The most disquieting feature for me is that the Reichstag has abdicated its position. We suffer everywhere from the bureaucracy. . . . The Reichstag is the indispensable cement of Germany's national unity. If its authority declines, the bonds which hold Germany together are weakened.

On the 24th of July 1892 Bismarck, addressing a South German deputation at Kissingen, said:

I would have gladly continued my work, but our young Emperor will do everything himself. . . . The German Reichstag is the focus of our national life. To strengthen the Reichstag, the responsibility of Ministers should be increased. Anyone can become Imperial Chancellor, whether he is fitted for the office or not, and the Chancellor's post may be abused to such an extent that he becomes a mere secretary, and that his responsibility is limited to executing the orders he receives. . . If ministerial responsibility were established by law, a man who does not possess the necessary qualifications would not take office. . . .

When I became Minister, the Crown was threatened by the people. The King was discouraged because he could no longer rely on his Ministers, and he wished to abdicate. Hence I strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament. Perhaps I have gone too far in that direction. We now require a balance of power within Germany, and I believe that free criticism is indispensable to the monarchy. Otherwise we fall a prey to official absolutism. We require the bracing air of public criticism. Our entire constitution is based on it. If Parliament becomes powerless, becomes a mere tool in the hands of the Government, we return to the régime of absolutism.

Bismarck was particularly dismayed at the Emperor's unceasing and exasperating interference in foreign politics which

threatened to create everywhere enemies to Germany. On the 30th of July 1892 he stated in his speech at Jena that in foreign policy the most important thing was not activity but patience, and he attributed much of his success to the fact that he had learned patience when stalking deer or fishing. Continuing, he said:

The basis of a constitutional monarchy is the co-operation of the monarchical will with the convictions of the governed people. . . . It is a dangerous experiment nowadays to strive after absolutism in the centre of Europe. Henceforward we must aim at strengthening independent political thought and political conviction in our Parliament and among

the German people. . . .

The wars which united Germany were necessary, but there is no need for further wars. Our wishes are fulfilled. We should be frivolous or clumsy if we allowed ourselves to be involved in further wars without need. If we follow a conservative policy we shall be able to hold our own against all comers, although we are in the centre of Europe. Germany cannot conduct aggressive cabinet wars. Besides, a nation which can be forced into such wars does not possess the right constitution. . . Since 1870 we have avoided further wars and have striven to strengthen Germany. In building up the empire some kind of dictatorship was necessary, but that cannot be considered as a permanent feature. Our task can be completed only when Germany possesses a powerful Parliament which embodies our sense of unity.

As Bismarck's appeals to the German Parliament and to the German people to assert themselves proved fruitless, he endeavoured to find a counterpoise to the Emperor in the minor States of Germany, which are represented in the Federal Council. He wrote, on the 11th of June 1897, in the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten:

According to Article 8 of the German Constitution, there exists within the Federal Council a committee on foreign affairs, formed by representatives of the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg, and by two representatives elected by the other Federal States. That Committee is entitled to demand information from the Government regarding diplomatic affairs. Formerly, a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council was of the greatest rarity. Prince Bismarck guided Germany's foreign policy, and no one felt the necessity of controlling him. Now matters are different. Although we do not wish to criticise the achievements of Prince Hohenlohe or Herr Marschall von Bieberstein, we feel that it is necessary to remind the country of the existence of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council. We are of opinion that the German people are entitled to know the character of the 'changes' which have taken place in the relations between Vienna and Berlin, about which inspired Austrian papers have been writing, and we hope that these 'changes' have not taken place at Germany's cost, that they will neither lead to Germany's isolation nor to Germany's dependence upon Austria and Russia.

The watchword of modern Germany is 'Machtpolitik.' Unrestrained violence is advocated as a policy. During recent

years, and especially since Bismarck's death, many leading Germans have advocated a ruthless policy devoid of morality and based exclusively on brute force. Modern Germany has paid lip-worship to Bismarck, but has disregarded his teachings, for that great statesman endeavoured, in the main, to follow an honest, moderate, and straightforward policy, and he attached the greatest value to political morality. On the 21st of July 1893, addressing a thousand people from Brunswick, Bismarck said:

The possession of moral authority is a very important factor in political life. To avoid wars, something more is needed than the possession of a powerful army. I attach value to the respect and the prestige which Germany enjoys among the non-German nations. Respect and prestige are desirable not merely to satisfy national vanity and ambition. They are valuable and extremely useful assets which carry with them great advantages, and we suffer when Germany's prestige and respect are diminished.

Contemplating with concern the Chauvinistic tendencies which had become noticeable in Germany under the government of William the Second, Bismarck, after his retirement, unceasingly urged that Germany should follow a policy of peace, of moderation, of good faith, and of good fellowship towards other nations. He wrote in his *Memoirs*:

We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling which has been called forth through our growth to the position of a real Great Power by the honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful for the freedom of others, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia, or England.

It has always been my ideal aim, after we had established our unity within the possible limits, to win the confidence not only of the smaller European States, but also of the Great Powers, and to convince them that German policy will be just and peaceful now that it has repaired the *injuria temporum*, the disintegration of the nation. In order to produce this confidence it is above everything necessary that we should be honourable, open, and easily reconciled in case of friction or *untoward events*.

In most cases an open and honourable policy succeeds better than the subtlety of earlier ages.

Advocating a peaceful, honourable, and straightforward policy, Bismarck was absolutely opposed to unnecessary wars, and especially to preventive wars. Hence, he would not allow the military men, who easily incline towards war, to exercise any influence upon statesmanship. He wrote in his *Memoirs*:

Even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one. Besides, one cannot read the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development and make one's own calculations accordingly. It is natural that in the staff of the army not only young, active officers, but experienced strategists also should feel the need of

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turning to account the efficiency of their troops and their own capacity to lead, and should wish to make themselves renowned in history. It would be a matter of regret if that feeling did not exist in the army. However, the task of keeping that feeling within such limits as the nation's need of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the military, heads of the State.

That feeling becomes dangerous only under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally

unjustifiable influences.

How peaceful Bismarck's views were may be seen from the following New Year article which appeared in the Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung on the 4th of January 1892. We read:

The indisputable predominance of Germany in European policy from the end of the Franco-German War to the end of the 'eighties was due, before all, to the superiority of the German army and to the great personal prestige and influence enjoyed by the Emperor William I. and Prince Bismarck. Since then other nations have increased their readiness for war, and since the disappearance of the old Emperor and of his Chancellor, Germany's authoritative position has naturally diminished, for only fresh successes can give Germany that prestige and influence which she acquired in the times of these men. However, successes similar to those achieved in the time of William I. do not often recur.

The German Empire, as left by its founders, does not require new foreign wars, for nothing can be gained by them. On the contrary, Germany's principal aim must be to increase its internal strength, so that the Empire may be able to weather future storms. In the time of William I. it was necessary to bring about appeals to arms, because the foundations of Germany's national life had to be laid. Now it is Germany's task to avoid these decisions as far as possible, for by war nothing can be gained, and only that which has been won can be lost. That has been Prince Bismarck's leading political idea ever since the Peace of Frankfort in 1871. . . . In entering upon the New Year we express the wish that German statesmanship may not abandon the fundamental directions which have been laid down for it's guidance, that Germany may, at least in the domain of foreign policy, continue to pursue the old course.

After dismissing Bismarck, William the Second announced to the world that he would henceforth steer the ship of State over a new course, and that he would lead Germany towards a great and glorious future. Filled with anxiety lest the reckless ambition of the Emperor would involve the young Empire in unnecessary and perilous wars, Bismarck wrote, in a series of articles published in the Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung between the 12th and 18th of May 1892:

Prince Bismarck had created Germany on a broad national basis. When that task had been fulfilled he and his successors had only to preserve Germany's position, the creation of which had demanded such heavy sacrifices. This being his fundamental maxim, it was necessary for Germany to be as strong as possible. At the same time, it was necessary to avoid, as long as possible, all appeals to arms in which Germany



could win nothing, but could only lose. His leading view was that every extension of territory beyond the limits of 1871 would be a misfortune.

... Bismarck's entire foreign policy culminated in the idea of isolating France and of placing the new frontiers which he had given to Europe under the protection of all the other Powers. . . .

Germany's position and activity will always largely depend upon her Allies. On the day when the leading German statesmen have to decide on peace or war they should inquire conscientiously whether the prize is worthy the sacrifice, and whether the desired result cannot be equally well obtained without a war, the issue of which no one can guarantee. War is made only for the sake of peace. It is made only in order to obtain those conditions in which we wish to live with our opponent when the war is over. . . . Is it really necessary to pursue a new course? The new pilot is, perhaps, not able to steer the German ship of State with the knowledge and determination of his predecessor, but is it therefore necessary to abandon altogether the course that had been steered in the past?

Wishing to avoid unnecessary and ruinous wars, Bismarck desired before all to avoid a war with Russia, Germany's traditional ally, who had saved Prussia from extinction in the time of Napoleon, and who had supported her in the wars of 1866 and 1870, and had thus enabled Germany to achieve her national unity. Besides, Germany and Russia had no conflicting interests, and neither Power had reason to covet any territory possessed by the other. Desiring that Germany should develop in peace, and fearing the possibility of a hostile attack, Bismarck had concluded a purely defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. It seemed, therefore, not likely that Russia would attack either Germany or Austria. Hence a war with Russia seemed to be possible only if an Austro-Russian quarrel should break out about the Balkan Peninsula and if Austria was the aggressor. Bismarck was determined that Germany should not be drawn unnecessarily into a purely Austrian quarrel. Hence he had concluded with Russia a secret defensive Treaty which, as has previously been stated, assured that country of Germany's benevolent neutrality in the event of an Austrian attack. long as Russia felt sure of Germany's benevolent neutrality if attacked by Austria, she had no cause to ally herself with France. Thus France remained isolated, and Austria could not venture to attack Russia unless with Berlin's approval. Hence she was compelled to be guided in her Balkan policy by Germany. on the other hand, Russo-German relations should become bad, it was clear that Russia would turn to France for support, and that Austria would be able to drag Germany into her Balkan adventures. Bismarck wrote in his Memoirs:

After the conclusion of our defensive alliance with Austria I considered it as necessary to cultivate neighbourly relations with Russia as before. . . .

If, however, Germany should quarrel with Russia, if an irremediable estrangement should take place between the two countries, Austria would certainly begin to enlarge her claims to the services of her German ally, first by insisting on an extension of the casus foederis, which so far, according to the published text, provides only for the measures necessary to repel a Russian attack upon Austria; then by requiring the casus foederis to be replaced by some provision safeguarding the Austrian interests in the Balkans and the East, an idea to which the Press has already succeeded in giving practical shape.

The wants and the plans of the inhabitants of the basin of the Danube naturally reach far beyond the present limits of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The German Imperial Constitution points out the way by which Austria may advance and reconcile her political and material interests, so far as they lie between the eastern frontier of the Roumanian population and the Gulf of Cattaro. It is, however, no part of the policy of the German Empire to lend its subjects, and to expend their blood and treasure, for the purpose of realising the designs of a neighbouring

Power.

In the interest of the European political equilibrium the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a strong independent Great Power is for Germany an object for which she might, in case of need, stake her own peace with a good conscience. But Vienna should abstain from going outside this security, and should not deduce from the alliance claims which it was not concluded to support. . . .

After Bismarck's dismissal the defensive Russo-German Treaty, the so-called Re-Insurance Treaty, was not renewed. Prince Hohenlohe wrote in his diary on the 31st of March 1890:

It seems more and more clear that differences regarding Russia between the Emperor and Bismarck have brought about the breach. Bismarck intended to leave Austria in the lurch, while the Emperor wished to support Austria, even if his policy should involve him in war with Russia and France. That is made plain by Bismarck's words that the Emperor carried on his policy like Frederick William the Fourth. Herein lies the danger of the future.

In another part of his *Memoirs*, Prince Hohenlohe wrote that the Emperor's refusal to renew the Russo-German Treaty was the principal cause of Bismarck's dismissal.

The old Emperor was so strongly convinced of the necessity of Germany keeping peace with Russia that on his death-bed, addressing William the Second, he said, according to Bismarck: 'Thou must always keep in touch with the Russian Emperor; there no conflict is necessary.' These were some of his last words.

Bismarck had been dismissed largely because the Emperor wished to reverse Bismarck's policy towards Russia and Austria-Hungary. Foreseeing that a discontinuance of the Russo-German Treaty would ultimately, and almost inevitably, involve Germany in an Austro-Russian war about the Balkans, where Germany had no direct interests, Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten on the 26th of April 1890, only five weeks after his dismissal:

Austria cannot hope to obtain Germany's support for promoting her ambitious plans in the Balkan Peninsula. These Austrian plans have never been encouraged by Germany as long as German's foreign policy was directed by Prince Bismarck. On the contrary, the Prince has, at every opportunity, particularly at the time of the Bulgarian incident, shown with the utmost clearness that he is very far from wishing to promote Austria's special interests in the Balkans in antagonism to Russia. Such a policy would not be in harmony with the stipulations of the Triple Alliance. That Alliance views only the damnum emergens, not the lucrum cessans, of the signatory Powers. Least of all is it Germany's business to support Austria's ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. If such ambitions exist, and are to be promoted with the assistance of other nations, Austria-Hungary will have to address herself not to Germany, but to the nations interested in Balkan politics. These are all the Great Powers except Germany. They are (apart from Russia) England, France, and Italy. Austria can always arrive at an understanding with these Powers if she wishes to further her interests in the Balkans, and Germany need not concern herself about them. Germany's point of view is this: that she has no interests in Balkan affairs.

Five months later, on the 29th of September 1890, Bismarck renewed his warning in the Hamburger Nachrichten:

In the past, when the relations between Germany and Austria and between Germany and Russia were discussed, there were two points of danger: Firstly, that German policy-or, what would be worse, the German Army-should be placed at the disposal of purely Austrian interests in the Balkans against Russia; secondly, that Germany's relations with Russia should be endangered and brought to the breaking-point by unnecessary Press attacks. We have always warned against this twofold danger, but we have never advised a breach of treaty faith towards Austria. The Austro-German alliance does not demand that Germany should support Austria's Balkan interests against Russia. It only demands that Germany should assist Austria if her territories should be attacked by Russia. . . . We attach the greatest value to the preservation of good and cordial relations between Germany and Russia. If Austria and Russia should differ, Germany can mediate most successfully if she is trusted in St. Petersburg. Besides, a breach with Russia would, according to our inmost conviction, make Germany dependent upon Austria. . . . No one can object if Austria succeeds in her Balkan policy without a war with Russia which would demand enormous sacrifices in The Balkans do not concern Germany. We are blood and treasure. interested in the maintenance of peace, and we do not care how Austria and Russia arrange their spheres of interest in the Balkans. . . .

Being anxious that good relations should exist between Germany and Austria, and that Austria's power and position should be preserved, we have opposed mistaken views as to the scope of the Austro-German Treaty, and have endeavoured to show that that Treaty does not oblige Germany

to support Austria in the Balkans.

Hinting at the so-called Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia which William the Second had refused to renew, under the provisions of which Germany was to support Russia in case of an unprovoked attack upon her by Austria, Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten of the 24th of January 1892:

The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of 1879 contemplated, as far as Russia was concerned, only mutual defence against a possible attack. Hence Germany always pointed out in Vienna that the Austro-German Alliance protected only the Dual Monarchy itself, but not its Balkan policy, against Russia. With regard to the Balkans, Germany had unceasingly advised Austria to find protection by means of a separate Treaty with the States interested in the Balkans, such as England and Italy. Relying on the unaggressive character of the Austro-German Treaty, Germany was always able to go hand in hand with Russia, and to influence Austria if the Eastern policy of that country seemed likely to take an undesirable turn.

This advantageous position, the maintenance of which made considerable claims upon the skill of Germany's diplomacy, was later on believed to be too complicated. Besides, personal misunderstandings [between the Emperor and the Czar] impaired the good relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg, and led to the Russo-French rapprochement. Thus the position has changed to Germany's disadvantage. Formerly it was in Germany's power to arrive at any moment at an understanding with Russia, in consequence of treaty arrangements which existed side by side with the Austro-German Treaty, but which exist no longer. In consequence of the estrangement between Germany and Russia, Austria has been enabled to exercise considerable pressure upon Germany.

Foretelling the present War and the breakdown of the Triple Alliance, Bismarck continued:

Apparently German statesmanship no longer observes a disinterested attitude in Eastern affairs. By following the path upon which she has entered, Germany is in danger of gradually becoming dependent upon Austria, and in the end she may have to pay with her blood and treasure for the Balkan policy of Vienna. In view of that possibility, it will be readily understood that Prince Bismarck again and ever again gave warning that Germany should not break with Russia. . .

The change in the European situation to Germany's disadvantage cannot be excused by extolling the power of the Triple Alliance. Formerly the Triple Alliance existed as it does now, and its importance was increased by the fact that Germany had a free hand, directed it, and dominated Europe. We fear that since then the strength of the Alliance has not increased. . . . A crisis in Italy, a change of sovereign in Austria or the like may shake its foundations so greatly that in spite of all written engagements it will be impossible to maintain it. In that case Germany's position would become extremely serious, for in order not to become entirely isolated she would be compelled to follow Austria's policy in the Balkans without reserve. Germany might get into the leadingstrings of another Power which, it is true, has accepted the new position of Germany. However, no one can tell whether Austria's historic resentment will not re-awaken and endeavour to find satisfaction at Germany's cost if the fortune of war should no longer favour Germany or if the pressure of European events should weigh upon us. Notwithstanding her fidelity to treaty, Austria may be disinclined to bear the supremacy of the new German Empire.

Considering good relations between Russia and Germany absolutely essential for Germany's security, and desiring to bring about a renewal of the Russo-German Le-Insurance Treaty, Bismarck at last embarked upon a great Press campaign. He revealed to Germany and the world the fact that there had

formerly existed a secret treaty with Russia in the plainest language in his celebrated article which appeared on the 24th of October 1896 in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*. We read in it:

Russo-German relations remained good until 1890. Up to that date both States were fully agreed that if one of them were attacked the other would observe a benevolent neutrality. For instance, if Germany were attacked by France she would be sure of Russia's benevolent neutrality, and Russia would be sure of Germany's benevolent neutrality if she was attacked without cause. That agreement has not been renewed since the time when Prince Bismarck left office, and if we are rightly informed about the occurrences which have taken place in Berlin it appears that the failure to renew the treaty was not due to Russia being dissatisfied at the change of Chancellors. It was Count Caprivi who refused to renew the mutual insurance of Russia and Germany, although Russia was ready to renew it. As at the same time Germany pursued a philo-Polish policy, it was only natural that the Russian Government should ask itself: What can be the object of Prussia's Polish policy, which stands in flagrant opposition to the friendly relations established at the time of the Emperor William the First?

We need not mention other anti-Russian indications at the German Foreign Office. Caprivi's attitude in the general European policy and in Germany's Polish policy was such that Russia, notwithstanding her great power, had seriously to consider the future. During the Crimean War all Europe, Prussia excepted, had been hostile to Russia. We do not intend to assert that a similar position will return. Still, it is only natural if a powerful State like the Russian Empire says to itself: 'We must have at least one reliable Ally in Europe. Formerly we could reckon with the three Emperors Alliance. Afterwards we could depend upon the House of Hohenzollern. If, however, in times of difficulty, we should meet with an anti-Russian policy, we must endeavour to arrange for support elsewhere.' The Kronstadt meeting and the first rapprochement between Absolute Russia and Republican France was solely brought about by Caprivi's political mistakes. Hence, Russia was forced to find in France that security which of course her statesmen desired to obtain.

This article created an immense sensation not only in the entire German Press but in the Press of the world. The Government-inspired Press accused Bismarck of high treason in divulging secrets of State, and threatened him with the public prosecutor and with imprisonment. The disclosure led to a prolonged Press campaign in the course of which Bismarck defended the Re-Insurance Treaty with great vigour in numerous articles. With wonderful energy Bismarck, who was then eighty-two years old, endeavoured once more to direct the policy of Europe with his indefatigable pen. He not merely criticised Germany's foreign policy and pointed out the dangerous mistake which had been made in destroying the intimate relations which existed formerly between Russia and Germany; he endeavoured at the same time to bring about a re-grouping of the Powers and to create differences between Russia and France likely to destroy their recent intimacy. This may be seen from many articles of Bismarck's, published at the time in various journals.

In his *Memoirs* Bismarck summarised his views as to the attitude of Russia and France in this blunt phrase: 'With France we shall never have peace; with Russia never the necessity for war, unless Liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders falsify the situation.'

'Dynastic blunders' have done what Liberal stupidities failed to achieve.

In his articles and in his *Memoirs* Bismarck repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary might not only abandon Germany in the hour of need, but, remembering the loss of Silesia to Prussia and the Battle of Königgrätz, turn against Germany.

Unceasingly Bismarck pointed out in the clearest language that Germany was under no obligation whatever to support Austria in the Balkans, and that, in case of serious Austro-Russian differences, such as those which arose in July 1914 about Serbia, Germany should not act as Austria's unconditional supporter but as a mediator between the two States. Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on the 15th of January 1893:

The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance provides only against an attack on Austrian and German territory on the part of Russia. Being thus limited, the possibility is excluded that the Treaty may serve Austria's special interests in the Balkans. The purpose of the Alliance is exclusively to prevent a Russian war of aggression. Its purpose is in no way to strengthen Austria in the pursuit of a purely Austrian policy in the East. Germany has no interests in the East. Besides, if she supported Austria's Balkan policy she would defeat the purpose of the Treaty, which is to preserve the peace. If Austria was entitled to the support of Germany's bayonets if engaged in the East, a collision with Russia would become probable. Hence the casus foederis is limited to the possibility of a Russian attack upon one of the two Allies. The task of Germany, as Austria's Ally, consists in acting as a mediator between the two Powers in case of differences in the Balkans. If Austria wishes to further her individual interests in the Balkans she must seek support not in Germany, but among those countries which are interested in the East-England, France, and Italy.

Bismarck spoke and wrote in vain. His shallow successors treated his advice with contempt. The great German statesman not only pointed out the mistake which the Emperor had made in breaking with Russia but he tried to re-create the intimate relations which formerly existed between Germany and Russia. His exertions proved unavailing, and he wrote despairingly in the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in June 1892:

The worst that has happened under the Chancellorship of Caprivi is that all the threads connecting Germany with Russia were suddenly broken. The German Emperor tried to win over the Russians with amiable advances. However, busy intermediaries reported to him expressions from the Czar's entourage which proved that his intended visit

to Russia would be politically unsuccessful. Then William the Second immediately went to England and concluded with England the Treaty relating to Zanzibar and Heligoland, and that anti-Russian demonstration was followed by his philo-Polish policy, which was hurtful to Russia. Germany's foreign policy could not have taken a more fatal step than to threaten Russia with the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland in case of a Russian defeat. That was bound to lead to the Franco-Russian rapprochement and to Kronstadt.

Bismarck clearly recognised that the alliance between Italy and Austria was an unnatural one, and that Italy's fidelity to her two partners would depend partly on the character of Germany's policy, partly on England's relations with Germany. In view of Italy's long and exposed sea-border and of her vulnerability in case of an attack from the sea, Italy could obviously not be expected to support Germany and Austria if such support would involve her in hostilities with the strongest Naval Power. For this reason, among others, Bismarck was anxious that Germany and England should be firm friends. He wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten on the 13th of June 1890:

The co-operation of Germany, Austria, and Italy threatens no one. The Triple Alliance does not involve dangers which would become fatal to the co-operation of these three States. On the contrary, the Alliance is designed to strengthen the peace of Europe. The casus foederis towards Russia arises only if Russia attacks the territory of one of the two Allies. This limitation deprives the Alliance of all aggressive tendencies, and excludes the possibility that it may serve the special interests of Austria in the Balkan Peninsula and thus threaten the preservation of peace. . . .

The Austro-Italian Alliance is not equally favourable. Austria and Italy there are unadjusted differences, which are to be found particularly on the side of Italy, such as the anti-Austrian aspirations of the Irredentists. Besides, the Italian Radicals are opposed to the Triple Alliance, and sympathise with France. . . . In view of France's aspirations, Italy must be able to rely on the assistance of the English Fleet, for the Triple Alliance cannot protect the Italian coasts. Hence, Italy has to think of England, and consideration of England may conceivably limit Italy's freedom of action. The maintenance of the present relations between Austria and Italy must be the principal care of the diplomats, especially as, if Italy for some reason or other should abandon the Triple Alliance, the Austrian Army would be compelled to protect the Dual Monarchy against Italy. Hence it would no longer be able to fulfil Article 1 of its Alliance with Germany, according to which it should assist Germany 'with its entire armed power.' By the detachment of Italy, the Austro-German Alliance would militarily lose so much that its value would become very problematical. . . .

If we sum up the considerations developed we find that the present position is quite satisfactory. As long as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy are united in the Triple Alliance, and as long as these three States may reckon on the assistance of the English sea-power, the peace of Europe will not be broken. We must take care that friendly relations between Austria and Italy and between Italy and England shall be maintained. Besides, we must see that the Triple Alliance is restricted to its original scope, and that it is not allowed to serve those special interests which have nothing to do with it. We therefore firmly trust that, as

far as Germany is concerned, the 'old course' will be preserved with particular care.

Bismarck died on the 30th of July 1898. We know from his speeches in the Reichstag that he attached the greatest value to good relations between England and Germany, that he saw in England 'Germany's natural and traditional ally.' Hence he never thought an Anglo-German war possible. To him such a war was, as he said, unthinkable. As long as the great Chancellor lived William the Second did not venture upon pursuing a violently anti-British policy which was bound to drive this country into the arms of France and Russia. Although William the Second was hostile to England, he was probably restrained by the fear of Bismarck's criticism during the Chancellor's lifetime. Soon after Bismarck's death William the Second began his naval campaign. When Bismarck had closed his eyes a violent anti-British agitation, financed by Krupp and carried on by hundreds of generals and professors, was started throughout Germany, and in 1900 was published the great German Navy Bill, in the introduction of which we read the ominous and oftquoted words: 'Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would jeopardise the supremacy of that Power.'

Bismarck had observed the Emperor's Anglophobia in its more modified form with alarm, fearing its effect upon Italy. He had written in a series of articles on the European situation, published in the Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung from the 12th to

the 18th of May 1892:

In discussing Anglophobia in Germany we must remember that the principal Anglophobe is supposed to be the Emperor William the Second, who was hostile to England not only as Crown Prince, but even during

the first years of his rule.

England's attitude towards the Triple Alliance depends not upon the Heligoland Treaty, but on Italy. If England is opposed to Germany, we can never reckon upon Italy's help. . . . The Austro-Hungarian Army is at Germany's disposal only if the Dual Monarchy does not require its use against Italy. Otherwise, one-half of the Austrian Army would be lost to Germany. . . . Italy is therefore a very important factor in the Triple Alliance, even if she limits her action to abstaining from attacking Austria. . . . The idea that Russia may make a surprise attack upon Germany is Utopian. Only moderate diplomatic skill on Germany's part is required to avoid a war with Russia for generations. The tension among the nations would be greatly diminished if we should succeed in re-creating in leading Russian circles the faith in Germany's neighbourly honesty which has disappeared since Bismarck's resignation. . . A Russian war is a calamity which must not be brought upon the population of the Eastern Provinces of Germany without pressing necessity. The seriousness of a Russo-German war is particularly great, because it would immediately lead to a Franco-German war, while, on the other

The principal passages will be found in The Ultimate Ruin of Germany, Nineteenth Century and After, September 1914.

hand, a Franco-German war need not lead to Russian intervention. Besides, the impossibility of obtaining adequate compensation for such a war must be borne in mind. What can Germany obtain from Russia? . . . At best she would obtain a second neighbour-State thirsting for revenge. Germany would be in an uncomfortable position created by her own rashness.

Bismarck did not consider England's support as a matter admitting of doubt. He reckoned upon it as a matter of course. Commenting upon an important colonial debate in the Reichstag, he wrote in the Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung on the 8th of February 1891:

The value of England's friendship consists in this: that in case of a war she protects the Italian coasts or, which is perhaps more uncertain, helps in protecting the German shores. By doing this, England would largely act in her own interest. . . .

Three days later he wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten:

In decisive moments our co-operation with Italy would be influenced by England's attitude. The greater or lesser measure of good relations between England and Germany is not without influence upon Italy's policy, and it is certainly questionable how Germany's relations with Italy would shape themselves if Italy should no longer be in the position of being attached by an equal friendship to England and to Germany.

On the 19th of May 1892 he wrote in the Hamburger Nach-richten:

We have repeatedly had occasion to point out that Italy's faithfulness to the Triple Alliance depends largely upon the relations existing between England and that country. Italy cannot run the risk of being isolated in the Mediterranean, and of being defeated by France. Hence she must be certain of the protection of the English Fleet in case of need.

The agitation for strengthening the German Navy began in a mild way soon after William the Second came to the throne. Bismarck, observing that dangerous development with concern, warned Germany against frittering away her strength and competing on the sea with the French or English Fleets. Addressing 3000 people from Schleswig-Holstein, Bismarck said on the 26th of May 1895:

I wished to acquire Schleswig-Holstein, because unless we had that province we could not hope to have a German Fleet. It was a question of national dignity that in case of need Germany should be able to hold her own against a second-rate Navy. Formerly, we had no fleet. I should consider it an exaggeration for Germany to compete with the French or the English Navy. However, we must be strong enough on the sea to be able to deal with those second-rate Powers which we cannot get at by land.

Two years later Bismarck warned Germany more emphatically against creating a fleet strong enough to challenge England. On the 4th of September 1897 Mr. Maximilian Harden published in the Zukunft the following pronouncement of Prince Bismarck:

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The papers are discussing unceasingly whether the German Fleet should be increased. Of course, all that is required in the opinion of sober-minded experts should be voted. I have never been in favour of a Colonial policy of conquest similar to that pursued by France. As far as one can see, the most important thing for Germany is a strong and reliable Army provided with the best weapons. I am of Moltke's opinion—that we shall have to fight on the Continent' of Europe for the possession of Colonies. We must beware of undue economy in naval matters, but we must also guard ourselves against fantastical plans which might cause us to quarrel with people who are important for our position in Europe. Qui trop embrasse. . . .

In December 1897 Bismarck stated his views on Germany's transmaritime policy as follows in the Leipziger Neueste Nach-richten:

The German Government should not embark on undertakings unless they are absolutely required, or at least justified, by the material interests of the State. . . . Nothing would be more strongly opposed to Germany's interests than to enter upon more or less daring and adventurous undertakings guided merely by the desire to have a finger in every pie, to flatter the vanity of the nation or to please the ambitions of those who rule it. To carry on a policy of prestige would be more in accordance with the French than the German character. In order to acquire prestige, France has gone to Algiers, Tunis, Mexico, and Madagascar. If Germany should ever follow a similar policy she would not promote any German interests, but would endanger the welfare of the Empire and its position in Europe.

Bismarck clearly foresaw that by embarking recklessly upon a policy of adventure in the colonial sphere Germany might endanger her relations with Great Britain. Besides, he foresaw that by wresting Port Arthur from victorious Japan in company with Russia and France, and occupying Kiaochow, she might later on be exposed to Japan's hostility. He did not understand why Germany should have gone out of her way to drive Japan out of Port Arthur with the help of France and Russia. Therefore he wrote on the 7th of May 1895 in the Hamburget Nachrichten:

It appears that Japan, following the friendly advice of Germany, Russia, and France, has abandoned the Liao-tung Peninsula. Germany has no interest whether the district in question remains in China's possession or not. If she has nevertheless exerted pressure upon Japan she might have had reasons with which we are not acquainted. Possibly the policy made in Berlin may have been due to the persuasiveness of people who were in favour of a policy of prestige similar to that pursued in the time of Napoleon the Third.

If Germany's action at Tokio was intended to do a service to Russia, it might perhaps be approved of. However, Russia might have been supported by an attitude of benevolent neutrality without active interference. . . For the present we believe that Germany's initiative in East Asia was not timely, and we doubt whether that policy and the extraordinary change of attitude towards England can be justified. We

cannot help fearing that Germany's initiative in East Asia is merely a symptom of a defect from which our foreign policy suffers: that it springs from the inability to sit still and wait. We do not see why it was necessary to run any risks. . . . Germany's action has diminished the sympathies for Germany which hitherto existed in Japan. That loss was perhaps unnecessary. The loss incurred on the one side may perhaps be balanced by gains, but only the future can show whether there are any gains.

Reverting to Germany's East Asiatic policy, Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on the 23rd of May 1895:

Germany's action against Japan can only be explained by a desire to regain good relations with Russia, which have lately been lost. If that is the case, the Government should be careful not to fall between two stools. Russia desires to obtain ice-free harbours in the East, and Germany has no reason either to support or to oppose her. During decades we have endeavoured to encourage France to develop and expand in every direction-except in that of Alsace-Lorraine. We have encouraged her to expand in Tunis, in India, and in Africa, and we have a similar interest as regards Russia in the East. Germany has little interest in the Black Sea, but still less in the Sea of Japan. . . . As we said before, we do not know the intentions of the Government, but we can only recommend that Germany, after having once more grasped Russia's hand, should hold it firmly and stand by Russia as long as Germany's own interests are not hurt thereby. If the contrary policy is followed, the result would be that we should offend Russia as much as we have already offended Japan by our interference.

Bismarck gave two most impressive warnings regarding mistakes in foreign policy in general and regarding a German attack on France, such as that which took place last summer, in particular. In Chapter XXVIII. of his *Memoirs* the great statesman wrote:

Errors in the policy of the Cabinets of the Great Powers bring no immediate punishment, either in St. Petersburg or in Berlin, but they are never harmless. The logic of history is even more exact in its revisions than the chief Audit Office of Prussia.

In Chapter XXIX., entitled 'The Triple Alliance,' Bismarck wrote regarding a German attack upon France:

It is explicable that for Russian policy there is a limit beyond which the importance of France must not be diminished. That limit was reached, I believe, at the Peace of Frankfort, a fact which, in 1870 and 1871, was not so completely realised at St. Petersburg as five years later. I hardly think that during the Franco-German War the Russian Cabinet clearly foresaw that, when it was over, Russia would have for neighbour so strong and so united a Germany.

Bismarck was a most loyal citizen. He never endeavoured to revenge himself on the Emperor for the disgraceful way in which he was dismissed, and for the persecution which, after his dismissal, he suffered at the hands of the bureaucracy, no doubt by the Emperor's orders. Although he distrusted the Emperor's reckless and adventurous personal policy, he never

attacked him or reproached him personally. He merely criticised his advisers and their action, and laid down the broad principles of Germany's policy in his posthumous Memoirs and in numerous speeches and articles. Bismarck's worst fears have been realised. The German nation, as I said before, has paid lip-service to Bismarck, but has utterly disregarded his warnings and advice. William the Second and his courtier-statesmen have apparently destroyed Bismarck's creation. They cannot plead that they were not warned, for Bismarck foretold unceasingly that the Emperor's rash interference would lead to the break-up of the Triple Alliance, make Germany subservient to Austria-Hungary, involve her in war with Russia about the Balkan Peninsula where Germany possesses no interests, detach Italy, bring about Japan's hostility, and end in Germany's isolation in Europe. The official and non-official spokesmen of Germany assert unceasingly that a world conspiracy has been formed against their country, that Russia, or England, is to blame for the present War. Those who are acquainted with Bismarck's writings know that the present War has not been caused by England's jealousy or Russia's ambitions, or France's thirst for revenge, but only by Germany's own folly, and especially by the action of her Emperor, who dismissed Bismarck, disregarded his warnings, and plunged the nation into a war which may end in Germany's destruction.

Bismarck died at the ripe age of eighty-two. During no less than thirty-nine years he was in the service of the Government, first as Ambassador and then as Prime Minister and Chancellor. As Prime Minister of Prussia and Chancellor of Germany he was uninterruptedly in office during twenty-eight years, and during the whole of that long period he laboured and fought unceasingly with the single object of establishing the German Empire and of consolidating it. Bismarck scarcely knew the meaning of pleasure or of relaxation. He laboured day and Frequently in the course of the night he called one of his secretaries to his bedside and dictated to him. The great Chancellor gave all his time, in fact his whole life, to his country. After his dismissal in 1890 he spent the last eight years, not in resting from his labours, but in fighting for his country. He fought not against the Emperor, as his enemies and enviers have often asserted, but against the pernicious policy, the incompetent statesmen, and the dangerous influences which, he feared, would cause Germany's downfall. Bismarck laboured and fought in vain. At the centenary of his birth the wonderful edifice which he erected almost single-handed seems to be crumbling. One man created the German Empire, and another one is apparently destroying it. J. ELLIS BARKER.

# LA BELGIQUE D'AUJOURD'HUI ET LA BELGIQUE DE DEMAIN

JE viens de passer quelques jours en Belgique, dans ce qui nous reste de Belgique, de Belgique indépendante. C'est un bien petit pays—quelques lieues carrées à peine—un pays de brouillards et de marécages, arrosé de sang, semé de ruines, mais c'est le dernier refuge de nos espérances, le suprême réduit de nos libertés. Ce pays, hier encore, avait une capitale: Furnes dont les monuments unissent la grâce de la Renaissance à la sévérité du Gothique : l'artillerie lourde des Allemands nous en a chassés. Mais s'il n'a plus de capitale, il lui reste une Armée, et il lui reste un Roi. Hier encore, ceux qui connaissaient mal le Roi Albert ne voyaient en lui qu'un jeune homme timide, appliqué, un peu gauche. On le savait courageux. On n'ignorait pas qu'à l'exemple d'autres jeunes souverains, comme le Roi d'Espagne ou le Roi d'Italie, il était d'esprit libéral, qu'il rêvait de réconcilier la royauté avec la démocratie, et, peut-être, avec le socialisme. Mais il a fallu la guerre pour le révéler à lui-même et aux autres, pour faire surgir des lisières de la Royauté un Homme, ferme, droit, intrépide, qui force l'admiration de ses ennemis, et en qui les Républicains, eux-mêmes-et nous en sommes-saluent les vertus militaires et civiques d'un Hoche ou d'un Marceau.

Quant à l'Armée Belge, elle a, depuis sept mois, subi les plus dures épreuves. Un instant, après la chute d'Anvers, on a pu croire que c'en était fait d'elle, et je me souviendrai toute ma vie de l'impression désastreuse que nous eûmes lorsque, le 10 octobre, nous vîmes sur la route de Furnes à Dunkerque, défiler dans un effrayant désarroi les avant-gardes de la retraite—30,000 soldats de forteresse—pêle-mêle avec un flot de 60,000 réfugiés. Mais, à l'arrière, heureusement, les divisions de l'Armée de Campagne tenaient tête à l'invasion. Elles tinrent pendant deux jours, pendant dix jours, en attendant que les Français arrivent. Elles tinrent malgré des pertes terribles—15,000 tués ou blessés sur un effectif de 50,000 bayonnettes. Elles tinrent contre trois corps d'armée, jusqu'au moment où, pour la première fois depuis le début de la guerre, elles

entrèrent en contact avec la grande armée des Alliés, et relayées par celle-ci, ou mises à l'abri par les inondations de l'Yser, elles connurent enfin un repos relatif.

Qui les eut vues alors, sans les revoir depuis, aurait peine à les reconnaître.

Il y a quatre mois, l'Armée Belge était réduite à quelques milliers d'hommes, sans souliers, sans couvertures, sans vêtements d'hiver. Mais, avec une rapidité merveilleuse, elle s'est refaite. Ses effectifs sont rétablis, ses pertes sont réparées, son moral n'a jamais été meilleur, et, tout le long des côtes de la Manche, depuis la Normandie jusqu'en Flandre, la Belgique d'aujourd'hui, frémissante et en armes, se prépare à refaire la Belgique de demain.

Dans les camps d'instruction, tout d'abord, de Rouen à Dieppe, il y a des milliers de recrues, venues pour la plupart de la Belgique occupée. A l'appel du Gouvernement, elles ont passé les lignes Allemandes, au péril de leur vie, et attendent avec impatience le moment d'aller faire le coup de feu contre les Allemands.

Viennent ensuite, autour de Calais, les Dépôts divisionnaires, où il y a encore quelques milliers d'hommes : soldats des anciennes classes ou convalescents que, bientôt, l'on renverra au front.

Enfin, par delà la frontière française, les six divisions de l'Armée de Campagne, bien équipées, bien armées, avec leurs effectifs complets.

Toutes ces troupes, bien entendu, ne se trouvent pas en même temps sur la ligne de feu. Dans la règle, les hommes restent pendant 48 heures aux avant-postes, aux tranchées, ou au piquet, et 48 heures au repos, dans les cantonnements. Mais, pendant ce repos même, il ne connaissent pas la sécurité, car il n'y a pas, dans la Belgique d'aujourd'hui, une seule localité qui ne soit sous le feu des batteries allemandes; que cette localité s'appelle, par exemple, L...à l'arrière, P.... sur la ligne des tranchées, ou X. aux avant-postes.

Voici L. . . . d'abord, un petit village du Furnes-Ambacht, à plus d'une lieue des lignes ennemies. Jamais un projectile n'y était tombé, et jamais, sans doute, un soldat Allemand n'y mettra les pieds. Mais, au mois de janvier dernier, on y a fait cantonner des troupes. Toute une compagnie avait été logée dans l'église. La nuit après, tous dormaient d'un profond sommeil, lorsqu'un obus de vingt-et-un, faisant crouler la voûte, tua 43 hommes!

Ce sont là, au surplus, des accidents exceptionnels.

Pour entrer, réellement, dans le domaine de la mort, il faut aller jusqu'à cette interminable ligne de tranchées, qui, partant de la mer, va de Nieuport à Dixmude, et delà, par Soissons et par Rheims, jusqu'aux Vosges.

Encore ne faudrait-il se figurer que, dans cette zone dan-

gereuse, tous les points soient également dangereux.

A Nieuport, à Dixmude, devant Ypres, la bataille est, pour ainsi dire, continue, et les obus ne cessent guère de pleuvoir. Par contre, dans d'autres endroits, où l'on s'est terriblement battu, au mois de Novembre, et où depuis lors les inondations ont rendu toute avance à peu près impossible, c'est à peine si, de temps à autre, on échange quelques salves de shrapnels. Aussi, depuis la bataille de l'Yser, le village de P., ou plutôt les décombres du village de P., sont devenus en quelque sorte un but d'excursion pour toutes les personnes qui sont admises à aller au front. Le poète Emile Verhaeren y est allé; la Reine y vient quelquefois, et un abri où elle s'est arrêtée s'appelle 'Le Repos de la Reine.' Les hommes politiques qui désirent faire figure de héros, ne manquent pas, eux aussi, de s'y rendre, et peuvent, à leur retour, dire qu'ils ont 'visité les troupes sous la pluie des shrapnels.'

En fait, comme on ne tire que par intervalles, et que les artilleurs allemands ont, à cet égard, leurs habitudes, le risque est aussi réduit que possible, et, actuellement, pour courir des dangers à P., il faut y séjourner, comme le font les soldats et comme le font les dames anglaises qui y ont établi un poste

de secours.

Elles s'étaient installées au début à cinquante mètres des tranchées, dans la première maison du village, mais cette maison a été détruite, et elles habitent aujourd'hui un autre logement, moins exposé, mais qui peut néanmoins, d'une heure à l'autre, être éventré par un projectile.

Que l'on ne se figure pas au plus que le danger qu'elles courent les empêche de goûter, malgré tout, la joie de vivre. Elles ne seraient pas des Anglaises si, dans cet enfer de P. . . ., elles n'avaient pas trouvé le moyen de se créer une sorte de home,

où elles aiment à recevoir leurs amis.

La dernière fois que j'y suis allé, deux officiers aviateurs étaient venus en auto avec un appareil cinématographique, et, pendant qu'au dehors les canons Belges et les obus Allemands faisaient alterner leurs détonations, ces dames et leurs hôtes prenaient le thé et regardaient passer les films.

Ce ne sont pas nos soldats Belges, au surplus, qui y trouveraient à redire. Eux-mêmes, dans les tranchées, rivalisent de bonne humeur avec leurs amies, les 'Misses.' Au fond de leur abri, couchés sur la paille, près du feu où ils cuisent leurs pommes de terre, ils rient, ils chantent, ils jouent aux cartes. Je me suis

même laissé dire qu'on avait amené aux tranchées un vieux piano, trouvé à Nieuport.

D'aucuns, d'ailleurs, se plaignent de mener une vie trop calme, et regrettent de n'avoir pas l'occasion de tirer plus souvent des coups de fusil sur les 'Boches.'

Les 'Boches,' en effet, sont maintenant assez loin, sur la rive droite de l'Yser, ou, tout au moins, de l'autre côté de la zône inondée.

Pour les approcher, il faut aller jusqu'aux avant-postes, dont certains se trouvent à deux kilomètres au delà des tranchées.

C'est ainsi que l'autre jour, ou plutôt l'autre nuit, je suis allé avec quelques officiers, faire visite à la Grand'-Garde de X. Là-bas vit, depuis un mois, dans une ferme en ruines, une des plus étranges et des plus héroïques figures de cette guerre : le Lieutenant L., un moine franciscain, qui a quitté son couvent pour défendre son pays. Mais, après avoir ainsi troqué la robe contre l'uniforme, il conserve, dans sa nouvelle vie, les habitudes de l'ancienne. Aujourd'hui, comme hier, il vit en cellule, hors du monde. Le poste d'observation qu'il dirige est inaccessible le jour, parce que ses abords sont fauchés par la mitraille. Aussi longtemps qu'il fait clair, un fil téléphonique est son seul lien avec le gros de l'armée. On relève les soldats qu'il commande. Il refuse d'être relevé. On le ravitaille la nuit, quand ce n'est pas impossible. Si on ne le ravitaille pas, il jeûne. Pendant trois jours, dernièrement, il resta sans eau potable. Mourant de soif, il mit dans une marmite de l'eau des inondations, de l'eau salée, où macèrent des cadavres, la fit bouillir, et lécha les gouttelettes qui venaient se fixer sur le couvercle.

La nuit avant celle où nous le vîmes, un obus entra et éclata dans le sombre taudis qui lui sert de chambre. Par un hasard extraordinaire—peut-être dit-il un miracle—il s'en tira avec une éraflure au doigt. Comme nous lui demandions si cette existence n'était pas insupportable, il nous répondit : 'Jamais je ne me suis senti plus heureux, car j'ai conscience de me rendre utile.' Ces mots, d'ailleurs, qu'il a gravés avec un clou sur la muraille, nous disent sa pensée : 'Vive le Roi!'

Quelle distance, à première vue, entre ce moine, ce conservateur, ce royaliste, et le républicain, le socialiste, l'internationaliste, qui venait, par cette nuit d'hiver, lui faire visite; et cependant, quand nous nous serrâmes la main, à l'extrème pointe de cette Belgique d'aujourd'hui, unifiée dans la souffrance, nous avions le même cœur, la même volonté, la même espérance: libérer notre pays, chasser l'ennemi qui nous guettait, dans ses tranchées, à deux cents mètres et, avec la Belgique d'aujourd'hui, refaire la Belgique de demain!

Cette Belgique de demain, que sera-t-elle? Qui saurait, qui

oserait le prédire? Mais, quoiqu'il arrive, quoique l'avenir nous réserve, nous savons, nous osons affirmer que cette Belgique sera.

Peut-être même pouvons-nous aller plus loin, et nous risquer

à dire ce qu'elle ne sera pas, ce qu'elle ne doit pas être.

Avant même que d'avoir vaincu, d'aucuns affirment déjà que la Belgique de demain doit être une Belgique agrandie, aux dépens de l'Allemagne.

Quand nous allions aux Etats-Unis, et passions par l'Angleterre, nous eûmes l'honneur de rencontrer un diplomate éminent, qui jouera sans doute un grand rôle quand seront fixées les conditions de la paix future. Il nous disait : 'La Belgique, après cette guerre, doit devenir un grand pays.' Et d'autres, moins mesurés dans leurs propos, se hasardent à dire : 'Il faut que la Belgique de demain s'étende jusqu'à la rive gauche du Rhin.'

Il est trop tôt pour parler de ce que nous pourrions légitimement demander au jour de la victoire : peut-être une rectification de la frontière du côté de Moresnet et de Malmédy, ou même le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, si, librement consultés, les Grands-ducaux manifestaient le désir de s'unir à la Belgique. Mais il n'est pas trop tôt pour dire, dès à present, les raisons qui nous feraient repousser le dangereux cadeau que serait un morceau d'Allemagne.

Au point de vue de notre politique intérieure, d'abord, notre pays est suffisamment divisé par le dualisme des langues, par la différence des points de vue entre les Flamands et les Wallons, pour que ce soit folie d'y vouloir annexer des populations allemandes, avec d'autres mœurs, d'autres habitudes, d'autres traditions.

De plus, et surtout, procéder par force à des annexions de territoire, créer en Europe de nouveaux irrédentismes, transformer une guerre de défense contre l'impérialisme germanique en une guerre de conquête contre le peuple allemand, ce serait enlever à notre cause tout ce qui fait sa grandeur, sa noblesse et sa légitimité.

Il y a quelques semaines, à Londres, les Socialistes des nations alliées—français, russes, anglais, belges—se réunissaient en Conférence dans le but d'affirmer, s'il était possible, une politique commune. Pareille tentative semblait condamnée à un échec. Comment faire coïncider en effet les points de vue d'hommes aussi différents, placés dans des conditions aussi différentes, que les socialistes belges, légitimement exaspérés par le traitement dont leur pays a été l'innocente victime, les Socialistes français, conscients d'être en état de légitime défense, et les anti-militaristes de la Confédération Générale du Travail, les Tolstoïens de l'Independent Labour Party, et les

révolutionnaires russes, placés dans cette alternative tragique de faire crédit au Tsarisme qui ne désarme pas, ou de faire tort à la démocratie occidentale, en armes contre l'impérialisme germanique? Nous y sommes parvenus cependant. Certes l'ordre du jour voté par la Conférence a été critiqué. On l'a trouvé vague et imprécis. On n'a pas compris, on n'a pas voulu comprendre, que c'était un résultat essentiel d'avoir obtenu l'unanimité sur cette affirmation que la victoire de l'Allemagne serait l'écrasement de la démocratie en Europe et que, pour éviter cette catastrophe, la guerre devait être menée jusqu'au bout.

Seulement, les Socialistes n'eussent pas dit leur pensée toute entière s'ils n'avaient pas ajouté que ce but, ce n'est pas l'écrasement politique et économique de l'Allemagne, mais au contraire, la libération de l'Allemagne, dominée ou trompée par ceux qui la gouvernent.

Ce qui fait pour nous, en effet, de la guerre actuelle, une guerre sainte, c'est que nous avons conscience de lutter pour le Droit, la Liberté, et la Civilisation.

Nous luttons pour le Droit, incarné dans la Belgique, dont les plaies saignantes crient vengeance au Ciel, et le Droit ne sera vengé que le jour où notre pays sera rendu à lui-même et intégralement indemnisé.

Nous luttons pour la Liberté, c'est à dire, pour le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, et la Liberté ne triomphera que le jour où la Pologne sera ressuscitée, où la France recouvrera ses frontières naturelles, où, de la Mer du Nord aux Balkans il n'y aura plus un peuple qui subisse la loi du plus fort.

Nous luttons, enfin, pour la Civilisation, et la Civilisation ne sera sauvée que le jour où sera vaincue, non pas l'Allemagne 'des penseurs et des poètes,' mais l'Allemagne des hobereaux, des militaires professionels, des fabricants de canons, l'Allemagne de Krupp, de Zeppelin, de Guillaume II., et aussi l'Allemagne de ces intellectuels, qui ont si complètement vérifié cette parole: 'Science sans conscience est la ruine de l'âme.'

Ils sont pires que ceux qui ont commis les pires méfaits, car ils les ont approuvés, sans avoir l'excuse de la fureur du combat. La Belgique a été violée, et ils ont approuvé; la Belgique a été martyrisée, et ils ont approuvé; la Belgique a été ruinée, affamée, décimée, et ils approuvent encore!

Aussi, contre ceux-là, le monde entier se lève, et, c'est notre ferme conviction que dans cette lutte, le dernier mot restera à l'Humanité!

EMILE VANDERVELDE.

## VOLUNTARY OR [COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(I)

## WANTED: A MILITARY CONSTITUTION

So averse are the English people to anything in the nature of a rigid system that they have hitherto resisted all proposals even to codify their civil laws. Every year this gap in the national polity costs a king's ransom. Lawyers are enriched and litigants are impoverished. Nor does the man in the street always know for certain what is criminal and what is not. Perhaps it is this aversion to a regular system which has for many centuries prevented the existence of a military constitution in England. The scheme under which our military forces have hitherto been raised has been a patchwork of hand-to-mouth expedients, for no well-considered axiom of foreign or domestic policy has dominated its contrivance, but, on the contrary, from time to time new regulations have been piled upon old and new conditions upon existing ones to meet successive emergencies.

Besides an instinctive dislike of symmetrical schemes which is a national failing, it is to be feared that traditions of domestic dissension have caused a deep-rooted hostility to what was long termed a standing army. These traditions have now become a superstition; they date as far back as the quarrel between Charles the First and his Parliament. The Parliament, having executed the King and subverted the constitution, proceeded in its turn to enforce its authority with troops. Again, in the reign of James the Second, the army played an important rôle in the rebellion which established the Whig ascendency. And after the battle of Waterloo rendered possible a partial disarmament, the troops we continued to maintain were regarded with dislike and suspicion by democratic agitators in spite of the moderation, and even timidity, of the executive in employing them to maintain public order. When the Crimean War broke out the British Army had almost ceased to exist. A mere handful of longservice regiments constituted a sort of Pretorian Guard, without reserves, without a second line, and with no territorial affiliation.

Moreover, these troops lacked almost entirely the administrative services to enable them to take the field as an army; the sanguinary lesson of the campaign that followed produced some good effect, which was enforced by the Indian Mutiny, and by the resurrection of the French power under Napoleon the Third. First the Militia was revived, and a few years later the sense of national danger created the Volunteer force in the teeth of parliamentary and official enmity. The Franco-German War of 1870 and a number of small colonial wars between 1859 and 1899 compelled successive Governments gradually to increase our military resources, but when the catastrophe of the Boer War overtook the Empire, we were, relatively to other nations, even more unprepared for a serious campaign than in 1854. nately war was confined to what history will consider a mere colonial rebellion, the suppression of which taxed the whole military power of the British Empire, but our relations with our continental neighbours were so bad when the early disasters in South Africa occurred, that we were within an ace of being attacked by a European coalition, which might easily have included our present Allies as well as the German Empire. this most critical moment nothing but the Fleet stood between us and destruction, there were no trained troops, and hardly a round of ammunition left in the United Kingdom.

The British Empire rounded the perilous corner because of the inability of our enemies to combine among themselves, but the margin of safety was so narrow that even the parliamentary politician recognised its nature and understood that something had to be done to prevent its recurrence. The foreign policy of the nation was radically amended. Instead of standing outside the system of European States in 'splendid isolation,' England definitely gravitated into the alliance which existed to curb the power of Germany. The process was slow, and the actual ranging of Britain with the Powers of the Entente was not an accomplished fact until 1911. This delay would have been very wise if the interval had been employed to reorganise our military forces so as to give effect to our policy. Unfortunately our politicians vainly imagined that Allies could take the place of an

army.

It is not now too early to consider what shape and form our military institutions should assume after the present War, both because military institutions take a long time to mould and also because popular interest, without which great organic changes cannot be carried through rapidly, diminishes as soon as the peril of war seems to be over. Now is the time to take decisive The neglect to use popular enthusiasm during the Boer War in order to reform our military constitution is costing us to-day the life of our bravest and best, and, that which may appeal more closely to the 'Pacifist' Party, it is also costing us

about two millions sterling a day.

The present writer on several occasions in the Nineteenth Century and elsewhere opposed the proposals of the National Service League because it was evident that a great war would probably break out before they could bear fruit, and they were unsuitable to our needs and also altogether insufficient from a military point of view. For example, they only contemplated training partially a vast Militia for home defence, with no obligation to go on active service across the Channel. They corresponded, in fact, in no respect to the military needs of our country. Moreover, Voluntary Service, had it been properly administered and properly supported, could very easily have produced five times the Expeditionary Force sent out by Mr. Asquith's Cabinet to stem the tide of German invasion last August. The product of Voluntary Service in the hands of Lord Kitchener has absolutely proved that point, and having regard to the undoubted advantages of Voluntary Service over Conscription in certain respects, especially in a great maritime Empire such as ours, there was much to be said for retaining that method of enlisting soldiers. But as the writer on more than one occasion pointed out, nothing short of Conscription can produce full muster rolls. The advisability or otherwise of a revolutionary change in our military constitution really depended on our foreign policy. If we needed 300,000 field troops in first line, and no more, to carry out that policy, the voluntary system could be relied on to produce them if it was properly worked. Parenthetically, it may be said that no serious attempt was made by any Government since Waterloo to give that or any other military system a fair chance. If, however, numbers on the Continental scale are required, nothing but compulsory service and universal obligation can supply them.

It is possible, and even not unlikely, that the numbers required to maintain our army on the Continent during the course of this War can be obtained voluntarily, both because of the national enthusiasm and also of other causes which, anyhow, limit the numbers we can put into line irrespective of the numbers who enrol. The question which has to be faced, and which should be faced now, is how the country is to preserve its independence after the War. It is only while the fear which was inspired by the German advance into the heart of France is remembered that we can count on popular support to render these realms safe in the future, and a crucial difference will arise between two schools of opinion. The first will maintain that this War will establish a lasting peace on the Continent:

the second will argue from the general development of organised might, not only in Europe but also in America and elsewhere, that national independence in the future, as in the past, will depend on the ability of any given State to protect itself. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that our insular security is diminishing with every new infernal device imported into naval warfare. Also that the wars of the future, if they do occur, will be waged with even higher military organisations than heretofore, and will be quite relentless in their character and in their final issue.

If the only result of the present War was to be an intensifying of the armament competition in peace with its accompanying burden of taxes, on the top of whatever the War may cost, then the prospect of the future would be dark indeed; but, mercifully, that is an unlikely result for a decade or more, because the vast expenditure of the present War will at any rate limit the outlay on artillery, battleships, and other war material in the near future. It is probable that Germany has touched the high-water mark of her tide of conquest, and it will strain all her resources to the last extremity to retain what she has seized. It is even possible, particularly if Britain succeeds in bringing her whole military power to bear, that Germany will be defeated and temporarily crushed. Temporarily, because the Liberal bravado of extirpating the 'arrogant Prussian military caste' is as absurd as most This caste includes all the inhabitants of Germany and German-Austria, some eighty-five millions of people. numbers are too great to be extirpated even by professional orators and pacifists. Their military strength may be, perhaps will be, broken for a generation, but one generation is not a day too long to reconstruct the ramshackle edifice of our military laws. If, however, Germany avoids defeat and retains Belgium after the peace, it will probably be obvious, even to Viscount Haldane, that British independence will strictly depend on British ability to fight. Even that far-seeing statesman will hardly repeat his reassuring bon mot of last year, 'There will be no war!'

So that whatever is the result of the present War, whether Germany is able to retain her present conquests, or whether her military power is broken for twenty-five years, it is incumbent on all patriots to unite now, while they can get their way, in restoring the health of our military organisation by placing it on a sound, simple and effective basis to meet the peril of a future war with Germany and her possible allies. But after all, the next British war may not be with Germany at all. There are other States in the world whose potential military and naval might is even greater than the present power of Germany, and with whom we have been at bitter war

in the past. It is far from impossible that we shall quarrel with some other State in the next fifty years, though our intentions will be good. We are much more likely to be able to give them effect if we are strong enough to render the hostility of our neighbours unwise and unprofitable. An England subjected to Free Trade and at the same time insufficiently guarded will always be a certain source of discord among the nations which from time to time will produce great wars. But a strong British Empire should and probably would be a great guarantee of European peace in the future, and perhaps the only guarantee. Not such a guarantee as Mr. Asquith made good for Belgium, but power to withstand wanton aggression or the quarrelsome attitude so often caused by suspicion and nervousness in diplomacy.

Of course the training of a considerable proportion of our youth to arms cannot be effected without an annual military budget exceeding that of recent years, but it need not be phenomenally high. At the end of the War we shall probably be in possession of so much stores and equipment that little will be required in the way of initial expense under these headings. The creation of a modern organisation for the Army would greatly reduce the former cost pro rata, and it must never be forgotten that while Conscription absorbs some of the wealth of the nation, it increases it considerably on the balance by improving its stock of men, their working capacity, and the length of their lives, besides averting the cost and bloodshed of future wars. the bogey of costly armaments eating up the national revenue, which democratic reformers would like to distribute among the electorate under the specious label of Social Reform, more bluntly termed the modern type of political bribery, should not deter the survivors of this War from profiting by its appalling lesson. The cost of compulsory enlistment need not and probably would not exceed the inevitable cost of Voluntary Service, because even if the Army were reduced to its former insufficient numbers after the War, the trend of the world's politics would soon compel successive Governments to increase their military forces somehow, and all the old spendthrift tricks and devices, bounties, capricious and repeated changes of the terms of service, confusion between Foreign and Home liability, would reappear and reduce to chaos any Army that the War creates for England.

To rehearse all the arguments in favour of compulsory enlistment would fill a volume, but there are certain points which, although they are not new, yet because they are habitually overlooked and forgotten it is necessary to press upon the attention of thoughtful folk; and in the near future it is not perhaps too sanguine to hope that we shall count among us more thoughtful

folk than hitherto.

Before the outbreak of the War in 1914 the foreign policy of Britain was to maintain a balance between Germany and her allies on the one hand, and Russia and her allies on the other. That, at any rate, was the problem which had to be solved by our military chiefs, and to which every other consideration was small by comparison. The vital necessity of fulfilling this condition was constantly denied by the orators of the political faction which controlled the Government, but, none the less, it was never absent in their intentions, nor indeed could it be. For England to withdraw into splendid isolation would have been an extremely perilous policy while she lacked the military power to render her isolation safe or possible. She was, therefore, thrown into the necessity of consorting with one or other of the groups of European allies. Before the troubles in South Africa the British Foreign Office, although without forming any definite agreement, acted generally in concert with Germany, particularly during Bismarck's tenure of office. Then came the building of the German fleet, the Kruger telegram, the South African War, and the Morocco question. Britain having moved from the German camp towards that of its opponents, and having committed herself to a friendship with France and Russia, it became all-important that she should be strong enough to prevent a rapid overthrow of our friends, for then we might easily have The Liberal War Minister, Lord been the next to suffer. Haldane, who was in office during the critical years when the policy of the Cabinet had made an eventual breach with Germany inevitable, had subscribed to the doctrine of his military advisers and had agreed in principle to despatch a British Army to France in case that country was attacked by Germany. The most formal assurances to this effect were repeatedly made by British to French military authorities, but only four divisions of infantry were maintained capable of rapid mobilisation, and in order to pay for their administrative services, without which they could not have moved at all, reductions were actually made in the establishments of the remaining infantry and artillery. It is not easy to say for certain what military strength we ought to have maintained to give us a casting vote when the inevitable crisis arose. The highest military authority had officially advised the Liberal Government that a field army of 500,000 men, with 500,000 in reserve, was needed at that period for the defence of the Empire. The present writer would have been content then with three-fifths of that total, but the ridiculously inadequate army maintained by the Government, hardly stronger than we possessed in the 'fifties, served the purpose of provocation rather than of defence.

All great wars create an epoch in the history of war. The

conditions are now changed, former estimates are obsolete, and it is clearly evident that the wars of the future between neighbouring States will more than ever demand the whole national strength. We might conceivably make war on Brazil or Japan by using our naval supremacy in attacking the extremities of our enemy, as we attacked Russia in the Crimea; but if in the future we are involved in a struggle with another European empire or coalition, even with allies on our side, the whole force of our manhood will probably be needed to ensure victory. By the same process of reasoning, the very fact of being able to muster that force in arms will probably enable us to keep the peace. Accurately to forecast the figures which will be required in the future is difficult, but it is certainly a moderate estimate to assume that a million field troops, with at least a million trained men in reserve, will be essential to our position as a great European Power. It is not to be expected that under any scheme of enlistment such numbers can be obtained by Voluntary Service. However great the theoretical advantage of Voluntary over Compulsory Service may be, vast numbers in the future will be essential to security in peace or to victory in war, and to obtain these numbers there is no alternative to Conscription.

The peculiar strategic position of the British Isles will always demand naval superiority over our most likely Continental rival, and although our former inaccessibility will tend to diminish with the progress of mechanical invention, yet our insular position will always confer upon us the great advantage of immunity from a sudden invasion by hastily mobilised troops. We shall always have a respite, more or less brief, between the outbreak of a quarrel and the moment when we must encounter the enemy's field troops. In consequence of this condition it is open to us, even more than to the Swedes and Swiss, to raise the necessary forces by a Militia system. Six months' recruit training, followed by three or four annual rehearsals of a month's duration each, would provide us with the Army we require as far as the training of the rank and file is needed. Annual contingents of 200,000 men, less than half of the numbers available in any one year, would suffice to produce a war strength of a million in the first line if six such contingents constitute the first-line regiments. The next six contingents would be the trained reserve of the first line, and older contingents than twelve years' service would be able to form a real Territorial Army for the defence and garrison of the British Isles. The so-called Territorial Force, into which the Volunteers were converted, has only been partially available to fulfil this condition, for a simple reason. It has been wanted for pressing service elsewhere.

In order to arrive at a just conclusion as to the Army we

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shall need for our future security, we must think a long way ahead, because armies are not built in a day, as we are now painfully discovering. If Germany emerges intact and unbroken from the present struggle, it goes without saying that our national existence, like that of France since 1870, will once more depend on our constant readiness to defend our independence. If Germany is humbled and defeated, it is probable that she will rapidly recuperate, and, sooner or later, resume the maritime rivalry which has brought us into collision with her. Even victory can only procure us peace for perhaps a generation, and a generation is not long to get a military constitution into working order. And, as I have already suggested, Germany is not the only great Power with which we have quarrelled in the past.

As far as it is possible to judge now, England and France are unlikely to have serious differences in the near future, though the thing is not quite impossible. But the Europe of to-morrow will include a vast and surging Slav population which has recently come into its lands by successful war, and which will not hesitate to make war to extend them. It seems very improbable that the Bulgarians will attack the British Isles, yet it was the blood feud of the Serbians which opened the War of 1914 and sent the peasants and workmen of our English counties to be slain by the thousand in many parts of the world besides Northern France. The experience of the last year should suffice to prove that Britain is too great, too rich, too near to the Continent, and too intimately bound up with its politics to avoid being implicated when war rends it asunder. There is no reason to doubt that Mr. Asquith's Cabinet ardently wished to keep the Empire out of European complications; no one denies that the diplomatic service has been skilfully performed, and yet the thing proved impossible. Future British Cabinets will not find it any easier.

Since, then, the quarrels of our neighbours may involve us in war, however unwillingly, and in spite of the most conciliatory policy towards the great States with which we are in contact, it will be a suicidal policy for us to be too weak in the future to make ourselves felt in the councils of Europe while peace is in the balance, and on the battlefield should the most adroit policy fail to keep us out of the trouble. Yet the danger is great that we shall once again trust to luck, hope to wriggle out at the last moment, or improvise an army after the outbreak of war. And perhaps the censoring of all criticism since last August has concealed from the nation, first, the appalling risk we were exposed to by the destruction of France as well as of Belgium, and, secondly, the fearful penalty we are paying in lives and money for the state of unpreparedness in which we were caught by the catastrophe of war.

The national tendency to meet all difficulties as they occur by improvising remedies has some admirable aspects, but in the field of land warfare it is absolutely fatal. In old days it caused the downfall of Saxon England and the substitution of a Continental system of military and civil organisation for the native laws. This made England a mighty Power under the Plantagenets, and formed the basis upon which the subjects of Elizabeth and her successors founded our oversea Empire by a series of victorious wars. It is far harder to hold than to seize, and the one chance of the British people retaining their dominions and Imperial position, a feat which no maritime empire within reach of great land Powers has yet succeeded in accomplishing, will depend upon our taking count of the real situation in good time and on our being honest with ourselves, a difficult task for Englishmen.

It is absolutely necessary that the laws which regulate the existence of the British land forces should be crystallised and codified. Every subject of the King should know for certain in the future what demands can be made upon his personal service, and in return every one, whatever his grade, should be protected in the enjoyment of his rank and rights. The anomalies and injustices which have disgraced our military administration in the past, and must perforce cling to any system whose organisation is a patchwork quilt of temporary expedients, must be swept away. There is no reason why British military administration should remain a bye-word for all that is unjust, inexpedient, and illogical; and when we remember the talents of our principal rivals in this same field of organisation it becomes plain that, in order to survive in the future struggle for life which is the evident destiny of European States, we cannot possibly afford to handicap ourselves by a slatternly and illregulated military system.

Although we have always had too few troops, we have always had too many sorts of troops. Last August found the British Forces composed of a Regular Army at home, another in India, and a third in the Colonies, all having somewhat different terms of service and more or less illogically mixed up with one another. Then there were the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry, renamed Special Reserve and Territorials. The Special Reserve was only one of several reserves, and no single officer or man of all these forces had any well-defined ideas of what his military obligation to the State might be, nor what rights he had under his military status. As far as can be ascertained by appeals to the Law Courts, the Regular officer is an outlaw, having no rights at all, and as much at the mercy of the crafty lawyers who intrigue themselves into the exercise of sovereign power in this country,

as the household slaves of the Negus of Abyssinia. That, at any rate, is the justifiable conclusion to be drawn from the litigation between Major Adam and the War Office. Just before the War a jury awarded Major Adam 2000l. damages for the malicious circulation of unfavourable confidential reports calculated to injure his prospects as a candidate for Parliament. This verdict has been reversed by a Bench of Judges on appeal. But the verdict of common sense and common justice will be that if the case was susceptible of trial by jury the verdict of the jury should never have been disputed by an appeal, and especially at such a time as the present.

The general position of an officer in the Regular Army is not only unsatisfactory but ridiculous. Though he is the expert among a host of partially professional assistants, he is too often passed over in favour of the latter for the command of newly organised forces which would give him the long denied chance for showing his capacity and establishing his position. then such promotion would mean more pay and pension, and the 'Treasury,' whoever that may be, objects to any public money being expended on the officers of the Army as a body, though certain high posts are not only well paid but far too well The selection of superior officers in peace will always be a very difficult matter to regulate, but it may be remarked that our practices in this all-important branch of military administration cause almost universal discontent and disapproval among the officers concerned, while in the hosts of our redoubtable enemy an absolute confidence has prevailed in the expediency and justice of the methods by which their leaders are chosen. This alone confers on the German army a notable and dangerous element of superiority, even were it not better organised in other respects and far more numerous than ours.

To return to the question of what numbers we must maintain in the future, it is clear that the oversea Imperial Forces, the troops in India and the Colonies, must be recruited and serve under totally different conditions from the Home Forces required to protect our European position. The Oversea Forces must be Volunteers, and should have a permanent career open to them. The training of an annual contingent of 200,000 recruits for the Home Army for six months in each year, besides the annual month's training of the first-line troops, will require an establishment of professional soldiers which will not be less than 3 per cent. of the total of the field army—viz. 30,000 officers and men to form the professional nucleus and instructors of one million field troops, with an annual contingent of 200,000. Of course it would be desirable to double this proportion; 30,000 may be considered a minimum, and it provides employment for

officers and soldiers of the Oversea Forces in their own country as a relief to Tropical service, or on retirement from it.

It is not feasible within the scope of this article to give the details of any proposed legislative scheme for constituting an adequate Home Army for the British Isles, but only to insist that the time has come now to face the absolute necessity for this reform. The leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition, usually too busy with party politics to attend to national defence, but now out of work, might profitably undertake the serious study of the subject. If they were better versed in the matter there might not exist the notorious consensus of opinion that even the present Liberal Ministers are preferable to any alternative Cabinet which the Opposition could at present offer.

To recapitulate the reasons for raising the question of Army reform at the present juncture, first and foremost time presses. Time is the essential condition of getting a military organisa-The proposed scheme of a Militia tion into working order. system would, for example, take twenty-four years before it produced its full numbers, and in the interval voluntary enrolment of all sorts of uneven categories of trained or partially trained old soldiers would have to supplement the existing cadres. The crisis of a great war is said to be unsuitable for a root and branch reform of our military system, and doubtless this argument has some weight, but the matter brooks no further delay. Moreover, and this reason is in itself sufficient, the electorate can now comprehend the need for laws which will ensure our armed strength in the future, and as certainly the power to make these laws will have evaporated when the obvious danger has been met and peace restored for a brief term of years.

When the British Government resolved to make war on the Germans in defence of Belgian neutrality it took the most momentous executive decision of any British Cabinet since the Peace of Amiens. Evidently its policy must correspond to this bold act, or the result will be disastrous. The only chance before the War of our living in peace with the Kaiser's Government lay in our having an Army as well as a Fleet which commanded respect, and after the War this will still be It is unnecessary to labour the point that a defeated Germany may ally itself with other Continental States. It will naturally gravitate to the strongest Power or group of Powers. The Germans are likely to entertain vindictive feelings towards England for several decades at least, and all the old reasons for maritime and commercial rivalry will ere long reappear and exert their inevitable pressure, whatever future British Governments may do to cultivate peaceful relations.

The British people must realise that besides the maritime Empire, the Colonies and coaling stations which they possess, and which arouse the covetousness of their rivals, they also possess a land which is of supreme strategic importance in any war which may break out in Western Europe. Owing to our geographical position it is almost impossible for us to refrain from taking sides in a great European quarrel. Since the reign of Henry the Eighth we have only kept clear of these wars when we were too weak to make ourselves felt by reason of internal troubles, and when at the same time the Continental war was of a partial character, such as the wars of 1866 and 1870, though we are even now finding out how closely they affected our fate.

It is much less easy to make it understood that properly digested laws should regulate the terms of any service, the rights of all ranks employed, and their liabilities. But without such laws our Army will always be inferior in certain vital respects to the well-developed military constitutions of Continental States. Before this War it was arrant folly for a man of capacity to become an officer, relying on his military talents to give him an interesting career; if he hoped to earn a livelihood it was more foolish still. Better by far be articled to a solicitor! In all probability he would make a good income instead of spending one, and on the outbreak of war would find himself much better placed in the military hierarchy by serving in the Auxiliary Forces. In war everyone offers his services, but wars are won by preparations in peace, and in peace there is only one way of obtaining the right men as leaders and instructors of our army, and that is by treating them the right way. It is a long while since any British Government has attempted to do so. Officers are a negligible factor in the great contest of votes, and unless they possess social interest in certain legal and political circles they are of no account whatever in the State.

The final and most important consideration is the answer to these questions: What form are future wars likely to take? Shall we in the future be more or less within reach of Continental attack? They certainly give grounds for reflection, and it is only too plain that nothing but the power to exert its whole armed strength will avail our country or any country to protect its vitals in the future. The wars of the future will be fought by millions of men, or staved off because millions of men are ready and able to take part if their country is involved. regards the naval aspect of the case, the supremacy which has heretofore conferred immunity from attack has already disappeared somewhat, and is likely to be less and less reliable with the march of science. Even this War has seen our coast towns bombarded in spite of an unchallenged superiority afloat.

are submarines and their possible development to be considered, and, most insistent of all, the need to prevent the naval bases of Western Europe falling under the sway of a powerful enemy.

Conscription, and Conscription alone, can train and mobilise a million field troops at the outbreak of war with the necessary reserves, and a well-considered revision of our military laws is required to make Conscription possible and tolerable. Such a revision is also required to remove the abuses and anomalies which handicap the administration of our War Office.

CECIL BATTINE.

## VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(II)

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IN ENGLAND: A RETROSPECT

THE dictum that the Common Law of England recognises on the part of every able-bodied adult male a liability to render military service, when required to do so in the defence of the realm, has caused much surprise among those to whom obligatory military service means nothing less than militarism of the purest Continental type. But if ten centuries of unbroken custom, recognised and sanctioned in innumerable statutes, are sufficient to constitute a law, the law in question can be proved. Its history may be divided into three periods: the first, when the liability existed, but we have little or no information how it operated or by what means it was enforced; the second, when it was enforced by statute and the machinery of government; the third, when it was not enforced at all.

Nothing in early English law is more familiar to the general reader than the trinoda necessitas, the threefold obligation on all freemen in Saxon times, which included the obligation to take arms in defence of the realm against invasion or for the maintenance of internal order. It was, we are told, by a general levy of the whole population that the early wars against the Danes were fought: in each county the ealdorman summoned the fyrd, and when the realm was so fortunate as to have a military genius for its king the war might have a successful issue. With an Alfred for king and savages like the early Danish raiders to contend against, there is no difficulty in understanding how the system worked. But in later days, when the English after their period of storm and stress settled into an unadventurous peace, from the death of Edmund Ironside and the accession of Canute onwards, it is not easy to understand how the fyrd was in fact collected. In Stubbs's Select Charters extracts are given from Domesday Book as illustrating the customs with regard to military service found in different parts of the country. the king went on an expedition' Oxford sent him twenty of her burgesses or paid 201. in lieu. 'Qui monitus ire in expeditionem non vadit, c. solidos regi dabit.' In Berkshire, 'si rex mittebat alicubi exercitum, de quinque hidis tantum unus miles ibat,' and each hide paid 4s. for his pay and victualling for two months. 'These monies were given not to the king but to the soldiers.' It is impossible, however, to avoid the suspicion that such entries describe not so much the ancient militia law of the country, but either the particular customs of a particular town or district—the first beginnings perhaps of the regular military tenures—or what the Conqueror's Commissioners of Inquiry in 1086 wished to be considered the law. It is of some significance that in the earlier Anglo-Saxon laws that are still extant no similar references appear to occur. The references in Domesday are, on the one hand, too rare, and, on the other hand, too precise to form a satisfactory foundation for the national system which unquestionably existed before the Conquest, and leave us in complete doubt as to the means whereby that system was enforced.

We are told that Canute's hus-carls, his personal retainers, formed the nucleus of a standing army, which was imitated by his successor. But the host that followed Harold to victory at Stamford Bridge and to disaster at Senlac, what was the motive that gathered them together? At a time when the ancient divisions of shire and hundred had lost much of their original meaning and the conception of England as a single realm was still a comparative novelty, when the tradition of fighting to obtain land to settle on and make a home in was dim and faded and, on the other hand, there had not been for generations the need to fight for very life against ruthless invasions from the North, it is difficult to understand how that primary obligation to render military service for the common good was enforced and what machinery of the law could be invented to keep it effectively We know that in some way or other it did survive. alive. Whether knight-service—that is to say the tenure of land by military service—was a natural growth in England or, according to another theory, was introduced, as it were, at a blow by the Conqueror, it is certain that feudalism, once established, tended to obliterate the more ancient law of the fyrd. The Norman king would look for help in his wars to the great nobles whose landed possessions depended on a strict compliance with the conditions on which they had been granted, rather than to a shadowy law which existed before the Normans came to England, and which had failed to organise a successful resistance to their invasion. Throughout medieval times it is probable that the feudal system supplied an army more consistently and more effectively than the ancient law of the land, but apart from it the law still subsisted, coming into greater prominence as feudalism decayed and triumphantly surviving when feudal tenures were finally abolished.

Some random notes on the evolution of the law of compulsory military service and the establishment of the Militia of our own days may be of interest at this time when the question of national defence must inevitably be in the thoughts of everyone. County Militia was pre-eminently the oldest and most constitutional of the military forces of the Crown is so much of a commonplace that we are apt to think it untrue or at all events more of a rhetorical statement than a fact of history. But the continuity of English law from the earliest ages can scarcely be more strikingly illustrated than by reference to the history of the Militia. and it may even be of practical utility to realise that an obligation to render military service when required, as exemplified by the Militia ballot, is no mere creature of statute, no importation from abroad, however nearly it may approximate to the 'conscription' of foreign countries, but one of the most deeply rooted of all English institutions.

In Florence of Worcester's Chronicle under the year 1094 we have a glimpse of what seems to be the survival of the ancient system under the Norman kings. He tells us how Rufus in the course of his wars in Normandy finds himself in need of reinforcements, how he summons 20,000 foot-soldiers from England, how they assemble at Hastings, each one having with him 10s. Then Ranulph Flambard, by the king's for his victualling. direction, takes their money, sends them home again, and transmits the funds so obtained to the king in Normandy. One may look on this as an example of the iniquity of an ill-advised king making money out of the patriotism of his subjects, or one may look at it as a sensible measure by which money was obtained to pay for a well-trained army of professional soldiers in place of such an ill-equipped and undisciplined host as thirty years before lost the day at Hastings; but, whichever view is fairer, the incident itself is a clear illustration of the traditional law of the land, and the assembly at Hastings was an exact prototype, even down to the detail of the 'conduct-money' each man carried with him, of the levies which we shall find mustered five hundred years later for Elizabeth's foreign expeditions.

It is, however, in the Assize of Arms of 1181 that we have set down for the first time in statutory form a comprehensive scheme of universal military service. The first clause requires every holder of a knight's fee to be possessed of certain armour, and later clauses impose analogous obligations on men who cannot be supposed to be bound by any tenure of land: every freeman whose goods or income amount to 16 marks is to have a hauberk, helmet, shield, and lance; if he is worth 10 marks his arms are to be of a cheaper kind; all 'burgenses et tota communa liberorum hominum' are to have helmet and lance and wambais—

apparently some kind of mail coat that differed from both the lorica and the aubergel. These they were to keep by them for service when required, neither selling, pledging nor lending them, and to leave to their heirs or their heirs' guardians, and no more than these were they allowed to keep. They might not sell arms to anyone to take out of England, nor might they themselves take them out of England except by the king's command. Finally, elaborate provision is made for an inquiry by the king's Justices, through sworn jurors in every hundred and town, to ascertain how many men there were falling under each category.

It is significant that the Assize does not attempt to specify what is the amount of military service required from the lieges. This is taken for granted as part of the Common Law: all that the king is concerned with is to see that the lieges are properly equipped for discharging the obligations incumbent on them. We know that forty days' service in the year was generally reckoned as the amount required from each holder of a knight's fee, but we know also that constant disputes arose as to the occasions on which it might be required, and even the limit of forty days ' seems to have existed rather in theory than in practice, and its theoretic existence can hardly be proved for England out of any authoritative document.' It is scarcely likely that the more general obligation to military service was ever more clearly defined. We should be disposed to assume that it did not extend to service beyond the seas if it were not that impressment for the Navy, which was based in a precisely similar manner on the immemorial Common Law, and to which we shall refer again later, involved necessarily obligatory service outside the realm. As it would seem that this obligatory service was always paid for, it is a fair conjecture that at every period of our history the law, though compulsion was always in the background, was so administered as to secure an amount of voluntary service sufficient to obviate any necessity actually arising for defining with precision the length to which compulsion might be carried.

The press-gang forms a prominent feature in literary pictures of the past: the hardship of being torn from home was no doubt keenly felt; numerous Acts of Parliament—which perhaps were not very strictly complied with—alleviated the hardship by granting exemption to special classes of the community, and the Courts of Law were constantly called on to decide whether the press had not been illegally applied; but it does not appear that occasion ever arose for determining how long a seaman impressed against his will might be compelled to serve. The same vagueness to this day attends jury-service. A juryman may in certain circumstances obtain a certificate which will exempt him from

<sup>1</sup> Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, i. 233.

further service on juries for a time, but this is not of very general application, and it would almost seem that the law which requires or required us to render service to the State as soldiers, or sailors, or jurymen whenever the State has need of such service fixes no limit within which such services must be restricted. The subject was much discussed in the early part of the sixteenth century, when the powers of the Crown were undoubtedly strained beyond the limits of the law; but it cannot be said that the limits of the law were even then very precisely ascertained.

At least we may be sure that in the early part of the thirteenth century military service was not felt generally as a hardship. The sixty-three chapters of Magna Charta enumerate in great detail all kinds of evil practices by the Crown for which a remedy is demanded, from such great matters as the freedom of the Church, the right to a judicium parium, or the encroachments of the Forest Law, down to the repair of bridges (Cap. 23), the commandeering of horses and carts for transport purposes (Cap. 30), and the removal of unauthorised fish-weirs (Cap. 33), but never a word can we find with regard to compulsory military service! The Charter is one long catalogue of the matters in which the king had used his powers illegally or oppressively, but military service is not one of them.

In later times traces begin to appear in the statute-book of the obligation to serve in the king's army having been enforced with harshness, but in such a connexion as to show clearly that the obligation itself was beyond question. 18 Edward III. stat. 2 cap. 7 provides that the pay of soldiers 'chosen to go in the king's service out of England' shall fall on the king from the day they leave the county in which they were chosen to serve till the day of their return. 1 Edward III. stat. 2 cap. 5 declared that no man should be charged to arm himself or to go out of his shire otherwise than had been customary in times past for the defence of the realm. 25 Edward III. stat. 5 cap. 8 again appears to point to a certain confusion between military service arising out of the feudal tenures and the much older Common Law liability. Under it no man was to be constrained to find men-at-arms, hoblers or archers, except by tenure or common assent and grant of Parliament. and other similar references have much significance as showing that, vague and undefined as the common law liability to bear arms in defence of the realm may have been, the fact of its existence was beyond dispute.

Curiously enough, it was in Philip and Mary's reign that the law was most clearly defined. An Act of 1557 (4 & 5 P. & M. cap. 2) lays down with great minuteness the arms with which each citizen was required to furnish himself, and sect. 7 positively



enacts that this obligation should not in any way lessen obligations arising from the tenure of lands. It is, in fact, a re-casting for the purpose of more modern requirements of the Assize of Arms of 1181, with a very important amendment. It was the Sheriff of each county on whom, as the local representative of the Crown, the responsibility of enforcing the law had hitherto devolved, but by the sixteenth century the dignity and authority of the Sheriff's office had greatly declined, and now the Act transferred this duty to specially selected Justices of the Peace empowered by Commissions under the Great Seal to ensure

compliance with the Act in each county.

This is the statutory origin of the County Lieutenancy as it It has been commonly said that exists in our own time. Lords Lieutenant were first instituted by Henry the Eighth, and it has been inferred that the institution of the office was due to the centralising policy of the Tudor kings. But, like most other English institutions, it seems rather to have been a natural outgrowth of an earlier system. The Sheriff, whose undoubted duty it was to muster the levies in each county, was sinking in importance, and more particularly in military importance, throughout the Middle Ages. His jurisdiction was limited to his own shire. When the county levies were required for the suppression of internal disorder the Sheriff naturally took command; and as for this purpose alone military force might often be required, it is in vain that we attempt to draw a sharp line between the posse comitatus summoned to maintain good order and headed by the Sheriff in person and the county levies mustered by him for service in the king's army. When the king himself was in command, the Sheriff's duties would be ended when he delivered over the quota required from his county, but when the king himself ceased to take command, it became necessary to appoint some deputy or Lieutenant of the king. For a time, no doubt, the feudal levies . marching under the banners of great barons, and held together by the bond of land tenure, supplied the place of the county Militia; but the Wars of the Roses broke the power of the barons, and during the Tudor period it was usual for the Crown to appoint by special commissions nobles of high standing to command the levies which the Sheriffs under the older law had summoned for The Acts of the Privy Council during the military service. Tudor reigns illustrate the process by which these Lieutenants of the king, at first appointed in special emergencies, became in time part of the permanent machinery of government. Thus, in 1542 letters were sent by the Council to the Sheriffs to have the county levies mustered and arrayed in anticipation of an incursion by the Scots, and the Duke of Norfolk was appointed

the King's Lieutenant to command the army of the North. 1547 Commissions of Array were issued to certain great nobles, both to collect and arm troops. In 1551 commissions were issued for a similar purpose to persons of high standing in twentyeight different counties. In some counties more than one Lieutenant were appointed, and on the other hand the same Lieutenant was sometimes appointed for more counties than one. A similar practice prevailed, in spite of the statute of 1557, up to the end of the century. The Principality of Wales was commonly treated as a separate unit, and again the Lord President of the Council of the North was regarded as the King's Lieutenant for all counties within his jurisdiction. Further commissions were issued for the summer of 1552, and again in 1553. It is noteworthy that the Lieutenants were at the first resorted to for other than merely military purposes. In 1552 a circular was issued to them with instructions to make search for counterfeiters of money, and in 1558 they were directed to appoint collectors of certain taxes. On the other hand, instructions were issued from time to time to Sheriffs and Justices with regard to the county levies, and in 1586 the Council expressed Her Majesty's pleasure that the Earl of Bath, who had been appointed Lieutenant, should, by reason of his youth, consult his Deputy-Lieutenants in the discharge of his duties.

We can perhaps best see how this machinery worked by reference to 1588, the year in which the peril of invasion was more insistent, or at least was thought to be more insistent, than it has ever been since then. Lords Lieutenant were well established by that time, and instructions were sent them on the 1st of April to call out the county levies, but the system was not complete; it was apparently only in the southern half of England that the Lords Lieutenant were held responsible. In the minutes of the Privy Council we hear little of the northern counties, except that the Earl of Huntingdon, who was Lieutenant of Leicestershire, was also 'Lord President of the Northe Partes,' and in that capacity was instructed on the 17th of June to see to the fortifications of Tynemouth and Newcastle, in case the Spaniards should attempt a landing there. He, rather than the local authorities, appears to have organised the measures for the defence of the realm.

Again, Norfolk appears to have been without its Lord Lieutenant, all instructions being sent to the Deputy-Lieutenants. Both in this county and Suffolk the inhabitants, finding the encampment on the sea coast 'greatlye chargeable and burthensome unto them,' the Council 'thought meete the same should continue onelye for one month,' one company relieving another at the end of that time. In those parts Sir Thomas Leighton

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was given a special commission to review the local levies and report to the Council thereon. The Sheriffs of Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex were bidden to render him assistance. Sir John Norris was sent on a similar mission to Kent, Sussex, Hants, and Dorset.

Again, the Lord Chancellor being Lord Lieutenant of Middle-sex, it appears that the County Justices took the levies in hand. They were first required to find 1500 soldiers, but pleaded that large numbers claimed exemption on the ground either that they were servants or officers of the Queen, or were citizens of London, or belonged to the Tower Hamlets, or had houses elsewhere, and consequently were charged elsewhere for military service. The number was accordingly reduced from 1500 to 1000.

Lastly, the Council appears to have communicated with the Earl of Pembroke, Lord President of Wales, rather than with the Lieutenants of the Welsh counties. Here, too, a special Commissioner (Sir Thomas Morgan) was sent down from London to

organise the troops.

It soon became apparent that persons liable to military service were not furnished with the necessary arms and armour, and instructions were sent to the various County Lieutenants to take for the purpose all arms sequestered from recusants two years before, and to seize any more that might now be found in the possession of recusants. These were to be sold to the persons

requiring them, and the price paid over to the owners.

A main army, called the Queen's Guard, was formed under the Lieutenancy of the Earl of Leicester, the Lord Steward. The

retainers of any peer summoned to attend Her Majesty were to join this Guard instead of serving in the county levies, and from many of the counties the greater part of the musters raised were summoned to London and thence to Tilbury in August—the whole of the Hertfordshire levies (1500); 1500 out of the 1871 raised in Surrey; 1500 out of 1900 for Berks; 1150 out of 1164 for Oxfordshire; 2500 out of 4000 for Gloucestershire; 3000 out of 4239 for Suffolk; and so on. Arms were issued from the Tower of London to this army, and instructions were sent to the Lord Mayor that he should tell the City brewers to 'carrye some quantitie of beere thither where they should finde readie moneye.'

The Deputy-Lieutenants, however, stayed in their own counties, sending off the trained bands under the captains they had appointed, with the 'coat and conduct money,' for which each county was liable. There appears to have been some chicanery about the raising of this money. In Devon the Council are given to understand that far greater sums had been collected by precepts from the Justices than were ever used. In some parishes money was exacted, but 'never a souldier trayned.' Men

had been pressed and discharged again on payment of monies. their places being taken by untrained recruits, some of the Justices being themselves under suspicion of complicity in such malpractices. It is clear that the picture drawn by Shakespeare in 2 Henry IV. iii. 2, of Falstaff's recruiting expedition into Gloucestershire may well have reproduced his own experience in the year of the Armada, and have exaggerated the facts to no great extent. Indeed, one cannot but suspect some knavery having been the occasion of a reference to the levies for this very county in the Privy Council's minute-book under the date of Thomas and Joseph Baynham, having been 18th of August. given by the Lord Lieutenant of Gloucestershire the charge of trayning and conducting' 200 soldiers apiece, 'wherein they had taken great care and diligence,' complained that the charge had been afterwards assigned to others. The Lord Lieutenant was ordered to look into the matter. The 'forwardness' of the Deputy Lieutenants of Somerset in collecting for the quota required from their county men 'well-chosen and of willing minds' called forth a week before a special letter of thanks. In Hertfordshire, on the other hand, strict measures had to be taken with 'divers gentlemen and others' who fraudulently changed the good and serviceable horses they had furnished at the musters for very bad ones.

On the whole, if we may judge the temper of the times from the proceedings of the Privy Council, the patriotism shown in our present day of stress need not fear comparison with the 'spacious

days' of Queen Elizabeth.

One more extract from the Acts for the Armada year may be quoted as illustrating how the novel Tudor militia system superseded the older county institutions. The Council were on the 27th of October informed that, though a Commission under the Great Seal had been issued to the Sheriff of Cambridgeshire to take unto him the posse comitatus for the enforcement of a decree in Chancery whereby one William Redman, Archdeacon of Canterbury, was to be put in possession of the manor of Great Shelford, yet the Sheriff, meeting with resistance 'to the hurte of some of his companie,' had after several attempts failed to carry out the law. Lord North, then Lieutenant of the county, was accordingly commanded to go to the Sheriff's assistance and arrest the offenders, sending them up to London or taking sureties in 2001. each for their appearance before the Council.

The proceedings of the Privy Council during 1589 illustrate our subject from a somewhat different standpoint. The military operations for this year were chiefly concerned with the retaliatory expedition to Portugal fitted out by Drake, Sir John Norris, and other 'adventurers,' of whom the Queen was one. Though this

could not in any sense be called an operation for the defence of the realm, instructions were sent early in January to the County Lieutenants in the south of England to levy troops for the purpose, and measures were taken for the impressment of trumpeters, drummers, fifers, surgeons, and armourers to join the expedition. There seems to have been no general opposition to these measures, and it may be further noted that instructions were sent to the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Treasurer, and the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs of London to prevent the arrest of any persons enlisted for the expedition, and to set free any who had been arrested (otherwise than in execution) since enlistment. The men from Hampshire, however, were ill-supplied with arms, and a letter had to be written to the Lords Lieutenant (of whom there were then two for the county), pointing out that 5s. for a coat and 3s. 4d. for a sword was 'verie lyttle,' and asking that further allowance should be made. In May letters were again sent out to the Lieutenants for mustering, arming, and arraying the county levies. It is not clear what was the occasion of this. It may have been done on account of bad news from Portugal, where Drake and Norris's forces were not prospering as well as the Council may have anticipated; but from a letter sent to one of the Lords Lieutenant of Hampshire on the 13th of May it would appear that the Council was by no means satisfied with either the quality or the quantity of the troops levied in this and the preceding year. His lordship was enjoined to take counsel with such of the County Justices as he should think meet how these defects might be remedied.

Soldiers were also required to garrison the 'cautionary towns' of the Low Countries, such as Flushing, Ostend, and Bergen-op-Zoom, where the English were helping the Dutch in their struggle against Spain. Most of these appear to have been obtained by impressment, and the Lord Mayor of London was told on the 6th of May to collect some forty or fifty from the City, where were 'divers masterless men to be found that lived idlely, and might well be spared.' It was probably one of these who was brought before the Council on the 4th of June by a pursuivant for having used 'contemptuous woordes when he was to be presed as a drommer to goo towards Ostende.' It does not appear what was eventually done with him. No other contumacy of the kind is recorded during the year. In all, some 500 were levied or 'imprested' from London for Ostend alone, 404 of whom had to be supplied with arms from Government stores: 150 of them being said to be 'verie bare apparelled' and 'in naked sort,' the Lord Mayor was enjoined to take order that they should be furnished with 'necessarie rayment' at the cost of one mark apiece. On the 8th of June the Lord Mayor was told that in future all levies should be raised in the City through him, instead of by officers sent expressly by the Council. From various instructions issued, it is plain that the Council had reason to fear peculation in the matter of the soldiers' pay after their arrival at Ostend.

Lastly, we may mention that inquiry into the frauds of 1588 in connexion with the Devonshire musters was continued in 1589, with the result that the monies fraudulently obtained were apparently, after much trouble, refunded. Similar frauds were discovered in Wiltshire. Forty shillings seems to have been an ordinary price for a man to pay to a Justice or his servant for discharge after having been impressed.

It is probable that a thorough examination of the daily minutes of the Privy Council for three successive years, at a time when military service was being freely enforced in accordance with the Common Law, will give a fairer idea of the operation of the law than would be given by a selection of the more striking entries during an extended period. No excuse, therefore, is needed for quoting further references to the subject in the year 1590. In this year an expedition was fitted out for France under the command of Sir John Norris to help Henry the Fourth against the League. It was at first intended that the greater part of the troops should come from the garrisons of the 'Cautionary Towns,' but deference was paid to objections raised by the Dutch States, and instructions were sent in January to the County Lieutenants to have their quotas ready for service. Out of every hundred men, forty were to be armed with pikes and corslets, five to be halberdiers, twenty musketeers, and the rest 'shot with callivers' (an arquebus lighter and shorter than a musket, which was fired without a rest). But to save the county expense in each case, the levies might be short by ten per cent., 'though the Queen's Majestie is to make her paie to the full number without saving any penie therebie.' It is not clear in what proportion the monies raised in the counties for 'coat and conduct' were ordinarily supplemented by allowances from the Exchequer, but it would appear that some controversy had arisen with regard to the heavy cost of the levies constantly raised during Elizabeth's reign for military purposes. Later in the month further instructions were issued, with a special recommendation to summon such persons to the muster 'as have served as soldiers aforetyme,' but much was left to the discretion of the Lieutenants as they should find 'most convenient both for the service and the ease of the contrie.' Later in the year, when the levies were ordered to march to various ports to embark for foreign service, 4s. a head was allowed by Her Majesty 'for everie coate,' and for 'conduct' either a halfpenny for each mile or 8d. for each day from the time they left their respective counties. The soldiers were also to be given their ordinary wages till they embarked, further allowances on board ship, and when they landed in France to 'enter into the monethlie paie.' Great care was to be taken to have an inventory of their arms and 'apparrellinge,' so that all might be restored on the army's return from foreign service.

It is clear from these and other similar entries that while service abroad in the Queen's armies was recognised as obligatory, the machinery for raising the necessary forces was not so well established but that disputes might arise with regard to it, and fresh instructions had constantly to be sent to the officers charged with the duty of enforcing the obligation. The difference in the operation of this law and that for impressment for the Navy, which appears to have had a precisely similar traditional origin, is very remarkable. The press-gang lingers in our memory mostly for the hardships it entailed and the efforts made to evade it: impressment for the County Militia carries with it no such associations. Whether it be that military service is more congenial to the Englishman than service on board ship, or that it was less onerous to him through being enforced by his neighbours and known officials instead of by strangers; or (which is perhaps the most probable reason) it was easier from the earliest times to escape it by providing a substitute, it has certainly left no such memories as the naval press-gang has. Further, while statutes for the purpose of enforcing military service are very numerous, naval impressment appears in our statute-book merely as a burden which Parliament has from time to time found it necessary to alleviate by granting exemption to certain classes of persons or by restricting the powers of the Crown with respect to it.

But however this may be, the reign of Elizabeth saw the last of obligatory military service in the strictest sense—that is to say, the sense in which service in the Navy was enforced up to the last century. The Act of 1557 was repealed in James the First's reign (1 Jac. I. cap. 25): an Act of Charles the First (16 Car. I. cap. 28) declared impressment by the Crown for the Army was illegal, though it authorised Justices of the Peace by order of Parliament to impress all men between 18 and 60 for the war. In the disputes between King and Parliament it would appear that Parliament repudiated not so much the ancient obligation to military service as the methods by which the Crown had enforced it. In the Petition of Right it is martial law as imposed by Royal Commissions that is mainly impugned. Nevertheless, it would not have been surprising if, in the welter of civil strife that followed these disputes, the ancient law of the realm had

been finally and irrevocably submerged; and it is perhaps the strongest evidence of its tenacity that it reappeared in a comprehensive and carefully elaborated form in one of the earliest Acts of the Restoration Parliament. The law of 1557 was reestablished in a modified form. In each county there was to be a Lord Lieutenant, who should appoint Deputy Lieutenants to undertake the duty of mustering the county levies when occasion required, the soldiers to be provided by owners of property in proportion to their income. Some relics of the older system remained in that certain great Crown officers, the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, the Warden of the Stannaries, the Governor of the Isle of Wight, discharged this function within their several jurisdictions in the place of County Lieutenants, and to this day the City of London has a Commission of Lieutenancy but no Lord Lieutenant.

Then when the Seven Years' War put a severe strain on our military resources more stringent measures were necessary for reaping the full benefit of the County Militia, and the Militia ballot was introduced by an Act of 1757. Under this the liability of every able-bodied adult to military service might have been made a reality, but it would appear that in fact the ballot was not put in force till 1775, and from the first every man balloted was allowed to find a substitute. During the Napoleonic period various experiments were made for the purpose of obtaining a Reserve Army from the material supplied by the oldest of our constitutional forces, and Militia Acts have been Mr. Fortescue, in his County Lieutenancies very numerous. and the Great War, gives a full account of the system during 1802-14. He points out that in all the discussions on the subject it was taken for granted that no one balloted for the Militia would serve in person, and notes that in one year in the Middlesex Militia out of more than 45,000 men there was only one principal—i.e. only one who was not a substitute for an original Whatever may be said of the suspension of the existing Militia Ballot Act, which has for long been an annual ceremony, it cannot be contended that under the existing Acts any approach to universal personal service could be made. The Militia Acts are a remarkable illustration of the law by which civic freedom involves a liability to military service whenever national interests demand it; but Mr. Fortescue has pointed out in a very convincing manner that their actual operation has been in the past by no means favourable to the national interests whenever those interests have made a large increase in the Regular Army

Any novel application of the law which we have traced from the eleventh century onwards would form a subject of discussion 1915

quite beyond the limits of the present article. Such application would obviously require the creation of administrative machinery not so far in existence.

The Acts relating to the Militia form an almost impenetrable tangle into which no one is likely to enter unnecessarily, but so far as the ballot is concerned the law at present, according to the officially authorised Manual of Military Law, appears to stand as follows: Those provisions of a Consolidation Act of 1802 (42 Geo. III. c. 90) which relate to the ballot are still in force, though they have been amended by some later Acts. No ballot for the Militia appears to have been held since 1810, except in the years 1830 and 1831. First in 1816 under a temporary Act, and then in 1817 under a permanent Act, the provisions for annual training were suspended year by year by Orders in Council. Next, from 1829 to 1865 annual Acts were passed suspending all proceedings for raising Militia by ballot, except when specially authorised by Order in Council, as happened in 1830 and 1831. The Act of 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 46), though for one year only, has been continued in force since 1865 by Annual Expiring Laws Continuance Acts.

Lastly, in 1808 and 1812, independently of the legislation referred to above, special Acts were passed for raising by ballot in each county a force of men between 18 and 30, which was styled 'Local Militia,' and is said in the Manual of Military Law to represent the old general levy. Each man balloted must serve in person for four years and receives no bounty. No force has been raised under these Acts since 1815. From 1815 to 1832 Orders in Council were annually passed suspending the operation of the Acts, but the Act authorising the issue of these Orders was itself repealed as obsolete in 1873. The 'Local Militia,' as distinguished from the regular Militia with which we are more familiar, does not seem to have ever been of actual importance; but the provisions relating to it are of interest as showing at what a comparatively recent date the ancient law of military service was embodied by Parliament in a statutory form.

H. B. SIMPSON.

## WAR AND THE FARMER

THE farmer is a chartered grumbler, and some dispensation of Providence, doubtless wise, provides him with a grievance at all seasons. When sunny weather is ripening his corn he remembers that it is shrinking his root crops; when the rain bulks his roots he remembers that it is spoiling his corn. If prices are high he declares that it is difficult to buy linseed or cotton cake and barley meal at a fair figure; if prices are low he will point out the impossibility of growing corn at a profit. If a prolonged spell of fine weather brings his clover and meadow hays safely to the stack he will point out the urgent need of rain for the seed clover and the after feed. He may have learned by experience that seed clovers can thrive through a drought, but the theory of his childhood is too firmly established to be relinquished at the bidding of mere fact. It follows that his complaints are regarded as incidental to his occupation, and are seldom taken seriously. At present he may be heard to declare that he is one of the worst sufferers from the War, but with wheat somewhere between fifty and sixty shillings a quarter, oats hard to obtain, and the price of meat standing high, nobody is prepared to believe him. He has cried 'Wolf' so long that, now the wolf is really at his door, his protests rouse very little interest.

To begin to understand his present position, it is necessary to remember that for long years past the number of agricultural labourers in this country has been steadily shrinking. The development of causes have contributed to the decline. towns and urban industries has drawn men from rural districts; the call of the Dominions overseas has taken agriculturalists from the British Isles by the hundred thousand. Canada and Australia have little use for the town-bred worker; they have gone so far as to warn him to stay away unless he has the wherewithal to live while he looks round for the place that may or may not be forthcoming. On the other hand, the sturdy labourer has always been welcome; he has a standing invitation. fares are arranged for his benefit; work awaits his arrival, and the wages are sufficiently high to enable him in Canada after a few years of strenuous life to take up one of the 160-acre farms that can be paid for over a term of years, farms on which 50 acres have been broken up and laid down to wheat, on which a homestead with suitable outbuildings has been set up and much of the pioneer work accomplished. Canada, with an area greater than that of the United States and little more than ten per cent. of its population, is hungry for men; Australia, not very far behind Canada in area, and with special advantages of her own, is equally clamant, and, since the twentieth century dawned, Great Britain has parted with more than a million of her sturdiest sons. They have not gone in the main from the towns but from the country. Our Dominions overseas receive a set-back from time to time; they outgrow their financial resources or suffer from over-speculation in one form or another, and then they must call a halt; but whatever the nature of the reverse, nothing less than an unforeseen succession of bad harvests can diminish the call for agricultural labour, and the agents of the Dominions go through every county at home telling in no reticent or guarded fashion the story of an Eldorado overseas.

For some years past the farmer has felt the pinch and has done nothing. Agricultural wages have remained as near as possible to starvation point, any little increase, grudgingly conceded, having been more than offset by the rise in prices of the necessities of life. It has not been possible for the labourer to pay an economic rent, the shilling or eighteenpence that he contributes weekly has not availed to keep his overcrowded home in habitable repair, and it is hopeless to build new cottages for him on the basis of a four per cent. return. Even if it were, the farmer would not undertake the task unless he owned his farm; he will not often do it then, and the landlord has not recovered from the long season of low prices, and is concerned with his mortgages rather than with improvements. Local authorities have the power but lack the will; their concern is for the ratepayer's pocket, and they themselves are ratepayers. Farmers have long complained that the present farm hand works far less than his father and grandfather did in the long day that brought them to the workhouse at last; they know that the man who does little at home develops new capacities in the Dominions, but they do not realise that the conditions and surroundings in the stimulating air of Canada or Australia, added to the living force of a vigorous democracy, are sufficient to account for the change. Here the labourer has no future; there his future is in his own hands. The present Government tried to improve the status of agriculture through the medium of the Small Holdings Act, but, as I pointed out in these pages some year or two ago, they did no more than put the cart before the horse. They exhausted the small capital that labour could save or borrow and provided no

market for produce. A couple of bad seasons could, and generally did, suffice to throw the labourer back into his old, hopeless position.

It followed naturally from the conditions briefly outlined here that this country was not in the position to part with its agricultural labourers when War broke out. There were no reserves to fall back upon; the men who left could not be replaced, for they are skilled workmen, albeit the worst-paid in Great Britain. Unfortunately the dangerous disease required a desperate remedy: the farmer and the landowner found themselves side by side on the village platform urging every able-bodied man to serve his country in the hour of need. Thousands of married labourers answered the call and went to submit their strength to the disci-They left home cheerfully, partly out of the pline of training. Anglo-Saxon love of adventure, partly out of the knowledge that their wives and children would be better off than they had ever been. The labourer with three or four children might bring home fifteen or sixteen shillings a week; out of that he would require perhaps as much as sixpence a day for his own beer and tobacco; the remainder must feed him as well as the family, and the housewife's task was hard. To-day he is better clothed and better fed than he has ever been; he is setting aside a certain amount of money against the end of the War, while his wife draws fifteen shillings weekly, with an extra allowance for each child. farmer works short-handed; he has in many cases raised the wages of those who remain behind, and he knows that the fighters will not return to the old conditions when War is over. They will be new men demanding new terms and treatment, and if they cannot find them at home they will look for them abroad.

Having taken toll and tithe of his labour, the Government bade the farmer sow more corn; and when these instructions were issued many farmers realised the seriousness of the situation, none more than those whose plough horses, or some of them, had been commandeered soon after harvest. Straw had been denied them, but they were bidden to increase the tale of bricks. It was reported by the Board of Agriculture that an addition of ten per cent. to the corn area might be anticipated, and this may be set down roughly at about 200,000 To bring this change about many labourers would be necessary, the extent varying according to the nature of the soil. Draining, liming, stone clearing, manuring, ploughing, cultivating, harrowing, rolling, would be necessary, together with some sacrifice of pulse, forage, root crops, and new pastures. Whatever the measure of labour required, it would not be inconsiderable, even granting that certain pulse and forage crops require more attention than corn, and the conditions would be further complicated by the fact that low-grade farming is far more common in this country to-day than it used to be in times when labour was plentiful. Without using modern machinery, the only safe labour-saver, the farmer has been forced, or has chosen, to farm poorly. One sees in nearly all parts of rural England fields with wide borders untouched by the plough and full of corn cockle, thistles, coltsfoot, bindweed, dodder, docks, field foxtail, and nettle; all too often these unwelcome visitors, to say nothing of others, have eaten far into cultivated land. At the best of times they seemed to have passed out of control; they will become a worse danger than before, when the already attenuated supply of labour is spread over a wider area. Spraying, draining, deep ploughing, fallowing, digging, all take time, cost money and demand hard work.

Parliament has partly recognised the special needs of the hour, and is prepared to allow children to work on the land and to advocate the employment of women. In Scotland and the North of England women are accustomed to help, and their labours are valuable, particularly in the dairy, for few cows will yield as freely to men as to women; in the south and centre women are hard to find even for milking, and now that the wives are receiving an ample allowance it is to be feared that their appearance in the fields will be sporadic. The value of children is doubtful, and the wisdom of their indiscriminate use more doubtful still. You may find them in pea-picking time doing their share and welcoming the little holiday from school, but their attendance in all weathers as constant workers is not likely to be regular. The mothers have no incentive to urge the children, and the physique of the country-born is not what it is popularly supposed to be. Down to a few months ago they did not always have enough to eat; the food their father's agricultural wage commanded was of the poorest. Herded together in overcrowded cottages, sleeping in rooms from which all suspicion of fresh air is excluded, they are in many cases more puny and delicate than the children of the towns.

To add to the farmer's troubles, the winter now at an end has been extremely unfavourable. Down to the end of September the year's rainfall was below the average; by the end of December that average had been exceeded. The mid-winter months provided nothing but rain, the frosts that complete the work of the plough and make the earth friable were conspicuously absent, low-lying lands were flooded in every direction and are saturated, winter-sown corn suffered, and spring sowing, late everywhere, has in certain parts been abandoned. If the full shortage of labour has not yet been experienced, it is because the land, down to middle March, has been too soft for spade or

plough. Some farmers have been unable to send their corn to market because there was no dry wind to remove the moisture from the stacks, and in the face of rising prices they have been unable to handle last year's harvest. This statement applies only to those more fortunate men who are able to hold their produce of whatever kind until the early glut, following hay or corn harvest, has been absorbed by the consumer. It is safe to say that the weather has been a factor in that rise of prices that has forced bread to its present figure and has added so much to the troubles of those whose earnings have been adversely affected by the War. Those corn-holding farmers who made a desperate effort to ignore the weather merely flooded the market with grain that could not be used for anything much more useful than poultry food.

With a favourable winter it is possible to have all the spring corn sown in March, and to have the other work on the land well forward. Under the exceptional conditions of the past six months there is hardly a farmer in the country whose preparations for the coming season are not badly in arrear, and even if he had a full complement of labourers he would not be free of anxiety. However small his supply at present, there are certain demands that must be met. He must have horsemen and cowmen, he must have stockmen and a shepherd under ordinary circumstances; whatever the size and needs of his holding, the live stock claim attention for the good and sufficient reason that they represent a part of his capital and cannot be neglected for a day. Only when their needs have been satisfied can the actual work on the land be considered. There is another difficulty before him. However ill-supplied he may be, there are others who are worse off and will endeavour to secure additional labour at his expense with the bait of a higher wage. Almost for the first time in his life, the farmer must conciliate his men, and they have not been slow to realise that they have the whip hand. Apart from the farmers whose chief concern is corn, the cattle-breeders, the men who live by fattening stock, the keepers of a dairy herd-all have been face to face with shortage of labour.

Enough has been said to show that the double problem of a mild, rainy winter and a short labour supply lies beyond the ordinary methods of solution; we may turn now to consider the effect upon the farmer of the extraordinary rise in prices since War began.

To do this it is necessary, in the first instance, to divide farmers into two classes. The first, a comparatively small one, embraces the men with ample capital and considerable holdings of their own. There were not many of these a few years ago, but after 1910 the general upward tendency of prices began to make

itself felt, and, while hundreds of landowners were selling a part of their estates in order to limit the area of increased taxation as applied to themselves, thousands of substantial farmers took advantage of the opportunity to become their own landlords. A farm is a very intimate and personal possession: every field has its special capacities, its little failings only to be checked by those who have watched it year by year; the old-established man can thrive where a new man would either fail or earn no more than a bare living. The comparatively rich farmers are in a position to mould their supplies to the demand, to sell or to hold, to increase one crop and diminish another, to use the best fertilisers, keep a good herd of cows or flock of sheep, and to purchase pedigree sires. They are sure of their market, and though bad weather and scanty labour affect them too, they can gather the benefits without suffering greatly from the evils of high prices. They have never known what is called in country parlance 'Saturday night farming'--that is to say, they have not to condition their work to the needs of their wages and living bill. Their holdings may be anything from four hundred up to a thousand acres, in some few cases several thousand, and as they are always practical and often hard workers who do not spare themselves more than they spare their men, the circumstances of the time present few vital difficulties. Perhaps the best farming in England is done by men with moderate holdings; too much land is almost as bad as too little, and undoubtedly some farmers hold more than they can attend to. It is unlikely that the big men will be able to raise as much spring corn as they hoped to do a few months ago, but theirs as a rule is high farming, and they are staffed to face abnormal times. It would be well for the country at large if farmers of a fairly large holding were in the majority, but the fact remains that it is very greatly outnumbered by the small men whose labours and responsibilities never end, and whose profits, always at the mercy of chance, have been ruined by high prices.

Paradoxical as this may seem it is easily explained and understood. The greater part of this country is farmed with insufficient capital by men whose grandfathers were prosperous until the repeal of the Corn Laws, whose fathers struggled to keep their homes together by aid of grants and rebates from the landlord. They farm with a minimum of labour, with old-fashioned implements, inferior stock, insufficient fertilisers, and the mental equipment of mid-Victorian times. In a good year they may set a little money aside, in an average year they earn a living, after a bad season they must draw upon their scanty savings or fall into arrears. Some have purchased their holding in the last few years and have a mortgage upon it; whatever the times and circumstances they must struggle on as best

they can, because there is not under the sun another occupation Their inability to pay proper wages or keep decent cottages for their labourers is one of the main factors in the agricultural unrest; even if they merely rent their holding and do not own it, the chances are that the landlord is relatively as poor as they. A burnt stack, a lost horse or cow, an outbreak of swine fever, any one of these ordinary incidents of the farmer's year will cripple them for the time being. By reason of their lack of capital they flood the market and depress prices. As soon as their hay is stacked it must be sold to pay the extra hands that helped to cut and cart and stack it; their corn goes to the threshing machine as soon as it can be hired and to market in the week or two following; nothing must stay on the premises after it becomes saleable. Those who have studied the Board of Agriculture's weekly returns will not have failed to note how prices fall as soon as hay or corn is ready for market, and the money paid at a hundred centres keeps the small farmer on his He is essentially backward in all his methods and intolerant of progress; having no money for modern improvements he is suspicious of them. Suggestions of co-operation in whatever form fall upon deaf ears; he knows that he has mastered the peculiarities of his own few fields and believes that this mastery extends to the whole practice of farming. A dour, hardworking and woefully backward man, he nevertheless does a brave day's work and seldom voices a specific grievance. To-day he is in serious trouble and needs prompt assistance.

The Government that came to the assistance of the banks and Stock Exchange can hardly overlook the small agriculturalist, for his troubles are largely due to the War, and for all his faults or shortcomings the country requires his services. Harvest was beginning when war broke out, and the ready-money grower sold his wheat at about forty shillings, his barley at thirty, and his oats at twenty-five, all fair prices. He was able to buy seedwheat for winter sowing at a moderate figure. By the time the rise in prices began to be noticeable, the great majority of farmers, who are not stock-breeders with good connexion, had nothing left to sell. In accordance with their custom they had finished with corn for the year, and were turning their attention to fattening oxen, sheep, pigs, their main source of support be-For stock feeding they require maize, barley tween harvests. meal, middlings, linseed cake, beans, cotton cake, oats, and peas. It is impossible to quote prices with certainty when they move from day to day, but in general terms it may be said that maize and barley meal have gone from thirty shillings a quarter Middlings and linseed cake have risen about 31. per to forty. ton, cotton cake about 2l. per ton. Beans have gone from about thirty-two shillings to forty-two, oats from twenty-five shillings

per quarter have reached thirty-five, and peas have advanced from thirty-six shillings to forty-eight. Before these lines can be printed changes in either direction may be recorded, but it may be said that the farmer has been compelled to pay twentysix or twenty-seven shillings for the food that a pound would have purchased before War began. In some cases the proportion is even higher. Spring-seed corns are very expensive. The man who sold his wheat at two pounds in August last will probably find that his spring seed costs three, or even more, for you cannot sow any kind of wheat in spring. Oats for March planting will cost him five shillings a sack more than his own fetched, and seed barley shows in some cases an increase of fifty per cent. The rise in the price of stock, although it is not inconsiderable, is not sufficient to cover the added cost of foodstuffs, and one hears in all directions of farmers who have been obliged to sell stock before it was ready for the market, either because they could not afford to buy more food at the enhanced figures, or because they needed the money to meet the high price of seed oats and barley. Some farmers with milking herds and contracts that run to April have been losing money, few have made any. Even where they could pay for the food required, there have been other difficulties; first, the delay in getting delivery by rail on lines required for military service; and, finally, the difficulty of carting. All these are small matters enough: so, too, is the additional two or three shillings to the wages of the labourer; but the cumulative effect is very considerable, and while many men can hardly see how they are going to hold out between now and harvest, still more realise that a really bad harvest would give them their knock-out blow. August weather in these islands is always variable, and it is clear that the harvest will take an unusual time to collect, in the first place because of the extension of corn area, and secondly on account of the labour shortage. Nowadays the hands make great efforts because so many farmers pay a lump sum for harvesting, and the sooner it is over the more profitable it is to the harvester; but even with men working as they never work at other times one may see the harvest considerably delayed by a few days' rain. If we have a wet harvest thousands of acres of corn will remain to rot in the fields, unless some new conditions are developed between now and August.

There are one or two other points relating to the financial position of the small farmer. He does not employ much labour, but what he does employ is costing him an addition of fifteen or twenty per cent. For assistance at harvest time he will need to pay a special price. His tithe being regulated by the price of wheat, oats, and barley, will in all probability be higher this year than it has been for a quarter of a century, and if he be

farming on a short or yearly tenancy he may reasonably expect to find his rent raised. Corn prices rule rent as they rule tithe, and it is well to remember that very many of those wicked Tory landlords, who really understood the farmer's difficulties, and knew how to distinguish between facts and appearances, have sold a great part of their land to men without traditions, who look upon it as an investment and nothing else. When the small man cannot thrive and the big man can absorb his holding the modern landlord or his agent will merely say *Vae victis*.

If the country could spare its small farmers there would be nothing more to be said, but it cannot. We have too few in England at present, and the real necessity of the hour is to help them to help themselves, to overcome their innate contempt for modern methods, and to place before them the means of making up for the loss of men and horses, the increased cost of foodstuffs, the increasing cost of freights, and the railway company's delays. This work, which can only be accomplished by the Government, has long been necessary, and we have only gone without it at a great cost in efficiency and with ample waste of national resources. To-day, when all our business methods are undergoing the closest scrutiny, the claims of agriculture cannot be overlooked, and even if the Government has not yet taken any steps to help the farmer, it has at least recognised his need for assistance.

There are two ways in which the Government can come to the farmer's aid. The first is by the supply of that modern machinery by which the shortage of labour may be made up. Steam and petrol can do a giant's work. For example, the steam cultivator can reduce a big field to order in far less time than three teams of horses would require, and for the smaller fields that cannot be handled by the large engines, by reason of the room they need for turning, there are small motor ploughs that save both time and money. A horse working all day can pull one tenth of its own weight; to compare this with engine capacity is to realise at once how much time and labour are lost under the normal conditions of ploughing. Much of the work done in all small farms by hand under cover could be more than trebled by the introduction of small engines fed by oil or petrolchaff cutting, meal grinding, root pulping, water pumping, and the rest could be completed in a fraction of the time. On the road the slow-going farm wagon could be replaced by the motor van. The harvest in North America consists of little more than one operation; a single machine serves to cut the corn and thresh it, being fed by the straw, for which there is no demand. In this country the value of straw for thatch, litter, chaff, and other purposes, calls for some other fuel, perhaps the substitution of oil or petrol, but this should not prove a problem beyond the resources of our engineers. It is interesting to note that nearly forty years have passed since experiments in ploughing by electricity were carried on in France. To-day the highest point of agricultural development, as far as labour-saving machinery is concerned, has been reached in America, and the methods followed in both the United States and Canada are worthy the closest attention, even though it must be admitted that the harvest weather in America is more reliable than it is here, and that for the best results fine days are indispensable.

At the present moment one cannot expect farmers to invest in modern machinery; even if they had the inclination they lack the means, but if the Government, through the Board of Agriculture, would supply the necessary machinery at different centres throughout the rural areas, and would notify the farmers of the terms on which they could be hired, the whole procedure of farming by machinery could be put upon a business basis. The farmer does a certain amount of hiring already; the steam plough, the threshing machine, and other agricultural plant, pass in their due season from farm to farm. This supply, however, is in private hands, is only moderately efficient, and leaves a large field of work untouched. Some farmers have their own machines, though they are only in use for a week or two in the year. If the Board of Agriculture took the matter in hand the middleman might be eliminated, the area of operations would be extended considerably, and, by reason of the rapidity with which the work can be done, it would be possible to collect the harvest for a number of farms in the time and with no more labour than is required for one. It would pay the farmer to meet charges that paid an interest on the outlay and provided a sinking fund to buy new machinery in due course. In a few country districts enterprising merchants may be found to take the farmer's corn from the threshing machine to the market town, prepare it for market and sell on commission. such firms are few.

Motor wagons for the transport of corn, hay, straw, and some of the stock from farm to railhead or market, would be an immense advantage to farmers. At present one man, sometimes two, go on a journey that may be ten miles or more out and home, by the side of the slow-moving carthorse. They take their time, receive a special allowance for carting, and stay as long as may be necessary at their favourite inn to liquidate it. Coal is generally carted from distant stations in the same comfortable, primitive fashion. In short, the whole pace of farming needs to be speeded up, and this can only be done by Government aid. As the Government demands more corn in the country's vital interests, it is not unreasonable that it should provide the machinery that will ensure the required supply under new condi-

tions that have made soldiers of so many agricultural labourers and made farming on the old lines well-nigh impracticable.

The other pressing need of the hour is a system of co-operation, for which we must look to Denmark rather than to North America for a model. It is not necessary to discuss the Danish system at any length; its general principles are familiar to all who take any interest in agricultural problems, and though the Danish farmers are not a very thriving body, they would hardly be able to remain in business at all if they followed our English methods. Co-operation has been demanded these many years; a few stray experiments have been made and failed because farmers would not assist. To-day the case is altered; the country needs all the food it can raise, and it is common knowledge that in every county in these islands an immense amount of fruit and vegetables is wasted annually because it can find no market. While there may be a shortage of certain foods in one district, in another these same foods are being fed to the pigs. make a single journey with a small supply is not a paying proposition; to send some foods to London is to incur a heavy expense for cartage, railway freight, and commission, and then to have the produce handled by a buying ring in the London market, so that the result of the whole transaction is often a definite loss. This has been the actual experience of the writer. The co-operative van would solve all these problems and would carry the good food to those who stand in need of it. While the fruit present system is wasteful and ridiculous. wastes in the English orchards, the townsman buys what has been sent from America or the Cape and has contributed the most of its flavour to the ships and trains that carried it; while not a tithe of our gardens and orchards pay toll to the honey bee, we pay 30,000l. a year for foreign honey.

If Denmark can make general farming and small culture possible through the medium of co-operation, why can we not do the same? And, having taken the responsibility of establishing the small-holder, why should not the Government give him the only assistance that can enable him to bear the heavy burden

of the gift?

It may be that down to the present the country has not been ripe for the change, that the hostility of the backward farmer has been a factor in the delay. Now the times have changed, and those of us to whom active participation in the present world tragedy is forbidden are prepared to do all that in us lies to increase the country's food supply and to see it directed into the right channels. But only the Government can give this movement the impetus necessary to enable it to ride, rough-shod if need be, over the ruts of long accumulated prejudice.

S. L. BENSUSAN.

## THE TRUTH ABOUT BIRTH- AND DEATH-RATES:

#### A REPLY TO DR. BREND

No subject which has been brought further forward by the War is of greater importance than that dealt with by Dr. William A. Brend in the March issue of the Nineteenth Century, in an article under the rather sinister title 'The Passing of the Child.' His view that 'changes have occurred, and are still taking place, in our population which point to the conclusion that the population of Germany, already much the greater, will in ensuing decades tend more and more to outstrip ours at an increasingly rapid rate,' is so gloomy that it must have depressed many of his readers. They will probably welcome any destructive criticism of Dr. Brend's paper which can reasonably be offered, and may even be disposed to listen to one who has studied the population question without any theological or socialistic prejudices, and has failed in consequence to see that the Malthusian principle is 'an exploded doctrine,' as it is so commonly described.

A brief historical review of the subject will enable the reader to appreciate the significance of Dr. Brend's cautiously vague arguments which 'point with a high degree of probability to a further fall in the birth-rate altogether independent of any increase in the practice which is the main cause of the fall, as well as to an automatic rise in the death-rate at no very distant time.' In 1798 the Rev. T. R. Malthus showed in his famous Essay on the Principle of Population that as food supplies could only be increased slowly, populations could only be increased slowly-in other words, that high birth-rates only caused high He advocated the remedy of late marriage and death-rates. small families; nevertheless, the birth- and death-rates continued high. But his theory became accepted, and became the basis of Political Economy and of the Doctrine of Evolution. Meanwhile, the system of early marriage and small families, or Neomalthusianism as it is now called, had sprung up. About 1832 a popular pamphlet on the subject was written by Dr. Knowlton,

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an American physician. In 1876 its sale, which had hitherto been very small, was suddenly forbidden in England. In the following year Charles Bradlaugh and Mrs. Annie Besant were prosecuted for publishing it to defy this prohibition. Although Lord Chief Justice Cockburn summed up strongly in their favour, the trial was decided against them. But it aroused widespread interest, and many of the reading public immediately began to limit their families. From this year the birth-rate commenced to fall in England, Germany, Austria, Holland, and Belgium, and within a decade or so in all the other European countries except Russia, the Balkan States, and Ireland. It may be noted here that the leading Neomalthusians, on humanitarian, eugenic, and anti-socialistic grounds, specially advocated encouragement of the new parents!

the new parental prudence among the poor and unfit.

Though the birth-rates were falling fairly steadily year by year as restriction extended downwards in the social scale, the populations continued to increase as fast as before because the death-rates fell with the birth-rates, as it had been predicted they But the decline had not been long in progress before false alarms began to be raised about the population diminishing. In vain did the Neomalthusians attempt to draw public attention to the equally falling death-rate, and the consequently unaffected rate of increase. In time, however, it became impossible to ignore the fact that the death-rate was correspondingly falling. So the suggestion—a particularly gratifying one to socialistic reformers—was started that the reduction was due to 'improvement in conditions,' the inference being that it was not due to any reduction of the pressure of population through family limitation. One suggestion, that it had all been brought about by the recent Public Health Act was easily disposed of, as this measure could hardly account for the strikingly synchronous reduction of the death-rate in the other countries where the birth-rate was declining. But the vaguer appeal to 'improvement in conditions' persisted, and still persists. Timely supplemented by a new line of anti-Neomalthusian argument-statistical corrections for age and sex distribution, which will be examined later—it underlies the whole of Dr. Brend's argument. reason why it still persists is that the following question continues to be ignored: Why has the death-rate risen in those countries where the birth-rate has risen, and why has the deathrate been stationary in those countries where the birth-rate has been stationary? There are four countries in which the birthrate has risen, namely Ontario (from 1895 to 1908), Japan, Ceylon, and Bulgaria. In every one of them the death-rate rose in close correspondence with the birth-rate. Can it be said that 'conditions' were deteriorating in these countries, thereby

increasing the death-rates? Again, in four countries the birthrate has remained practically stationary, namely Russia, Roumania, Jamaica, and Ireland. In these the death-rate has remained practically stationary—though Russia seems in the last few years to have had a reduction of its death-rate, and of its birth-rate. Will Dr. Brend maintain that there has been no progress in these countries of the kind which, according to his view, would reduce their death-rate? Italy is another case to which attention should be directed. Its birth-rate only began to decline about 1886. It was then about 38 per thousand, and fell to 32.5 in 1901, the death-rate meanwhile falling from about 28 per thousand to 22. According to the Eugenics Review for October, Italy's birth-rate stopped falling in 1901—and so did the death-rate! Italy's birth- and death-rates have remained practically stationary from 1901 to 1910! Yet 22 per thousand is a high death-rate. Why were the doctors and social reformers unable to reduce it these ten years?

The only satisfactory explanation of the very remarkable way in which the death-rates follow the birth-rates, i.e. of the strikingly high correlation between these rates, is the Malthusian one, namely that in every country in the world (except New Zealand, and perhaps also Australia) the birth-rates are, though in varying degrees, still excessive, and that the populations, in these varying degrees, are all pressing on their means of subsistence.

What happens when an excessive birth-rate falls is that the infants, children, and adults live longer because of their share of the insufficient food-supply being increased. In 1876, when our birth-rate was 36 and our death-rate 21, the average duration of life was about 35 years. As the birth-rate fell, this steadily increased, till now it stands at about 53 years. Why, therefore, should we not go on reducing the birth-rate so long as the average duration of life goes on increasing-in other words, so long as the death-rate falls with it? But Dr. Brend apparently believes -and this is one reason for his pessimism-that an average duration of life of 53 years is as high as we can expect to get. To this, indeed, he seems to attribute the arrest in the fall of the death-rate since 1912. He should have observed, however, that the birth-rate has also been practically stationary since 1912. and should consider whether the Maternity Benefit (to which and similar schemes he seems partial) has not actually had the effect of arresting the fall of the death-rate by arresting the fall of the birth-rate-that is, by encouraging an increase of the already excessive birth-rate among the poor. But what grounds

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In Hungary the same phenomenon followed the Act passed in 1901 for the State care of necessitous mothers and infants.

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are there for supposing that we have already reached the maximum average duration of life? None, except the determination, which we have been exposing, to ignore the economic or Malthusian factor in the maintenance of high mortality rates. Every thoughtful person must see in the mass of poverty still in our midst a potent cause of shortened lives. What reason is there to suppose that the average duration of life in a sufficiently fed community would not be over 70 years?

Assuming that an average duration of life of 70 years is possible, and that our coal and iron advantages will continue enabling us to maintain our annual increase of population of 1 per cent., the death-rate will at least continue falling with the birth-rate till the latter reaches 20 per thousand. may exclaim someone who has more faith in numbers than in the abolition of poverty and unfitness, 'the birth-rate may go on falling for many years after the death-rate will have ceased to fall with it.' The general answer to this is that there is still a very large proportion of unmarried men and women in the population, and to suggest that most people will be glad to be married and have at least two children when, through the reduction of rates and taxes and charitable demands by a low birth-rate among the poor, they will be able to do so easily; the particular answer is to point to New Zealand, where the birth-rate, having fallen till the average duration of life had risen to over 60 years, ceased to decline, and the marriage-rate increased. Another objector may, with Dr. Brend, deplore the thought of a larger proportion of people in the population being over 40 years of age. But surely the steadily rising average duration of life means that men and women are retaining their youth longer as the pressure of life diminishes. In another decade the age-limit for war service may well be over 40 years. Moreover, a country wants money as well as men for national defence, and it is the people past 40 who are the main reservoir of savings and of experience.

Before the foregoing argument is concluded, the paltry differences may be briefly considered which Dr. Brend, following on the work of Dr. Newsholme on the correction of vital statistics, introduces in the shape of modifications for age and sex distribution. (1) That the decline of the birth-rate is causing, or will cause, a change in the age and sex distribution unfavourable to a sufficient production of children. In the Registrar-General's Report for 1912 the actual analysis was given of the fall of the birth-rate and these corrections. The fall of the crude birth-rate from 1876-80 to 1912 was 11.53. This was partly responsible for increasing the number of women between 15 and 45 years of age, which should have raised the birth-rate by 2.86; but the

proportion of married women became smaller, which should have lowered the birth-rate by 1.1. The two disturbing influences acting together should, therefore, have caused a net rise of the birth-rate of 1.76; whereas there was an actual fall of 11.53, showing that the fertility of marriages had fallen even more, viz. by 11.53+1.76. So this correction, which is one of the largest, is only 1.76, as compared with a total drop of 11.53. (2) That the decrease of the death-rate is not such a gain as appears at first sight, because it is due (a) to a smaller proportion of infants among whom mortality is (necessarily?) high, and (b) to a more favourable distribution of ages. As to (a), Dr. Brend argues as if infantile mortality were a constant, and as if there were about as high a rate among the infants born to well-nourished mothers in the West End as to the underfed mothers in the East End. This, however, is too simple a way of explaining why the death-rate follows the birth-rate. The average infantile mortality in this country until recently was about 130 per thousand born, while the fall of the birth-rate has been from 36 to 24, a drop of 12 per thousand of the population. Hence, for a million of the population there are 12,000 fewer births; and, since in each thousand of these births there were 130 deaths, a reduction would result of 12×130, or 1560 deaths in a million of the population, or 1.56 per thousand. Thus the whole effect of the fall of the birth-rate on the general death-rate by reducing infantile mortality would have been 1.56 per thousand. Since the actual fall of the general death-rate was no less than 8 per thousand (viz. from 22 to 14), it is obvious that the great part of it represents a real improvement in the health of the people. As regards (b), it is only necessary to refer to the table given by the Registrar-General for 1909 showing the crude and corrected death-rates for various countries at different times. only very few cases did the differences between the crude and corrected figures exceed 1 or 2 parts per thousand, in spite of differences of birth-rates of from 15 to 20 per thousand, and of such extremes as regards migration as were shown by New Zealand's immigration and Britain's emigration. It might also be noted that in France the birth-rate has been falling for over a century, and is now the lowest on record, yet the death-rate is still decreasing, and shows no signs of the 'almost inevitable' rise which Dr. Brend makes out must well-nigh be upon us.

No table of comparative figures for the average duration of life in the various countries seems yet to have been published, and the following is an attempt to supply one. Such figures are the best indication of the degree of civilisation, though these had better be taken as only approximately correct. The table is based, where possible, on the mean of the years 1910-11-12. It

is interesting to note the pacifist countries above the 50 yearsand-over line and their low birth-rates; also that Germany will be the next country to come above the line:

	Birth-rate	Death-rate	Natural Increase	Average Duration of Life
New Zealand	26.2	9.3	16.9	61.3
Australia	27.5	10.8	16.7	56
United Kingdom .	24.4	14.2	10.2	53.8
Sweden	24.1	14	10.1	53.7
France	19.1	18.3	.8	53.2
Norway	25.8	13.4	12.4	52.8
Denmark	27	13.2	13.8	51.9
Belgium	23.4	15.8	7.6	51.7
Ireland	23.2	16.7	6.5	50.6
Holland	28.2	13.5	14.7	50.1
Switzerland	24.9	15.7	9.2	50.1
Germany	29.8	16.9	12.9	43.9
Italy	32.4	19.8	12.6	39.1
Austria	31.7	21.2	10.5	38.3
Japan	34	21.3	12.7	36.8
Spain	32.3	22.8	9.5	36.7
Servia	37.6	21.7	15.9	34.6
Hungary	957	24	11.7	33.9
Bulgaria	41.6	24.5	17.1	31
Roumania	42.1	24.6	17.5	30.7
Russia (European).	45	28.3	16.7	27.8

A very few words in conclusion will suffice for Germany. If any people had reason to be alarmed about the falling birthrate it would be the Germans.2 Whereas ours has been decreasing by about .3 per thousand per annum, theirs has in recent years been falling by over 1 per thousand—thrice as fast as ours, and the fastest in the world. The figures from 1908 onwards were 32.1, 31.1, 29.8, 28.6! It is safe to assume that in 1914 Germany's birth-rate was only 25.6, as against our 23.6. The poverty which must follow her tremendous expenditure of money in the War will surely accelerate the decline of the birthrate, so that it will overtake ours within three or four years' time, and approximate to the figure in France within a decade. Moreover, her huge sacrifice of breadwinners, as well as the expenditure of money, must raise the death-rate in the coming years much more than will happen in our country. Germany's rate of natural increase will probably fall below 7 per thousand, while ours, if we do not exceed our present rate of casualties, and if we afterwards capture some of her trade, will very likely continue at about its present rate of 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Since this was written the Lancet (March 20) reports a paper by Herr M. von Gruben bewailing the rapid fall of the German birth-rate in characteristic répopulateur fashion.

Germany's day for rapid increase of population is over, and she will soon realise that her national safety will require her to enter into an entente with France, Belgium, Britain, and the other low birth-rate countries of Western Europe. the terribly high birth-rates of Russia and the Balkan States continue, so long must we all be fully prepared for the disturbances that may arise from their pressure of population—a dangerous pressure, as evidenced by their very low average duration Apart from the hopeful prospect of a Western European entente which would securely maintain the balance of population at home, it should not be forgotten that Australia and New Zealand have the continuously highest rates of increase in the world, and that Canada, another rising continent, should long continue her present rate of 10 per thousand per annum. To a Neomalthusian, therefore, our population question has no gloom such as Dr. Brend has depicted. Were we now frankly to recognise it and to encourage parental prudence among the poor, and if the War were over, one could say that the future of the British Empire was full of promise.

That the foregoing views are not merely based upon theory but have also practical experience on their side is shown by the case of Holland. There the Neomalthusian League has been registered as one of the Societies of Public Utility, and has been able to work freely and effectively among the poor. The general mortality has fallen to the lowest, and the rate of increase of population has arisen to the highest, in Western Europe. army figures show a steady and most remarkable progress as regards the numbers and physique of the recruits. It also appears that the demand for Socialistic legislation is comparatively weak in Holland. We, on the other hand, keep playing into the hands of the Socialists and muddling on towards a state of completely reversed selection. The modern parental prudence is a movement which everyone agrees cannot be arrested. It is surely time, therefore, that it began to be openly recognised and intelligently directed on individualistic lines.

BINNIE DUNLOP, M.B., Ch.B.

# RICHARD GRAVES AND 'THE SPIRITUAL QUIXOTE'

There are few to-day, even among students of literature, who have read Richard Graves's Spiritual Quixote. It is seldom, indeed, that a book, when once it has attained reputation and even fame, falls so deeply into oblivion. First published, anonymously, in 1773, The Spiritual Quixote went through numerous editions during the next forty years, and was generally supposed to have taken its place among classic English novels. In 1812 Mrs. Barbauld included it in her series of British novelists. Since that date it has never been reprinted, and to the present generation its very name is almost unknown. The curious searcher may find it, as I have, in a remote country farmhouse, unread by the farmer's daughters, or on a Charing Cross Road bookstall. No one now thinks of it as a comic masterpiece, in its own way among the best of English novels.

It might be curious to inquire how it is that this once popular book was suddenly thrown aside and forgotten. Largely, no doubt, the book was out of harmony with the rather prim and serious tastes of the Early Victorian period. Graves was a clergyman and a schoolmaster, a man of fine taste, orthodox though tolerant in matters of religion, quite unexceptional also in his attitude towards moral questions. But the savour and vivacity of his humour, the occasional picaresque touch, the little audacities of expression, were not of the Victorian epoch, while his satire of religious extravagances-entirely good-natured as it was, and, indeed, skilfully adjusted to avoid offence-was positively dangerous ground in days when Methodism was firmly established and Evangelicalism was permeating the Church. Moreover, Graves belonged to an age of provincial intellectual centres, and spent over fifty years of his life on the outskirts of Bath, one of the chief of these provincial centres. He was not a professional literary man; he made no attempt to build up his own reputation; his books were not published under his own name, and it is evident that he impartially extended to himself the same humorous satire which he bestowed on all the world

around him. Finally, he was emphatically a man of the eighteenth century, which his life almost covered; he loved the people and the ways of his century, and even in his broadest humanitarian ideals was still its child. It cannot be altogether surprising that when the great Romantic movement swept over England, and Scott's novels poured forth from the press, Graves shared the fate of many who deserved it more. His great contemporaries, indeed, Fielding and Smollett and Sterne, stood firm by virtue of their laboriously erected reputations, but Graves—whose masterpiece deserves to rank with all but the best of theirs—reaped the fruits of his good-humoured modesty. He was submerged.<sup>1</sup>

## II

Richard Graves the Younger, as he is sometimes called, born in 1715, was the son of Richard Graves the Elder, an antiquary referred to by Hearne as a most worthy and virtuous gentleman, an excellent scholar, and sweet-tempered man. It is supposed that his son described him in *The Spiritual Quixote* as Mr. Townsend, a benevolent old man with antiquarian foibles, who is the father of the heroine, and had tried to bring up his children in an eccentrically ancient Roman manner. The Graves family had settled at Mickleton, in Gloucestershire, but they belonged to Yorkshire. It was in allusion to this northern origin that in some of his novels Graves calls himself 'Peter of Pomfret.'

We first hear of young Graves at the age of sixteen, when, being already 'a pretty good Grecian,' he was elected scholar of Pembroke College, Oxford, which Dr. Johnson had left two years before. Here, as he says in his Recollections of Shenstone, he 'joined a very sober little party who amused themselves in the evening with reading Greek and drinking water'; the authors selected being Epictetus, Theophrastus, and others outside the University course. A little later, however, he entered 'a less mortified symposium,' including Shenstone, and here they 'supped Florence wine, and read poetry, plays, Spectators, Tatlers, and other writings of easy digestion.' He was even, as he admits, to be found among those who 'drank ale, smoked

After his death, in 1805, a complete and uniform edition of Graves's works was projected, to be accompanied by a biography, partly written by himself, and completed by his daughter and executrix, Lucilla Graves, but there was evidently no encouragement to proceed with the scheme. The unfinished MS. of this Life is now in the possession of Mr. S. G. Hamilton, Graves's great-greatnephew. The best published account of Graves is contained in the Remains of the Rev. Francis Kilvert, who became curate of Claverton in 1816 and piously collected all the available information about the old rector. It should be added that the credit of practically rediscovering Graves's masterpiece belongs to the distinguished French critic, Marcel Schwob, who, however, never wrote of it.

tobacco, punned, and sang Bacchanalian catches the whole evening.' But his scholarly tastes, inherited and acquired, were not thus dissipated; he took his degree in 1736, on the same day, it is interesting to note, as Whitefield, who was a servitor of the same College, and in that year also he was elected Fellow of All Souls. He now became intimate with Blackstone, and is said to have continued his intercourse with the great jurist until the latter's death.

It was intended that young Graves should study divinity. He preferred medicine, came to London, and attended two courses of anatomy. Then, however, he fell ill, and apparently realising that he was not sufficiently robust for a surgical career, he devoted himself more seriously to divinity. In 1740 he entered Holy Orders, and became family chaplain to Mr. Fitzherbert, near Ashbourne, in Derbyshire, where he also performed parish duties. He remained here three years, and with the good fortune which in this matter accompanied him throughout life he enjoyed the society of many distinguished people, attracted by the fine qualities of the host, and especially the hostess who, said Dr. Johnson, had 'the best understanding he ever met with in any human being.' Mr. and Mrs. Fitzherbert are said to be the Sir William and Lady Forester whom we are introduced to so delightfully in The Spiritual Quixote, engaged with their friends on a summer evening picnic in a grotto above the river Dove, with music and The chapters which follow this introduction are wine and song. indeed an incomparable and many-sided picture of an upper-class country home in the middle of the eighteenth century, vividly bringing before us its elegance mixed with homeliness, its bucolic frolics, its serious and benevolent philanthropy. In this picture we find Miss Sainthill (who is said to stand for Dr. Johnson's friend, and 'sweet angel,' Miss Boothby), the witty and vivacious old maid, with her long nose, and her snuff-box, and her measured repartees. The learned chaplain is duly mentioned, but all we hear of him is that 'he is gone to the "Bowling Green Club," 'the old-time substitute for golf.

On leaving the Fitzherberts Graves became a curate at Aldworth (within riding distance of Oxford), where he lodged with a farmer named Bartholomew. Here was enacted the love-story of the novelist's life, the heroine being the younger daughter of the house, Lucy, then aged sixteen. More than a quarter of a century later Graves introduced into The Spiritual Quixote—under the guise of the episodic history of Mr. Rivers—the detailed narrative of this courtship. It is perhaps the most interesting episode in the whole novel. Graves's humour is here subdued to a deep tenderness, his realism is expended on a serious picture, and he succeeds in producing an idyll of old English life not often

surpassed in eighteenth-century literature outside the pages of the Spectator or The Vicar of Wakefield.

The marriage was not altogether prudent from a worldly point of view, and it gave offence to Graves's family, not unnaturally if the unconventional circumstances of the union are faithfully recorded in The Spiritual Quixote. His bride was scarcely of his own social position, and he thought it desirable to send her to London for two years to complete her education. Moreover, Graves had had no intention of entering the married state, and was scarcely in a financial position to do so, for it meant the abandonment of his All Souls' Fellowship. But it is evident that he was not the victim of infatuation: he was too shrewd an observer, he had too much knowledge of the world, to make the mistake that easily befalls the scholarly, inexperienced curate. The marriage seems to have been entirely happy, and Mrs. Graves even gained the approval of Mr. Graves's aristocratic friends, for we find one of these, Lady Luxborough (Bolingbroke's sister), referring to his 'agreeable' wife.

The risk of financial distress was averted by another of the fortunate circumstances which befell Graves. He was presented, in 1750, to the Rectory of Claverton, to which was shortly after added the adjoining Vicarage of Kilmersdon and the chaplaincy to the Countess of Chatham. It was a comfortable living, and it not only gave him a competency and leisure but placed him amid a circle of distinguished and congenial friends. forth there was no danger that Graves would share the fate of those much-tried Anglican parsons who were compelled in that age to labour unremittingly amid difficulties of all kinds in return for a miserable pittance. Graves has incidentally described in The Spiritual Quixote the life of at least one such devoted servant of the Church, whose parish was situated in a little paradise; the vicarage was a thatched cottage, covered with honeysuckle and sweet briar; there was only one living-room, and here the vicar, with his squalling children and scolding wife, sat in his dressinggown, 'every faculty of his soul fully employed; for he was reading a folio that lay on the table to the right, hearing his little boy read, who stood by him on the left, rocking the cradle with his foot, and paring turnips.' Graves could now afford to contemplate such a scene, which he had doubtless often viewed, with serenity. He found at Claverton the satisfaction of all his modest desires. Here he remained, for more than half a century, till his death, never once leaving his parish for so much as a month at a time.

Claverton, a romantic little village on the outskirts of Bath, presented in those days, it is said, a combination of attractively picturesque features rarely combined in one spot. The old

rectory, near the church, was a long, low, even humble building, lying beneath the level of the road, and until it was enlarged Graves occupied the manor house, now destroyed, a beautiful old sixteenth-century building, reported to have been built by the architect of the famous Kingston House at Bradford-on-Avon. Hither he was able to attract his intimate friend Shenstone, and Claverton became the poet's favourite haunt. Near here, too, was Prior Park, the seat of Ralph Allen, who, shortly after Graves settled there, acquired the manor of Claverton. Shenstone is nowadays only a name, though he was in his own small way a pioneer of the great Romantic Movement; but Ralph Allen, outside Bath, is scarcely even a name. Yet in that day he was a famous personage, loved, almost adored, by his numerous friends. A distinguished official, wealthy, genial, highly cultivated, he sought the friendship of many of the famous literary men of the time, some of whom-Pope, Fielding (who dedicated Amelia to him), Warburton, and others—came down from time to time to Prior Park, where Allen seems to have kept open house. Graves soon became an assiduous and welcome visitor at Prior Park.

But the Rector of Claverton's restless energies were far from absorbed by his parochial duties and his social pleasures. A young family grew up around him, and when there were four children it occurred to Graves's versatile mind that the best and most economical way to educate them would be to establish a school. This he accomplished; his reputation as a teacher ultimately became considerable, and at one time he had forty pupils, among them being so brilliant a person as Malthus, the famous author of the *Essay on Population*.

Even the school was not enough to employ all Graves's activities. There remained yet another outlet, which in the end has proved the most memorable of all. He had always moved in a more or less literary circle; his chief friends were eminent literary men; it was natural that he should himself turn to letters. He never, however, sought to become a professional man of He wrote, by native instinct, to please himself, to record his judgments of men and things, to revive sweet memories, to while away winter evenings, to find consolation amid the cares of old age. In this way, after he had reached middle age, Graves wrote a considerable series of books, continuing his literary activity until his death in extreme old age. The longest of these books, the only one by which his name deserves to live, was also that in which he placed most of himself, his experiences and his philosophy of life. He published it anonymously, at the age of fifty-eight-almost the same age at which Cervantes published his great romance-in three volumes under the title of The Spiritual Quixote; or the Summer's Ramble of Mr. Geoffry Wildgoose: A Comic Romance.

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The Spiritual Quixote follows, though with no slavish imitation, the classic model furnished by Cervantes. That is to say that we have the central figure stirred by a too highly strung idealistic impulse to sally forth on a great mission, in Wildgoose's case the restoration of primitive Christianity; we have his faithful, uncouth, earthly minded servant; we have the variegated adventures, serious and comic, of this pair; we have the long interspersed narrative episodes, often of considerable interest and skilfully introduced. Wildgoose, the spiritual Quixote, a young country gentleman living with his mother, on his return from the university, is moved to religious enthusiasm, partly by reading old Puritan literature, partly by the arrival at his village of some strolling preachers. He becomes a preacher himself, and in order to gain further spiritual illumination he sets forth to find Whitefield, taking with him, in the capacity of servant, the village cobbler, Jerry Tugwell. At an early stage of his adventures Wildgoose falls in with a young lady who has been compelled to run away from home; this distressed damsel, Julia Townsend, arouses Wildgoose's chivalrous feelings, and his quest eventually becomes the quest of love. It is Julia Townsend whom at the end he finds, and he settles down in his native village, reconciled to the Church and a life of normal and benevolent activity. Graves concludes with a moral which forecasts that of Wilhelm Meister, who, like Saul the son of Kish, went forth to seek his father's asses and found a kingdom: 'Providence frequently makes use of our passions, our errors, and even our youthful follies, to promote our welfare and conduct us to happiness.'

In a certain sense, it will be seen, The Spiritual Quixote may be called a religious novel, but not in the sense in which we nowadays call Robert Elsmere a religious novel. In order to understand the book, Graves states in the Introduction, it is necessary that a man 'should have dipped into the Bible sometimes, or, at least, should have occasionally conversed with those who have.' But, however serious the underlying idea may be, Graves consistently maintains the note of comic romance. It is not difficult to account for his impulse to make the new religious movement of his day the leading motive of his comic romance. Its excesses and peculiarities appealed to his observant humour; while, on the more serious side, Methodism presented a practical problem to the country parson, for even the village of Claverton had on one occasion been visited by a journeyman shoemaker preacher, who, during his stay, had attracted large crowds. Methodism had indeed been brought home to Graves thirty years earlier, for his younger brother, Charles Casper-described as a

good, kindly, quiet man, who was perhaps the original of Wildgoose—had in early life been carried away by the new movement, and became for a time a Methodist preacher at Oxford, though he afterwards entered the Church. This fact, with Graves's invariable good-humour and genial vision of life, may account for the entirely kind and always inoffensive manner—though offence was sometimes taken—in which Graves dealt with Methodism, an attitude entirely different from that of Butler, a century earlier, in his attack on Puritanism in Hudibras. Moreover, Graves had himself gone up to Oxford before the founders of Methodism left it, and the unconventional way in which they are introduced into the pages of the novel adds to its value as a typical picture of English eighteenth-century life.

After many adventures, comic and semi-tragic, Whitefield is encountered early one morning, in Bristol, 'sitting in an elbowchair (in a handsome dining-room), dressed in a purple nightgown and velvet cap; and instead of a Bible or Prayer-book (as Wildgoose expected), he had a good basin of chocolate, and a plate of muffins, well-buttered, before him.' Graves brings out, impartially, his conception of Whitefield as a man of real spiritual unction alloyed with a somewhat plebeian worldly wisdom. He also casually gives us a glimpse of John Wesley. Wildgoose and Tugwell had found themselves at noon near Worcester, in a deep valley, through which ran a winding silver stream shaded They rested in their cool retreat, Wildgoose pulling with alders. out a godly little manual to read, and Tugwell instinctively rummaging in his wallet until he had attracted his master's attention to the question of luncheon. When thus occupied two travellers passed along the road, and sat down in the same agreeable shade, one of whom ' (though his long hair was somewhat in the style of Ralpho in Hudibras) had a gentleman-like appearance, both in his dress and his address.' This was Wesley, and after converse which began with observations on the innocent freedom of the birds around them, and passed on to fate and free-will, Wesley, his horses having come up, continued his journey. Graves's fairly respectful treatment of Wesley's personality again illustrates the soundness of his judgment and his complete control of the humours of comic romance.

If we attempt to place The Spiritual Quixote among the chief English novels of the eighteenth century, we can scarcely fail to recognise that it stands by itself. It is impossible to couple Graves with either Fielding or Smollett, although The Spiritual Quixote was at one time attributed to Smollett. Fielding impressed his books with his own great personality, Smollett with his brilliant talent, but they were both, practically if not quite literally, professional men of letters. They wrote to earn their

living as well as to amuse or to influence the public, and their efforts to do so often display a deplorable lack of levity. They belonged to the transitional stage, when the man of letters who lived to write was giving place to the man of letters who wrote to live, a disastrous change which has produced results we know. Graves wrote to amuse himself; that is doubtless the secret of his wayward ease; that is why every page of his book is readable. He has all the levity which we miss in his stolid predecessors. If we compare The Spiritual Quixote with Joseph Andrews or Humphrey Clinker-which are probably the novels of Fielding and Smollett most easily lending themselves to this comparison—we note, not only that Graves's book is much more various, but that it is more modern. It presents us, indeed, with no single figure that stands out so memorably as Parson Adams, and it cannot rival Smollett's masterpiece for sustained brilliance and caustic wit, but, unlike them, it is never heavy and it is never brutal. Graves's mental alertness, his unfailing humour, here serve him well, while his genial love of men, altogether distinct from Fielding's humanitarian philanthropy, becomes naturally translated into urbanity. This observant yet indulgent humour, one notes, is that of the cleric, and Graves may perhaps in this respect remind us of another cleric, his contemporary, the Rev. Laurence Sterne, and still more, I think, of Goldsmith, a cleric's son, who has immortalised himself by delineating clerical life. A more delicate masterpiece than Graves's comic romance, though on a very much smaller scale, The Vicar of Wakefield, published only seven years earlier, is probably the only novel of that age at all allied to The Spiritual Quixote. Graves's romance has something of the same tender levity, the same rapid vivacious movement, while it also reveals a mature breadth and variety, which were outside the scope of Goldsmith's immortal little story.

Where, however, Graves's book is distinguished from the other novels of his time, and, indeed, from his own books in general, is by what may be termed his naturalism. This is a quality equally far removed from the naturalism of Zola and the precise realism of Defoe. It is the expression of a direct and unaffected vision of men and the world; and that vision is the outcome of Graves's whole temper and mode of living. Here, after a lifetime spent in going in and out among men and women, and up and down the highways of Central England, Graves gathered in the harvest his quick and genial eye had reaped. Picture after picture seems to have come to him out of the past as he sat in his study during the long winter evenings, the people he had known, the houses he had lived in, the scenes he had witnessed, the experiences he had passed through. With

a little dexterity they could all be woven into the adventures of the Spiritual Quixote and his man Tugwell. It is the peculiar privilege of the form of narrative art devised by the genius of Cervantes that it affords infinite scope to this introduction of the variegated incidents of life into a coherent novel. At the time when Graves was writing his comic romance, Goethe was about to show how even the deepest and boldest visions of the world can be woven into this same pattern. The two essentials for success are some original quest which harmonises all the pictures brought before us by enabling us to view them all at the same angle, and, behind this phantasmagoria, a creative artist with a personal vision of his own, an alert and vivid power of observation, and a tender spirit of human sympathy and indulgencethat indulgence which, as Renan said, is often a form of justice. It is this art and this spirit which Graves was able to put into The Spiritual Quixote. It is they which, we now find, have set on this book, plucked from the rubbish heap of the past, a permanent seal of distinction.

#### IV

The Spiritual Quixote became immediately popular and its fame spread widely. Edition after edition came from the press in England, and a translation appeared immediately in Germany, and shortly afterwards in Holland. It continued to be issued without the author's name, and Graves showed no anxiety to claim the reputation which was now his due, though it was sometimes given to Smollett. He had dedicated the work to 'Monsieur Pattypan, Pastry-Cook to His Most Sacred Majesty King George the Second,' in the hope that 'you are not over-stocked with waste-paper by my brethren of the quill,' and he was not apt to take an unduly solemn view of his literary avocations. Possibly also he felt that to a clergyman and a schoolmaster it would be a dubious advantage to claim the authorship of a comic romance. But he was encouraged to carry on his literary pursuits with new After 1773 books came rapidly from his pen, though they were all of much slighter texture than The Spiritual Quixote.2

A place by itself among Graves's works is occupied by his little book of reminiscence of his intimate friend, Shenstone, who seems to have had a considerable influence on his mental development. Shenstone is introduced, by name or under a disguise, in several of Graves's books. Thus in *The Spiritual Quixote*, Wild-

One branch of Graves's versatile literary activity is constituted by his translations from the classics, notably his rendering of Marcus Aurelius's Meditations. This was recently reissued by Messrs. Methuen and Co., and is the only book of Graves's reprinted in nearly a hundred years.

goose spends a night with Shenstone at Leasowes, or Shenstone's Folly, as his estate near Birmingham was called, and The Spiritual Quixote takes the opportunity of showing his disapproval of one who paid a 'greater regard to Pan and Sylvanus than to Paul or Silas.' Shenstone, with his elaborate gardens and his cascades and his Gothic bedroom with painted windows, was, in his own artificial way, not only a verse-writer with fine musical feeling, and one of the first of landscape gardeners, but also, like Horace Walpole, a pioneer of the Gothic revival. Graves's little book of reminiscence is admirable in its way, an excellent picture of a man in whom we can to-day take little interest. To his contemporaries Shenstone's genius was indisputable, but his little star was quickly lost to sight in the brilliant dawn of the Romantic Movement.

Graves's fondness for verse-making was, as he himself states, due to his early intimacy with Shenstone. From that period on, he says, in his collected volume of occasional verse (published in 1776, and entitled Euphrosyne: or Amusements on the Road of Life), verse-making had been a 'chemical disease' with him. ' A distich or even a hemistich aptly applied has often afforded as much consolation as a glass of cherry brandy, or a sermon on affliction of an hour long.' It was in this spirit that he always regarded verse-making, not as a serious vocation. He never, he says, formally sat down to write verses; they were usually composed on a jogging horse to relieve the tedium of a journey, or else to alleviate the tedious journey of life. They reflect this origin for the most part in their gay triviality, their casual spontaneity.

Graves put all of himself in The Spiritual Quixote, his best literary art, his choicest experiences of life. There was little over for the numerous books that followed, even though they often exhibited his characteristic vivacity and humour. They are But though there is little slight, often very slight indeed. substance in these books they are still usually readable. Graves retained his alert wit and observation, his crisp and rapid style, easy and often careless as it certainly is, even in the garrulous reminiscences of an old man who had travelled so little and seen

so much.

These later books enable us to obtain a fairly clear picture of Graves himself as he lived and moved among men, a picture which concords with that furnished by others. In the Dedication to his Lucubrations, 'by the late Peter of Pontefract' (1786), Graves speaks of himself as 'our late friend,' and outlines his own career as a younger son, marrying early, engaged in teaching, and leading a life of active and fatiguing work. 'He could only amuse himself in an evening with such kind of reading

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and writing as, in an indolent posture, lolling in an easy chair, or leaning on one elbow, a man may be supposed to have attended to.' There is no allusion here to his parochial duties. But Graves glances at himself from that point of view in his Columella, which also contains reminiscences of Shenstone and other friends.

Mr. Pomfret, the little Rector, who is an old acquaintance of mine [says the Canon], is a worthy man, and a man of reading, and had taken his degrees in the University. But he is a poor, heetic, miserable-looking creature, and the want of dignity in his person, the want of spirit in his reproofs of vice, and the want of a good elocution to inculcate his virtuous sentiments, prevent him from doing that good in his parish which he might otherwise have done. He preaches tolerable discourses, but with so little emphasis that his audience frequently fall asleep in the midst of them. If he has occasion to exhort privately any of his parishioners he does it in so timorous and undecisive a manner, and with so much hesitation, that it loses its effect. 'I have been told,' says he to a drunken fellow, 'but perhaps it may not be true, that you are apt to drink a little more than does you good sometimes. I am afraid, John, you will get an habit of drinking, if you don't take care, John!' 'It's very fine weather for the after-grass, Master Pomfret,' replies honest John.

And we may be sure that the parson was relieved at the new turn the conversation had taken.

Various accounts of Graves and the portraits painted by Gainsborough and Northcote enable us to fill in the details of the sketches he has given of himself.3 He was short and spare, though active, with large, expressive blue eyes under an intellectual forehead, prominent nose, small mouth, well-cut chin, his face on the whole expressing a singular benevolence. In speech, as in his books, he had a flashing wit, and a gift of impromptu epigram; but his utterance was not only rapid but with a tendency to stutter, so that he called himself 'the worst of all possible speakers.' This same rapidity of movement which marked his speech, and is one of the graces of his style, was visible also to an even comic extent in his walk. It was, we are told, not so much a walk as a trot, with both hands extended before him, in his left, perhaps, his large gingham umbrella, and in his right a stick or any other object he might be carrying. He wore a brown wig, and his costume generally when at home was 'the clerical coat of the period, much too large for him, black smalls, and silk hose, and fulled white cambric neckerchief.' As he advanced in age he wore top-boots and a low beaver hat, much battered. It was a joke against him at Prior Park that, having the privilege of dining in his boots so that he could leave early to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> I refer especially to R. E. Peach's *Historic Homes in Bath*, vol. ii, pp. 90-100, and to reminiscences quoted by Kilvert.

ride home, he would in his hurried way carry off his dinner napkin on his spurs.

Whatever the ludicrous traits in Graves's personality, he was always a well-bred gentleman, courteous to everyone, good-humoured, cordial, and it is clear that he was welcome in all societies. His natural politeness, his simplicity of manners, imparted charm to the manifestation of his ardent and energetic spirit. His eccentric impetuosity was combined with an essential love of order. 'Ever in a hurry and always collected,' wrote one of his pupils, 'though seemingly composed, yet amidst all his velocities coolly methodical:

By turns he seemed grave, gamesome, learned, wild, In sense a sage, simplicity a child.'

Whatever frailties Graves possessed seem to have been on the surface. His biographer, the Rev. Francis Kilvert, blessed with a nineteenth-century sense of ecclesiastical decorum, states that Graves's 'lively and epigrammatic vein occasionally betrayed him into levity not wholly suitable to his sacred character.' Mr. Kilvert, no doubt, was shocked to find that in old age Graves had written a *Plea for Unseasonable Gallantry*, and therein declared that

Amidst my cramps and other strange ills, I am eager to converse with angels.

But there are no scandals of any sort connected with Graves's name; and Kilvert, who had every opportunity of knowing, states that there is no evidence that he failed in his duties as a parochial clergyman.

Although the course of Graves's daily life was confined for half a century within so narrow an orbit, his daily visits to Bath and his intimacy with the circle at Moor Park alike served to keep him in touch with the world outside. His active mind was never merely parochial. In politics he was a Whig, and, like many of the advanced Whigs of that age, he was in sympathy with the humanitarian ideals, then being elaborated, especially in France, which now seem to us so characteristic of that century. They could not fail to appeal to his humane and benevolent temper, essentially that of an optimist. In his Eugenius, written when he was about seventy, he vigorously defends the present as against the past, arguing that, as a result of the growing liberality of governments, Europe 'may in time be formed into one grand Commonwealth; and even Rousseau's Utopian system for an universal peace to be guaranteed by the several States may be adopted, and at length prevail over the whole world.' And at the end of the book he expresses the hope 'that the next generation at least may see if not the golden age or paradisaical state, yet at least the silver age of the world again restored.' Considerably less than a generation brought the French Revolution, which converted so many optimists into pessimists. That it had that effect on the cheery Rector of Claverton, who survived it for fifteen years, there is no evidence to show.

Graves retained, we are told, his 'boyish agility' until the age of fourscore. He was not without troubles; his declining years were saddened by a son who turned out badly, involving himself, 'imprudently or rather wildly,' as Graves put it, in difficulties of which now nothing is known. Yet 'never,' wrote Warner in his Literary Recollections, 'did the hand of advanced age lie lighter upon a human being or less exert its withering influence on the intellect, genius, and feelings.' others, however, who have attained extreme old age, Graves had had to face and to conquer the problem of invalidism. In a book called The Invalid, published when he was ninety, he gives an account of his method of living, and it may interest some modern food reformers to know that he had anticipated them in taking a lesson from the old Venetian Cornaro. In early life he suffered much from ill-health, but he chanced to meet with the life of Cornaro, who, he found, had derived the greatest benefit from limiting the amount of food to six ounces. He adopted Cornaro's rule, eating two slices of mutton for dinner, and only taking a slight breakfast and supper; by this diet, with regular exercise and care, he soon recovered 'a tolerable share of health,' though if he deviated from this rule he suffered from headache, sorethroats, and colds, which were usually cured by abstinence. As regards wine, his rule was 'after the third glass thrust the cork into the bottle.'

Graves was able to conduct service almost to the end. In his last illness the sacrament was administered to him by his old pupil Malthus; he died on the 23rd of November 1804, and was

buried in the parish church.

The dust has gathered thickly over Graves and all his productions. It is worth while to stir that dust for a moment to catch a glimpse of an interesting old eighteenth-century figure who typifies some of the best elements of his time. His productions may, for the most part, sleep in peace. But The Spiritual Quixote, once rescued from amidst the pile, is not likely to be again forgotten. It is one of our classic English novels, and as a many-sided picture of old English life can scarcely be equalled.

HAVELOCK ELLIS.

## TELEGRAPHS IN WAR-TIME

THE importance of direct and secret telegraphic communication by essentially deep-sea, 'All-British,' cables between the different branches of the Empire—for diplomatic purposes and for gathering together the resources of our widely scattered domains—is now forcing attention in a practical way in connexion with the great prevailing War.

The general belief that the mastery over and retention of cable communication in time of war resolves itself into a question of naval supremacy proved itself correct at quite an early period, for besides several new cables being laid down by British vessels in the English Channel and elsewhere, it was within but a few days of the outbreak of hostilities that we cut the German Atlantic cables to the Azores—thus breaking off the enemy's communication with the United States-besides several other Teutonic telegraph links. In fact, we have pretty well isolated Germany from her colonies as well as from neutral countries. To be more exact, we have rendered something like a dozen German lines absolutely useless, their repair being very difficult to effect. Most of these pass under the English Channel, where their dislocation or control (for censorship purposes) is a fairly simple matter, but others are in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. the interruption being effected—as in the case of the Azores cable-quite near the landing place. In a word, except through the 'wireless' service, Germany can only telegraph to her dupe and ally Austria and to one or two comparatively minor European countries.1 It is, perhaps, possible that occasional

<sup>1</sup> The following statement on the subject has been actually given out officially by the German Information Service:

'Between Germany and England there exist six cable lines—partly German, partly English—which, of course, are not used now. From Germany's west coast, therefore, no communication with the world is possible.

ast, therefore, no communication with the world before permark, Norway, and The telegraphic communication via Holland, Denmark, Norway, and

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Germany has five cables ending at the Island of Borkum, in the North Seaone going to Brest, in France; one to Vigo, in the north of Spain; one to
Teneriffe, on the Canary Islands at the north of Africa; and two by way of
the Azores to New York. All five lead through the English Channel, so that it
was not difficult for England to cut them. On the other hand, it will be very
difficult, even impossible, for Germany to repair them as long as the War lasts.

April

messages may be got through the Atlantic cables, with the aid of third parties, to certain neutral States, but all messages suspected as coming from the enemy would naturally be stopped.

## PACIFIC CABLE INTERRUPTION

On the other hand, all our own trunk lines have been kept intact, with the exception of the 'All-British' Pacific line, a section of which—that between Vancouver and Fanning Island -was interrupted on the 7th of September, a German man-ofwar having that day landed a party at Fanning Island to effect the said object.2

Fanning Island—scarcely more than a desert rock—is situated about 400 miles to the southward of the Hawaiian group. the population consisting of 26 white men, 4 white women, and 260 natives. All the 'whites' are connected with the cable station in one way or another. The highest point of the island is only some 9 feet above high-water mark—rendering invasion a peculiarly easy matter-and the dull monotony of life received a severe shock when the German cruiser Nürnberg paid its eminently informal call. On the other hand, the Germans made the most of a fleeting visit. They attended strictly to business, doing over 30,000l. worth of damage to the cable and station outfit, some of the instruments costing 1000l. each. How thoroughly the work of destruction was effected is brought to light by the fact that communication was only completely restored on the 6th of November.3 The southern section (Fanning-Fiji) was quickly repaired, but the northern section (Fanning-Vancouver) was what the Germans had

Sweden can only be kept up by cables that end in England and France, where,

of course, cablegrams are censored.

'The ways to the south via Austria or Italy are also blocked, as the cables that run from west to east in the Mediterranean belong to an English company, the Eastern Telegraph Co., and end in English territory. The cables starting from Italy, and also from Turkey, go via Malta, Gibraltar, and Lisbon to the Atlantic Ocean. With Africa no communication is possible without using the cables of the "Eastern" Company, and telegraphic land connections with China pass through Russia or British India. Therefore, with the exception of the wireless service, Germany can telegraph only to Austria-Hungary, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries. Spain and Portugal are cut off, too.'

2 This cable had experienced a great rush of traffic immediately on the outbreak of war, the receipts becoming three and a-half times as much as at ordinary times. Indeed, the cable now carries about 140,000 words a weekequivalent to seven million words per annum-instead of the 200,000 despatched during the first year of working. Most of this increase is accounted for by the compulsory use of 'clear' messages, but enough represented diverted traffic to prove the value of the line as an alternative and safer route in time of war.

They even returned to the island forty-eight hours later to make certain that no repairs had been effected meanwhile, or no undetected reserve (duplicate) apparatus installed.

naturally paid their best attention to, it being considerably the

longest in existence—i.e. 3458 nautical miles.

. Soon after the interruption, the Pacific Cable Board despatched a steamer (s.s. Kestrel) to the lonely island with supplies and new instruments, and the following report by the officer in command (Captain E. L. Tindall) is not without interest:

'We arrived at the north end of Fanning Island at daybreak on the 25th of September. I gave orders for the chief engineer to bank the fires so that no smoke would be visible. We crept up cautiously, and from the masthead of the *Kestrel* we surveyed the surrounding water for the presence of a war vessel, and found none. I then proceeded around the island and to the harbour entrance. We noted a ship's boat with a crew which was apparently grappling for the broken cable.

'We were greeted upon our arrival by Superintendent A. Smith and his staff, and our welcome was a genuine one. The devastation caused by the Germans was apparent before we landed, and evidence of the free use of gun-cotton and dynamite could be seen many yards from the shore. The landing buoy

to which vessels make fast was demolished.

'Although none of the residents of Fanning Island had suffered any personal injury from the German landing force, the feeling against the British Government in not giving this important station their naval protection is quite marked.

'While the people of Fanning were expecting the presence of a German cruiser for about three weeks, no one really thought that Germans would actually attempt to seize the island, especially as the British Government knew the whereabouts of the

Nürnberg and the Leipzig.

'They kept a man on the look-out for two weeks, and on the 7th of September two vessels, which proved to be the Nürnberg and a collier, were sighted. Both flew the French flag, and so sure were the Fanning islanders that these were friendly vessels that preparations were made to launch a boat from shore and show them an anchorage. It had hardly started on its friendly mission when two boats, loaded with Germans, put off from the Nürnberg and came in full speed for the shore. They did not even wait for the boats to ground on the beach, but jumped into the water waist deep, and with fixed bayonets and drawn revolvers commanded the surprised little gathering of Fanning islanders to surrender. They rushed on shore and mounted a Maxim gun, which was trained on the cable headquarters. Marines were posted all around the station, while officers and sailors, armed with rifles, made their way to the office building.

'The cable employees were hard at work, and were paralysed to see a German officer at the door of the operating-room with a revolver. "Take your hands off those keys, all of you!" he commanded.

'The men were made to line up against the wall while the sailors with axes smashed the delicate and costly instruments. A good deal of valuable mechanism was left intact, indicating that their knowledge of cable instruments was very crude.

'A cable message had been posted conspicuously which stated that the *Nürnberg* or *Leipzig* was due any day. One of the German officers saw this, and, with a smile, said "Rather interesting, don't you think? I'll take this for a souvenir."

'Another party was engaged near the shore end of the cable, trying to locate it. Failing in this, heavy charges of dynamite were planted and the cable blown to atoms. A crew from the collier grappled for the cable further out to sea with the intention of doing additional damage. Still another party planted dynamite and gun-cotton in the engine-rooms, the boiler-rooms, refrigerating plant, and in the dynamo-rooms. The explosion from these charges was terrific, but no one was hurt. A search was then made of the offices and a number of valuable papers were taken. These papers were taken aboard the Nürnberg, and a few hours later an officer returned and hastily summoned a detachment of men. The papers had revealed that several valuable instruments were buried—in reserve for just such contingencies; that a quantity of hidden arms and ammunition existed, and that there was 600l. in the office safe. The latter was blown open and the money taken. The officer in charge of this section of the expedition apologised, and said that this was the first time in his life that he had acted the part of a burglar.

'The buried instruments were blown up and the guns and

ammunition seized.

'Through all of this devastation the courtesy extended by these German officers was most marked. They expressed themselves as being greatly surprised that no armed resistance was offered, as they had every reason to believe that Great Britain had taken the precaution to defend this important outpost.

'The officers and men worked with feverish haste and seemed anxious to get away. The private quarters of the

employees were left unmolested.

'A little humour was interjected into the occasion when one of the German sailors borrowed a saw from the cable station and felled a giant flagpole at the top of which flew a British flag. The pole was cut into sections, and the saw and flag were taken aboard the Nürnberg as souvenirs.

'The officers appeared to have a complete knowledge of what was going on in the outside world, and seemed to be in possession of as much information as those who had been in daily cable communication with the mainland. The collier was carefully disguised, and there was nothing which would reveal her identity. She is about 2200 tons register, and had an elaborate grappling outfit aboard her, whilst her men seemed to be experts in this class of work.

'The Germans completed their task in about twelve hours, and steamed away, west south-west, toward the Marshall Islands.'

It is clear from the above, as well as from other evidence at hand, that the cable would never have been disturbed but for two factors: (1) That the German cruiser and her consort sailed under false colours—the French flag; and (2) the entire lack of protection accorded to the island, on which this highly important 'All-British' strategic line is landed. The present writer has always urged that each of the three intervening cable stations—i.e. Fanning, Fiji, and Norfolk Islands—should be adequately fortified with guns over the cable landing of a range that will carry out to fairly deep water, where cable interruption would be a difficult and time-taking process, such as could be checked by our cruisers at sea.

### THE COCOS EPISODE

The valiant Captain von Müller, of the now defunct *Emden*; also attempted one of his bogus-funnel ruses as a means of similarly taking by storm the cable and wireless station on Keeling-Cocos Island. It would indeed have been a crowning

4 The following is a quotation from a report on the measures taken by the British Government to guard the cable office and cable landing of the Com-


mercial Cable Co .- an American company-at Waterville, Ireland.

'The office building is completely enclosed by a barbed-wire fence, patrolled within by a sentry. At the office door is stationed a second sentry, to whom must be shown a pass by all persons entering or leaving. The basement windows—outside the battery and testing rooms—are blocked up with sandbags. Preparations are now being made to close up the windows on the operating-room floor with a bullet-proof protection of galvanised iron and timber, after which we shall be working completely in artificial light. The cable landing is protected by barbed-wire entanglements and guarded; a guard is also maintained at the engine-house. The latter place is presently to be bullet-proofed, and the water-tower by the office similarly protected. A building of blockhouses is also intended.'

If such careful steps can be taken by our Government to protect the property of an American company—the Commercial Cable Co.—surely it behoves us still more to do something adequate to guard against telegraphic interruptions

on the Imperial State Pacific cable to Australia and New Zealand!

<sup>5</sup> For nearly two months this German cruiser had enjoyed a successful and relatively glorious career. Out of nineteen British vessels which she had captured she destroyed eighteen, the aggregate tonnage being over 80,000, and the value 2,000,000*l*.



victory for this famous German officer. But it was not to be, for the ruse was detected—and well ahead—by those in charge on shore, who promptly advised by 'wireless' several of our men-of-war near by, which led to the *Emden's* ultimate doom. Moreover, a 'rush' cable message was sent out to the Navy Office at Melbourne, who acted with wonderful promptitude on the information given. It is evident that the cable and wireless superintendents—with the experience before them of what had happened at Fanning—exercised considerable alertness, besides acting with exemplary intelligence and despatch in a way that contributed largely to the result achieved.

The *Emden*, in going to Cocos Island with the idea that she would seriously damage the interests of Great Britain by cutting some very important cables, actually ran into a hornets' nest. It was the thought and work of a moment, on the appearance of the famous corsair, to flash the tidings of her arrival to east and west and south and north; in short, to every point from which signals could reach his Majesty's ships, which, under the directing hand of the Admiralty, were closing round the German

cruiser.

The landing parties of the enemy did, indeed, succeed in cutting two cables (since repaired), but they were too late. The intelligence which proved so fatal to the *Emden's* career had

already passed over the wires.

The story of the telegraphists' part in the sinking of the Emden is one of those records of ready wit and efficiency which make the best of romance. The guns of the Sydney sent the Emden on to the rocks, but those guns would not have come into play had not the telegraphist at Cocos quickly recognised the enemy in all her disguise, and despatched the warning message throughout the world, which brought the Sydney up in time. It is almost disturbing to think that before the boat's crew had landed from the Emden the warships were moving to the rescue, and London was making arrangements for repairing the cable and wireless stations. The men who perform these unostentatious miracles—and upon whom, in the last analysis, the linking-up of our scattered ships, as well as of our scattered Empire, depends—are not known to the great public. desolate little islands, in remote alien cities, they lead the loneliest of lives. For conversation they must talk across the wires to colleagues, possibly equally lonely, a thousand miles away. They know as soon as kings and ministers what is happening in the great world from which they are exiles, but they have to keep the charge with an honour as strict as their devotion. For a full and illustrated description of the Cocos episode reference should be made to The Zodiac-that admirable little organ of the cablestation official. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

#### LESSONS LEARNED

The War has already served to draw attention to the fact that the more cables there are between any two points in the Empire, and the greater the depth in which they are laid, the less likely is communication to be broken off.

It has also revealed the desirability—if not actual necessity—for all our Inter-Imperial communicating links being placed under a Government Board of Control in strategic and general national interests, with a fixed and lasting policy as to administration to meet all such conditions. Had an authority of this nature been in vogue previously to the War, the charges for ordinary rates would not have been maintained at the same high figure under a state of censorship, for a board of this class would have throughout studied public (national) interests as a whole, rather than the admittedly human interests of shareholders. For satisfactorily carrying out the proposed Government administration scheme all the cables landing on our coasts might suitably be connected direct to the General Post Office and hence with the War Office—and the cable stations sealed up—during warfare.

Again, had such a central authority existed it is pretty certain that the censorship of cablegrams would have been more effectively dealt with-under a single, organised and uniform, For a considerable time all code messages were entirely 'banned'-with very serious business results, both as regards cost and delay.7 It has to be remembered that shipping companies, etc., are normally in the habit of despatching cablegrams in the same way that the ordinary individual communicates by letter. Thus, they have experts continually working at the perfection of their code, which often costs over a thousand pounds sterling. By the disuse of codes the 'cabling' expenses of such firms are increased nearly fourfold. For instance, a cablegram to Australia, which ordinarily costs about 51., will in plain language run into anything between 15l. and 20l. Indeed, it is stated by a certain firm that the War cabling restrictions had cost them, during the month of August, over 750l.-i.e. at the rate of nearly 10,000l. a year (!), whilst, on the other hand, owing to the interruption of some of the overseas mail services, the call for favourable telegraphic facilities is all the more marked. Then, again, business firms naturally attach considerable

<sup>7</sup> Even now messages are frequently stopped altogether without any intimation being given to the senders, though bona-fide English firms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Surely the control of our Inter-Imperial cables should at least be taken over in these emergencies, just as the railway systems—with perhaps less reason—have already been. Occasion may be taken here to mention that cable rates, under a certain amount of pressure, have been reduced to a somewhat greater extent than railway rates—other things being equal in regard to monopoly, etc. The financial position of the cable companies is, however, of a sort that would justify enterprise more than in the case of railways.

importance to secrecy, and there is always the possibility of an ordinary clerk in a cable company's office, belonging to a far-off market, disclosing—may be inadvertently—the contents of a plain-language message to his personal acquaintances or to the competitors of the sender. Yet it is an open question whether plain-language phrases are not far more readily and effectively used to convey another meaning by the German spy and such like—as the notorious Lody did, indeed—than any commercial codes. In other words, plain-language code is, in actual fact, probably a greater danger than any ordinary commercial code. Thus, the important point for a censor to concentrate his attention on is, really, the actual origin of a message and whom it is intended to reach.

On the other hand, that really efficient censorship is a first necessity for the satisfactory administration of our Inter-Imperial communications in time of war should be fully recognised. Unfortunately, however, it may be gravely doubted whether this condition prevails, largely on account of extreme pressure and lack of the necessary special knowledge and experience in those to whom the censorship duties are entrusted. Were a satisfactory Board of Control established for the administration (especially during war-time) of all our Inter-Imperial telegraphic links—such as I have frequently suggested 8—it is pretty certain that the censorship of cablegrams could be more effectively dealt with than at present. This is assuming that the Board were not mainly confined to considerably overworked military officers with no experience in cable working.9 In any case, there is fairly conclusive evidence that messages of an apparently innocent character are being got through by the enemy which in actual fact have had an inner meaning (to someone not disclosed as the ultimate receiver) altogether opposed to British interests and of first service to our foes. It is surely of comparatively little use our cutting off Germany's means of communication if we allow the enemy (as we undoubtedly have been doing) to obtain and despatch telegrams through British or neutral lines—even those landing on our own shores! As a matter of fact, there has been a considerable and otherwise unaccountable increase in the

<sup>8</sup> Notably in a paper read before the Royal Society of Arts on April 28, 1914, on 'The Administration of Imperial Telegraphs' (vide Jour. Roy. Soc. of Arts, vol. lxii. No. 312); also Nineteenth Century, July 1914.

A soldier, however smart he may be, can scarcely be expected to know all about cable matters any more than a civilian can about military tactics. That those responsible are doing their utmost to meet requirements there can be little question, but unfortunately that is not everything. It has been sometimes said to be characteristic of this country that those responsible for the administration of our great services usually have no knowledge of the tools the operations of which they have to direct. However that may be, is no other talent available amongst those anxious patriotically to serve their country during the war?

number of so-called neutral cablegrams (passing through neutral countries) during the War.

Censorship can readily be effected where full control exists, but not so, of course, where that state of things does not prevail.

#### THE MISSING LINK

Naval supremacy has so far enabled us to maintain control of all the Eastern-bound cables. But in these days of floating mines, submarines, and bombs the position might conceivably be somewhat modified; and if our telegraphic inter-Imperial communication of one sort or another were to become seriously disturbed it would be a sorry day for the Empire, and the Mother Country in particular—partly from the standpoint of our food supply.

Happily, the All-British Pacific Cable is now repaired; but for some time we were solely dependent on the 'Eastern' lines for maintaining cable communication (by way of the somewhat vulnerable Suez Canal) with India, Australia, and New Zealand.

Even so, under normal present conditions the 'All-British' Pacific line cannot be regarded as a very reliable means of communication between the Mother Country and Australasia-in wartime especially-so long as we require to rely on American-worked Transatlantic cables for connecting up therewith. Thus there can be little doubt that the fact of having no Atlantic cable under British administration is a distinct defect at the present juncture, and would be still more serious were the United States, for business or political reasons, ever to side with Germany.10 In the first place, we are not in so good a position as a censorship as we really ought to be. Secondly, so long as our sole communicating links with Canada are the property of American companies, it would be impossible to bring into force such a Central Authority as is urged in this paper for administering our entire Inter-Imperial telegraphic systems. But the broad question we have to ask ourselves is as follows: Is it good for the Empire that its vital communication should be in the hands of a foreign corporation -especially under conditions of war on the one hand, and unsettled contraband questions on the other? Does such an arrangement make for security or secrecy, or for the control over communications which it is desirable the Government should possess on the outbreak of hostilities? Under present conditions, if ever the United States were to be at cross purposes with Canada, she (Canada) might be completely at the mercy of her American neighbours by being cut off-in the matter of com-

German vote seems likely to be 'nursed' in some quarters. In fact, the German vote may prove as formidable a feature in American politics as the Irish vote over here!

munication-from the Mother Country. Then, again, supposing American sympathies were to become increasingly German, there would be considerable likelihood of the leakage of any strategic messages we might be sending to other parts of the Empire. The question as to whether such a contingency is probable or not is altogether beside the mark; for it is the business of Governments, in the interest of the country, to provide for all contingencies of a really serious nature. With cables under foreign administration, though landed on British territory, messages are always liable to be deciphered in code, and any messages may be ordered by the foreign Government to be blocked or copies sent—say, to headquarters at Washington. 11 In a word, a cable landed on British territory, with British clerks and foreign ownership, does not constitute reliable British control, as anyone knows who is acquainted with the working of a cable system. Moreover, anything which tends adversely to complicate the question of censorship should surely be overcome if possible.

But for the Government allowing, in 1912, all the six British Transatlantic cables to pass into the hands and control of an American company, there would have been nothing to complain of in this respect. There would then have been no chance of any of our own messages being censored or the contents notified to others.

The publication of this article occurs at a moment when the Board of Trade has just been applied to for renewal of the now expiring landing licences of these American-controlled cables. Occasion is therefore taken to urge the Government to refuse to renew the same except on conditions that will at any rate materially meet what amounts to a serious defect. Even so, however, the real and pressing need for a line owned and worked by the State in inter-Imperial interests, for connecting up with the 'All-British' cable, becomes clearer every day.

The Mother Country and Canada have already had things to say to each other of an essentially private nature, yet they were hampered in so doing by the fact that their communications would at the same time become known to foreigners.<sup>13</sup>

That messages are quite ordinarily subjected to foreign scrutiny where vital issues are at stake there can be no doubt. For instance, in connexion with the *Titanic* disaster a telegram sent by Mr. Ismay from the British steamer Carpathia was intercepted by the United States Government at Washington. This, in itself, serves to show that, whenever it is thought necessary, surveillance, interception, censorship, or other control is likely to be instituted by the American Government if desired.

As I more than once pointed out in advance, had our Government refused to transfer the British licences of the Anglo-American Telegraph Co. and the Direct United States Cable Co. to the Western Union Telegraph Co. of New York the deal would have been effectively stopped. This was certainly a neglected opportunity of a highly important order.

neglected opportunity of a highly important of a relative or a relative of the recognised of the futility of relying on codes for secrecy purposes is well recognised by experts. Moreover, there can never be any assurance against the banning of

We must not forget, too, the possibility of the United States falling out with our ally Japan, conceivably on the over-running of California by immigrating Japanese. In that case we could scarcely expect to count on any of these American-controlled Atlantic cables being of much service to either Mother Country, Canada, or any section of the British Empire. Under these conditions, indeed, Great Britain being an ally of Japan's, all our messages would be forthwith censored by the United States Government! Surely it were better to censor other people's messages than to have our own censored.14 The changes in foreign politics are so rapid and uncertain that a serious misunderstanding might even arise between our present friends of the United States and ourselves, and then of what value to us would any of these American-worked cables be? In such circumstances we should be entirely cut off from all telegraphic communication with Canada.

Seeing that we had to wait for so appalling a disaster as that associated with the s.s. *Titanic* before we became aware that all was not as it should be in the matter of maritime safety, it is to be hoped that we shall not similarly have to wait till we are cut off from the rest of the Empire before serious attention is given to this matter.<sup>15</sup>

Those who have opposed the scheme for a State Atlantic cable connecting up with the 'All-British' Pacific cable and land line have partly done so on the mistaken premises that for effecting the said link we should be using the country's revenue at the expense of British shareholders in what were originally British cables. These cables are now-on a ninety-nine years' lease-practically the property of the Western Union Telegraph Company of New York; moreover, the dividend is a fixed one, assured by the American Company to the said shareholders, and is, therefore, quite independent of any State competition. Further, anything which is used by the State for the purposes of the country-her welfare and defence-should be considered from that point of view rather than with regard to any particular section of the community. Thus a project of this character at once becomes a suitable subject for provision out of public funds.

Those who rest their arguments for opposition to the pro-

codes by the Power controlling a cable—as we have ourselves rendered clear in the present war.

The writer has dealt with this aspect of the matter more fully in the Quarterly Review for January 1914 as well as in the course of evidence to the Dominions Royal Commission (Blue Book Cd. 6517).

15 Railway disasters are commonly left to heap up before recommendations by Board of Trade inspectors are acted upon—and then only at the dictate of actual legislation.

posed State Atlantic cable on the ground that it would not prove a financial success (and criticise unfavourably the 'All-British' State Pacific cable) should examine the returns of the Pacific Cable Board, the annual balance-sheet of which shows clearly how, with development, the financial position has steadily-and enormously—improved from year to year. 16 Then, again, it has been suggested that sufficient traffic for the proposed State Atlantic Cable could not be relied upon to keep it anything like busy. This suggestion, however, appears to be made without considering the great increase that would accrue as a result of the provision of the cable and land line. Yet, in the writer's opinion, if the cable does not warrant itself nationally and strategically, it does not warrant itself at all; and those who argue that neutral cables are of greater strategic value than All-British lines should note what is actually done with neutral cables on emergency. 'Might is right' then appears to be the maxim!

It should be remembered, too, that whereas we are spending some 50,000l. per annum on various subsidies to different cables, this proposed Transatlantic cable—the most important missing lirk in the whole Imperial telegraph system—would only mean about 10,000l. to the Mother Country, the Dominions concerned having already (repeatedly, indeed) expressed a desire to take

their proportionate share in the undertaking.

Let us not forget that the strength of a chain is really that of its weakest link; and the weak link in the Imperial chain is at present the American Atlantic Cable System, on which it is dependent for communication between Great Britain and Canada.

There are also those who argue that the State Atlantic line would be unsuitable on the score that wireless telegraphy is more economical, both in regard to establishment and working. It should, however, always be remembered in this connection that the cable is pre-eminent in the matter of efficiency, and that there are no signs at present of this condition of things being reversed. Efficiency is far more important in such a matter than economy, much as we may hope to see cable rates radically reduced before long.<sup>17</sup>

Without wishing to make too much of the actual turn of

odd instead of 79,000l. for the first complete year of working, whilst the increased expenditure does not bear anything like the same proportion. This is a very satisfactory state of things when it is remembered that for want of a unified trans-Pacific-Atlantic system the Pacific Cable Board (unlike the 'Eastern' Companies) has no traffic offices of its own in London.

That efficiency is considerably more important than economy in telegraphy is proved by the fact that business people frequently pay 2s.—in place of 2d.—per word to have their messages 'rushed' from London to Paris via New York (instead of the ordinary—shorter—route) for the sake of expediting

transit.

events; opportunity must be taken to remind those who, in opposing the proposed Imperial Atlantic cable, have never been able to conceive the possibility of our country being engaged in serious warfare, that such has, indeed, come about sooner than might have been expected. A glance at the House of Commons debate of the 3rd of April 1912 serves to indicate that people with superior knowledge' and the comparatively brief experience afforded by party political administration do not always come out 'on top' after all. The following quotation is what I have in mind:

The honourable member first raised the hypothetical case of our being at war with some European country, and, secondly, of the sending of a cipher telegram that could be deciphered or communicated to others. Really, such a contingency is so remote that I do not think this House should make any costly provision to meet it.

Yet the right honourable gentleman who spoke thuswise proposed to provide a far more costly—and comparatively untried—wireless service at the country's expense! No one seems to have thought of criticising the Imperial wireless chain from the standpoint of cost, any more than anyone in his senses would now object to the national expense of a Dreadnought—though also more than double the price of an Atlantic cable. Certainly Hansard affords entertaining reading if indulged in historically!

One can almost hear it being urged that this is no time for expenditure on the proposed State Atlantic Cable. It is but natural that such a view should be held by those who only think of communication from the standpoint of business during peaceful periods, and fail to appreciate that it is still more essential as an element in strategy and defence. The writer has some hope that the latter feature may be appreciated at a time when we are gradually spending on the Great War upwards of two millions sterling per day, and when, therefore, a single lump sum of half a million added to the same Estimates would form but a small item. 18 It should be further stated that considerably more than enough cable of suitable type is already to hand in this country—partly cable that has only recently been manufactured, but which, owing to the War, has not gone to its intended destination. This surely should be turned to account for completing the missing Imperial link, unless the Government can arrange satisfactory terms for the absolute and unqualified appropriation

15 These are, indeed, different times from those—really but a few months agowhen, with many 'politicians,' war was not dreamt of, and when, therefore, almost insignificant expenditure on defence was severely criticised. Yet it is but a dearly bought lesson that we are learning, which we might, by even moderate foresight and provision, have saved ourselves in the piping days of peace. As, indeed, that grand old patriot Lord Roberts tried hard to make us understand, had we established a standing army of say 3½ millions strong, we should have rendered what has taken place out of the question.

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of at least one of the American-controlled transatlantic cables. This—or an independent new cable—would alone meet the requirements of the Board of Control here urged for our Inter-Imperial Communication system, seeing that no American-owned cable could be brought under such an authority.

### WIRELESS IN WAR-TIME.

Let us now take up-to-date stock of the position of wireless telegraphy in connexion with this great War. The art has provided, as it were, a new organ of sense to commanders both on land and sea, to enable them to determine without delay the state of affairs at very distant points of the field, and to issue orders accordingly. Thus wireless has proved of considerable value. It may nowadays be said, indeed, that on the ability of a Government to communicate instantly with its naval and military officers—and they with one another—is likely to depend in large measure the final outcome of the struggle in which we are now playing so vital a part.<sup>10</sup>

'Wireless' has, however, also proved to be a somewhat uncertain and distinctly two-edged weapon to rely upon. The very first day after the declaration of war revealed the comparative ease with which a 'wireless' system may often be 'jambed.' This was effected by the enemy's 'wireless' station at Swakopmund, near Omataka, German South-West Africa, the result being completely to swamp-by a higher power-all signals received at Cape Town, 850 miles off. On the other hand, a few days later a British cruiser entirely destroyed the wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam, German East Africa. A number of other wireless stations have since been put out of service and are no longer available for communication purposes, and these are set forth in the last official list issued by the Berne Telegraph Among them is Togo (German West Africa), the biggest wireless station in the world outside Europe, which had been in existence about three years, and had kept up nightly talks with Berlin throughout. This we should have 'wiped out' before capturing Togoland; but, unfortunately, the Germans destroyed it previously to our invasion, which was really effected mainly for the set purpose of acquiring this wireless station-

19 According to the Official 'Eye-Witness' at the Front, the Army Signal Headquarters Office is the nerve-centre of the army in the field, receiving messages from all quarters by wire telegraph, telephone, wireless telegraphy, and motor cyclists. About 3000 messages are, in fact, handled daily.

and motor cyclists. About 5000 messages are, in fact, finding and 20 A memorandum issued by the German Colonial Office on the course of events in the German colonies contains references to the more or less complete interruption—so far as the German Empire is concerned—of communication by cable and wireless telegraphy. Just as Germany controls but few colonies now, cable and wireless telegraphy. Just as Germany controls but few colonies now, so, similarly, she has very few wireless stations left, and none at all in the Pacific.

partly in order to 'listen in' to wireless communications from the enemy's wireless headquarters at Nauen, near Berlin.<sup>21</sup>

But though the Togo plant is not available to us for picking up the official messages which are continuously sent out from Nauen, the Marconi Company has been doing highly useful work at their stations in reading off the Nauen signals, and also those wafted forth from the new-and still higher power-station at Hanover. A large proportion of these messages consists of false versions of war occurrences (partly in English) for the benefit of the United States and other neutral countries, whom Germany wishes to impress. If it were thought desirable, the signals could be effectively stopped or rendered unreadable by jambingi.e. by transmitting from any of our high-power stations a series of impulses of corresponding wave-length so as to drown down the German signals, thus preventing their reaching Tuckerton or other wireless stations. But it is thought, on the whole, better to permit the emission of false statements to proceed, in order to note their purport, through the Marconi stations. As, however, the writer took occasion to suggest almost at the commencement of hostilities, it might be well to counteract the effect of this 'news' in neutral countries by disseminating accurate particulars of the War from the great Eiffel Tower station. For if neutral countries were made acquainted with the real facts, they would surely recognise that Germany was a common danger and a common enemy to the whole civilised world; and in order to bring the War-and the more or less universal paralysation of trade-to a speedy conclusion, they would then very likely join forces with the Allies for the purpose of completely and speedily suppressing their Teuton foes.

Whilst 'wireless' has more than once done splendid work as an agent for detecting crime and detaining evil-doers, it has also frequently served as a ready weapon to the unscrupulous—inter alia, by the transmission of unauthorised signals. Since the outbreak of war it has been largely used by Germany in this way. Thus it is that several British merchant vessels have been ensnared by the enemy; and, on the other hand, there can be little doubt that the enemy's cruisers have more than once been well served by secret wireless stations—partly on neutral territory. Again, stories are current in well-informed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Besides being in communication with Nauen—3450 miles distant—Togo was also in wireless touch with various stations in the Cameroons, with Windhuk in German South-West Africa, with Tabora, German East Africa, as well as with the Paloos and Caroline Islands. This immense station at Togo (near Kemina) had served, in fact, as a big receiving and distributing centre for messages from Berlin to Germany's African possessions. Through it also German ships in those waters could be warned and German cruisers instructed.

quarters that in the United States the Germans are systematically using wireless telegraphy to serve military ends. American radio-telegraphy service is strictly controlled by the U.S. Government, and the plan seems to be to instal secret plants in inaccessible places and send messages to cruisers. couched in apparently innocent language. American newspapers recently had something to say about one such plant which was alleged to be situated among the almost unexplored tumble of mountains, forests and water which cover most of the State of Washington on the Pacific Coast. The code employed is said to make the messages resemble harmless business telegrams of quotations, prices, etc. In contradistinction to cable telegraphy, in the case of 'wireless' the origin of a message can never be known or traced for certain, and messages that may seem to be coming to a British warship from the Admiralty-or vice versa-may really be bogus messages from the enemy for the purpose of misleading our forces. Though in her adventurous rovings the now defunct Emden mostly refrained from sending wireless signals, she appears to have been throughout a ready 'listener' on a wide scale, and was always well acquainted with the whereabouts and projected movements of our ships without revealing her own.

This War has already, times without number, proved on the one hand the great value of wireless for disseminating instructions and information widely, directly, and speedily; but it has also obviously revealed the risk that is necessarily run in its employment-if only on account of the complete absence of secrecy or of certain knowledge as to the origin of messages. Indeed, it is often a question whether silence may not be wiser. That question never arises with the cable. Further, all wireless messages received require to be regarded with the greatest caution before being assumed as authentic or suitable for being acted on. That the late Admiral Cradock was misled by false wireless messages really originating with the enemy there can, be little doubt, and his disastrous encounter off the Chilian coast is probably attributable to this and to the wireless instructions he sent to his fleet—as well as those intended for him—being

'jambed' by the enemy.

That wireless telegraphy—like the carrier pigeon—is of great service to espionage is clear; and there is weighty circumstantial evidence that a good deal of important information has been thus disseminated by spies from our shores to German vessels at sea, notwithstanding the prohibition of the private wireless apparatus. Indeed, although no single station of sufficient power could successfully transmit to Germany without detection, it is quite possible that, by means of a chain of small power stations

with hidden aerials, messages might be transmitted a few miles at a time, and thus get across the North Sea or the Channel. A comparatively small station with an aerial hidden in the roof of a house, or carefully trained up a flagstaff floating the Union Jack, may well transmit over a distance of 100 miles. Such stations could, indeed, easily pick up signals sent out by our own 'wireless' stations, whilst also receiving instructions from enemy 'wireless' stations.

The existence of 'private' radio-telegraph stations in different parts of the world has already been the subject of much diplomatic correspondence, and will undoubtedly be made the occasion for stringent international regulation in days to come. Meanwhile, on the very outbreak of hostilities the Postmaster-General—quite rightly—not only vetoed the use of all private radio-telegraphic stations in this country, but even the possession

of wireless apparatus of any kind.22

It only remains to be said that, with at least five Government Departments separately concerning themselves in wireless telegraphy more or less actively, there is the same need for a central authority here as with cables; and there would be everything in favour of a single Government Controlling Board for the combined administration of our Imperial system of cables and wireless, with representatives thereon of all the departments concerned. Such a Board would get over much long drawn out interdepartmental correspondence, besides ensuring a uniform policyso especially essential in time of war. Moreover, stricter secrecy could then be ensured.

Partly in view of the strategic aspect of telegraphy, the following data relating to wireless stations throughout the world will probably be of interest. There are, altogether, 629 such stations. The United States leads with 198; the British Isles come next with 101, Canada 41, France 39, Italy 38, Russia 31, Brazil 29, Germany 29, Norway 27. China and Sweden have only three stations each in working order, but

several more are being erected.

Yet the rapid growth in the number of wireless stations has in no way checked the increasing mileage of submarine cables. In the past six years this network has progressed by 125,000 miles, of which 35,846 belong to different nationalities and about 90,000 to various private companies. There are, in fact, now some 290,000 miles of cable in operation at the bottom of the sea, of which 154,000 are British, 62,700 American, 27,000 French, 27,000 German, 10,000 Danish, and 9000 Japanese.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The Wireless Society of London has done much useful work in watching for improper uses of wireless. Moreover, the Wireless World affords considerable information on the subject.

Enough has perhaps now been said to show that the War experience so far in wireless telegraphy only tends to prove that, whilst of enormous value during hostilities as in peace times, it is still a very two-edged weapon, such as no complete reliance can be safely placed in, and that it certainly does not at present serve as a suitable substitute for cable telegraphy wherever the latter is available. Indeed, the following bygone opinion still holds good:

To believe it possible to discharge an electric impulse into ether, and expect it to be as reliably communicated through the range of Nature's atmospheric and electrical phenomena to its destination as a current can be passed through an unbroken electrical conductor connecting two points, requires a faith in man's conquest over Nature which is altogether beyond comprehension.

CHARLES BRIGHT.

1915

### THE GERMAN-AMERICAN

THE Revolution of 1848 shook most Continental thrones, and in turn filled Germany with fervent socialistic aspirations after freedom, which were, however, put down with a strong hand by the Prince of Prussia, destined later to develop into Kaiser Wilhelm the First; on whom his admiring grandson conferred the further distinction of 'the Great,' before it was conferred on him by history, to which the world usually leaves this supreme tribute. But on his way to that pinnacle of fame the Emperor William, who was heir to his brother Frederick William the Fourth of Prussia, and later Regent when the King became subject to intermittent attacks of insanity, had a good deal of mud flung at him by such of the Germans as loved liberty. It was probably because liberty was one of the luxuries denied to the sons of the Fatherland that so many wanted it, fought for it and died for it, while those who could neither gain it nor die for it shook the dust of the Fatherland from their feet and went in search of countries where liberty is not so fatally unpopular. This explains the large number who, in 1848, emigrated to America in search of freedom, and furthermore, Germany being a poor country in those days, to obtain a decent living in that promised land whose streets were reputed to be paved with gold.

For German emigrants this legend has indeed proved true, for none have been more prosperous or more valuable to their adopted country. Although they were of less muscular build than the Irish, who by mere physical strength and endurance made possible the first railway across the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific, they were better educated even when labourers, while their artisans, merchants, and many professional men, among whom were some of the highest eminence, who had been an honour to their Fatherland as they were later to the United States, proved of inestimable value. But German and Irish have one common characteristic: they have not even yet been quite assimilated by America, so when referred to they can never escape the distinctive 'German' or 'Irish,' as the case may be. Also from the beginning they have been inclined to intermarry among themselves, and socially they have kept rather

aloof from their American fellow-countrymen. Although these barriers have been slowly breaking down the last few years as the result of universal and excellent educational facilities, of increasing political supremacy and wealth, the very fact that a certain political influence is described as 'Irish' and another is appealed to as 'German' proves that America has not yet assimilated these two races, although the time must come when there will be no more hyphenated Americans, and when in her own interest she must stand between her naturalised citizens and the danger of alien interference by that country from which most of them were only too glad to escape.

It is but just to admit that the German-Americans have always been identified with law and progress, nor, unlike the Irish, have they been biassed by a too romantic attachment to their native country, in which most of them refused to live under existing conditions. The Irishman had dreams of returning to end his life in the old home, but the German has always been quite contented only to go back on visits, just to give ocular proof to his relatives of his aggressive prosperity, safely shielded as he is from conscription and other little drawbacks of his late Fatherland by his American citizenship. And he rejoices all the more when he observes the increasing taxes wrung from a people whose earning power is out of proportion to the demands of a Government whose perpetual interference with the rights of the individual has created a new crime of the first magnitude entitled lèse-majesté. That, too, when as a brand-new American he has learnt the lesson that 'he's as good as anybody,' and may say whatever he chooses, and that the worst that can happen to him is that nobody will listen. In addition, he recognises new social standards fixed by a military caste, the first of which is the snubbing of the purely civilian, unless heavily smothered in cash. No wonder, then, that the German-American finds no inducement to end his days in his ex-Fatherland. On the other hand, the tenacity which made the Irishman long to end his life in the Old Country in peace and happiness was merely a romantic misconception of his own nature, for an Irishman with only happiness and peace to look forward to would be inconceivably bored! But possibly this aspiration may explain why the Irish have been so long in taking root in America, for the first generations did not, so to speak, unpack; instead they were prepared for instant flight back should home-sickness provenunbearable. It was the first generation that suffered, for the second grew more reconciled, although they too did not become quite American, only Irish-American.

That was the trouble. Sometimes in those far-off days one came across amusing reversions to type characteristic of that

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much simpler time if not of this, now that the Irish-Americans sway the politics of the United States, and the German-American bankers bring the pressure of their financial influence to bear on the situation, possibly for the good of their late Fatherland and incidentally for their own.

The early Cunarders, which at that time sailed from the provincial wharf of Boston, were very little and always, as a female passenger expressed it, full of Beacon Street; and Beacon Street even to this day still represents aristocratic Boston. times Beacon Street unbent its stiff back and was quite affable to less aristocratic streets, and even shared a hymn-book with them at divine service, an ineffable condescension that stopped short at Liverpool with an abruptness that nearly hurt. On such a voyage one realised the chasm that separated the 'real' American from the Irish-American who now rules Boston with a political rod of iron. But such is the whirligig of time!

The only cabin-de-luxe on such a pre-historic Cunarder was the captain's, which, if he chose, he could sub-let and pocket the proceeds. To have the captain's cabin also conferred a certain social distinction, and it was usually sacred to the more exclusive rich and great. On one such voyage two occupants were invisible, and two chairs at the captain's table were always empty. Now the cream of Beacon Street sat at the captain's table, the ladies a little sharp of nose and elbow, and the gentlemen nearly English in their distrust of the unintroduced. But as the captain's cabin was sufficient introduction they made cautious inquiries as to the health of the invisible. One day solved the mystery. A passenger strolling on deck found the door of the captain's cabin open and in it were wedged a stout and elderly Irish couple. He wore a knit Cardigan jacket, cloth cap with the peak behind, and a black satin stock illuminated by a resplendent diamond brooch. His lady, he called her 'mother,' was in green poplin and a red Paisley shawl; a defiant black velvet bonnet rose on the back of her head. Her eye was snappy and suspicious. His was green and ruminative, and signalled timidly for human converse. They proved to be Mr. and Mrs. O'Flannigan, who thirty years before had sailed from Ireland to New York in the steerage of a sailing ship, on which occasion they had made a vow that whenever they returned to the Old Country it would be in the very best. And here they were, the victorious product of the liquor trade, in the captain's cabin! 'But,' Mr. O'Flannigan admitted with a sigh as he looked about at the dingy glory of this stateroom-de-luxe, 'it ain't all it's cracked up to be, and it ain't pleasant to sit in alone, not for long.' 'Why don't you eat in the dining saloon?' they were asked.



They looked secretly at each other, and then 'mother' spoke, 'We're afraid.'

It was a disgraceful confession for people in the captain's cabin.

'Afraid,' and 'mother' twisted her thumbs in her Paisley shawl, 'afraid of using the knives wrong, and afraid of their noses and their looks.

Whereupon Mr. O'Flannigan burst out while he mopped his heated brow, 'I says to mother, I says, if I want to put a knife down my throat I will, and all Beacon Street can't stop me, only I-I don't darst to do it in there,' and he referred with a dingy thumb to the dining saloon, 'and so we eat in the steerage -with friends. It ain't enough to hire the captain's cabin,' and his eye looked gloomy and dissatisfied, 'one's sorter got to be born in it!'

Another reversion to a humble type was German. same town there was a noted restaurant kept by an enterprising German, who had worked his way up from dish-washing to the supreme command, till he used to stroll between the tables and exchange greetings with gratified patrons. The great man had an only son destined to succeed him, to which end he also was set to dish-washing, after which he became so accomplished a waiter that as a reward of merit the old man bestowed on him a handsome cheque, with the strict injunction to go abroad and spend it all to see the world and improve his mind. He was gone six months, and when he reappeared there was nothing in his outer man to denote that seeing life was either expensive or polishing. Even his clothes were the same, with an added appearance, characteristic of waiter's clothes, of having been made for somebody else.

It was not until after supper that the paternal eyes twinkled and, between two puffs of his pipe, he asked encouragingly, as between man and man, 'I guess you ain't brought home much

of that cheque! Seeing life isn't cheap, is it, heh?'

'You just wait an' see, father,' said the son who was not a prodigal, and opened a rather greasy pocket-book, 'I guess you'll I ain't cost you a cent, an' I've brought home mor'n be satisfied. you gave me,' and he handed his astonished parent a larger cheque than the one he had carried away.

'What in thunder,' and the old man stared first at the cheque and then at his heir, 'have you been doing? It costs big money

to see the world."

'An' ain't I seen the world?' the son retorted with modest assurance, 'I guess! Why, I wa'ant aboard that ship an hour before I was waiting at table for a steward who hadn't turned up. An' I hadn't mor'n got to London when I got a first-class job at a restaurant. After that I up and did a bit of waiting in Paris—in a hotel. I wa'ant out of it twice,' he added triumphantly, 'an I've clean forgotten the name. Then I got tired and quit, and so I worked my passage to Berlin in a dining-car, an' got a real daisy of a place there, an' there I stayed ever since, for it was real homey. But I've found out something!' he concluded, satisfied with his contribution to the wisdom of the world, 'and that is cooking smells just the same everywhere.'

In those old days no sooner did the Germans reach the promised land than they became naturalised and cast in their lot with their new country, which was the wisest thing they could do, as it safeguarded them and their sons from coercion by what was once their native land, for Germany has a far-reaching military arm and a long memory for those who try to escape conscription. In return for this, all the United States required of them was that they should become loyal citizens, and by their good conduct avoid the criminal laws, and employ such talents as they possessed for the service of their adopted country. But from the beginning a barrier has stood between them and the native American, which is rarely surmounted until the second generation, and still prevents their entire assimilation, and that is language. An alien language is a barrier which makes a foreigner of a man even among people with whom he has cast in his lot, and with whose principles and aspirations he is in full sympathy. It makes him lonely and ready to cling to old memories, even to forget old sufferings. He lives in the past, to which, however, even in his sentimentality nothing would induce him to return. All the same, socially and racially he is inclined to keep to his own, which is narrowing and alike bad for people and country. There are important American cities more German than American, where more German is spoken than English, and where education is as much German as English. This is an evil, for although their loyalty may be the same as that of the American without a hyphen, of which one is assured by the sterling qualities of the German-Americans, still it is this barrier between the two great races in one country that has enabled the German Government to threaten America with reprisals at the polls, through those very citizens to whom she has given shelter, peace, and prosperity. For the sake of their own future, people who accept the hospitality of a country and settle there should first of all learn its language and make it their own, and let the language of the country they have left become of secondary importance. the bi-lingual facility of the German-American, broadening though it may be in its added possibilities for knowledge, may also among the less educated exercise a deteriorating effect both on the English and the German. In America, if only the one language can be spoken perfectly, let that language be English.

The Berlin threat of reprisals through German-Americans at the polls has so far only succeeded in rousing the deep and just resentment not only of Americans, but of those German Americans who are as loyal to the United States and all it stands for as the best Americans can be. For there are many more such than German propagandists like to admit. Here, for instance, is a quotation from a recent letter written by a prominent German-American, a man of eminence and of great influence in the city in which he lives: 'It is a terrible War, and Germany will certainly have to pay heavily for the dastardly outrages she has committed against civilisation and humanity. But I sincerely hope that the next year will find us at peace, and England triumphant.' Indeed, these German-Americans who are not pro-German suffer from no illusions about their late Fatherland, and they know, none better, the value of the benefits conferred on them by America, its liberal government and free institutions which permit them to satisfy their reasonable ambitions, and assure their children's future. Who of them, threatened by a conquering Germany-which would turn the world into one Empire ruled by a despotism unique in its cold-blooded, blundering cruelty, which spares not even its own—who would not take sides with the country to which they owe everything, rather than the country they have repudiated, and to which they owe nothing but the accidental circumstance of having been born there, although sharing with the rest of the world the privilege of being uplifted and aided by its noblest genius? But how has that great country fallen! Whatever natural sympathy the German-Americans still feel for the country which was once their home, they will undoubtedly at the crucial moment remember that their first and most solemn duty is to America, which has been their refuge and their salvation.

If one considers that Germany has no scruples as to the methods she employs to gain her ends, and that indeed she herself asserts that success justifies every crime, it is a matter for gratitude that so far her sinister purposes have met with constant defeat. When one opens certain pro-German papers published in America one has a sense of being deafened by the uncontrolled fury of their propaganda. America is threatened, unless she is properly neutral, and properly neutral, according to Germany, means to favour Germany. But even if the bitter attacks of the pro-German propagandists, from the German Ambassador to those 'exchange' professors who, having once basked in the warmth of the Imperial approval, are pro-German for ever—if

their attacks, subtle or otherwise, confuse some sane judgments, how can that affect the ultimate result? What German-Americans not subsidised by Berlin, with the exception, possibly, of those good old-timers of the first generation pursued by sentimental home memories, or others who want to assert themselves and their political influence as against the native American element, would want to return to the feared and familiar slavery? Would it, other considerations apart, would it pay? And, after all, is that not the crucial test by which political issues are decided these days?

Sometimes one suspects, for one can hardly doubt the sound German-American common sense, that all this violent pro-German invective represents nothing, achieves nothing except a fictitious success fanned with increasing weariness from Berlin, and may at best be briefly described as a fireside patriotism. For the fireside patriot enjoys all that is most thrilling and harrowing during the War, and gets it, so to speak, cheaply and safely, he and his sons being well sheltered behind their American citizenship; so, whatever their blatant loyalty to the old country, he and they run no risk of having to fight for it. He is even in no financial danger, for his American investments are probably sound, and the merciful distance between him and his late Kaiser prevents the long arm of necessity from reaching his purse, and this is the time when heart and purse are Tears these days are very commendable, but they are of no earthly use unless accompanied by a cheque. One is reminded of the first immense pro-German mass meeting at the Madison Square Gardens in New York at the beginning of the It was crowded by thousands of German-American sympathisers, and when later a collection was taken for the cause, one felt a certain sense of amusement at the sadly small result—estimated at elevenpence ha'penny per head! real enthusiasm should never stop short at the pocket! For it is the easiest and safest thing in the world to sit in a comfortable armchair, in the pleasant glow of the fire, and over a good cigar and a bottle of Rhine wine burst into lurid denunciations of England the hated, and the supineness of the American Government. Had not pro-German patriotism really stopped at the cheque-book the world would have rung with it, for it is Berlin's policy to encourage and exaggerate all public manifestation of sympathy with her cause if only for the disconcerting moral effect on the Allies. So far as the world knows, there has been no outpouring of treasure to aid Germany from the masses of well-to-do as well as enormously rich German-Americans. Indeed blood may be thicker than water, but there is

that in the free German-American blood which will not again suffer the old, mad, ruthless despotism which the tragic War of to-day proves unaltered.

The masterly strategy of the German propaganda as an important branch of her Foreign Office first became a factor to be reckoned with in America on the occasion of that famous visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the United States—we may add in parenthesis that America, being a republic, dearly loves a prince—and Prince Henry proved himself a most charming visitor, in spite of being nearly killed by the exhausting hospitality of the Great Republic. It was the first time that Germany came into her own, represented as she was by a prince of the Imperial house, and for the first time Germany was on a social level with the 'real' Americans. No wonder that in the universal enthusiasm England was quite forgotten, although only a few years before the British Lion, in the person of Admiral Sir Edward Chichester, had prevented the German Admiral von Diedrich from interfering with Admiral Dewey when he bombarded Manila. But republics have proverbially short memories. nobody thought of the bluff British Lion when Prince Henry, polite but exhausted, was drawn in State, attended by Governor and bodyguard and all the rest of the glory, from Boston to Cambridge to receive an honorary degree from Harvard University in the presence of the aristocracy of these famous towns, till President Eliot of Harvard, in addressing the distinguished visitor, welcomed him, as he said, not as the brother of a great Emperor, but as the grandson of the great Queen who had always been a friend of the United States. All honour to that grand old man who did not forget and who has never forgotten the world's debt to Great Britain. One feels convinced that the Lion was comforted, and that he purred softly and contentedly.

Those were the days that marked the beginning of that ardent friendship which Germany has ever since manifested towards America because it suited her deep-laid schemes. But as one studies the effects of German friendship on Austria and Turkey, a nation cannot but accept it with foreboding. It was the beginning of the German-American 'exchange' professorships, of the founding of the Germanic Museum at Harvard to which the Kaiser presented innumerable German plaster casts, while the statue of Frederick the Great—a great but certainly not a democratic ruler—he gave to the United States, to which it proved something of a white elephant. Indeed, the indefatigable Kaiser has left no stone unturned to endear himself to America and regain the loyalty of his lost subjects. One

wonders what the world would be like to-day had German diplomacy proved as efficient as her mighty Army! But fate has so far intervened, and if one studies the blunders of German statesmen and the inspired utterances (that is, inspired by Berlin, but nothing higher) of her admirals, generals, and minor greatnesses, one gathers at least one supreme comfort out of this tragic time: and that is that even this great empire, and what it is pure flattery to call her diplomacy, are mercifully served by very many bungling patriots who have quite mistaken their vocation in life.

ANNIE E. LANE.

## TOWN IN NORTHERN FRANCE:

#### MARCH 1915

THE quay is crowded. A few blue-clad porters carry luggage ashore. Blue-uniformed soldiers stand with fixed bayonets on the railway lines, on the station platform, and at points of egress. Khaki-clad soldiers swarm over the ship's gangways: disembarkation officers check every man's papers as he lands. A general officer with his staff is conducted direct to a waiting motor car and driven, without a moment's delay, through the town and away into the open country beyond. Other officers crowd into the refreshment room for luncheon, and every seat is filled; little French newsboys scream 'Dailee Mell.' When the officers move out, the non-commissioned officers and men crowd in. ladies, inappropriately clad in khaki cotton dresses and pearl necklaces, offer tickets for free meals to them. In some instances they are accepted, in many cases they are declined, respectfully and with embarrassment; for most of the men returning from leave have sufficient money and something to spare. An hour passes; the refreshment room empties. The manager and his wife are counting money at a desk. The military train is filling; and in half an hour more it steams away, and a few civilians are left standing on the platform, which the blue-coated soldiers still guard with those long spiky French bayonets. An elderly Englishman walks across the quay to the white ship lying waiting for ambulances which will presently come down from the hospitals in the town bringing their loads of wounded for home; a few are already sitting on deck seats in various states of disablementsome sad and anxious-looking, but most of them cheery and enjoying the somewhat cold spring sunshine and fresh air.

The elderly civilian has, apparently, a free pass everywhere.

The army doctor in charge welcomes him.

'Yes! a full ship to-night, but mostly doing well, and lots of them will be back again in a month or two. Thank you for your help, Dr. Lumsden: it's most useful to have you at hand, knowing all the ropes in this foreign place. When in difficulty, we quote you, and it always smoothes things out. By the way, I know they sent for you from the Hôtel de Londres an hour ago.

An English lady wanted attention; our fellows did what they could, but it was a case for you. She broke down over her son's wounds. He is dying in our hospital at the Bellevue, shot through the lung, and other wounds.'

'I'll go there on my way back. I came down to see my

nephew off to the Front from England.'

And the doctor who has practised at --- for thirty years leaves the ship and makes his way over the quays crowded with Red Cross ambulance cars, Army Service motor wagons, a Kilburn omnibus, and a hundred other English vehicles; past the tarpaulin-covered mountains of army stores to the town itself.

The Hôtel de Londres is crowded. Its entrance hall is full of English officers; a few ladies; three or four Indian doctors in khaki (there is a hospital for Indian soldiers a few streets away); French Army surgeons attached to the English staffs, in khaki uniforms, un-English in shape and detail; Red Cross nurses passing in and out in parties of five and ten to their work in the neighbouring hospitals; Indian orderlies waiting for orders, dumb, but smiling in a strange land. The whole scene about as different and unusual as anything the dwellers in a French seaport a year ago could possibly have imagined.

Dr. Lumsden went direct to the little office of the proprietor at the back of the hall. Madame la propriétaire welcomed him with expressions of gladness and a stream of inarticulate protesting sounds indicating that her patience with existing circumstances and conditions of life was quite exhausted. But her smiling lips belied her, and she and her husband are quite

content with the English invasion.

Yes, the English lady was upstairs in No. 21. Madame

would telephone for her maid to conduct the doctor to her.

In truth, the lady is ill. She has come over to see her son in hospital, and has found him dying, delirious, and still obsessed 'Shoot, and shoot straight,' by the ordeal of the trenches. he calls continually; 'we must stop them-God! what a thin line we are [he whispers this] to stop that crowd. We can't-but we must.'

Always the same words-of the pain of his shattered shoulder, his torn lung, he knows nothing. His mother's voice he cannot hear: her touch he shakes off, it prevents him shooting, of course. He will be quieter soon, the nurse told her. Won't she go to the hotel and rest a little? The nurse promised to send. No! but the surgeon insists; and the lady tries to go and faints.

Dr. Lumsden asks the maid some rapid questions, and then approaches the lady and prescribes. She tells him he must try and strengthen her so that she can behave better; but she has had a shock.

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'Your son is in good hands, Mrs. Ingram, the surgeon is the best he could have even if he were in London.'

He does his best to encourage her. She must not let delirium alarm her too much. They are most of them like that-and it passes. Shall he come again in the morning? Yes, she will be grateful. She has a little sleep, and then goes back to the hospital. Her boy is calm now, and entirely conscious, so she is happy till next afternoon, when he dies.

Dr. Lumsden, a little more tired now, for he sees what is to happen and it troubles him, passes out on his interrupted round. He is stopped in the Rue Lafayette by a messenger, who has been twice to his house and each time has been met with a sharp, short 'sorti' from Annette, the maid, who refused to predict when the doctor would return.

Madame Duval, the wife of a prosperous shopkeeper, was anxious about her little boy. Her own doctor was with the Army. If Dr. Lumsden would have the goodness of heart to

excuse her sending for him, etc., etc.

He finds the lady nervous and very angry-chiefly with her husband, who is defending himself without much spirit. boy has caught something terrible from these English soldiersalways in the shop-entering as if it belonged to them, for sooth -no salutation-mere English common soldiers to enter the shop of persons like her husband and herself! Madame's stream of invective ran on till Dr. Lumsden quietly but firmly desired her to take him to the child and to cease talking and wasting his time.

Presently he comes downstairs again with Madame. Monsieur Duval's anxious face appears from the private door to the

shop.

Nothing to be alarmed about, and you need not accuse your English customers. The child has caught measles at the school of St. Geneviève. I know, because I have other patients from there. There is no measles amongst any of the English here.'

'That is all very well,' chimes in Madame, 'but who can

tell what other malady they will bring in?'

'They pay for what they buy, surely? Is it not so? But if you do not want them, why not put up a notice: "No English served here "?"

'Pay! yes, I make them pay when my husband here does not

interfere--

'Oh! and the things these good compatriots of Monsieur's buy! Monsieur, it would astonish you. They must be rich, these English boys. Do not listen to my wife. She fears the English are enemies and will take our country. As for me, I welcome them, because I know better than that.'

Dr. Lumsden is in the street by this time.

Opposite is the old hotel of the days of travelling carriages; one enters under an archway into a paved courtyard which guests have to cross to get to their rooms from the salon and the salle-à-manger. Beyond, through another archway, the stables. A college friend of the doctor has an office here and is working the bureau for tracing the 'missing'; various relief committees are established here, and the sleepy old house has never been so crowded since railways came and the old paraphernalia of the Grand Tour disappeared into oblivion.

Dr. Lumsden passes on his round—up the long hill to a quiet street behind the walls where he has an English patient, an old lady of ninety-six, who has not yet heard of the War down again through the market square, where Annette, basket in hand and door key on finger, is cheapening cauliflowers for his

refreshment.

'Telephone for Monsieur—Villa Labordette,' she interrupts her bargaining as he passes.

He nods and looks at his watch.

'Marie, I am not well. I have an abominable migraine. My limbs scarcely support me when I walk. I am old and weak, and I fear I must consult the doctor. Go to Jean and see if he knows what doctors there are left in the poor place. Probably all are with the army. We old women must do without after all what would it matter if we died?'

'Jean says, Madame, there are but four doctors left in and three of them have the grippe. There remains but the English doctor Lumsden; and shall he call by telephone that

Dr. Lumsden should attend Madame?'

'Yes, Marie, and ask that if possible he comes soon, for I expect Monsieur le Général and I do not wish their visits to clash.'

'Yes, Madame.'

And Marie goes off on her errand while Madame la Comtesse de Clairville Beaurieux drew the silk shawl closely round her thin shoulders and shivered.

Her careworn face grew graver and she lapsed into thought. She was thinking of her beloved home in Champagne, torn, trampled, destroyed, by the foul German enemy, and of her two grandsons fighting under the French flag. Old and lonely, she had retreated to her villa by the Channel. Old Jean, her

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butler, and old Marie, her maid, brought her. The other men servants were all with the army, the women fled to their villages.

The lodgekeeper's wife and another native woman or two made a little household for her at the Villa Labordette, and there Jean did his best to maintain the 'state and ancientry' of the Château Beaurieux on the meagre income the Comtesse was able to collect from her shattered resources. Every summer she was wont to spend a few months at ———, but in winter she had never occupied the rather draughty house with its many wide windows looking seaward.

'Dr. Lumsden will come to Madame with all haste, but must be forgiven if he is late since he is overwhelmed with work.'

'Monsieur le Général Valletort,' announces Jean with all ceremony. Madame gives him her slender hand, still white and shapely, to kiss, and bids him draw a chair near to her sofa and the stove. The gallant old man is all deference to the wellbred lady.

'And your grandsons? news of them first, please, before we talk of anything else.'

'They are well and they write to me as often as they can. Georges is on the staff now and has the father's wise head and quiet ways. Pierre is promoted Captain and is happy. Oh! General, how long have I to bear it all—I mean have we all to bear it? I must not be selfish as if I alone suffered.'

'Ah! Madame, not long now. Have hope. Winter is long but it has served us well. Soon is the beginning of the end. There are terrible days ahead, days of anxiety and sorrow; but the end comes and can be but one end—victory for us and freedom for France. I am proud to have lived long enough to see it. I always, since 1870, feared to die before I saw France regenerated. You and I remember those days. We lived through them and nothing that is happening now can equal that misery and shame, and at last we have new hope, and a certain one.'

'Yes, General, let us have hope and courage. I am too old to be alone, perhaps, for I lose heart at times and that is a bad sign. Perhaps I am too much alone and then here one feels no longer in France. The English invasion is almost too much. Everywhere there is that wretched khaki. The very word is dreadful and I do not understand. It may be well for France but could we not, with our own army, defeat the hateful Germans and drive them out? Why must we wait and suffer all this misery because our ally is not ready? We were ready——'

'Is that so?'

'But surely—you do not think our army would fail us. Ah! you cannot think we shall fail now? No. I know we cannot. Georges and Victor both tell me and I have perfect confidence. But why wait?'

Because we too wanted time. France is only lately regenerate. Germany struck because she knew we were strengthening ourselves, but the process was not yet complete. Madame, let me tell you what an old man knows because he has heard it from men who saw. You remember the awful days of last September, when the Germans wrecked your home and were within a few miles of Paris itself?

'Remember ——!'

'It was a "strategic withdrawal to a position prepared beforehand," you remember, that left your land and your home at Beaurieux trampled and ruined. It was to a pre-arranged line of defence that our Joffre had all along planned to hold. Everyone was to have perfect confidence. There was nothing to fear. The Government went to Bordeaux merely for a little change. Madame, let me tell you. Give me six matches—no, I have them—the wooden English ones you detest—never mind; they serve to show you. See, this match is our northern army——'s; the next is——'s army; here is the English army, then poor——'s, the rest matter not—so, and so, and so, right away to Belfort. And here, facing our northern army, is von Kluck, then others, and this one here is the Crown Prince.

'You did not know and no one was told what was happening -what happened. Von Kluck turned our left flank-that match is broken to pieces; fling it away; it is of no account as an army. The next ----'s-piff-he is smashed too. Kluck is racing south-east, he has them in flank—they are no longer an army-fling that poor match away. Then the English, where are they? fled, disintegrated, a rabble. He knows it. He has seen the roads strewn with their equipment, everything they could throw away was flung by the roadside to lighten them for flight. It was a rout and he knew it. And to his left another French army, outmarched, in disorder, their line broken, facing too much east and themselves kilometre upon kilometre from the English who should have joined them; a gap of many leagues, his cavalry report. What does he decide to do? It is night. He has to rest his men a little. Shall he march straight on Paris now or smash this broken army of \_\_\_\_\_'s? The long-legged English are of no account—as all Germans knew.

'It is the choice of his life and—he chose wrong. He decides to let Paris wait and to take the other French army in flank, drive it into the Crown Prince's hands. You see this

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wooden match is the Crown Prince as I told you. What glory for him, to defeat a French army, opposed to him, to be the first to hack his way through to Paris! Von Kluck is perhaps more loval than wise—I do not know—perhaps he thinks he will work it all out and his Prince shall have the glory. Perhaps he has had a telegram from his War Lord—who knows?—at all events he turns on ———. But he does not know ——— has been withdrawn; a stronger man has taken over his command the day before. The army that Von Kluck was to outflank is, God bless it, facing him fair and square. Never mind; the Prince will come up behind. And now, Madame, a surprise for you and for Von Kluck. Those English cowards who had fled! What do you think? Fled, yes, but undefeated; the finest retreat in history, Madame! What Von Kluck saw thrown down in the roads was everything a soldier can do without and yet remain a soldier. There was no rout. Their generals, with their experience of war that not one of ours had ever had, maintained a perfect control. They rested, they reformed, they attacked— Madame, they saved Paris and they saved France!

And the old General in his excitement threw all the matches in a bunch on to the stove and smote the table with his fist.

'Monsieur le Médecin, Madame'; and Dr. Lumsden bows to the Comtesse with great politeness and then to the General. The latter is coughing. Madame has tears in her eyes.

'Aha! mon cher Dr. Lumsden, you are arrived at a welcome moment. Madame and I were discussing your country and your countrymen, and I was, old grumbler that I am, telling Madame all their faults and saying that they will never understand us Frenchmen. "Frogs," you say, is it not so? of us all. Aha! Madame is alarmed, but no, no, Dr. Lumsden and I are old friends."

So Madame had time to collect herself, for the General's story, illustrated so dramatically with the wooden matches had moved her. She was more agitated by Dr. Lumsden's presence than she had expected to be. It seemed like the climax of her disillusionment, and yet it hardened her in her smaller prejudices—she felt ungenerous and unwilling to discard them. She hoped the General would talk of other things and soon leave her. He was already moving to make his adieux.

'But one question before I go, Doctor. How are those gallant sons of yours, fighting in the next army to Madame's grandsons? For I know where they are, and my old military friends tell me sometimes a little about the position of things.'

'As far as I know they are both well, General—busy beyond letter-writing, so I hear seldom. Like all our English boys, they

felt they had to go. One is a doctor with the army and the other enlisted as a private soldier. He has his commission now.'

'Adieu, Madame,' and he kissed her hand again; 'I leave you to the good offices of my friend, and I pray he may cure you of every ill that troubles you.'

So Dr. Lumsden prescribed his remedies after hearing what Madame la Comtesse had to tell him.

'They will help a little, Madame, and good news of your grandsons will help more. The peace, when it comes, will be your cure.'

'There are many like me among your patients, Doctor. It is fortunate we have you here to help us, and I am grateful. I wish your sons well. The General was too generous. It was I who was doubting the value of your country's help to us. He has told me the truth and I see I was wrong. "He who knows all can understand all"—we have the proverb that is common to all languages. Your soldiers are difficult to understand—so gay and laughing, making war a joke, a game. Have they no thoughts of their women and children at home? No, that cannot be. Is it, then, the laugh that conceals the heartbreak?"

'No, Madame, not the first—and not even quite the second. It is their training. We in England make everything, even life, a game. Games are a great part of our education. The good and the wise keep the rules, whether they are winning or losingand the first rule is to play with all your heart; what we call to "play up." The next is not to show emotion. We have itwe are as full of sentiment as any nation, as free to avow it, but always provided there is no public, no third person even, looking This is a strict rule of the game. If you had seen what I as a doctor have seen you would realise. These English wounded men here in hundreds in your hotels which are hospitals-you do not know what courage and endurance they show-and what tender things they think and do and plan for their women and children at home. I have often to be their means of communication and I know. And even to me there is the concealing smile. the gay laugh, the humorous word that helps us both and makes us understand each other, because we learnt the game that way.

'There is much besides that you, Madame, cannot understand in the English invasion. There are ladies here doing work which no French lady would undertake. They, too, have been taught differently. Ah! yes, I know—there are one or two ladies here, not more, who are not English ladies or ladies at all, but whose doings are too much chronicled and discussed. We are not proud of them any more than you, Madame, are proud of Madame de —— as a Frenchwoman. We cannot help it any

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arc eei more than you can help Madame de ——. But there are many hundreds of English ladies here doing women's work for the wounded of their country and of yours that you, Madame, would be proud to know and to receive, though your own compatriots would not do such work. They would get it done and see that it was done. English ladies are trained differently, and they can do, without hesitation or failure, much work that is less well done, Madame, in your hospitals.'

'You astonish me, Doctor, but you help me. I am glad to distinguish between the English women we see and hear of in the town. Perhaps then we have something to learn from them in war, though war has been so much nearer to us and so much more cruel. For one does value house and goods and the beloved pictures and the old china and all that makes the home. Do you know those German staff officers in my salon had sheep killed and cut up for food in order to destroy my furniture, my carpets, my hangings? I was fond of these things for old association, and they made a slaughter-house of my drawing-room! God has protected you in England from that, and yet we have something to learn from Englishwomen in our conduct in war'—and Madame smiled sadly—' and I begin to see we have.'

'Madame, war is a great teacher: this War surely the greatest we can ever listen to. We should all listen—we who cannot be in arms can look on in awe and wonder, and learn. I will say adieu, for I have much work to do.'

'Adieu, Monsieur! and my thanks from my heart.'

Annette is standing at Dr. Lumsden's open door as his fiacre draws up. Her face is one large smile. She sees nothing but the squad of Highlanders swinging down the street—khaki tunics and stockings and tartan kilts that nothing will induce them even to cover with khaki aprons—and Dr. Lumsden has to touch her arm before she stands aside—blushing finely—to let him pass into his house.

'Pardon, Monsieur! but Monsieur is late and must be fatigued.'

'Yes, Annette, bring me some dinner—when the Scotchmen are out of sight! Annette, Madame Duval says she cannot bear English soldiers in her shop and is afraid they mean to take your country.'

'That Monsieur should listen to Madame Duval, who is a peahen and a wicked one too! And the way she robs those poor men who go there to buy souvenirs to send home—it is a scandal! Mongrel Swiss that she is—understanding neither French people nor English! I myself have stopped her and saved a poor

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English boy paying three francs for a cup and saucer worth seventy-five centimes. Yes—and a brave boy too—worth fifty Mesdames Duval and all her shop thrown in.

'Monsieur, your soldiers are veritable heroes! and to think of the killed and wounded over here!—well, the devil take Madame Duval for her evil tongue, and Monsieur's dinner will be served in five minutes. Entrecôte à l'Anglaise and a choufleur au gratin, Monsieur.'

C. H. BABINGTON.

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# THE CASE OF DR. AXHAM

II

It was my privilege in December last 1 to be allowed to prefer a plea on behalf of Dr. F. W. Axham, whose name was struck off the Register by the General Medical Council in May 1911, because of his association, as anaesthetist, with Mr. H. A. Barker, the Bonesetter of Park Lane. I hope I succeeded in proving to the satisfaction of every unprejudiced person that Dr. Axham had been treated with quite unnecessary harshness, and that the time had arrived when he might be justly reinstated in the position which he had occupied for fifty years without a blemish or a stain.

If in the following pages I can succeed in demonstrating that the 'outsider,' with whom he was and is associated, is in no sense of the word a 'quack,' but an altogether exceptional person engaged in beneficent work on entirely sound and scientific lines,

it is obvious that I shall greatly strengthen that plea.

A very strong feeling exists at the present time that the medical profession should seriously take in hand an investigation into the claims of manipulative surgery. The evidence that has been accumulating during the last ten or fifteen years makes it quite clear that there are a vast number of people suffering from various affections of the joints with which the regular practitioner is not competent to deal. The instruction which he has received at the schools is not of such a nature as to qualify him to deal successfully with these complaints. Yet there are men outside the profession who are possessed of a secret or knack or system -call it what you like-which enables them to deal effectually with such cases. The profession are well aware of the fact; but apparently they take no steps to avail themselves of information which lies to their hands. They are content to assume an attitude of aloofness and incredulity, and to pose like those who fondly asked 'Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?'

Now, it always appears to me that the one blot on the escutcheon of a noble profession is the blind prejudice which it has

<sup>1 &#</sup>x27;The Case of Dr. Axham,' Nineteenth Century and After. December 1914.

ever entertained against those outside its ranks who have ventured, from time to time, to suggest that they were in possession of an idea which might be of assistance in the treatment of human maladies. It has always been assumed that the brain of the layman is incapable of conceiving anything likely to be of practical utility in the sacred domain of medicine and surgery.

A man may have travelled the world over; he may have witnessed the elementary treatment of disease amongst savage tribes; he may be in possession of the highest scientific acquirements; he may have investigated the most complex and delicate appliances in different countries; he may be possessed of the keenest power of observation; he may have been brought face to face with disease in its manifold forms, and have witnessed the unsuccessful efforts of trained physicians and surgeons to alleviate or cure; nevertheless, it is presumed to be inconceivable that he, being an outsider, should be able to evolve a remedy, an appliance, a process superior to that which the faculty are accustomed to employ.

Yet it has always been considered that the true scientific spirit manifests itself in a readiness to sift, and test, all evidence from whatsoever quarter. Bigotry, prejudice, narrow-mindedness, conceit, are entirely alien to the scientific pursuit of knowledge. How, then, can the faculty attempt to explain, or condone, their conservative opposition to discoveries on the part of the layman, or innovations when suggested by pioneers within their ranks?

For unvarnished history reveals the fact that medicine has progressed with the assistance of the layman and the pioneer, in spite of, and in face of, the bitter opposition of the pundits of the profession.

(a) Cinchona was introduced into Europe by Jesuit priests, who had learned its value from the Indian tribes of South America;

(b) Ether was first employed as an anaesthetic by an unqualified man;

(c) Lithotomy was introduced by a layman;

(d) The first Caesarian section was performed by one who had no diploma;

(e) Pasteur was refused a hearing by leading physicians

because he had no medical degree;

(f) When Harvey announced his discovery of the circulation of the blood, he was denounced by the profession of his day as a 'circulator' or quack;

(g) Lister was scoffed at when he advocated the employment

of antiseptics;

(h) The laryngoscope was sneered at as a physiological toy;

(i) The early ovariotomists were threatened by their colleagues with the Coroner's Court;

(j) When Villemin submitted to the Académie de Médecine experimental proof that phthisis was infectious his doctrines found no favour;

(k) When Bodington advocated the open-air treatment of con-

sumption the idea was ridiculed;

(1) Years later, when Sir W. McCormack's father read a paper enunciating the same doctrine, a member of the 'Medical and Chirurgical Society' asked that that body should be protected against such papers;

(m) When electricity was put forward as a curative agent

it was looked upon with suspicion;

(n) Massage introduced in our own day was regarded as an

unclean thing;

(o) While fifty years ago, when Wharton Hood was applying, with such success, the methods which he had learned of the bonesetter Hutton, he was openly denounced as a quack; and it was even suggested that there was something irregular and improper in his practice.

This strange record may be said to justify a frequent suspicion, on the part of the public, that the medical profession officially is more awake to its peculiar privileges than to the true

interests of suffering humanity.

It might be thought that by this time it had learned its lesson, and was prepared to receive with open arms any outsider, or pioneer, who could bring forward a remedy or system likely to assist it in its noble effort to reduce the burden of human suffering.

But enlightenment seems as far off as ever.

Bonesetting, or manipulative surgery, is still generally taboo to the profession: its principles are unknown and untaught, and its exponents, good, bad, and indifferent, are lumped together as quacks, and treated with contumely and scorn; and this, in spite of the accumulation of overwhelming evidence of the value of

those principles.

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In November 1910 a Blue Book was issued—On the Practice of Medicine and Surgery by Unqualified Persons—embodying reports by local medical officers of health. This book was published with the avowed object, not merely of influencing public opinion, but especially with the idea of promoting legislative action for the regulation of the practice of medicine. That such legislation is needed is universally allowed; but common sense requires that it should be based on a fair and impartial inquiry into the true circumstances of the case.

But it is easy to demonstrate that this report, or series of

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reports, is everything but impartial: that it is, on the contrary, absolutely biassed, narrow-minded, and utterly untrustworthy.

The summary states (page 8) that numerous complaints have been received of the encroachments by bonesetters upon the surgical practice of qualified practitioners; that the number of bonesetters is increasing; that an astonishing amount of public confidence is reposed in them; that Friendly Societies in the North even accept certificates from them in cases of accident as equivalent to certificates from medical practitioners. on public health are declared to be disastrous, and, in particular, it is reported that 'the greater number of bonesetters undertake complicated cases, and irretrievable harm is sometimes caused. Dislocations are treated without being reduced, and permanent disablement sometimes results.' It goes on to affirm that 'what bonesetters practise is fraught with danger to their patients, that any success is accidental, that the results are, on the whole, disastrous, and that only a natural shrinking of the victims of pretentious quacks from displaying their credulity and folly prevents this danger from being demonstrated to the public.' It is also asserted that their patients are 'drawn largely from the working-class population,' and are 'in many cases illiterate and uneducated.' In their blind and unreasoning condemnation of osteopathic methods, these doctors stultify themselves by classifying such skilled and gifted operators as Hutton, Atkinson, and Barker with illiterate bonesetters, vendors of patent medicines, quacks, and charlatans. True, there are bonesetters and bonesetters; but there are doctors and doctors, and there is a vast amount of bungling in the profession which never comes to light because, being members of a sacred trade union, they are pledged to stand by each other, through good report or evil.

But here is the extraordinary fact—not one jot or tittle of evidence is brought forward to substantiate the sweeping generalisations and accusations that are made so glibly. In the eyes of thinking men, therefore, the report fails to carry any weight whatever, and stands condemned as a merely narrow-minded diatribe.

The publication of summaries of the report in the various journals not unnaturally evoked a series of spirited controversies, showing that, though the medical profession may choose to bury its official head in the sand, the public has, by this, come to realise that bonesetting is no longer in the primitive stage of mid-Victorian days, but has developed, in the hands, at any rate, of Mr. H. A. Barker, into a sound system of therapeutics on a thoroughly scientific basis.

In so far as the report can be said to have any reference to

Mr. Barker at all—the report makes no exceptions in its diatribe—it is, I will not say grossly unfair, but manifestly ridiculous. It is an absurdity to hurl abusive generalisations at the head of an educated man, a serious student, who has devoted the best

twenty years of his life to the alleviation of human suffering; it is sheer ignorance to suggest that his patients 'are drawn largely from the working classes,' and are 'in many cases illiterate and uneducated'; it is rank wickedness to insinuate that his practice is 'fraught with danger to his patients, that any success is accidental, and that the results are on the whole disastrous.'

The report failed—I will not say to wreck—but even to shake the solid position which Mr. Barker occupies in the opinion of the thinking public. It did more than fail: it evoked such unbounded testimony to his unfailing skill that the profession are no longer able to venture upon a wholesale condemnation of bone-setting.<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly when the medical correspondent of *The Times* rashly rushed into the fray, intending to belittle the work of the bonesetter, he was so embarrassed with the evidence with which he was surrounded that whereas he set out to curse he only succeeded in blessing.

Soon after this Professor Howard Marsh made another effort in the columns of the *British Medical Journal*; but Mr. Barker replied with a paper in the *English Review*, which completely upset the contentions of the professor.

Now, as Dr. Axham was drummed out of the profession solely on account of his association with Mr. H. A. Barker, it will be just as well to ask—for the benefit of the profession—who is Mr. Barker, and what do the public think of him?

The profession as a body have always acted as if they were under the impression that Mr. Barker was some common, ignorant charlatan, and they have generally done their best to induce the public to entertain a similar idea. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Mr. Barker, whose father was the much-respected Coroner for South-West Lancashire, has from early youth been interested in mechano-therapy, and it was the most natural thing in the world that, when he was old enough, and opportunity offered, he should be taken as an assistant by his cousin, Mr. Atkinson, who, in the latter half of last century, was easily the most famous bonesetter of his day.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See article in the English Review by Mr. Walter Whitehead, F.R.C.S., F.R.S. (Edin.), June 1911, p. 478. 'I am convinced that the attitude adopted by the medical world towards the method of manipulative surgery is only adding another regrettable page to those chapters in its history which it recalls with profound shame. Blinded by professional prejudice, the medical world has stolidly opposed nearly every innovation and discovery which has been submitted to it.' The italics are mine.—J. L. W.

Atkinson was the successor of Hutton, but advanced far beyond him in his methods, and his waiting-rooms were crowded with distinguished people of all kinds from Royalty downwards.

On Atkinson's death in 1904, Mr. Barker took his cousin's place in Park Lane, where he has ever since continued to practise. Those who have had any dealings with him recognise at once that he is no ordinary man. His quiet, unassuming manner, his silent reserve, are at once indicative of strength and selfconfidence. At first glance you are satisfied that he is a serious student, that he is perfectly cognisant of his limits and his power. There is no suggestion of pretence or sham about him whatever; he strikes you as knowing exactly what he can do, and as being the last man in the world to venture on a rash experiment. In appearance, in manner, in conversation, he is, in fact, the very antithesis of a quack. He is as far in advance of Atkinson as Atkinson was in advance of Hutton. Twenty years' experience has resulted in the development of a scientific system of treatment, the soundness of which is demonstrated by the unfailing regularity with which cures are effected in case after case brought before him. Twenty years' experience has caused him to acquire a proficiency in his art that enables him to know exactly what can be done and how to do it deftly.3 Patients, in all ranks of society, from all parts of the world, officers and men of both Services, sportsmen, athletes, cricketers, football-players, members of Parliament, the aristocracy, dignitaries of the Church, lawyers, barristers, journalists, and, lastly, medical men and their families (but 'secretly for fear of the Jews') have resorted to his consulting-rooms.

The names of those who have experienced relief at the hands of Mr. Barker, to quote *Truth*, would 'probably comprise a more imposing list than that of any living surgeon.' Such a list for obvious reasons could never be published; but, taking only such names as have appeared from time to time in the various newspapers, it is obvious that Mr. Barker's patients are by no means 'drawn largely from the working-class population' and 'in many cases . . . illiterate and uneducated,' as the Blue Book suggests,

but from the cream of intellect and society.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> "It is by those means that Mr. Barker has won his way to the topmost position on this side the Atlantic. His present reputation has been won by actual achievements, in the face of cruel and reasonless opposition, by a series of successes, maintained through two decades, in cases where the ablest surgeons, working on orthodox lines, have failed. On that score I have no doubt whatever. The evidence has convinced me. It has swept away the prejudice that for years made me an unrelenting critic, and such evidence accumulates daily—coming often from the highest quarters of society and intellect.'—Ibid. p. 480.

To instance a few names taken from the correspondence columns of the daily newspapers:

The Marchioness of Exeter.
Lord William Cecil.
Duchesse de Lousada.
Countess of Yarborough.
Lady Markham.
General Count Gleichen.
Major-General Ketchen.
Col. Sir Charles King-Harman.
Mr. J. M. Moorsom, K.C.
Sir Daniel Gooch.
Mr. Walter Larden.

Lady Low.
Admiral Reynolds.
Admiral Mark Kerr.
Sir Krishna Gupta.
Sir Archibald Sinclair.
Mr. Hart Davis, ex-M.P.
Mr. Featherstonhaugh, K.C., M.P.
Lord Digby.
Baron Bentinck.
Sir Herbert Parsons.
Mr. H. G. Wells.

Now the one remarkable feature about all the patients who attend the consulting-rooms of Mr. Barker is that they are the failures of the orthodox registered practitioners. Each one is an advertisement of the fact that there is a 'hinterland' of surgery still, that there is something which even registered practitioners of the first rank do not understand.

Each one tells the same tale—months or years of suffering, painful, expensive, and ineffectual resort to surgeons of all degrees of eminence, experiments of all kinds fruitlessly performed, bandages, plaster of Paris, steel cages, enforced rest, and even the knife—but never a cure.

It is all very well for the profession to envelop itself in a mantle of exclusive self-satisfaction; but it must be blind indeed if it cannot see that Mr. Barker's success constitutes a very heavy indictment against its methods, and, when Dr. Axham is considered, against its ethics also.

It has been objected by surgeons that the various people must have been 'unfortunate in their choice of professional advisers'; but, if that is so, it renders the indictment a thousand times more serious, for a mere glance at the few names we have given makes it clear that, having the means and the burning desire to be healed, they must have consulted, one or another, every leading surgeon in Britain.

It is no reflection whatever upon the individual practitioner that he knows nothing of bonesetting; he has never been taught, and he is not allowed to learn; but it is a very grievous reflection upon the faculty officially that, because of a childish etiquette, it is content to practise painfully and expensively upon the suffering public rather than learn from a layman what, as it happens, only a layman is competent to teach.

The amount of suffering that has to be borne by the public, not merely from natural causes, but from the so-called therapeutic treatment of the orthodox surgeon, solely and entirely on account of official narrowness and prejudice, is appalling.

The few letters which I append—gathered from newspapers — reveal, in language carrying infinitely more weight than anything I could employ, a preference of private interests to the public weal which is so callous, so ignoble as to be perfectly inexplicable on the part of a corporation which exists for the good of the public.

FROM THE MARCHIONESS OF EXETER,

To the Editor of 'The Times.'

SIR,—Having seen Mr. Heather Bigg's letter saying that the manipulative methods of Mr. Hutton and Mr. H. A. Barker are practised by surgeons, I should like to state that, although I visited several doctors and surgeons at different times during seventeen or eighteen years, such treatment was never tried or even spoken of. Allow me to give a short

history of my case.

In 1893 or '95, whilst running down a steep hill, I displaced the cartilage of my left knee, and was laid up for a fortnight at that time. After this the joint was a continual source of trouble to me. It would slip out whilst dancing, playing tennis, or even wiping my boots. I saw several surgeons about it, but they were unable to help me beyond ordering me elastic knee-caps, etc., and, finally, a large 'cage,' which I wore two years without benefit. My knee was then so weak that it went out on the smallest provocation.

Over a year ago I consulted Mr. Barker, who at once diagnosed what was wrong with my knee, and when gas had been given the cartilage was put in its place, and I left his house without any discomfort. After a few days' further treatment I was completely cured. I can now play tennis, dance, etc., without any support whatever, and in perfect comfort.

Yours truly,

M. EXETER.

Burghley House, Stamford, February 14, 1911.

The two following letters from Dr. Sutherland Rees-Phillips and Dr. George Garrard show conclusively that doctors themselves and their children have to seek from Mr. Barker the relief which distinguished surgeons at home and abroad are unable to afford them:

To the Editor of the 'Express.'

July 22, 1914.

SIR,—I notice several letters on Mr. H. A. Barker's great claim to recognition. Let me give you my experience as a physician.

I was in a fair way of becoming a cripple this year. I went to Mr. Barker. He cured me and made me walk well again, and made me

grateful as anyone could be. This is what occurred:

I slipped while playing golf; my right knee swelled up and got painful. I had been in the habit of walking some eight miles a day, but then a quarter of a mile, and that with a stick, was all that I could do. I had often heard of Mr. Barker and of men who had been patients under him.

Then a clergyman in Exmouth said: 'Why do you not go to Mr. Barker? I have been to him and been cured by him. I was for many years

<sup>4</sup> The writer is indebted to the courtesy of the Editors of The Times, Daily Express, and Pall Mall Gazette for permission to reproduce these letters.

more or less lame, always being uncomfortable, and never getting any permanent cure from the medical men I consulted. I went to Barker. He put me under gas and cured me at once. I walked away from his house a cured man. I have never been lame since.'

The clergyman is a five handicap man at golf, plays cricket regularly, and is a perfectly healthy man. So I went to Mr. Barker, who examined my swollen knee, noticed a painful spot which projected on one side, and put me under gas. Afterwards I found that the projecting spot had disappeared, and that the pain had gone. I went to Mr. Barker five times more, steadily improving till pronounced well.

Now I can do as I used to do—walk several miles, play some golf and some billiards, and enjoy everything. And all things through Mr.

Barker, of whom I cannot speak too highly.

SUTHERLAND REES-PHILLIPS, M.D.

To

Exmouth, and South Bolton Gardens, South Kensington.

From Mr. George Garrard, M.R.C.S.Eng. and L.R.C.P.Lond.<sup>5</sup>
'Pall Mall Gazette,' September 1910.

Some time ago I had a patient suffering from a painful and obscure affection of the ankle, which was causing her great pain and suffering, making walking almost impossible and which for a long time refused to improve, though orthodox remedies were perseveringly tried. I advised her to see a famous London surgeon. She saw two at different times. She also went to Berlin and saw an eminent surgeon there. Their advice and treatment resulted in no improvement whatever.

When she returned she told me she would like to see Mr. H. A. Barker, as he had cured a friend of hers. I agreed, and she did so. At the end of a few weeks she had made a complete recovery, relief being

afforded almost immediately.

My own son was at that time suffering from an ankle injury which also refused to yield to treatment by three surgeons at different times. It prevented him from indulging in any kind of sport at his University. Having already had experience of Mr. Barker's methods, I took my son to him and witnessed the treatment. The patient was put under gas, a few dexterous and determined manipulations of the joint were effected, and the patient was immediately all right. His words as he left the house were: 'I've never been able to walk so well before.' He has been quite well ever since, and now plays football and other games without feeling anything of the old trouble. I join with Dr. Bryce heartily in pleading for the admission of this scientific mechano-therapy, or bone-setting, amongst recognised methods of treatment.

From a letter to 'The Times' of December 18th, 1911, from Mr. Robert Shewan, of Shewan, Tomes & Co., 27 Leadenhall Street, E.C.

As one who feels a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. Barker, may I add my testimony to that of others as to his skill, and say a word on behalf of the medical gentleman who is now being proscribed by the General Medical Council for assisting him to alleviate the sufferings of his patients?

Nearly twenty years ago, in Hong-Kong, I broke both my ankles. I was assured by the doctors there that nothing could be done for me, and that I should be a cripple for life. I then went home to England, but fared no better. Among others I consulted Mr. Wharton-Hood, who told me that there was nothing to be done to my feet, and added the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Dr. Garrard was officially warned for the publication of this letter.

information that I ought to have killed myself. After that I did my best to endure the pain of the broken and dislocated bones and put the

best face I could upon it.

This summer, however, I was induced to consult Mr. Barker, who, when he had examined my feet, assured me, to my great surprise, that he could do everything for them if I would agree to undergo a simple operation under gas. To this I at once consented, and am glad to say, with a grateful heart, that I can now put my feet to the ground without fear of pain, and walk with the greatest pleasure and comfort, whereas previously I had to walk in boots with an iron plate in the sole, without which I could only stagger across the room.

The following letter from the pen of Mr. O. T. Norris, a late famous Oxford Blue, appeared in the Daily Express on the 22nd of August 1913. If Mr. Barker had cured only one out of the thirty patients sent to him by Mr. Norris, he would have proved the superiority of his methods; but he cured them all in a few days or weeks, after each one had failed to get relief in the highest surgical quarters during months of ineffectual treatment.

#### To the Editor of the 'Express.'

SIR,—Mr. Barker cured me of long-standing knee cartilage trouble in a very short time, after three well-known medical men had failed even to diagnose the case.

I have sent some thirty other sufferers to him during the last few years, and they have without exception obtained speedy and complete relief.

O. T. NORRIS.

These letters are taken from the public Press, but day by day · Mr. Barker is receiving letters from grateful patients; and, in ever-increasing numbers, letters from individual members of the medical profession, who thus privately assure him of their sympathy and their admiration of his methods. It is a glaring testimony to the effectiveness of the tyranny under which the individual member of the faculty is constrained to live and work that when he sees a man healing suffering humanity day by day, by means which the faculty do not understand, when he is convinced the system is scientific and the method sound, when he knows that at the same time the faculty are dabbling blindly and empirically with thousands of cases which Mr. Barker could heal at once-when his conscience tells him that he ought to stand up and speak out like a man for the cause of righteousness-he dare not. He would run the risk of being struck off the Register for 'infamous conduct.'

The only thing he dare do is to write to Mr. Barker privately and confidentially, or to the Press anonymously! This he has done freely; but it is a curious reflexion on a noble profession that its standard of honour has come to be of a different species to that accepted amongst other associations of gentlemen.

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Truth has not hesitated to describe the profession as a 'Trades Union'; and in this there is certainly a strong resemblance, that certain men manage to climb upon the backs of their fellows and plant their heels upon their necks.

But I am not without hope that before long sufficient numbers of the profession will be found to express their unanimous protest against the fetters which have been forged by the General Medical Council and ancillary associations under the powers supposed to

be conferred upon them by the medical Acts.

The faculty base all their opposition on the presumption that Mr. Barker is a quack; but the wildest flights of imagination could not detect the faintest resemblance between Mr. Barker and a charlatan or quack.

The charlatan or quack is essentially a man who pretends to do what he cannot do; he may be a registered or unregistered, a

qualified or unqualified practitioner.

Mr. Barker pretends to nothing; he knows exactly what he can do, and he never fails to do it. He has never had a disaster, and it is only in quite exceptional cases that he is unable to afford relief.

When the faculty call Mr. Barker a quack they are handling a two-edged sword with which they run the risk of cutting their own limbs, for if a quack is a man who pretends to do what he cannot do, he who tries to do what he is not sure he can do, and very seldom does do, comes very near placing himself in the same category. As The Times said: 'The medical profession would gain . . . by showing greater toleration all round and by keeping to a definition of quackery more consonant with natural distinctions and less dependent upon artificial ones than that now in vogue.' 6

The Press has been most generous in its recognition of the

genuine nature of Mr. Barker's successful work.

The late W. T. Stead threw himself, with all the generosity of his nature, heart and soul, upon the medical faculty, and produced in the Review of Reviews page after page of fact and argument that would have brought conviction to any association

open to reason and scientific proof.7

Truth, the terror of all quackery, in one article after another has expatiated upon the undeniable and unique gifts of Mr. Barker, and 'the absolute indifference of the "faculty" to considerations of humanity when they conflict with professional etiquette-what it pleases doctors to call "ethics," but what is best described as trade-union regulations.'

Truth has also said 'Probably no one in the medical profession

7 See Review of Reviews, October 1910.

See The Times, November 7, 1912, 'What is a Quack?'

could produce a more imposing list of patients to speak to his practical qualifications.'... 'The wicked bonesetter' (Mr. (Barker)... 'cures in a few minutes injuries and diseased conditions which orthodox surgery either fails to relieve or definitely aggravates. He goes on doing this day after day and year after year until his reputation extends over the whole world and eclipses that of any living member of the medical faculty.' <sup>8</sup>

The Times, in a leader on the 25th of November 1912, generously remarks (and no one would be bold enough to accuse the leading journal of 'gush' or undue precipitancy in focussing

public opinion):

Mr. Barker has cured a great many people whom recognised and even eminent surgeons had been trying to cure for years without any success. Dr. Axham assisted him in cases where anaesthetics were necessary. Both are benefactors to the public, and both ought to be honoured accordingly. Both have been pursued by professional jealousy and prejudice, which have tried hard to ruin the career of both. It is time to put an end to this. It is more than time to acknowledge that if Mr. Barker did not pass through the schools, he knows, about the class of cases he deals with, more than the schools can teach; and also that if cure does not prove the correctness of diagnosis, then diagnosis cannot matter much to the sufferer. Further, it is time that Dr. Axham were reinstated in the position from which he ought never to have been driven, seeing that the only ground for taking his name off the Medical Register was that he assisted a master of manipulative surgery to relieve human suffering for which no relief could be found elsewhere.

The question has been put to me on many occasions 'Do you

really believe in Barker?'

I answer 'Certainly I do; I have no option in the matter; as an intelligent being I cannot choose; as one possessed of some knowledge of logic, and not altogether ignorant of the principles of scientific inquiry, I am bound to believe that, as *The Times* says, Mr. Barker is a "master of manipulative surgery" and "a benefactor of the human race."


I believe in Barker not from any sentimental reason, but simply because of the overwhelming evidence that confronts me—from thoroughly reliable quarters—evidence as to his continuous and unfailing skill in a certain definite and limited field of surgery.

In face of that evidence a man who would dispute the ability

of Barker would be fatuous enough to dispute anything.

If you hear people talking about the same man at your club, at hotels, at private houses in town and in the country, at health resorts, at the seaside, at home and abroad, wherever you may happen to be; if his name constantly appears in the magazines and the daily Press; if you see scores of letters in most of the

5 The italics are mine.-J. L. W.



leading journals, one year after another, from people of all kinds, in every station of life, testifying to the relief they have received at the hands of the same man, when all other surgeons have failed; when you observe that a paper like Truth—the declared enemy of all quackery and malfeasance—chooses to devote something like fifty columns in support of this person; and when, as a finale, The Times steps forward as the champion of his skill, you are justified in accepting as an indisputable fact the claim that Mr. Barker is possessed of a sound and scientific system of therapeutics.

If, in addition, you are allowed to see some hundreds of private letters from medical men, some of them from the very leaders of the profession, all telling the same tale in evidence of Mr. Barker's skill—well, the fact is established in accordance with the strictest

requirements of scientific inquiry.

It is no longer a matter of opinion.

I say, without hesitation, that the medical profession are satisfied with far less evidence in support of any fact which they desire to establish; but in this case, because they have interested reasons why the fact should not be established, as they are not able to dispute the evidence they meanly seek to minimise the fact.

For instance, they say 'Oh, well, he's only one of many! There are lots of bonesetters about.'

Quite true; there are 'lots of bonesetters about.' There always have been. There always will be, so long as you doctors are too vain and narrow-minded to learn what they have to teach. But doesn't this strike you as being a very invidious thing to say? You know it is manifestly unfair to lump all bonesetters together, and Mr. Barker in the midst of them. You know perfectly well that he stands quite apart: that his skill, according to your own showing, is unique. His predecessors Hutton, Thomas, and Atkinson did much: Barker does infinitely more. They were as wanderers on the seashore; he has struck into the hinterland. The paths which he treads fearlessly day by day they never ventured to explore.

'Oh, yes,' say they, again trying to minimise, 'we are quite prepared to allow that he does good here and there; but sur-

geons are doing infinitely more good on scientific lines.'

I dispute this entirely. I say it is mean in the extreme to say he does good 'here and there.' He does good invariably. Case after case comes before him, and with clockwork regularity he effects a cure. What have you got to say to such a letter as that of O. T. Norris, the Oxford Blue, who says that after you had tried your skill in vain, he was cured himself, and sent along no less than thirty other sufferers who were all likewise entirely



cured? When you say that doctors are doing more good on scientific lines, you are either labouring under a fond delusion, or stating that which you ought to know cannot be supported by fact.

If the doctors were doing more good on scientific lines Mr. Barker's living would be gone. You know perfectly well that the people who resort to Mr. Barker are, almost without exception, those unlucky persons upon whom you doctors have tried your scientific methods without success. You have tried for one year may be, or for eighteen years, as you did with Lady Exeter, or even for twenty years as you did with Mr. Robert Shewan, and your so-called scientific method was ineffective and useless. It was expensive—nothing more. A glance at the scores of letters which have appeared in the Press makes this painfully clear.

With monotonous regularity the writers, many of them, mind you, distinguished members of your own profession, say that they only went to Mr. Barker after all modern medical science had proved its inability to meet their case. In fact, these very letters, which establish beyond a doubt the scientific nature of Mr. Barker's methods, seem strongly to indicate that you are not working on scientific lines at all, that your methods are, in truth, empirical.

'Oh,' say the minimisers again, 'of course, we have some

disasters, but then so has Barker.'

Again I want to argue. You doctors, we know only too well, have disasters, but they are hushed up. You stand together, 'for the sake of the profession.' You support each other through thick and thin. Whatever you think of each other, and say to each other, you keep to yourselves, 'for the sake of the profession.' I am not blaming you. Now, it is not reasonable to suppose, for one minute, that every 'disaster' you have finds his way to Mr. Barker. Suppose one in ten finds his way to Park Lane; Mr. Barker has seen 40,000 or 50,000 patients in the last twenty years. Doesn't it make you blush? And this only in one small department of your work. Yes, you have disasters sufficient to constitute proof in accordance with strictest scientific requirements that your methods are wrong.

Mr. Barker has been making a handsome competence by helping your lame dogs over the stile, and the only way you can excuse yourselves is by mumbling a tu quoque! Mumbling I say; for you have more good sense than to say outright what is not true. Where are Mr. Barker's disasters? You know that for years you have been watching him at every turn and corner as a cat watches a mouse—ever ready to pounce upon him. You know perfectly well that if he had had a disaster you would have



seized upon it at once. All these years you have only succeeded in finding one—as you thought; but, when it was dragged before the Courts, instead of injuring Mr. Barker, it only reflected dis-

credit upon yourselves.

I wish to say quite calmly and fairly that if Mr. Barker had had disasters, you would have unearthed them by hook or by crook; you would have advertised them; you would have taken good care that the public should know what you had found. Your medical journals, with all their manifest hostility to Mr. Barker, have never been able to produce a single case. Why? Because you cannot produce what does not exist.

Frankly, I think all this paltry quibbling is quite unworthy of a great profession. There is no objection you can urge against Mr. Barker that cannot be met, fair and square. As

scientific men you are not entitled to scorn all evidence.

You are quite right to fence your preserves, but not against

the well-being of the public.

I think it may be assumed from the evidence I have adduced that Mr. Barker has fairly established a claim to be treated with consideration and courtesy by the profession, which exists solely for the noble purpose of alleviating suffering humanity. It must by this be evident to them that in the opinion of all reputable people—outside the faculty—Mr. Barker is engaged in a legitimate way in doing a share, and a large and valuable share, of the work of healing the public. There is nothing secret about his methods; on the contrary, the ambition of his life is to see his methods recognised and adopted by the faculty. He has time after time expressed his readiness to allow a properly authorised committee of medical gentlemen to witness his operations, and investigate his methods; he has offered to operate one day a week at any London hospital gratuitously, or to lecture at any medical school.

What Mr. Barker magnanimously requests, I feel the public

have a right to demand.

The time has come for the public to say what it so strongly feels—'Away with your etiquette; away with your artificial definitions and distinctions! You are a public corporation, hedged round by statute with privileges and considerations; you exist for the public, not for yourselves; open the doors; let in the light; if you do not know how to heal us yourselves, then, in God's Name, extend some consideration to those who do!' I cannot understand how, in the face of all the evidence that is at hand, in the face of the testimony of countless patients in every walk of life, in the face of the generous sympathy that has been extended by all the leading journals, the medical profession can refuse to acknowledge that, if an offence was committed



against professional etiquette by Dr. Axham in assisting Mr. Barker, that offence has long ago been thoroughly purged. Surely, this is eminently a time when his case might be reconsidered, and a different complexion placed upon the procedure of one who obviously only acted in accordance with the dictates of his conscience.

I put it to all fair-minded members of the profession, that there can be nothing even derogatory for one of their number to associate himself with a man of such proved eminence as Mr. Barker; certainly there can be nothing in his conduct calculated to bring disgrace upon the profession to which he belongs, or to justify any body of men, whether a properly constituted judicial tribunal or not, in attaching to him a stigma which carries with it a disability to prosecute his legitimate calling, is calculated to rob him of his good name, and to 'bring his grey hairs with sorrow to the grave.'

J. L. WALTON.



## RELIGION AND REBELLION:

### THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BOERS

THE recent futile rebellion by De Wet, Beyers, and a few other backveld Boers, while naturally hurtful to British pride as a reflection on British justice, is not altogether surprising to those who have studied the history of South Africa and the psychology of the Boers. England should feel satisfaction rather at the poor achievement of the gigantic and subtle temptation held out by Germany to a people still smarting under the wounds of twelve years ago. The history of South Africa is a history of futile rebellion, passive when not active. To count accurately the quarrels in which blood has been shed would alone be the work of an historian.

Let us therefore consider the soil of South Africa as predestined for rebellion, and thank our lucky stars that things are no worse. At least there are ample signs that after an eternity of misrule England can at last claim to have won over the great majority of the Boers. Another twenty-five years of self-govern-

ment will, I believe, complete the great work.

Overpowering psychological causes made the Boers great and glorious rebels. Environment and circumstances made them the implacable enemies of England. For in 1806, as the sequel to a war in Europe between France and England, Cape Colony with its entire population was handed over by Holland to the British Crown. Two parties in Holland had taken sides in the war, and one party had inevitably to lose. For the sum of six million pounds (of which they touched not a penny) the people of Cape Colony were transferred to a hostile race; and this act was the beginning of a destiny henceforth decided by the squabbles of political parties six thousand miles away. From now onward what one Colonial Secretary did lasted only until his Government was outvoted, when some new official undid any good that might have been done, and replaced bad by worse.

Now let us examine the material which this vicious party system attempted to govern. The progenitors of the Boers came from Holland, whose people were the most resolute fighters for religious liberty in the world. The Boers in their formation were reinforced by another group of colonists, the French Huguenots,

who were driven from France by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Both sects had all the virtues as well as the vices of Calvinism. Narrow, unswerving devotion to God is seemingly always accompanied by a certain irreverence towards men. I mean that the intensity of ardent theism precludes hero-worship. The Boers grew into what one might call Calvinistic Social Democrats, further restricted by being pastoral. If one goes fully into the history of rebellion it will be found that the supreme rebels have almost invariably been religious ones. Those who went to America in the Mayflower were every bit as contentious and ready to rebel against wrong as the Boers. Does intense devotion to God make man less able to believe in man, or does man's lack of faith in man naturally lead him to God?

Anybody who has lived among the Boers must have felt their lack of devotion to great men. The humblest farm labourer will approach the Prime Minister entirely sans façon, just as his father visited Paul Kruger. Great names mean nothing. Homage to achievement and success does not exist. Olive Schreiner is no more to the average Boer than an obscure school teacher would be. Patriotic Afrikanders like Kruger and De la Rey are held in esteem more for their resolute deeds in the Boer cause than for their own genius. It was this lack of hero-worship that made the early Boer occupation of Natal a failure. For after the death of Pieter Retief (he had trouble enough to command) the Voortrekkers found it impossible to agree upon a leader and split up. These hateful jealousies were constantly arising while the Boers were trying to crush the Zulu power; and De Wet's book on the last war proves that the same spirit existed twelve years ago. It exists to-day, and it made the recent rebellion possible.

Dissatisfaction with human things may be defined almost as the keystone to the Boer character. To use an Americanism they are prenatally 'kickers.' One of the most striking differences between the Germans and the Dutch of Europe to-day is the reverence for heroes and the awe of established authority in Germany, and the democratic nature of the monarchy and govern-But the Hollanders have lost the narrow ment in Holland. theism of the Boers, and are consequently more easily influenced by men. The Boers have paid heavily for their aversion from hero-worship; to give one striking example, the first annexation of the Transvaal by England was directly due to it. prevailed in the Republic owing to the attacks of a powerful native Chief, Sekukuni; and it was essential, if interference by England was to be avoided, that an expedition should crush the defiant Kafir. All had been arranged, and the success of the campaign was assured, when the burghers began to murmur that their President was an agnostic, or not sufficiently pious to obtain

for them the blessing of God on their enterprise. In the end the Boers tremblingly returned to their homes, the disorder extended, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1877 formally annexed the country to the British Crown. Had President Burgers been Napoleon he could not have moved these stubborn Calvinists, who in the last war held out until they assured themselves that it was God's will they should surrender. In all the deliberations as to whether or not peace should be made the heroes of the war made but a slight impression on the burghers. It was not until the Boers began to feel that God had ordained surrender that they accepted the terms of Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner. Then as ever they resigned themselves to the heavenly decree and

dispersed thanking God in prayer.

Naturally such character as this provides many admirable traits. The Dutch have always been a self-reliant race, they are benevolent and hospitable to a degree, as has quite recently been exhibited in Holland to the Belgian refugees. But, as even in the bracing air of the Netherlands many of the people are slow of thought and action, the indolence with which the Boers have so often been charged is hardly surprising. The indigenous races of South Africa are indeed as slothful as any on earth, and after three or four generations the most energetic European stock loses its vigour. A much more serious charge brought against the Boers is that they are disingenuous to the point of dishonesty. I know people who affirm, too, that the Hollanders of to-day are 'tricky in business.' But whatever basic deceit there may or may not be in the Boers it is abundantly certain that the habit of lying was, as Theal says, developed by early mismanagement of the Dutch East India Company. Taxation was imposed largely on the personal assurances of the taxed as to their income; and here the Dutch settlers were taught to prevaricate in the most seductive manner possible. It is an extraordinary thing, but men who compose a State rarely seem able to realise that their interest is bound up with that of the State. Even in England those able to evade income tax are mildly looked upon as financial heroes, for nobody thinks it a very dreadful thing to defraud the Government. I have seen decent, honourable men in South Africa screen boys who cut up straps on the State railways in the belief that nobody was injured, and that after all it was 'good for trade.' My personal experience is that the Boers on the whole discharge scrupulously any obligations which they believe to be just ones.

The English have consistently attacked the Boers for alleged brutality to the natives, this charge being both openly and freely made by missionaries, and inferred by the entirely different methods of handling the subject races which the British Govern-

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if

ment practised. Here, again, the uncompromising Calvinists acted as they thought was required by God. The Hottentots and Kafirs were inferior to the white men, and the only brutality that constituted a policy was in treating the impious, idolatrous savages as unfit to be the equals of the children of God. That was the Boer view. The missionaries, on the other hand, looked upon the natives with a professional eye, and saw millions of potential proselytes. What missionary could see otherwise? There are still in our midst many amiable Protestants who believe firmly in the converting of all Roman Catholics, and Catholics who look longingly upon the millions of Protestants in a similar manner.

Naturally the Boers and the missionaries failed to agree. Both were interested. Both were sectarian. Both were religious. The pity is that the Government, which should have been neutral, took sides. Nobody can deny that the English missionaries, more than any other men, made the name 'Boer' hated and misunderstood in the United Kingdom. From the very beginning of the English occupation of the Cape, however, there was a clash of ideals and policy between the newly imposed Government and the people. The same clash of ideas prevails to-day between the white man who lives comfortably in Europe and can afford to look with tolerance upon the few blacks in his neighbourhood; and the white man who has to live in a country where the blacks are social and mental inferiors. It is no longer any question of Dutch and English: it is a question of European and colonist. But when the English first occupied the Cape the Dutch happened to be the colonists in occupation, and this question of the natives came to be regarded as a quarrel between Dutch and English. To-day one sees clearly how great was the injustice done the Boers. The British Government, having at last realised that the only possible administration for the colonies is self-government, to-day refuses to help its Indian subjects to migrate to British Columbia, Australia, or South Africa. But had the colonists in the early days of ignorant, unsympathetic, or unjust administration by the Home Government refused to admit Indians they would certainly have been treated as rebels.

There is something about living in wild, spacious countries which makes men curiously independent and unready to submit to wrong. When Wilhem Adrian van der Stel began to exploit the Dutch colonists he found his path by no means an easy one. Oppression and dragooning failed to cow the pioneers, and in the end van der Stel was recalled to Holland and disgraced.

Theal says:

There have never been people less willing to submit silently to grievances, real or imaginary, than the Colonists of South Africa.

5

And again:

The burghers of South Africa, though relishing keenly the pleasure of making money, have at every period of their history shown a firmer attachment to what they hold to be their political rights and liberties. If at times a few men have been found to waver between money and freedom from misrule, the women have never hesitated to reject wealth at the price of submission to wrong.

Despite these obviously good qualities conscious or unconscious wrongs were inflicted by almost every Governor. In the earliest days of the Cape Lord Charles Somerset hanged at Slagter's Nek (Butcher's Neck) six rebels whose insurrection had been quelled by their own burghers. In 1821 English settlers were sent out to the Eastern Province, of which admittedly they made a great success. But seven years later, when English men and women comprised only one eighth of the population, English was made the official language, and had to be used in all Courts of Law. Lord Charles Somerset was indeed a great autocrat, and, among other things, indulged in the suppression of newspapers. So far as this is concerned it was the more Anglicised part of the people who objected, for the Boers to this day have rather a contempt for newspapers. They tolerate those printed in Dutch, but intensely dislike any news outside of the parish-pump order. Market reports (produce not share), church information, hypothecations, births, deaths, and marriages are enough to satisfy most of their literary appetites. As becomes a godly people, too, they dislike theatres, dances, and all modernity or obvious amusement. Their most popular musical instrument is the American organ, which they consider has a proper godly sound. All Sunday is given up to long-drawn-out harmonies (melodies being considered too secular) on this melancholy apparatus. I have known only one troupe of entertainers really successful in the dorps, and the members of this company played sacred tunes on church bells. At Senekal, a little town in the Orange Free State, terrible commotion was created a couple of years ago by a schoolmaster who thoughtlessly allowed a few principles of Darwinism to slip. The Boers, shocked beyond measure at the idea that they were descended from apes, withdrew their children from the school, and petitioned for the recall of the offending master. It is considered more or less as marks of godliness to wear a beard and be married. Both the clean-shaven and the unmarried are looked upon with mild suspicion by the pious.

Nevertheless, the good qualities of the Boers greatly outweigh the bad. Their humanity in the great war was unquestioned, their kindness of heart and conjugal fidelity are proverbial; and they are a rare race, among whom social barriers between rich and poor do not exist. Unconsciously (for conscious socialism would be abominable to them) they are true socialists and lovers of their fellow-men. Art makes little appeal to them, but their fidelity to what they once adopt as their own fills one with hope of the future. Too much must not be expected. A people which has struggled for liberty since its birth at the Cape of Good Hope over 250 years ago might reasonably have been expected to resist very much longer than it has even the liberal rule granted by the British Government. One must not forget history in one's judgments and expectations of nations. What Froude said might profitably be quoted now:

Because the Dutch are a deliberate, slow people, not given to enthusiasm for new ideas, they fell into disgrace with us, where they have ever since remained. . . . We had treated them unfairly as well as unwisely.

That the memory of the many unwise, unfair, and often cruel acts of English Governors between 1806 and 1902 could be entirely forgotten in twelve years of liberal self-government by a tenacious, uncompromising race was asking too much. The splendid and active loyalty of the enlightened Boers, however, indicates that the fierce, narrow Calvinism of the Voortrekkers is gradually wearing itself out, and with it the genius for rebellion. Once the natural leaders of the people receive their just recognition as heroes, progress will be swift, for the heroes of the country are full of good thoughts and good counsel.

STEPHEN BLACK.

## HOME RAILWAYS DURING THE WAR

THE British Railway Reports for 1914 are of exceptional importance, not only to the stockholders but to the general public as well. Although the conditions in which the railways have been operated prevent comparisons of the details of receipts and expenditure with those of the previous year, the general results in each case throw an interesting light upon the influence of the War, and the interposition of the Government, upon the traffics, profits and dividends. It is disappointing but inevitable that the accounts should be presented without many of the usual statistics. This is the first occasion, since the adoption of the new system of annual instead of half-yearly accounts and of uniformity of abstracts, on which it would have been possible to compare the details of one whole year with another. The abnormal conditions of the last five months of the past year have prevented the presentation of the accounts in the ordinary way, and in any case many of the figures would have been only superficially During those five months the companies were working under Government control (a warrant having been issued under an Order in Council empowering the President of the Board of Trade to take over the railways), and their ordinary business had to be subordinated or postponed to military exigencies.1 The expeditious movement of troops and war materials in time of war is of infinitely greater importance than the interests of individuals or even of trade as a whole, and such expeditious movement was only made possible by means of a central organisation and the co-ordination under Government control of the Precedence had to be military and railway administrations. given, and facilities afforded, to trains conveying troops, guns, ammunition, food supplies, army clothing, horses, motor-vans, and everything else required for the War at home or abroad.

¹ In the House of Commons lately Mr. Runciman denied that the Government had assumed control; they had, he said, only drawn the railway managers together round a table and told them to manage the railways. But they had to manage them in a particular way. They were directed to carry out the instructions of the War Office; in other words, Government business was to be paramount, and if that was not exercising control, it is difficult to know what control means.

This precedence is analogous, on a large scale, to the regulation in London and other big cities whereby all ordinary street traffic is held up, or voluntarily gets out of the way, when a fire engine is signalled. The necessity for keeping main lines clear for the transport of soldiers unfortunately involved the shunting of a great number of trucks of coal and provisions on to sidings, where they became congested and thus helped in conjunction with a scarcity of waggons to bring about temporary shortage and higher prices. These are consequences that could not be avoided and had to be endured with patience. The military situation and military necessities were the main things that

mattered. Salus reipublicae suprema lex.

Since the 5th of August all the principal British railways have been worked according to the regulations of an executive committee of general managers with the President of the Board of Trade as chairman, whose duties are to control and direct the traffic so as to meet the requirements of the War Office and the This Committee has provided the machinery and regulates its work. In time of war a country's railways are of the utmost strategic importance. Most of those Continental countries-namely, the principal States of the German Empire, Belgium, France, and Russia-whose railways are either wholly or partly State-owned, had in existence, when War was declared, organisations for automatically transferring the control from one State department to another. The Prussian system worked like the mechanism of an accurate clock. In Great Britain, where our methods are of the more happy-go-lucky kind, the virtual transfer of direction to a composite Committee, in which the Government had the ruling voice, was so unexpected that at the beginning there was bound to be some confusion. This, however, is only one of the departments in which we found ourselves in the customary state of unpreparedness when faced with the most momentous struggle in our history. The comparative smoothness which has been evolved from the mêlée at the outset deserves the grateful recognition of all classes of the community.

The Government acted under the Regulation of the Forces Act (1871), in the terms of which interposition involved a certain They foresaw the disorganisation of the companies' finances that would be caused by the holding up of ordinary traffic, and the injury which it would inflict on the stockholders, and as a matter of elementary justice, as well as of legal obligation, they undertook to recompense stockholders for this loss. The Act provides that full compensation shall be paid to the owners of the railroads for any loss or injury they may have sustained through the Government taking possession, the amount of such compensation to be settled by agreement, or, if necessary,

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by arbitration. In September last the Board of Trade issued an official Memorandum on the subject:

His Majesty's Government have agreed with the railway companies concerned that, subject to the undermentioned condition, the compensation to be paid them shall be the sum by which the aggregate net receipts of their railways for the period during which the Government are in possession of them fall short of the aggregate net receipts for the corresponding period of 1913. If, however, the net receipts of the companies for the first half of 1914 were less than the net receipts for the first half of 1913, the sum payable is to be reduced in the same proportion. This sum, together with the net receipts of the railway companies taken over, is to be distributed amongst those companies in proportion to the net receipts of each company during the period with which comparison is made. The compensation to be paid under this arrangement will cover all special services, such as those in connection with military and naval transport rendered to the Government by the railway companies concerned, and it will therefore be unnecessary to make any payments in respect of such transport on the railways taken over.

A statement made by Mr. Curtis Bennett, representing the Great Western Railway Company at an inquiry held at Fishguard in January, has been construed to indicate a rather wider range of responsibility in financial control than the foregoing summary would lead one to imagine. He said that as 'every penny taken on the British railways went into the coffers of the Government,' the Board of Trade and not the companies were liable for any breach of regulations. This statement has been interpreted in one quarter as implying Government ownership, whereas all it means is that the Government having become guarantors have pooled the receipts for the purpose of making such proportionate contributions as are allotable to the different companies. The net receipts of the companies themselves, plus the amounts paid by the Government, are divided amongst the companies according to their 1913 profits. If the arrangement of September had been adhered to, the modification caused by any falling-off during the first six months would have been operative; but it was announced two or three weeks ago that, in connexion with certain wages adjustments, the Government surrendered its claim to reduce the aggregate net earnings in the proportion of the first six months. It is understood that this reduction was rather under 3 per cent., and the net profits are now to be fixed on the 1913 basis, less 25 per cent. of the War bonus to be paid to the railwaymen, to which reference will be made later.

The idea that the Government had guaranteed dividends, somewhat widely entertained at one time, had, of course, no foundation in fact. All that they guaranteed was an income out of which dividends could be paid. It was very desirable, as Mr. Cosmo Bonsor (Chairman of the South Eastern and Chatham

Managing Committee) pointed out, that an arrangement with regard to the basis of compensation should be such as to eliminate as far as possible any conflict of interests between individual companies, and also to avoid all questions as to the services to be rendered by the companies and the charges for such services. It was felt that the only satisfactory arrangement was one under which the Government should get the benefit of all traffic receipts and bear the burden of the expenses, handing over a certain net revenue for distribution among the companies. If an arrangement had not been reached the whole question of compensation would have had to go to arbitration, and might have been postponed, to the great detriment of the stockholders, until the War is over. Hence the existing arrangement, which is happily described by Lord Allerton, Chairman of the Great Northern, as 'a universal pool among the controlled companies of the whole of their net traffic receipts.' To a great extent this involved an interchange, virtually amounting to a pooling, of rolling stock as well. Never in the course of their history have the railway companies worked together with such a singleness of endeavour for public ends. The question naturally arises whether this unanimity of effort, which is imperative in war time, could not be brought into operation in the interests of the community, by means of a great scheme of co-ordination and central control, when the War is over.

If the arrangement had not been modified, it would have been impossible to arrive at the Government's liability without reference to the net earnings between January and June, inasmuch as it would have been essential to know in the first place in what relation the net receipts for the first half of 1914 stood to those for the first half of 1913; and in the next place, what were the figures of revenue and expenditure from the 5th of August to the 31st of December. The first factor we practically have, but the second is wanting. As regards the first half of the year, the reaction in the iron trade during the six months from the 1st of January to the 30th of June, and the still more serious inactivity in the cotton trade, had an injurious effect on the Northern goods traffic. For those months most of the heavy railways had decreases in their gross traffic receipts, as published week by week. The Great Western (which had 106,000l. to the good) and the Great Northern were fortunate in being exceptions, and the Brighton, the Great Eastern, and the two Metropolitan companies also had increases. The decreases ranged upwards from 1287l. for the South Eastern and Chatham Joint Committee, those of the bigger companies being considerable. For example, Lancashire and Yorkshire's

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decrease was 95,300l., the North Western's 81,000l., the Great Central's 72,800l., the Midland's 64,000l., the North Eastern's 39,000l., the Hull and Barnsley's 42,262l., the Caledonian's 21,100l., and that of the Furness 14,584l. The weekly statements have, however, a knack of under-estimating the gross takes: allowing for this they show that the Government's contribution on account of the five War months would have had to be trimmed in some cases—not in all—in proportion to the decreases in net earnings of the first six months. Roughly, the working expenses of the bigger companies for the first half of the year average about 65 per cent., and upon this basis it might have been possible to get some sort of idea—conjectural, it must be confessed—of the net amounts to be considered in adjusting the Government's contribution. Any comparison of the traffic receipts is enormously affected by the stipulation that, during five of the twelve months with which the reports deal, no Government payments were made for transport on the railways taken over. Fortunately, in the interests of simplification, these complications need not now trouble us. It may, however, be pointed out that the companies which suffered most in the first half of 1914 will benefit by the new method of averaging the net receipts. The North Western, the Great Northern, the Great Central, and the Lancashire and Yorkshire, all of which were affected by the South Yorkshire coal strike, and some of the southern lines, such as the South Eastern and Chatham and the Brighton, should have better individual results; but these benefits, it must be remembered, will be spread over the remaining companies as a consequence of the pooling arrangement.

The dividend announcements have put to rest a good deal of speculation about the financial effect of the War conditions on the stockholders' interests. With the exceptions of the Lancashire and Yorkshire and Great Eastern, which maintain their 1913 dividends, all the companies make smaller distributions. Generally speaking the reductions, as already indicated, have an evident relation to the drop in gross receipts during the first six months. The Lancashire and Yorkshire, however, is a striking exception. It had the heaviest decline for the period referred to, but over the whole year what was lost in traffics was more than made good by reductions in cost of working, so that the net receipts for 1914 were actually better than those for 1913. Some boards of directors appear to have taken a more conservative view than others, and the number of instances in which the reserves and undivided profits have been increased testify to the anxieties involved in reaching a decision, combining equitable treatment for the stockholders with a prudential regard for the future. In the following table the changes in dividend are brought together, and to make the comparison more complete the amounts put to reserve and carried forward are also given:

	Dividends		Put to Reserves.		Carried forward	
	1913	1914	1913	1914	1913	1914
North Western Ord, Midland Def, Ord, Great Western Ord, North Eastern Consols Lancashire and Yorkshire Ord, Great Northern Def, Great Eastern Ord, Great Central 1894 Pref, South Western Ord, Do, Def, North British Def, Ord, Caledonian Ord, Do, Def, Brighton Ord, Do, Def, Glasgow and South Western Ord, Do, Def, South Eastern Ord, Do, Def, Ord, South Eastern Ord, Do, Def, Ord, North Staffordshire Taff Vale Barry Ord, Do, Def, Hull and Barnsley Metropolitan District 2nd Pref, Furness	%746t743225511t1 3 511t1 4 10 6 3 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	%646644224 514344 514344 514344 514344 514344 514344 514344 514344 514344 514344 51434 5144 514	£ 100,000 200,000 200,000 300,000 20,000 55,000 10,000 — 40,000 — 20,000 a — 20,000  5000 20,000	£ 100.000 200,000 200,000 150.000 20,000 60,000 10.000 20,000 20,000 8000 nil (b) 12,500 20,000	£ 101.928 141,329 122,780 135.000 40,780 130,797 111.146 8700 42,599 48,804 22,081 33,362 11,022 4199 85,935 10,842 9174 4298 16,244 8258 12,658 1698	£ 109,002 131,442 115,000 189,774 45,998 101,008 108,909 7600 52,623 34,000 — 39,994 21,937 7817 73,093 12,458 14,021 3333 11,507 11,500 13,937 1804

(a) Taken from reserve. (b) The accounts for 1913 showed reserves, including the 5000*l*. shown above, of 15,000*l*., but in the balance sheet for 1914 General Reserve Fund figures at 74,113*l*., and nothing is said as to where the difference of 59,113*l*. comes from.

The most disappointing result is that of the North Western, which is 1 per cent. lower on a capital of 42,890,000l.; North Eastern is ½ per cent. lower on a capital of 32,155,984l., Brighton Ordinary is 1 per cent. and the Deferred 1 per cent. lower, South Eastern Ordinary 1/2 per cent. and the Deferred 1 per cent. lower, Chatham Second Preference 11 per cent. lower, North Staffordshire & per cent. lower, Barry Ordinary 1/2 per cent. lower, Hull and Barnsley 11/2 per cent. lower, Metropolitan District 1/2 per cent. lower, and Furness 11 per cent. lower. In the remaining cases, except those of the Lancashire and Yorkshire and Great Eastern, which remain as before, the declines are smaller, but the 4 per cent. reduction on Midland Ordinary amounts to no less than 96,708l., and that on the Great Western to 61,476l The Lancashire and Yorkshire not only pays the same dividend as for 1913 and puts the same amount to reserve, but it carries forward about 6000l. more. The interesting point about this declaration is that the reduction of gross receipts in the first half, which lowered the interim dividend to 3 per cent., has been made good in the second half, the reduction in expenses being an important factor in the recovery. The Great Northern Deferred



dividend is } per cent. less than the year before, and some 30,000l. less is carried forward. Hull and Barnsley's reduction from  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. to 2 per cent. was to some extent foreshadowed by the traffic decrease of over 42,000l. for the first six months (caused chiefly by strikes of Yorkshire miners and pit-prop workers in Hull) and also by the drop in the interim dividend from 3 per cent. to 1½ per cent. The balance carried forward is about 5000l. less, and nothing is added to reserve against 5000l. for 1913. The net receipts of the Joint Committee of the South Eastern and Chatham Companies were 1,775,240l., as compared with 1,821,721l., and most of the loss occurred during the War period. As the South Eastern gets 59 per cent. and the Chatham 41 per cent. of the net pooled receipts, the amounts credited to them were 1,047,392l. and 727,848l. respectively; Chatham Second Preference, which got 13,072l. for 1913, gets nothing for 1914, and the balance forward is reduced by about 12,000l.; while the South Eastern distribution drops to the extent of The Brighton dividend, ½ per cent. less on the Ordinary and 1 per cent. less on Brighton 'A,' was considered disappointing.

Apart from the interest felt in the dividend question, there is the other always instructive subject of the detailed comparison of the year under review with its predecessor, and this, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of the conditions and the lack of many important statistics, will be found to furnish some suggestive information. It is intended in this examination to deal with the principal companies in England and Scotland, companies representing in the aggregate a capital of more than 1,100,000,000l., and paying in stock dividends, over and above debenture interest and other fixed charges, on the average considerably more than 30,000,000l. a year. They represent, taken together, about sixsevenths of the entire railway business of the United Kingdom, and are, therefore, in ordinary circumstances, as faithful an index of trade conditions as can be got, and a sort of microcosm of much that pertains to our economic well-being. Their accounts reflect better than any other set of accounts the ups and downs of national prosperity, and a comparison of the figures for 1913 and 1914 shows at a glance the measure of the War's disturbing activities. It will be seen that such local undertakings as the Taff Vale, the Furness, the Barry, and the North Staffordshire companies are included. They serve districts intimately connected with important industrial interests and are, therefore, equally as good indices, in proportion to the volume of their business, as some of the bigger lines. The Metropolitan and the Metropolitan District Companies are also brought in, for although 1915

they are purely London, or Greater London, undertakings, and although they are worked by electricity instead of by steam, they help all the same to throw a light on the passenger traffic. The Metropolitan, it should be observed, was one of the companies not affected by inclusion in the Government control.

It is as well, perhaps, to start with an idea of the relative capital importance of these companies in Debentures, and in Guaranteed, Preference, and Ordinary stocks on which dividends are payable. In the case of some of the Preference and Ordinary stocks the amounts issued do not coincide with those on which dividends are payable, because the companies concerned have from time to time carried out stock conversions that have involved nominal additions to, or deductions from, the issued amounts. For instance, the Ordinary stock of the Midland Company, as issued, amounts to 43,530,656l., whereas this has since been divided into Preferred and Deferred Ordinary, and dividends are payable upon a nominal 78,203,664l. Another example is that of the Great Northern Company, whose issued Ordinary stock amounts to 17,863,067l., whereas, as the result of conversion, dividend is payable upon 21,883,530l.

					Debentures and Loans	Guaranteed and Preference Stocks	Ordinary Stock
					c	£	£
North Western			•••		39,022,343 43,593,170	44,452,736 82,079,505	42.890,907 78.203.664
Midland		***				37,491,539*	37.082.210
Great Western					25,564,710	24,780,198	32,155,984
North Eastern			***		24,204,775	31.898.502	18.821.470
Lancashire and Yorkshir	е				20,285,846	23,195,260	21.883.530
Great Northern					15,241,538	20,826,335	15-362-886
Great Eastern					18.353.116	20,567,488	10.658.020
Great Central		***			23,129,978	27,575,902	21,579,287
North British					17,885,456	20,498,206	22,346,324
South Western					15,407,489	23,794,591	21,250,726
Caledonian			•••		11,624,686	6.042.335	6.465.268
Metropolitan					5.671,155	6.873,413	3,325,000
District					3,580,411	8.001,145	11,259,282
Chatham				***	10,797,946	14,070,685	10.049.230
South Eastern				•••	8,667,511	12,077,732	10,447,085
Brighton			•••		7,175,841	7,751,540	6,551,250
Glasgow and South Wes	stern	***	***	•••	4,527,725	4.487.483	3,594,650
North Staffordshire					2,845,990	3,286,623	5.192.500
Taff Vale					1,526,258	1,375,000	3,300,000
Hull and Barnsley					5,017,057	3,029,875	2,642,000
Furness					2,396,123	1,883,051	2,001,240
				***	1,220,031	1,000,001	B,001,810
Barry				-			

· Including Rent Charge Stock.

The accounts formerly numbered 10 to 17 inclusive and abstracts A to J inclusive are omitted this year under authority of the Board of Trade. This policy withholds from the stockholders a good deal of information which might very well have been given. There is, for instance, nothing in the new conditions which makes it necessary to suppress particulars of the amounts paid for local rates, Government duty, national insurance, and



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passengers' compensation. Nor is there any apparent reason why the number of civilian passengers carried, as well as their classification, should not have been stated. Admitting that details of passenger and goods traffic would have been of but little use for the purposes of comparison, they would still have had considerable interest and a positive value. The lack of abstracts dealing with the maintenance of the permanent way, the rolling stock, the locomotive running expenses, and the traffic expenses, also of the accounts of the subsidiary enterprises of steamboats, omnibuses, docks, canals, and hotels, rob the reports of a good deal of their statistical interest. No complaint, however, would be reasonable on this score, since the same derangement which has affected the train service has equally affected the docks, harbours, etc.

The greater part of the receipts are, naturally, derived from working the railways, but the subsidiary enterprises contribute, on the whole, a substantial revenue. They are included in the following table of the gross receipts and expenses of, in each case, 'the whole undertaking,' and it must be borne in mind that the 1914 column of gross receipts includes the estimated Government contributions on the September basis:

	Gross Receipts		Increase or	Expenses		Increase or
	1913	1914	Decrease	1913	1914	Decrease
North Western Midland Great Western North Eastern Lancashire and Yorkshire Great Northern Great Central South Western North British Caledonian Brighton Glasgow and South Western South Eastern and Chatham North Staffordshire Taff Vale Barry Hull and Barnsley Metropolitan District Furness	15,962,757 16,020,995	£ 17.328,711 15.859,655 16.200,032 12.077,414 7.137,780 6.972,605 6.304,239 6.125,315 5.565,755 5.430,310 3.828,382 2.198,468 2.198,468 1.020,208 1.088,368 856,405 756,253 969,982 817,456 650,207	-103,102	£ 11.322,164 10.174.037 10.406.109 7.919.279 4.804.757 4.715.608 4.467,444 4.054.577 3.258.291 3.293,123 2.332.992 1.391.408 3.289.561 719.542 652,190 508,446 483,310 522,910 383,132 397,431	11,745,141 10,188,551 10,606,962 8,008,277 4,694,696 4,772,799 4,267,965 4,080,477 3,289,853 3,270,821 2,471,039 1,421,044 3,406,378 711,609 635,017 505,248 463,875 553,199 413,970 420,309	£ +422,977 + 14,514 +200,853 + 88,988 -110,061 + 57,191 -199,479 + 25,900 - 22,302 +138,047 + 29,636 +116,817 - 7,933 - 17,173 - 3,198 - 19,435 + 30,289 + 30,838 + 22,878

The next table shows the net receipts for both years, also the total net income. The net income, it should be explained, is made up of the net receipts from working the whole undertaking, together with rents, dividends received, transfer fees, and the amounts brought forward. It forms the basis of the appropriations, and is the fund from which, after payment of interest, rentals, Debenture interest, and amounts put to reserve, the

Guaranteed and Preference dividends and Ordinary dividends, if any, are payable.

	Net R	eceipts	Increase or	Total Net Income		Increase or
	1913	1914	Decrease	1913	1914	Decrease
North Western Midland Great Western North Eastern Lancashire and Yorkshire Great Northern Great Eastern Great Central. North British. Caledonian South Western South Eastern and Chatham South Eastern Chatham Brighton Glasgow and South Western North Staffordshire Taff Vale Hull and Barnsley Barry Furness Metropolitan District	£ 5.896.896 5.788.720 5.614.886 4.316.088 2.432.225 2.033.859 2.048.165 2.317.840 2.173.930 2.046.685 1.987.118 — 1.389.481 780.577 426.203 443.234 330.023 359.958 264.437 391.397 406.530	£ 5.583,570 5.671,104 4.069,137 2.443.084 2.199.806 2.062,489 2.036,273 2.159,489 2.044,838 1,947,572 — 1,357,343 777,424 408,599 435,350 292,378 351,158 229,897 416,783 403,486	£ -313.326 -117.616 -221.816 -246.951 + 10.859 - 34.053 + 14.324 - 45.337 - 41.937 - 14.441 - 1.847 - 39.546	£ 6.334.595 6.362.738 5.929.035 5.929.035 5.425.498 2.602.111 2.463.016 2.173.330 2.218.221 2.427.282 2.334.041 2.190.502 1.416.960 816.193 1.534.911 825.568 441.288 451.581 332.769 370.488 279.433 567.838 523.073	£ 6,001,787 6,238,924 5,873,509 4,212,741 2,621,325 2,424,567 2,193,034 2,174,311 2,367,776 2,315,842 2,195,454 1,384,966 797,022 1,487,492 823,392 443,487 295,227 358,227 358,227 598,286 519,221	\$\begin{array}{c} \text{\$1\$} & 332.808 & -123.814 & -55.526 & -242.227 & +19.214 & -43.910 & -59.506 & -18.199 & +4.952 & -31.994 & -19.171 & -47.419 & -2.176 & -21.296 & -37.542 & -35.388 & -30.448 & -3852

The Lancashire and Yorkshire, the South Western, the Great Eastern, and the Metropolitan are the only companies that have a better net income than for 1913. The heaviest decline is in the case of the North Eastern, whose big decrease in gross receipts was accompanied by an increase in expenditure. It is rather curious that whereas the Lancashire and Yorkshire with a gross traffic decrease of 100,000l. saved 110,000l. in working expenses, the North Eastern with a traffic decrease of 158,000l. increased its expenditure by 89,000l.

The absence of the usual abstracts makes it impossible to show what the expenditure has been on the two most important items of coal and wages. A year ago several of the reports laid stress upon the increased coal bills arising out of the miners' wages settlement, also upon the advance in the companies' own wages list caused by the concessions made during the great railway strike. All that can be said about the wages question is that the numbers employed have probably been reduced in the second half of the year by the absence of many of the men with the Colours. So far as can be calculated from the authentic figures supplied by some of the leading companies, nearly 70,000 men have gone from the railways of the United Kingdom to one The London and North branch or another of the Services. Western heads the list with 11,449; the Great Western comes next with 9462; the Midland has supplied 7530 (to the 14th of November); North Eastern, 6000; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 4016; Great Northern, 3050; Great Eastern, 3572; Great Central, 3333; South Western, 2100; North British, 2000; South Eastern and Chatham, 2000; Caledonian, 1870; Brighton, 1895; and so on.

Even if the detailed figures of wages had been given in the abstracts, they would only have been useful for comparison with those of the previous year and no sufficient criterion of the expenses of the current year. A rise of wages to last as long as the War lasts has already been announced. With the cost of living greatly increased and the balancing of the domestic budget becoming more and more difficult, there was nothing at all surprising in the agitation of the railway employees for a higher scale of wages. After several conferences between their representatives and the managers' committee with the concurrence of the Government, a compromise between the offer of the companies and the 5s. asked for by the men was reached, it being agreed that a War allowance or bonus of 3s. per week for those receiving less than 30s., and 2s. per week for those receiving 30s. or more should be paid for the period of the War. This will add somewhat about 4,000,000l. per annum to the wages bill, one fourth of which will fall upon the companies, the remaining three fourths being borne by the Government; and in consideration of this arrangement the Government have modified their claim under the September agreement, as already explained earlier in this article. No reasonable person will grudge the railwaymen this concession. Apart from the extra cost of living, which has necessitated the fixing of new standards, they have worked hard during the critical time and have won the hearty praise of Lord Kitchener. It is not too much to say that the country is greatly indebted to them for their public-spirited devotion to duty, at the cost of the great strain on their physical endurance, by which alone the punctual execution of our military preparations was made possible. Trade Union regulations as to the hours of work and overtime were suspended without pro-The demand for an advance, therefore, was not a case of holding a pistol at the head of the companies at a time of stress and difficulty; it was the legitimate outcome of a unique situation and called for consideration in a large and equitable spirit. Many other classes of labour have benefited pecuniarily by the War, but the railwaymen, although they were called upon to make these exceptional exertions, had to be satisfied during several months with the wages of normal times, notwithstanding the abnormal demand on their resources caused by the much higher cost of living. An inevitable effect of an increase in the wages bill, although the companies have to pay only a part of it, will be a corresponding increase in the expenditure for 1915; but the Government's acceptance of most of the liability may simplify the situation. It amounts, at any rate, to a virtual admission of the national character of the railways in war time, and of the exceptional claims of the employees, and in these respects as well as in that of relieving the stockholders to some extent of the additional cost, it has a significance that cannot be overlooked.

It will now be interesting to see what the differences in dividends mean in actual money to the stockholders. Unfortunately, the aggregate is considerable; unfortunately, because just when the tax-gatherer is most urgent the means of satisfying him are undergoing a severe shrinkage. In the following table the Guaranteed and Preference dividends are distinguished from those on Ordinary capital. It will be noticed that, even in the case of one or two companies which have made no change in their distribution, there is a difference in the amounts appropriated. This is due to the issue of small amounts of stock during the year. Capital expenditure is continually going on, and where the capital authorised is in excess of that created additions to the sums that rank must be expected.

Dividends

	Guaranteed a	nd Preference	Ordi	Capital Expendi-					
	1913	1914	1913	1914	ture in 1914				
London and North Western Midland Great Western North Eastern Lancashire and Yorkshire Great Northern Great Eastern London and South Western North British Caledonian South Eastern Chatham Brighton North Staffordshire Taff Vale Hull and Barnsley Barry Glasgow and South Western Furness Metropolitan Metropolitan District	£ 1.718.961 2.051.950 1.494.077 991.046 1.019.267 892.910 773.607 866.076 738.526 1.078.830 772.883 533.939 315.803 603.873 158.024 124.108 51.250 81.310 301.962 215.195 284.107 161.680	£ 1,777,946 2,051,984 1,494,077 9,91,183 1,028,186 892,910 773,607 804,076 752,110 1,078,827 772,883 542,070 302,731 603,887 158,024 126,719 51,250 81,310 301,962 121,195 284,107 154,330	£ 3.002,307 2,636,193 2,284,451 2,242,142 846,966 788,838 384,072 851,199 437,360 646,311 401,969 548,472 207,700 115,500 200,124 314,052 66,050 105,034	£ 2.573.454 2.539,485 2.222.975 2.087.030 846.966 781.509 384.072 816.892 407,361 623.229 351.723 496.236 157.266 194.719 66.000 190.118 274.898 26.420 80.816	£ 1.233.251 532.809 996.845 797.862 469.062 436.315 152.711 386.109 398.155 344.509 104.293 } 316.694 141.936 30.164 66.323 464.896 99.966 93.222 36.822				

In round figures there will be distributed by the companies included above about 1,180,000l. less for 1914 than for 1913. If the differences on the other lines be taken into the reckoning, the full loss will nearly approach the sum of a million and a quarter. Although this, spread over the whole body of stockholders, does not show a formidable sum per head, it is of sufficient magnitude, taken in conjunction with the drop in other investment dividends, to make an appreciable difference in the spending power of the investor. The State, furthermore, will be sufferers from the smaller amount on which income tax is payable.

The figures of capital expenditure for the year are included

in the same table. No matter what the conditions are, the policy of expansion goes on, and the capital expenditure is ever on the increase. Whether this is an altogether wise policy, when the whole future of the railways is obscure, is a question for stockholders themselves to answer. As a general rule they take little interest in the authorisation and creation of new capital, and the wholesome check of domestic criticism is too often lacking. A certain amount of new capital expenditure is, of course, unavoidable. Not only have works to be renewed from time to time, but new districts have to be opened up and new custom secured. But a careful examination of the dividend results of much of this continuous outlay-an examination for which there is no room in this article—would certainly establish the fact that it is often unproductive. The stockholders' view, however, is not the only one. Railways to some extent are monopolies, and the privilege of a statutory monopoly involves obligations to the public as well as to the stockholders. In the long run, perhaps, these are identical; although it is sometimes a very long run. Modernisation and the employment of new and improved methods are desirable and frequently necessary for the convenience and rapid transport of the public, and often show An expenditure which promptly develops excellent returns. traffic is beneficial to everybody. This will doubtless be found to be the case with those companies which are supplementing steam by electricity. Railway electrification is a form of capital expenditure that promises immediate results, and at which, therefore, no stockholder can reasonably cavil. Although checked for a time by the War it is nevertheless making progress. A serious set-back was exceptionally given to the London and Brighton suburban enterprise in this direction on account of the Berlin contractors, whom they had employed for their additional sections, being unable to deliver the materials, and the work had to be hung up until new arrangements could be come to. It is a little singular that no reference is made to the subject in the Company's report. In October the London and South Western had no difficulty in raising 1,000,000l. of new capital for the electrification of part of its system. This has made steady progress, the main power-house and the sub-power stations being practically completed, and the machinery for working them in course of construction. The first section to be electrified is that from Waterloo to Kingston, for which the laying of the high-tension cables is proceeding satisfactorily. The Central London extension to Ealing is in progress, but the work has not advanced as rapidly as was hoped and the opening will be delayed. The Midland has obtained powers for new lines on the Tilbury and Southend section in connexion with its electrification scheme from Fenchurch Street to Shoeburyness. The North Western is proceeding with the electrification of important parts of the outlying London districts. All this seed will no doubt prove fruitful. It is sown in fertile ground where every stimulus to germination already exists. The expenditure of some of the big companies on insignificant branch lines to unheard-of villages and scattered populations is not so easily to be defended.

The efforts that are being made in some quarters to build upon the tentative Government control-if Mr. Runciman will pardon the word—a superstructure favourable to ultimate State ownership cannot be said to have any sufficient warrant. denying that the facts set forth in the earlier part of this article have a bearing upon such an issue, that bearing may easily be exaggerated. Many serious considerations must arise, and many initial difficulties be cleared away, before a State purchase of the whole vast and costly railway system of the country can be seriously contemplated. So far, the most that recent experience has shown is the ability of the Government to give due preference to the paramount needs of the situation and to deal judiciously with the labour side of the problem. It is difficult to see how State purchase is brought any nearer by this experience. The more vital questions of the permanent relations of the State as employer, of the creation of a huge new national investment, and of the success or otherwise of other State-managed commercial undertakings, are barely touched by temporary measures contrived for a particular end. If State ownership be ever thought practicable and desirable, there is an Act already in existence which lays down the terms of purchase on which the railways would have to be acquired. These terms are based on the average net receipts of the three preceding years, capitalised at so many years' purchase, and even if there were no doubts concerning the interpretation of some difficult points, the application of the principle would mean an investment of public money on such a scale that the market value of the existing Funds could not fail to be gravely prejudiced by the new rivalry. great war on our hands and the prosperity of the country likely to experience a protracted set-back, a proposal that the State should buy up the railways, whatever might be its abstract merits, would be, to say the least of it, inopportune. Some day or other public opinion may demand the nationalisation of the railways; for the present, however, the subject has only an academic interest, and the various deductions that have been drawn from the Government's exceptional action with a specific object are, for any practical purpose, premature.

H. J. JENNINGS.

3 P

# THE GREEK EASTER AT JERUSALEM

In the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem there is a spot which guides point out as the centre of the world, and which the Russian pilgrims, and probably a good many others too, believe implicitly to be the exact spot. The first time you are told this you are inclined to smile at the simple but audacious statement; each successive visit to the church shows you the curious truth of it. For Jerusalem is not only the capital of Christendom, she is the centre of the religious world. To her go up year by year all the nations of the earth, no matter by what creed or name they call themselves—Christian, Moslem, and Jew, all turn in hither as to a common home; and so it is that within her narrow limits are found all the elements of that unity which must one day transfigure the city that was built to be at unity within herself.

The most beautiful place in the city, and by far the most reverently kept, is the Mosque of Omar, the Dome of the Rock; but for Christians of every description the Church of the Holy Sepulchre remains the centre of interest. Though we may not believe in its authenticity (and there are many of us who cannot bear to associate such an event with all the unseemly strife and bitterness that rage around it), yet is it hallowed by the tradition of centuries, and even more by the devotion, the belief, the love, and the self-sacrifice, of countless thousands of worshippers. Almost every Christian Communion has its chapel, shrine, or holding within the compass of this wonderful church. We of England have laid a worthy offering at its door, where lies buried Sir Philip d'Aubigny, one of those invincible men who procured for us, and signed, the Great Charter of English liberty: 'To no man will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice.' Of your gratitude pray for the soul of Philip d'Aubigny.

The interest of the Greek Easter centres in three great ceremonies of the Holy Week: the Washing of the Feet on Thursday, the Holy Fire on Saturday at noon, and the Easter Mass at midnight. Easter comes at the end of a long and very severe fast of forty days, during which oil, milk, butter, and eggs are forbidden. The pilgrims keep it rigorously, also many of the

poor; and no doubt the physical unbracing that must follow on such abstention from nourishing foods is a big factor in the wild and uncontrollable excitement displayed at these ceremonies. The upper classes, and those whose work taxes the brain and mental powers, observe the first and last weeks of Lent.

The Washing of the Feet takes place on Maundy Thursday at eight A.M., in the courtyard of the Holy Sepulchre. supremely interesting as a lingering survival of the miracle play. We were in our places by seven o'clock, in a high window of the Greek Convent, directly overlooking the stand where the feet-washing would take place. The Patriarch was in the church, we were told, at a service which had begun at five; he would fast until it was all ended. A light drizzle was falling, and the air was clear and keen. Already the crowds were rolling together, in a way that was hardly perceptible except by the gathering hum of voices, but owing to the War 1 there were barely half as many pilgrims this year as there are as a rule. Lemonade vendors, and sellers of cakes and sweets, did good business in a crowd that had been on the go since dawn, and had no immediate prospect of returning home. Every window, balcony, roof, and ledge rapidly filled up; babies (some crying, others dazed beyond the relief of tears) were everywhere; pilgrims, excited and emotional, but always devout, made a solid wall of humanity behind the double line of soldiers; photographers were perched precariously in boxes hanging by cords from balconies, adventuring their lives in the pursuit of duty. On the south side of the courtyard, facing the raised stand, was a small balcony, and near it, overhead, a young olive-tree was suspended by cords from an upper window; this was to represent the Tree of the Agony in Gethsemane. The crowd became so dense as time wore on that it could only move in a mass, swaying like a cornfield in the wind; the lines of soldiers kept a clear space round the stand.

And here I may make a brief digression to deny emphatically a charge that is often brought against the Turkish soldiers—that they strike and otherwise ill-treat the crowds at these services. Having grown up in Jerusalem, and having been present at every kind of service, ceremony, and gathering, I can only say that I have never seen a soldier ill-treating anyone in any way on any of these occasions, even when excited 'worshippers' have used fists upon them with more zeal and effect than piety; and I have seen many little acts of consideration, and a uniform good-temper and patience. For instance, at this very service, two little children, who were in danger of being crushed, or at least badly hustled and frightened, were lifted shoulder-high by

1 The writer is, of course, referring to the Balkan War.

soldiers out of harm's way; an officer held up a little Christian boy so that he might get a good view of the Patriarch; and another officer, seeing the soldiers push back a vociferating old pilgrim-woman, interfered on her behalf, and himself showed

her to the place for which she held a ticket.

Soon after eight, the great bells of the Holy Sepulchre clanging out announced the Patriarch's approach, and while their wild clamour filled the air, the procession emerged from the gloom of the church into the bright sunshine in the courtyard. First the Archimandrites, two and two, splendid in robes of red and gold brocade, carrying tapers, and chanting; then, alone, the double snake-headed staff in his hand, came the Patriarch. He was in striking contrast to the procession of which he was the last; they were all in such vivid colours, chanting so lustily as they went; he was alone, clad all in gleaming white brocade and silver, with flowing hair and beard of white, while the sun's rays turned to points of fire the diamond settings of the icons and cross upon his breast, and the jewels in his crown. Full of dignity, silent amid much sound, yet pathetic, too, in the weariness that could not be hidden, the white figure paced slowly through the crowds and ascended the platform. twelve Archimandrites took their places on cushioned seats; and now the Patriarch's outer robe of white, his jewels, and crown were removed, and he was seen in a plain, straight garment of shell-pink satin, delicately outlined in gold. A large rough towel was girded round his waist, another slung over his shoulder, and a handsome ewer and basin of embossed silver and gold were brought forward. All this time an old priest in the little balcony opposite was reading out the story of the first Holy Thursday and the last addresses of our Lord to His disciples, in a very lusty sing-song voice, without any apparent pause for The Archimandrites, each of whom, of course, represented an Apostle, bared one foot, which the Patriarch, kneeling down, washed, dried, and kissed, his hand being kissed as he rose by each in turn. When it came to the turn of St. Peter (whose part is taken by the Russian Archimandrite), the Gospel scene was enacted literally, and this being ended, the Patriarch resumed his robes and crown. He then descended into the crowd, where a small square platform placed under the hanging olive-tree represented Gethsemane. Three of the Archimandrites grouped themselves in attitudes of sleep upon the steps of the big stand. Here again the whole scene of the Gospel story was portrayed; and watching the earnest faces of the Russian pilgrims, as they bowed and crossed themselves and followed every movement with rapt and devotional interest, you could only feel that to their simple and uncultivated intelligences these scenes from Scripture made real the Agony and Passion of the Saviour. There is a stage in every life, whether of nations, Churches, or individuals, when men must be taught by means of pictures; the fault is not in those who find happiness and good in such things, but in the grown minds which refuse to let the flock be taught. The service ended with this, and the procession reformed, returning to the Patriarchate. As he passed along, the Patriarch dipped a bunch of flowers in the water that had been used for the washing of the feet, and sprinkled the crowds. The pilgrims liked it very much, the troops evinced less pleasurejudging from the faces of both. A double line of soldiers formed up immediately behind the Patriarch, the crowds broke order and surged after them, and so, swaying to and fro, some following the gleaming processional cross, others scattering to their homes, the throng melted away out of the courtyard. One great

ceremony of the Holy Week was over.

The chief event of the week, however, is the Holy Fire, which takes place on Easter Eve at noon: Places had been reserved for us in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and we had to be in them by ten o'clock. We were in a kind of balcony in what is known as the Greek Cathedral, exactly opposite the Sepulchre. Already the cathedral was full of Russian pilgrims, while the rotunda was rapidly filling up with noisy, excited people, pilgrims and others belonging to all the Eastern Churches. On either side of the Sepulchre are two large holes, through which the fire, when kindled, is thrust out; one hole belongs to the Armenians and one to the Greeks, and any intruder of another creed found near either hole would have short shrift. Every place was crowded—the galleries in the dome, the balconies (of which each foreign Consul has one, like a box at the theatre), ledges, corners, and recesses, all showed spectators clustered thick together; and in the deep archways of the rotunda small wooden platforms had been nailed up, accommodating so many persons at a good price. Many of these, with sleeping rugs and carpets, babies, food, and even umbrellas, were sleeping here for the three nights of Thursday, Friday and Saturday, and numbers of the Russian pilgrims, too, were rolled up doglike It was a wonderfully interesting on the floor of the church. crowd, alive with emotion, excitement, and colour; men dancing on each other's shoulders, clapping, and shouting catches from one to the other, until the whole church rang again:

> The Fire has shone, and we have feasted: We have visited the Sepulchre of our Lord. Our Lord is Jesus Christ. Christ came to us, And with His Blood He bought us.

We are rejoicing to-day,
And the Jews are sad!
O Jews! O Jews!
Your feast is the feast of monkeys,
Our feast is the feast of Christ!
There is no religion but the religion of Christ! Hurrah!

### And:

O Virgin! peace be to thee! We have visited the Sepulchre and the Church. Respond, O ye Brethren! Let not our enemies rejoice!

O St. George! we have prayed at the Sepulchre! We are Christians, and the candles are carried in our hands!

While the pilgrims were praying
The Sepulchre was opened, and the Holy Fire came forth!

There were also cries of 'Long life to our lord' (the Patriarch); and so it went on, thrown from voice to voice, until the frenzy of excitement spread like fire among stubble. Here and there water-sellers threaded their way in and out, and the soldiers good-humouredly pushed the crowd back within some bounds. A wonderful crowd it was, such as you would see nowhere else in the world probably-only it was hard to remember that you were in church! But to turn your head for one moment was to receive a totally different impression. Just behind, in the Greek Cathedral, the Russian pilgrims were still silently gathering. It was all intensely real to them; there was no shouting here, no pushing, no derisive songs and snatches, but such earnest, watchful eyes, such rapt faces, lips moving in silent prayer, frequent bowing and crossing, and here and there, perhaps, a still figure fallen prone upon the floor in worship. Nothing could have been more arresting than the contrast to us in that balcony; in front the seething, noisy crowd deliberately working up its emotions to a fever pitch; and behind, that dim, silent cathedral full of prayerful watchers.

Shortly before twelve the door of the Sepulchre was closed and sealed by a Greek, an Armenian, and a Syrian priest, and one of the Moslem guardians of the church. A Franciscan monk was also there, to show by his presence that the Latins, too, have rights in the Sepulchre of Christ. The sense of expectation

grew in everyone.

The sudden outburst of the great bells overhead at twelve was the climax to the seething excitement of the crowd. Even to a Western imagination those deep throbbing notes, so wild and harsh, so persistent and compelling, are stimulating and suggestive in an extraordinary degree; to such a crowd as this, whose emotions were already strung up to the highest pitch, it was the

last straw. Back in the dim cathedral the golden doors of the Ikonostasis were thrown open, and a procession forming in its depths came slowly into view. First banners, long, narrow, three-pointed ones, each portraying in paint or needlework some scene in the life of our Lord. There are some very old and valuable banners belonging to the church, which are generally used, but because of the split between the Greek and Arab members of the Orthodox Church these were not used this year; they belong to the Arabs and are really ancient, and the right of carrying them belongs to certain of the oldest families. year four of the banners used were carried by Christian soldiers in uniform, which was nice to see. A procession followed, of choir boys, priests, and bishops, ending with the Patriarch wearing the crown and jewels of his office, and went three times round the Sepulchre; after which, standing outside the sealed-up door, the Patriarch was divested of his outer robe, his crown, and jewels, in none too gentle a fashion by the deacons. the seals on the door were broken, and the Patriarch entered alone. A few minutes' breathless suspense—then lighted bunches of candles were thrust through the holes on either side, and a scene of the wildest confusion followed, while the great bells raced and jangled overhead. A priest from the Greek side of the Sepulchre broke through the crowd, waving two great bunches of candles all aflame; he went to light the lamp before the altar in the Greek Cathedral. Runners fought their way through, carrying lanterns, one for the Armenian Church, one for Jaffa. A man is sent from Jaffa every year to bring the Holy Fire back; on his arrival he delivers it up to the priests, who light all the lamps and candles from it. In past years the Holy Fire used to be taken out to Bethlehem by specially selected members of certain families, who conveyed it out with great rejoicings, while the priests, with crosses, banners and candles, came out as far as the Bethlehem Serai to meet it; but owing to jealousy and quarrels amongst these families, which resulted in the fire being extinguished more than once upon the road, the privilege was taken away from the natives, and now a Greek monk is charged with the duty. He drives out to Bethlehem in a special carriage, escorted by three mounted police, and on his arrival is met by the priests and taken in procession to the church.

The fire was passed from one to the other until in a few minutes the whole church was thick with smoke, out of which the flames shone and leaped like living things. Every person was provided with a bundle of tapers, which were lit, and the pilgrims extinguished theirs with round caps specially provided for the purpose, and which are then put by, to be used in time for their burial. It was rather alarming to see the people bathing



April

their faces and beards in the flame, and passing their clothes through it: 'It is Holy Fire,' they say, 'it can never burn us!' Truth compels me to add that we have never heard of a case of burning, and if a fire were once started in that dense throng it could hardly be stamped out. Those who were up in the dome, or in high places, let down their candles by strings to be lighted, and then drew them up again; showers of candle-grease fell everywhere, but no one seemed to mind that in the least. But the most wonderful sight of all was the Greek Cathedral, where the Russian pilgrims, their solid immobility absolutely melted by the fierce ardour of their religious zeal, swayed and pushed and panted in the struggle to get their tapers lighted. The whole cathedral was like a scene out of Dante's Infernorolling clouds of smoke, white straining faces and eager shining eyes of men possessed, lit up by the hungry leaping flames which they seemed as if they would press to their very hearts in the excess of ungovernable emotion. It was through this scene (which I can only describe as appalling in all that it expressed and all that it suggested of human feelings stirred to the very depths) that the Patriarch was presently hurried, holding aloft two flaming candles, and was half carried, half propelled, up the steps into the Ikonostasis. We were glad to think that his part in the ceremony was over, and that he could now rest and take a little nourishment before the long but very beautiful midnight Mass, which begins about eleven and ends some time after three.

Straightway upon the Patriarch's departure followed a triple procession of Armenians, Copts, and Syrians, all wearing very rich and beautiful copes and crowns and jewels, and walking in such close rank that they seemed like one long procession. the midst of this there suddenly flared up one of those nasty little quarrels whose possibility makes the presence of soldiers at every ceremony a necessity, though it is true that these quarrels are becoming rarer and less serious every year with the spread of education. A chair was brought out for the old Syrian Bishop, who was very tired, and the Armenians, following on, found the way blocked, and tried to remove both chair and Bishop, whereupon the irate Syrians seized the Armenian Bishop's staff and tried to break it upon the stone floor. a moment a furious little quarrel had blown up; the soldiers ran together to the spot, anxious officers parted combatants, whistles were blown, the bugler unslung his bugle ready for orders, and an agitated young recruit just behind us started loading with ball-cartridge, until his musket was taken away from him by a more level-headed companion. An Armenian priest was seen to leap upon the shoulders of a Syrian confrère, bear him to earth with the weight and suddenness of the attack,



and bang his head hard upon the stone floor; while another Syrian gave an Armenian some very shrewd blows over the head and nose with a thick candle. And it all died away in a very few minutes; a few of the most furious combatants on either side were expelled by the soldiers, and the procession calmly went on its third round. A great deal might have happened, of course, but nothing did. Except those immediately concerned, and the soldiers, no one seemed to pay very much attention; the tumult did not disturb the devotions of the Russians behind us in the very least.

Do the people believe in the Holy Fire? The pilgrims and the unlettered masses do, most certainly. They say that the Patriarch rubs the tomb with consecrated oil and prays, while it grows warmer under his hand, and then suddenly the flame leaps forth. This is the story the Crusaders told and believed—perhaps invented in the first instance. Says Geoffrey de Vinsauf (1192):

On Easter Eve Saladin, with his retinue, paid a visit to the Holy Sepulchre of our Lord, to assure himself of the truth of a certain factnamely, the coming down from Heaven of fire once a year to light the lamp. After he had watched for some time, with great attention, the devotion and contrition of many Christian captives, who were praying for the mercy of God, he and all the other Turks suddenly saw the divine fire descend, and light the lamp, so that they were vehemently moved, while the Christians rejoiced, and with loud voices praised the mighty works of God. But the Saracens disbelieved this manifest and wonderful miracle, though they witnessed it with their own eyes, and asserted that it was a fraudulent contrivance. To assure himself of this, Saladin ordered the lamp to be extinguished; which, however, was instantly rekindled by the divine power; and when the infidel ordered it to be extinguished a second time, it was lighted the second time; and so likewise a third time. . . . Saladin, wondering at the miraculous vision, and the faith and devotion of the Christians, and exceedingly moved, asserted by the spirit of prophecy, that he should either die or lose possession of the city of Jerusalem. And his prophecy was fulfilled, for he died the Lent following.2

The Russian Abbot Daniel, who was a pilgrim in the year 1106-7, describes how the crowd waited for over three hours, chanting 'Kyrie Eleison,' and 'each one, searching the innermost depths of his soul, thinks of his sins and says secretly to himself "Will my sins prevent the descent of the Holy Light?" The Bishop looked through the grille into the tomb, 'but seeing no light returned.' 'At the end of the ninth hour . . . a small cloud, coming suddenly from the east, rested above the open dome of the church; fine rain fell on the Holy Sepulchre. It was at this moment that the Holy Light suddenly illuminated the Holy Sepulchre, shining with an awe-inspiring and splendid brightness.

2 Itinerary of Richard I. Book V. chap. xvi.



. . . The Holy Light,' explains Abbot Daniel, 'is like no ordinary flame, for it burns in a marvellous way with indescribable brightness, and a ruddy colour like that of cinnabar. . . . Man can experience no joy like that which every Christian feels at the moment when he sees the Holy Light of God. He who has not taken part in the glory of that day will not believe the record of all that I have seen.' Early on Easter morning the Abbot went to the Holy Sepulchre, where 'we breathed with ecstasy the perfume which the presence of the Holy Ghost had left; and we gazed in admiration on the lamps, which still burned with a bright and marvellous splendour. . . . The five other lamps suspended above (the tomb) were also burning, but their light was different from that of the three first, and had not that marvellous brightness.' Later, when the Abbot paid his farewell visit to the church, 'the keeper of the keys, seeing my love for the Holy Sepulchre, pushed back the slab that covers the part of the sacred tomb on which Christ's Head lay, and broke off a morsel of the sacred rock; this he gave me as a blessed memorial, begging me at the same time not to say anything about it at Jerusalem.' No doubt!

'Why do the Greek clergy not tell the people that it is only a beautiful symbol? ' an English lady once asked a Greek bishop. 'Madam,' he replied, 'if we did they would tear us to piecesand still they would believe in it!' Some years ago the then Patriarch, with a fine courage not to be over-estimated, did preach about it during Lent. Furious anger was the result, and on Easter Eve the people locked him out of the church. will punish him!' they said, accounting him a blasphemer; and when he died before the next Lent these people, iron-bound in narrowness and prejudice, said that God had struck him down. The Armenians do not believe in the actual descent of the fire from heaven, for every year their Patriarch explains the service to them. The cult is rooted in centuries of tradition, and to the unenlightened but passionate belief of limited minds it represents much of the beauty and the mystery of religion, but it is one of the main obstacles in the way of reform. I suppose the chief upholders of it are the Russian pilgrims, whose religion seems to an outsider to centre in the Dead and Buried Christ 'Who shall roll us away the stone rather than in the Risen One. from the door of the Sepulchre?'

When we again found ourselves at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre the scene was very different. The church was almost empty save for a few Russian pilgrims, and for some men who were busy lighting the countless lamps and candles in every part of it. This is the one night in all the year when everything is lighted, but it takes some time to do, and meanwhile we went

up on to the roof of the Chapel of St. Helena, which is included in the Abyssinian Convent, and where their Eve service was in progress. A small crowd was here, waiting for the procession to issue from a long tent which had been erected at one side. Standing outside in the clear starlight, we could hear the rise and fall of voices chanting in melancholy cadence, and from time to time the deep booming note of a drum that spoke to a Western imagination of the hidden recesses of primeval forests, and rites more strange and ancient than hallowed. Presently we managed to squeeze inside the tent, where, in a space designed for, say, forty, at least a hundred persons were amicably herded together. The dragoman of the Abyssinian Convent (discovering our connexion with the English Bishop 3) interrupted the officiating priest to introduce us, and also wrested chairs from others of the clergy for our accommodation near the Abbot. All took the interruption very placidly and quite as a matter of course; the embarrassment was entirely on our part. To our uninformed minds the service proceeding was rather pointless; it seemed to consist solely in reading out of a large and ancient volume, thrumming on a bell-shaped drum, and occasional outbursts of chanting in a very dolorous key. Some of the clergy had curious silver sistra, which they shook monotonously to and fro. interest for us lay in watching the faces before us, stamped as they were with the weariness of centuries, faces that could only belong to the scions of a very ancient race. They are a strange people, the Abyssinians; they are probably the oldest Christian nation extant, dating from the fourth century, when Greek missionaries from Alexandria converted them. They have preserved through ages and through generations the form and tradition of a somewhat crude and barbaric Christianity; they allow polygamy, and forbid the eating of swine's flesh; both baptism and circumcision are practised; controversies on the Nature of Christ, long since forgotten, still excite their orthodoxy; Pilate is accounted a saint for his words 'I am innocent of the Blood of this just Man,' and their devils are all most artistically white.

Presently they all struggled to their feet, and strayed out upon the roof in a somewhat disorderly procession, bearing lighted tapers. The effect was both weird and picturesque—the dark melancholy faces and bright rolling eyes, the ancient robes and gleaming jewels, the monotonous thrumming of the drum pierced by the sharper note of the sistrum, and the never-ceasing roll of that guttural minor chant. This year (we could not find out why) they did not use either the curious silver crowns or the large velvet and gold-embroidered umbrellas that usually adorn

3 Bishop Blyth.

the procession. We watched it go its round three times, seeming more like a train of melancholy ghosts let loose upon earth for a space than part of a Christian service in the twentieth century; then we went back into the church.

The sound of sweetest chanting drew us on willing feet up the narrow slippery steps to Calvary, where, amid the subdued shimmer of silver lamps, a Russian service was in act. There is nothing sweeter, more harmonious, or more peaceful than Russian Church music unaccompanied; every Russian seems a natural musician, and the Russian voice can express tones and depths of sound that are beyond the compass of ordinary throats. These strains were as sweet and as haunting as the Pilgrims' Chorus from Tannhäuser.

Passing quietly out of Calvary we climbed many steps, broad and narrow, steep and uneven, and trod dusty passage-ways, till we came out upon a narrow gallery very high up in the roof of the Greek Cathedral. Looking down, our eyes picked out of the gloom of that dim place the few worshippers who are never absent, and the soldiers beginning to form up already for the Midnight Mass. From the distance came the solemn chanting of the Russians in Calvary. But the wonder of it all lay in the lights—the countless lights that patient hands had awakened in every corner and recess of this wonderful church, lights that shone and twinkled in starry clusters, lights that burned dim and steady in silver lamps, crowns and circles and constellations of light, light everywhere, soft, brilliant, searching, festal. down below were faint sounds of moving feet, and the passing of shadow-like forms, and the murmur of voices; but we were in another world up in that gallery, wrapped round in an extraordinary sense of peace and remoteness quite indescribable. It was the climax to the experiences of a wonderful day-which had been, perhaps, an analogy in brief of life, the noise and clamour and unrest of the earlier part, followed by the calm and quiet of this starlit hour. It quickened the imagination and spoke through it to some deeper feeling, of which the imagination was only the expression. For here some faint realisation of the true life of the church touched you; the glare and glamour, the strife and pettiness, that mar the wonderful building, had no power to break the utter peace of this remote solitude. It was as if the prayers of all the countless worshippers had gathered in a brooding calm up here, in this dim place above the piercing lights. It was an influence not to be resisted, even if you had the will.

With slow reluctant feet we retraced our way downstairs, paused one moment in the place of Calvary, and so into the body

of the church below. Already it was filling for the great Midnight Mass, though it was barely ten o'clock when we took our places. Through the kindness of the Patriarch we were well in front, just near the entrance to the Sepulchre itself, where His Beatitude was to be, while the double row of soldiers behind kept off the ever-swelling crowd of Russian and other pilgrims. The Mass began with a splendid procession of clergy, Archimandrites, and Bishops, with banners and censers. The Patriarch walked alone at the end, all in Easter white, afire with jewelled orders and icons; two deacons, walking just in front, turned every few moments to swing their censers towards him, bowing reverently each time. The slow rise and fall of the chanting, the magnificent robes and jewels, the sweet breath of incense, all combined to make the scene a striking one as the procession thrice wound slowly round the shrine. A young Turkish officer went first of all to clear a way (for a congregation cannot very well be orderly in ranks, where there are no seats or bounds of any kind); we were struck by his gentleness and good-temper with the crowd, and it was a shock to learn next day that when he went home after the service, receiving no answer to his knock, he had to break in, only to find his bride of three weeks had been robbed and murdered by her black servant during his absence, presumably for lust of her wedding-jewels. Splendid as the service was in scenic effect and colour, there was about it also a soberness and restraint which reminded us that it was still the Vigil of Easter. The hush of expectation lay upon that massed crowd, and grew upon us all as the hour drew on to midnight. The service was long, and a little wearying to those who could not understand Greek, but it was really a service, not merely a ceremony, as so many of the Eastern rites seem to us. Presently the Patriarch went into the Greek Cathedral of the Resurrection, and the Litany of Peace was sung, the slow rhythmic beat of the chant fitting most harmoniously the beautiful words of the Litany.

For the peace from above, and the salvation of our souls . . . For the peace from above, and the salvation of our souls . . .

For the peace of the whole world . . .

For this Holy House, and those that with faith, reverence, and fear of GOD enter therein . . .

For this Holy City . . .

Let us beseech the LORD.

What a fitting preparation for the Divine Oblation on Easter

So with prayer, and chant, and much stately ritual, the hours were on to midnight. And then, with most impressive effect,

the Patriarch, standing before the Sepulchre, lifted up both arms and cried aloud:

Christ is risen! Alleluia! Alleluia! He is risen indeed!

that great waiting, rustling crowd made answer in one glad shout. The great bells rushed together in tumult overhead; banners and tapers were raised and lowered thrice, like a flag in salute; the pilgrims, some with tears of joy, embraced each other, saying 'Christ is risen!' What a tremendous force the words had for them, uttered in the very city itself, and, as they so ardently believe, at Christ's own Sepulchre! The wave of rejoicing caught us too, for who could be there and not share in anything so heartfelt and sincere? It was all most lovely.

Following upon this wonderful scene came the administration of the Holy Communion. The Patriarch first received himself from two Archbishops; then he communicated them all, each one by name, and each one, before returning to his place, kissed the Patriarch's hand. It was all very reverent and impressive. After the Bishops and clergy had received, the Orthodox Consular staffs came forward; and then the Russian pilgrims began to press up, their rugged faces shining with emotion and joy. To them this was the climax of all—to receive the Holy Sacrament at the very spot where faith assured them the Body of Christ had lain. But in their ecstatic devotion there is something a little alarming to the outside spectator; perhaps it is that absolute heedlessness of anything but the object in view. If you give way before their forward movement, well and good; if not, you must take your chance, for you do not exist for the Russian pilgrim; he will walk over you as soon as not if you fall, for that is your concern, not his. It is not that he is unkind or wilfully rough, only that he is so enthralled by the fullness of the moment that outside considerations simply do not touch him; he neither sees nor hears apart from his service. Mindful of this somewhat terrific power of concentration, we gave way before that solid forward move; the soldiers made place for us, and somehow we were passed through the crowd and gained the courtyard outside. It was cool and fresh and quiet, flooded with the glorious light of the Easter moon—a great contrast to the heat, the quivering lights and tapers, the overwrought throngs in the church behind us, whence the chanting reached our ears in receding waves of sound.

It was nearly three, and as we passed through the silent streets the Holy Sepulchre bells once more clashed out, announcing the close of the service. We breathed a hope that it meant also some rest for the weary, fasting Patriarch.

We had brought away a harvest of thoughts and impressions,

too deep to be lost; but we had left behind us the power to express them. The peace of Easter was abroad, as well as in that wonderful church and haunted dome above the lights. As the bells rang out their jubilant welcome to the dawn of Easter, all unbidden there sprang to mind the words of the old Mozarabic collect:

'Behold, O Lord, how Thy faithful Jerusalem rejoices in the triumph of the Cross and in the power of the Saviour!'

ESTELLE BLYTH.

Jerusalem.


# PROBLEMS IN THE NEAR EAST

(I)

## THE TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS OF THE BALKAN STATES

One of the most striking points in connexion with the present War is the success of the carefully laid plans by which Germany took advantage of jealousies and dissensions among the Balkan States in order to hold up a considerable proportion of British and Russian forces in Egypt and the Caucasus. By one means and another, largely bribery no doubt, Germany induced Turkey to make a hopeless attack on Egypt, and to send an army against the Russians. Although it is now quite clear that Turkey's attack upon Egypt cannot have any measure of success, and that she can accomplish nothing against Russia, Germany has, nevertheless, succeeded in the main object of her intrigues in this direction by compelling Russia to keep an army in the Caucasus and England to retain troops on the Suez Canal, which we cannot afford to remove until all danger of further attacks by the Turks has passed. Turkey has thus served Germany's purpose, and what becomes of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the War will no longer give much concern to Germany, who will be unable to render her assistance. One can understand Germany's action, as she has risked everything on the one throw, including her interests in Asia Minor, the Bagdad Railway, Syria, and Mesopotamia; but it is difficult to realise how Turkey could have been so misguided and short-sighted, as she stood to lose in either case; it is certain that even if Germany could have come out 'on top,' Turkey would soon have become merely a German dependency. German intrigues at Sofia resulted in Bulgaria's adopting an attitude friendly to Austro-Germany and threatening to Serbia and Greece, an attitude which has largely neutralised Greek and Roumanian desires to give active assistance to the Entente Powers.

With regard to the territorial ambitions of the various Balkan States, which cause them all to be vitally interested in the present War, they may be shortly summarised as follows:



During the short period which has elapsed since the Turkish War Bulgaria has much improved her army, which is now in a state of great efficiency. She demands that Serbia should give back to her all the territory she could have asked under the 1912 Treaty. In this Bulgaria is unreasonable. When, however, the present European War is concluded—presumably in favour of the Entente Powers—Serbia, together with Montenegro, will be able very largely to expand to the north-west by the acquisition of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and parts of Dalmatia and Croatia—so largely that she can well afford to be generous to Bulgaria and to cede to her some part, at any rate, of what she asks.

Bulgaria demands from Greece the port of Kavalla, with the towns and districts of Drama and Serres, which form part of the present kingdom of Greece, this being territory which Bulgaria would have had, but lost under the Treaty of Bucharest (owing to her attacks on her allies). Greece is firm in her decision to part with no portion of her present belongings to Bulgaria. Whether or not she will, in a final settlement, see her way, in

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view of the possible acquisition of territorial advantages elsewhere, to meet Bulgaria to some small extent, is a matter which she will no doubt consider.

Bulgaria may presumably also look to acquiring after the War (provided that her action is such as in the opinion of the Entente Powers entitles her to consideration) Adrianople and Turkish territory down to the Enos-Midia line. If she is allowed by general consent to occupy this part of Turkey, it will be because the Ottoman Empire will no longer exist in Europe, and because, perhaps, no better future owner for it could be found. furthermore, has a question to settle with Roumania regarding the Dobrudja, which she naturally wishes that State to hand back to her, this being territory which Roumania acquired from Bulgaria by the Bucharest Treaty, and it seems not improbable that Bulgaria, profiting by the present situation, will be able to secure some territorial concession from Roumania as the price for 'amicable neutrality,' when the latter State proceeds against Austria. In any case it is clear that Bulgaria, provided she does not make another faux pas, will, after the War, on one side and the other become a larger State than she now is.

2. Serbia.—This kingdom, together with Montenegro, will, as already stated, after the War receive extensive additions in the north-west, and by the acquisition of a slice of Dalmatia will no longer be an inland State, but, like her neighbours—Bulgaria, Roumania, and Greece—will possess a seaboard with some excellent harbours.

Serbia will thus become a far more important and powerful State than she has been in the past. It is also probable that eventually, after the death of King Nikolas, Serbia and Montenegro will amalgamate. This, indeed, seems a wise course, as Montenegro is too small, too weak, and too poor to be able to carry on as an independent kingdom and to do justice to her own resources. The Serbs and Montenegrins are practically the same people, and it is not likely that there will be any opposition to amalgamation in either State.

3. Roumania hopes for the incorporation of Transylvania in her dominions. It goes without saying that neither Russia nor her Allies will be likely to go out of the way to bring this about unless Roumania by her action can be considered to have established a substantial claim. At present her policy may not have been quite definitely declared, but there can be little doubt that she will proceed before long to the invasion of Austrian territory.

4. Greece.—This country is on a somewhat different footing from the three other Balkan States, as she has no prospect of increasing her dominions in Europe [except by the occupation of the southernmost strip of Albania (Epirus)]. By acting, however,

in harmony with the Entente, and in view of territorial additions to the other States, she thinks that in a general rearrangement of Balkan questions she has a right to consideration. It is doubtful whether she will agree to cede any part of the Salonica province to Bulgaria. The latter State has certainly no valid grounds on which to base her demand for Kavalla, Serres, and Drama. Whether or not, however, Greece eventually consents to the cession of some part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, she looks for an increase of territory by the cession to her of either (a) the islands now held by Italy near the coast of Asia Minor, (b) Cyprus, or (c) Smyrna and other coast towns of Asia Minor, with a hinterland.

Of all the Balkan States Serbia is the one which deserves first consideration. In the face of enormous difficulties she has not only held out single-handed against the attacks of Austria, but has actually on two occasions inflicted crushing defeats on the armies of that Power. She has afforded great assistance to the Triple Entente, has kept some portion of the armies of Austria occupied on her borders, and by holding out against them has prevented Germany and Austria from obtaining possession of the line of railway from Vienna to Constantinople.

Roumania can no doubt look after her own interests in Transylvania. If she desires to extend her dominion in that direction

it rests with her to take the necessary action.

Greece, as already pointed out, expects practically no terri-

torial increase in Europe.

Bulgaria has not been fortunate in her attitude so far. There is no moral doubt that she has intrigued with both Austria and Turkey, and the impression has been very generally formed that she meditated a descent on Serbia (when, as seemed at one time likely, that State was too exhausted to continue her resistance to Austria) and the seizure of Serbian Macedonia. She even took what were practically hostile measures against Serbia in countenancing organised attacks by 'Comitaji' bands on the Salonika-Nisch railway, Serbia's only line of communication with the outer world, a line which is of the most vital strategic value to her. Bulgaria disavowed responsibility for these attacks, but as they were made from Strumnitza and other Bulgarian centres where the bands are concentrated and definitely organised, and as the raiders were proved to have been supplied with Bulgarian Government rifles and '1914' ammunition manufactured for the Bulgarian army, and were in possession of machine guns-and as no attempt has been made by the Bulgarian Government to suppress the Comitaji organisation—such disavowals are not worth much consideration.

Bulgaria by her action has alienated much of the sympathy which was undoubtedly felt for her, and has not as yet established much claim for special consideration in a future Balkan settlement. But for her doubtful attitude Roumania might possibly have taken action against Austria before now, and Greece might have been enabled to come to the assistance of Serbia. Up to a certain point the views of Bulgaria can be readily understood. She desired to delay, to be quite sure which way the European War would end before committing herself openly to a definite policy, keeping meanwhile on such terms with both sides as would allow of her finally throwing in her lot with either-a difficult course to follow. At the present date, however, such a policy is clearly an unwise one. It is evident that, however the War may end, it cannot terminate in a crushing of the Entente Powers; probably the utmost which Germany now hopes for is a peace which may not be too disastrous for her. The result of Bulgaria's policy so far is that she has embittered Serbia, thereby rendering a territorial settlement with that State more difficult than it might have been in other circumstances. She has also irritated Greece by covert threats and demands for some of the best and most valuable parts of her dominions. Before the attack made by Bulgaria on her allies, Serbia and Greece, the latter State would have consented to Bulgaria taking a part of what is now Greek Macedonia. Since that war, however, Greece finds herself in an entirely different case; her army has been so reorganised and improved that it is almost equal to that of Bulgaria, and she sees no reason why she should give away territory which was acquired as some compensation for the losses she suffered in men and money during the war which Bulgaria forced on her. not a case of Greece holding territory which once belonged to Bulgaria; Grecian Macedonia was never in Bulgarian possession, and the argument advanced by Bulgaria that the country she demands (Kavalla, Serres, and Drama) has a population consisting chiefly of Bulgarians has been clearly proved not to be based on actual facts. Greece is also convinced that Bulgaria would not even be satisfied if her present demands were agreed to, but that she would finally claim Salonika itself. In any case Salonika, without the important tobacco districts of Serres and Drama, would lose a great deal of its value.

It requires no argument to show that it would be unreasonable, when the other Balkan States are enlarging their territories, to call upon Greece to give away some of hers. It would certainly greatly facilitate a Balkan agreement if Greece could be induced to part with Kavalla and a small hinterland; but even if she were largely compensated in the Aegean and Asia Minor, it is true, as her politicians point out, that no compensation of this

description would really remunerate her for loss of territory on the Continent of Europe; while the possession of any holding in Asia Minor would involve her in new responsibilities, and would compel her to defend an inland boundary in a new country separated from Greece itself.

It may be taken as highly improbable that the Balkan States will ever be able to come to an agreement among themselves regarding readjustments of territory and boundaries. rearrangement is necessary-after the War-none can doubt. The fact alone that Serbia will largely increase her holding is sufficient to necessitate a reconsideration of the terms of the Bucharest Treaty, a convention which could never have been expected to stand for long. It was a certainty that as soon as Bulgaria recovered from the effects of the war with her former allies she would seek the first opportunity for demanding new conditions and new boundaries. That time is now at hand, and Bulgaria is bringing forward her claims. She has been, apparently, sufficiently well advised to abandon any ideas which she may have had of endeavouring to take advantage of Serbia's exhausted condition during her war with Austria, and to remain strictly neutral, to await the conclusion of the European War and the friendly assistance of the Entente Powers in the arrangement of terms with Serbia, Greece, and Roumania. It is not likely that the Powers will be able to give Bulgaria everything she would wish to have, but it is certain that with a new Serbia extending to the shores of the Northern Adriatic, and possibly a new Roumania embracing the whole of Transylvania, there is ample room and opportunity to provide for a new Bulgaria comprising parts of Turkey and Serbian Macedonia.

It is not probable that there will—eventually—be any great difficulty in bringing Bulgaria and Serbia to an understanding, but matters will not be so easy with Greece, whose statesmen have taken up a very uncompromising attitude as regards Macedonia and the cession of any of Greece's present territory. In any case it will be impossible to please everyone, but whatever final arrangement is made will have to be imposed. In the consideration of various territorial boundaries, moreover, it will be of little use to go to the very bottom of the 'nationality question.' It is possible to prove almost anything by argument in this matter; and in many parts of the Balkans foreign populations have settled down happily and contentedly under a new rule and ask nothing better than to be left in peace to cultivate their farms, to be free from wars and raidings, and to have no more change of rulers. The idea that these 'foreign' populations are unhappy and desirous of a new order of things has been largely kept alive by systematic agitation from outside. When the time

comes for the arrangement of a new Balkan Treaty, the 'national question,' while being taken into consideration to a great extent, should not be allowed to stand in the way of geographical and other equally important considerations. The end to be reached is such a rearrangement as will be really work-

able and lasting and fair to all.

With regard to the Eastern Adriatic, its future partition will naturally largely depend on the course taken by Italy in the present War. There can be little doubt that the great bulk of the Italian population realises that the parting of the ways has now been reached, and that if Italy has any real national ambitions in the Adriatic she must throw in her lot with the Entente Powers. It is obvious that this is the only means by which she can expect to obtain additions of territory on the Eastern Adriatic coast. Presuming that Italy shortly takes action against Germany and Austria, she will be justified in expecting great consideration in the final territorial arrangements. What will be Italy's position if she remains neutral to the end of the War? She will by no means secure the friendship of Austria and Germany, who will never forget that she failed to give them active assistance. She will not have established any specially friendly relations with Russia or France, and, while England will always continue to feel great friendship for Italy, it would be impossible for her to advocate Italian interests, specially, in the general settlement after the War. Italy would thus find herself more or less without any close friends in Europe.

The ambitions of the 'Italia Irredenta' party are well known. They are the acquisition of the Trentino, Trieste, possibly Istria, and some of the Dalmatian ports and seaboard. The extremists of this party go further than this, and consider that the greater part of Dalmatia ought to come to Italy, together with a con-The future division of Dalmatia siderable portion of Albania.

which they suggest is roughly as follows:

1. To Serbia (with Montenegro), a stretch of the coast below Fiume, to provide an outlet for (a Serbian) Croatia, and another stretch further south, including Cattaro and Ragusa, to give an outlet for (a Serbian) Bosnia.

2. The rest of Dalmatia to Italy.

If Italy considers that it is a sufficiently ambitious future for her to hold Valona she will undoubtedly be right in remaining neutral. If, on the other hand, she desires to realise national ambitions she must presumably throw in her lot with the Entente Powers. The question is one for her to decide, and she will no doubt take the course she thinks best.

It is fairly clear now that there is only one way of satisfactorily settling the Albanian question-namely, by giving Epirus



to Greece, the extreme northern strip to the future Serbia (with Montenegro), and either forming the central parts of Albania into an independent or international State, or else possibly handing them over to Italy.

Albania has so far proved to be incapable of self-government. The country may be said to be in a state of anarchy; armed bands belonging to different sections, and independent parties of robbers and brigands plunder and kill in all directions. The most recent exploit of some of these is a treacherous attack on poor Serbia, who already has her hands full, an attack no doubt instigated through Austro-German influence. Italy's occupation of Valona was originally described as a 'sanitary expedition'; we may reasonably presume, however, that it will be permanent. If Valona is intended to be anything more than a strategic position it will require a hinterland.

The appointment of a ruling 'prince' for Albania proved a disastrous failure. This may have been to some extent due to the fact that the Prince of Wied was personally incapable of adapting himself to the conditions prevailing in his dominions, but it seems probable that if Central Albania is formed into an independent State it would be better, instead of appointing a foreign 'prince,' to provide a form of government more on the lines of a Republic, with a strong Council chosen from the different sections of the Albanian population.

With regard to Constantinople-on my recent visit to the Balkan States I found that there was a general expectation that it will be handed over to Russia. The feeling throughout the Balkans is that it would be preferable for Constantinople, with an enclave comprising both shores of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, to be formed into a State, either to be administered internationally or placed in the hands of some Experience in the past small and inoffensive neutral Power. shows that a condominium is never a great success; it was a failure in Crete, Egypt, and the New Hebrides. On the other hand, the suggestion that a Constantinople enclave should, subject to certain international conditions, be given to Belgium was universally received as being one of the best solutions of the question.





## PROBLEMS IN THE NEAR EAST

(II)

### ITALY AND INTERVENTION

The European War came as a painful surprise to Italy. We neither desired it nor foresaw it. It suddenly revolutionised the two fundamental principles of our traditional policy. The aim of the first was to consolidate, under a peaceful régime, the recent work of restoring the nation; the second, to maintain at all costs the equilibrium of Europe through our participation in the Triple Alliance, a policy that was far less spontaneous than would have been necessary to fulfil our purpose.

From the very beginning of the War, therefore, the Italian people saw clearly the double danger towards which involuntarily it was drifting. While on the one hand the Italians felt themselves decidedly opposed to compromising the young life of the country in a war they did not want, on the other hand they realised the terrible unknown quantity with which the nation would be faced should the balance of European power change.

At a moment in which all the largest nations of Europe were dragged into the conflict, in order to fight for their existence or for their liberty, Italy, free from that imperious necessity, might have joined that group of belligerents whose victory she considered the easier or more probable. In this way she would have looked after her own practical interests, and thus solved the problem of the future.

Italy, on the contrary, declared her neutrality. It was a brave action, because it forced the nation to defend its destinies by its strength alone. Moreover, it was brave because, on that account, she renounced once and for all an agreement that, though unnatural, rigorously protected our safety—the Triple Alliance.

Europe, it seems to me, is beginning to lose somewhat the sense of value with regard to Italian neutrality. It has been forgotten that neutrality was declared when the intervention of England in the conflict seemed improbable and that of France doubtful. It has been forgotten that, by that very declaration of



neutrality, we implicitly condemned the policy of our allies and made them our enemies. It has been forgotten that in pursuance of that declaration the Government was forcing the country to make sacrifices as great as those of war, yet devoid of practical results. Lastly, people have forgotten that through our rigid interpretation of our national duty we ran the risk of being wholly isolated, thus forsaking the easy way to any practical conquest.

I have spoken of rigid interpretation of our national duty: it is out of that that our neutrality has been born. The Government and the people of Italy, in declaring the conditional neutrality of the country, had to face two inevitable problems resulting from the new situation. The first was the impossibility of helping our allies in carrying out a programme both spiritually and practically contrary to our interests; the second, the preserving of our national dignity, both in the present and for the future, by respecting the agreement signed with our Allies until the day when their action should prove itself to be decidedly irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of national safety. It is well that it should be known that the great mass of the Italian people to-day is still preoccupied by the desire of proving to the world that Italy knows how to keep faith with her agreements.

While awaiting that day, all inducements of a sentimental character made to Italy continue to be vain and harmful. A people which is on the eve of risking its national existence cannot attribute any value to passing manifestations of sentiment. On the other hand, it has not been easy for Italy to forget the incidents of the *Manouba* and the *Carthage* and the words of Poincaré at Palazzo Borbone, an incident which is certainly Prince Bülow's strongest ally in his diplomatic campaign in Rome. Italians are passionate sentimentalists. Their affection is as violent and as lasting as their hate.

It is on this account that the only idealistic factor that helped to determine Italian neutrality was our traditional friendship for England. Italians do not forget that the English have been the sincerest and most disinterested co-operators in their national Risorgimento. Nor do they forget that England has cultivated this historic cordiality of relations and this natural affinity between the two peoples even when our part in the Triple Alliance might have compromised or cooled them. It is therefore difficult to find an Italian in Italy who would fight against an Englishman. I am inclined to believe that the Anglo-Italian friendship contributed far more to our declaration of neutrality than our traditional aversion for the 'Tedeschi.'



Apart from this feeling of cordiality towards England, no spiritual factor other than that which corresponded to a clear and patriotic vision of national interests, and was yet reconcilable with respect for the treaties of which we were the signatories, determined our neutrality. There are some who believe and declare that, at the outset, our neutrality reflected a state of weakness or impotence, and accordingly consider our declaration of neutrality to have been caused by the fact that our Army was unprepared, and by the certainty that the will of the people would have rebelled against concerted action with the Central Powers. Such an opinion in each case is incorrect.

At the beginning of the War our Army found itself in the same condition as those of the greater part of the belligerents. It had the advantage over those, however, of having been trained to war by the recent Libyan campaign, and of having its equipment strengthened thereby. Experience has proved that no nation was prepared for war except Germany. We were therefore at the same point of preparation as the other belligerents, and, like them, could have successfully defended our

country.

Having once declared neutrality, military preparations had necessarily to adapt themselves to the new requirements. greater part of the Italians to-day consider that Italy's possible intervention in the near future could not, and should not, limit itself to the conquest of Trent and Trieste. When calling upon her citizens to make the terrible sacrifice of war, Italy intends that it should result in a complete and definite settlement of the questions of national territory and in sufficient compensation for her traditional Eastern aspirations. All the anguish of Irredentism must finally disappear. Wherever the Italian language, Italian life, and Italian traditions exist, and have existed for centuries, such territories must be gathered under the Italian flag. We intend therefore that the Adriatic question should be completely solved in all respects, while still desiring to come to a friendly understanding with the Slavs with regard to all those questions in which our respective rights are identical or reconcilable. On the other hand, we desire that our position as a great Mediterranean Power should be strengthened by our possible intervention in the solution of the Eastern Question.

In view of the programme which our neutrality forced us to regard as a vital factor in the event of our having to go to war, our military preparation has been carried to the highest degree of efficiency. Italians recognise that their Army, while being sufficient for a defensive war, was not sufficient to ensure victory in a lengthy war such as might be forced

upon them by the unknown quantity of a European conflict. Hundreds of millions were spent to strengthen our armaments, the people were asked to sacrifice themselves in order to prepare for the War. Italy has to-day 1,500,000 men ready, fully aymed, and well equipped, both materially and morally, for the strain of a war. Our fleet, which was already efficient before the outbreak of war, has now been reinforced by the addition of six modern and very powerful Dreadnoughts. Our military and naval power constitutes a new and formidable factor which from one day to another could weigh down the balance in favour of one of the two groups of belligerents.

For more than eight months of neutrality, which was defined as watchful and armed because it inevitably preceded intervention, it has been possible to perfect the technical and bureaucratic machinery of military organisation. A nation that has had eight months in which to prepare herself for war, and who is relatively free to choose the moment in which to intervene, must be assured of her success. To-day we are convinced that our army can effectively support all our national aspirations.

I dwell upon this point because it is well that our English friends should clearly understand our intention. They know that Italy is not a rich country, and that the present crisis, which has been strongly felt among us, has followed upon the crisis produced by the national effort during the Libyan campaign. Notwithstanding this, the Government has asked of the country the enormous sacrifice of providing and equipping a great army, and the Italians have made it cheerfully. The National Loan of 40,000,000! was over-subscribed in a few days. The Italians are conscious therefore that every sacrifice destined to guarantee the greatness of the country at this moment must be made.

Those who think, however, that Italy, after having made such sacrifices, can rest content with realising the minimum programme of Trent and Trieste, deceive themselves. So, too, do those who believe in the success of diplomatic negotiations limited to the concession to Italy of more or less substantial rectifications of frontier as a reward of her perpetual neutrality. A country which has made the greatest effort to complete its national strength does not care to run risks in the future for love of a quiet life.

Prince Bülow's attempts prove two things conclusively: the essential importance attributed by Germany to our possible intervention, and the Central Empires' respect for our military power. Conscious and proud of this, Italy might consent to maintain her neutrality only in the case of Austria deciding upon such vast concessions as would have the result of excluding



her for ever from the number of the Great Powers; that is to say, the cession of the Trentino and of every Italian zone in the Adriatic, and the conclusion of an agreement that should safeguard Italy from any possible future revenge at the hands of Austria. But those who know the Austrian mind with regard to us consider this hypothesis absurd, and at bottom every Italian thinks that Prince Bülow's diplomatic intrigue is but a product of the singular relations between Germany and Austria about which we can only congratulate ourselves.

Italians to-day cannot be swayed by diplomatic intrigue. Each one of us feels that Italy must come out of the present crisis either very much enlarged and strengthened or considerably weakened. All the nations which are taking part in the European War are conscious of being able to count upon solid and practical friendships. We do not disguise the fact that we have fallen into the most complete isolation; to avoid the present and future damages that may accrue to us from it, only one way lies open before us: to be respected and feared on account of our strength. Only by means of a more or less effective manifestation of this power can we assure our country the peaceful future which mere military victories could not of themselves ensure.

Summing up what I have already said, it is evident that, while Italy is convinced of the inevitable necessity of fulfilling her highest national destinies in the present hour, there have been two reasons against her intervention. One, the respect due to moral obligations that still bind her to her allies; and the second, the absence of a new element in the European conflict that is in direct contrast with her immediate interests. Any other consideration, whether of an idealistic, political, or aesthetic nature, seems in our eyes to be negligible or of secondary importance. Italy will declare war that day on which one of the above-mentioned reasons shall, by the force of circumstance, cease to exist.

It is unnecessary to remark that these two causes—one moral, the other material—are closely related. When, by reason of this War, in which we have had no part nor responsibility, our interests come to be affected, we shall be inevitably free from every obligation. There is no political consideration that can override a nation's right to existence. So far, that day has not yet dawned, nor can we therefore free ourselves without dishonour or danger from our duties towards the Triple Alliance.

Many will ask what may the factor be that will determine Italy's abandonment of her neutrality. According to our point

of view, it can only assume two forms: either the military break-up of Austria, caused by notable Russo-Serbian victories, or an energetic and decisive action of the Triple Entente against Turkey. The first, by completely disturbing the Balkan equilibrium, would force us to look after our Adriatic interests; the second, following upon the disappearance of Turkey in Europe, would make it necessary for us to take an active and fruitful part in the partition of her spoils so as to preserve our legitimate and traditional aspirations in the East.

With regard to the first question, the breakdown of the Austrian Army, we Italians have no illusions. Russia can only become formidable on the day in which she really breathes freely in the Mediterranean. Austria is still a military organism with exceptional powers of resistance. We know, for instance, that she keeps 500,000 men on our frontiers, which, together with two German army corps, will have the task of opposing the irresistible advance of our national aspirations. This is in itself a proof that Austria's military resources are far from being exhausted. nor do the Italians disguise from themselves the fact that a possible war will be fraught with dangers and unknown elements. The second hypothesis—that of a decisive action of the Allies against Turkey-is looked upon in Italy as being far more probable. The Turco-Italian War proved to us that the Dardanelles could be forced. At that time a flotilla of destroyers succeeded in reaching the Sea of Marmora. We do not doubt therefore that the Allied Fleet, which is attempting the same task in force, will be able to gain Constantinople. The day on which the Allies should force the Young Turks to abandon once and for all their nefarious European policy, Italy could not remain absent or indifferent.

Eastern policy, as a matter of fact, has been always fostered in Italy mainly for traditional reasons. The remembrance of Venice and Genoa is still too fresh in the minds of our maritime population for us to forget that the natural direction of our expansion lies towards the East. Every event that may alter the interplay of European influences, both in the European and in the Asiatic East, finds an immediate and live response among our people. For this reason, above all, the Libyan war was so popular. On this account the events in the Near East are followed with greater interest than those in the West. The action against the Dardanelles provoked an immediate reawakening and keen interest among the Italians. It was immediately followed by Von Bülow's negotiations. That sagacious diplomat realised that the attack on the Dardanelles was to be the prologue of possible Italian action against the Central Empires. That which he offers

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us, however, is far too little as compared with what we wish fornamely, to renew the splendid traditions of Venice and Genoa in the East. The supposition of a possible break-up of Turkey in Europe preoccupies us as much as the possible destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. When the material action of the Allies has destroyed the balance between the two groups of belligerents, Italy will be unable to keep out of the War.

That is the new factor to which I referred above as capable of determining Italian intervention. It would solve our extremely delicate moral position, for we should be led to hostile action against Austria and Germany in order to fulfil an end sacred to the destinies of Italy, an end which the Central Empires for their personal advantage, and contrary to our interests, will try to frustrate. The insurrection of the Moslem world against Europe is the only thing which Austria and Germany have as yet accom-

plished contrary to Italian interests.

It is necessary, however, that the Allies should carefully consider this factor of Italian intervention. Their action against Turkey places Italy in the position of having to choose between isolated action to defend her national interests after the War, and concerted action with the Allies now to attain a common end. A wise diplomatic preparation should precede any military action. It is conceivable that an agreement of incalculable historical importance has been entered upon between Russia, France, and England with regard to the division of Turkey in Europe. We could not have taken part in it for reasons inherent in our delicate position. Italy is anxiously asking herself to-day what her position in the East will be in relation to the Great Powers which have in a friendly way arranged the boundaries and the extent of their spheres of influence in the East.

We therefore consider that a frank determination of the limits within which it is intended to grant us liberty of action in the East will be highly appreciated in Italy. Such a course, considered in relation to its future rather than to its immediate operation, would be found more effective than all the manœuvres of Prince von Bülow. A specific proposal advanced by the Allies, as a result of a possible action on our side against Turkey, would quiet us and might bring about a quicker intervention, which we

in any case consider indispensable.

It is well to add that we are awaiting such proposals mainly from Great Britain. For many obvious reasons we are of opinion that our Eastern and Mediterranean interests can be more easily reconciled with those of Great Britain than with those of any other Great Power. We have no wish for any further guarantee than that of an understanding with her in the Mediterranean,

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based upon a simple formula of balance convenient to both nations. In an interview that I had the honour of having with Mr. Winston Churchill, and which was greatly appreciated in Italy, the First Lord did not, on the whole, exclude the possibility of such an understanding. Italy hopes that it may be realised. However this may be, it is certain that even to-day negotiations having the object of determining its feasibility or its basis will have an immediate effect on the psychology of the Italian people.

One friendly and outspoken word from Great Britain to-day would be of much greater value than all the diplomatic expedients of Prince Bülow. Its main force of persuasion would lie in a romantic factor that no artifice of the ex-Chancellor could create in favour of Germany: the traditional cordiality of feeling between Italy and England.

GINO CALZA-BEDOLO.

### 'SELF-APPOINTED STATESMEN.'

To the Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

SIR,--Mr. J. O. P. Bland, who has qualified himself for the authoritative discussion of European politics by many years' residence in China, is, I see, very angry in your issue for March at a mere England-knowing Englishman such as I am expressing any opinion whatever about the present European war. There is, I gather, some sort of specialist, the 'Statesman,' to whom these high affairs should be restricted. I am afraid that I, as a man with children who will have to live in the world that this war and the subsequent peace will rearrange, cannot acquiesce in the complete abandonment of their affairs to the operations of these mysterious superior beings. So far their occult activities have made a tremendous mess of things, and it is with the deliberate intention of letting the light into their operations that amateurs and outsiders like myself are battering open the discussion of the settlement. Statesmen like Mr. J. O. P. Bland would be more usefully employed if, instead of abuse and suggestions for suppression, they set themselves to correct our crudities and point out our impossibilities.

I have, however, some slight doubt whether Mr. J. O. P. Bland is altogether qualified for the task. He is apparently blankly ignorant of the conditions under which articles published in English papers reappear in America, and he quotes from American papers the abbreviated and garbled phrases of cabled despatches as if they were my weighed and deliberate sentences. If this is not sheer ignorance, then it is very unfair. He seems, too, to have met an 'Austrian' language in China, which will be of interest to European philologists. He does, I admit, establish one inconsistency between my first article upon the war and the article upon Holland. It involves an interesting point and one worthy of better treatment than mere reviling from the professional 'Statesman.' Assuming victory, can we afford to leave Prussia, with her innate militarism

and her habit of building strategic railways, extending right up to the frontiers of Belgium and Holland? I admit the crudity of annexing chunks of Western Germany to the Netherlands. M. Yves Guyot, also an invader of the province of Mr. J. O. P. Bland, has suggested the separation of Germany west of the Rhine and north of Lorraine from Prussia, and its establishment as an autonomous neutral Star, within the German Zollverein. Perhaps some real statesman will make a suggestion.—Very sincerely yours,

52 St. James's Court, Buckingham Gate, S.W.

The Editor of The Nineteenth Century cannot undertake to return unaccepted MSS.

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# NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. CCCCLV-January 1915

## VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(I)

#### THE CASE FOR VOLUNTEERS

Since the question of Voluntary rersus Compulsory Service has divided the country on party lines, and as a curious consequence has closed many organs of Unionist opinion to any statement of the case for Volunteers, I gladly avail myself of the opportunity offered to me by the Editor of this Review to state in as brief a form as possible the genesis of this problem, and such of the facts as are personally known to me.

The Nineteenth Century circulates so freely amongst all classes that I have hopes of reaching some of the many who are in ignorance of the distortion of facts by which some advorages of compulsion are seeking to bolster up their case.

H is the more necessary as very many of these distorted reses have been taken from papers and pamphlets which wrote myself some years ago, not for the purpose of advocating compulsion in the United Kingdom, but in order to

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prove that compulsory service in Germany was not the hated 'blood tax' it was at that time the fashion to call it, but, on the contrary, was popular in that country, and was, in fact, the mainspring of her growing commercial importance, and her bulwark against the undue spread of Socialism.

This was in 1890-95, when the German policy was still essentially controlled by some of the finer minds of that nation, tempered and developed by the storm and stress of the years from 1865 to 1870-71, who understood the greatness of the issues then involved, and were by no means minded to see the unity so hardly won endangered either by excess of militarism or by

weak-kneed concessions to popular clamour.

Compulsory service first came into the focus of British public opinion after the wars in Bohemia in 1866, and in France in 1870-71, at a time when our own recruiting system for a long-service Army had hopelessly broken down, and Lord Cardwell, assisted by his most able military adviser, the late Colonel R. Hom R.E., was fighting the battle of short service and Reserve which is now again, as it did during the Boer War, provin its efficiency for our own particular needs, and for those o.

At that time, though some very able soldiers, notably Colonel our Allies. W. H. Hime, R.A., tried to rouse public sentiment in favour of compulsion, the feeling in the country was still so entirely under the influence of the old horror resulting from the appalling sacrifices in men that Napoleon had exacted (not only from France, but from all the other countries into which he had introduced, or caused to be introduced, the law of Jourdan, passed in 1797-98 by the French Chambers, from which law the principle of compulsory service without substitutes really dates), that it would not listen to the compulsory service advocates. Moreover, it was then an axion of political economy that money spent on soldiers and military preparations was money wasted. People counted the cost of Germany's military institutions, and spoke of it as a drain upon her industries. This was the British official view, and was put forward by Lieutenant (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir John) Ardagh, R.E., in a paper read at the Royal United Service Institution about 1875, which was really intended as a reply to the very strong case made out for compulsion by Colonel Hime, R.A., in an Essay which had won the gold medal of the same institution about two years previously.

I was at the time a very junior officer, but family affairs taken me very frequently backwards and forwards between England, France, and Germany, and as I watched the astounding progress in the latter country year after year, especially along the Rhine Valley, and compared it with the relative stagnation in the West Riding of Yorkshire, where my home lies, and where I had abundant financial reasons for being intimately acquainted with the land values in the vicinity of at least one of its great towns, the conviction grew on me that the money spent on military training in Germany was not being poured into a bottomless pit, but was, on the contrary, the real secret of her extraordinary commercial development.

It was not, however, till about 1886 that I first began to write on the subject, and during the succeeding years the columns of such papers as the old St. James's, under Frederick Greenwood, and the National Observer, under W. E. Henley, were always open to me to state my case, which ran briefly as follows:

'It is not true that Germany is suffering under a "blood tax "; on the contrary, it can be shown that, allowing for all the men who have met their death in the field from wounds or disease suce Waterloo, which is a very small percentage indeed on the a mbers which have actually passed through the ranks, the tlalth of the men who have undergone training is so much diproved that their expectation of life is very materially inceased. Hence there are at any given moment some 2,000,000 nore men alive than would be the case had no military service been exacted from them. Further, each of these men not only lives some years longer (German statisticians agree that five years would be a reasonable average), but they are physically harder, and therefore better wealth-producers, throughout their whole working career. Accurate figures are wanting, but on the lowest assumption this extra production of wealth per head would show as a very large return indeed upon the 1,000,000,000l. odd spent on the Army during the last fifty years or so, and would compare more than favourably with the 3.7 per cent. earned by our railways, in which during the same period almost exactly the same sums in money have been sunk, and whose death roll exacts on an average of years a much heavier blood tax from their employees than the German Army has suffered during the same period.'

From these figures and arguments I concluded that German military expenditure should be considered on the same lines as the money we laid out in Famine Insurance in India, in canals, and in communications generally, and should therefore be classed as 'reproductive expenditure,' not as a drain on the national resources.

Finally, I pointed out that, with the storing up of energy resulting from her system of military service, the time must come when she would be forced into a career of colonial expansion which would bring her directly across our path, or else she would split up by social upheaval, since the military machine drove the weakest to the wall, and tended to the production of the most violent contrasts between the condition of the physically fit and the unfit. This must obviously breed dangerous social discontent in clearly defined classes, and it is the existence of this clear definition of only two classes within the nation that constitutes the gravest danger in Germany.

Comparing her position with that of other nations under the same laws, I further showed that, whereas in Germany everything made for the growth of strength, which could only act in the above-mentioned two directions—viz. horizontally, by expansion, hence ultimately in War with Great Britain; or vertically, i.e. by social internal revolution; in the others, because the laws were not so well adapted to their environment they tended to produce relative weakness rather than strength, and therefore I came to a final conclusion, written in 1887, that Germany must ultimately be our great antagonist, not France Russia, as we then thought.

The question of compulsion in Great Britain had hard occurred to me at all, for it seemed too hopelessly outside practic consideration to waste time in discussing it, and as long a we kept pace with our possible rivals in naval expenditure, and could keep our Regular Army filled with seven years' service men, there was no reason from the point of view of the officers of that Army to consider the question at all.

In so far as I thought of the Volunteers and Militia, I looked upon them as invaluable agents for spreading the doctrine of an invincible Navy, for the cynical reason that the longer they were left to realise how exceedingly inefficient they then were, the stronger advocates for naval expenditure they would obviously become, for their own safety's sake. Since it was then clearly impossible for them to repel an invasion on land, common sense must compel them to clamour for a Navy sufficiently powerful to preserve them from such a trial.

At the time, also, it seemed unnecessary to trouble much about the question of numbers, for the impression was general almost all over Europe that, following the example of Germany in 1870, no nation would begin actual hostilities until its army had completed its mobilisation, a process requiring then (i.e. about 1887) at least three weeks. This would constitute a period ample enough for us to take all necessary measures for home defence, as our trial mobilisations in previous years, it was held, had sufficiently demonstrated. Moreover, once our Fleet had got out to sea, I do not think many of us felt any serious doubt as to the result to the enemy.

Had I remained in the Army, my views would doubtless

have become as stereotyped as those of most of my contemporaries; but during the years from 1890 to 1893 I had unusual opportunities of studying both the German and French armies from the civilian's standpoint. I soon became aware of the immense array of social and economic facts which enter into every great question of military organisation, and I was able to follow at first hand the changes just beginning to work in the German Army, as all the officers of company commanders rank, and the re-engaged N.C. officers who had served throughout the war of 1870, began to pass out of direct contact with the men, either by promotion or retirement.

It must be remembered that previously to the Franco-German War somewhere about nine tenths of the German recruits came from agricultural, not industrial, districts, and amongst the former class much of the old feudal spirit had survived. Promotion had been very slow, and the older captains had trained successive annual contingents of recruits until there was hardly a family in their several districts whose sons had not passed through their hands, and since discipline was patriarchal in those days, and there was none of the modern hustling, nearly everyone entertained a really kindly feeling for the 'Compagnie-Vater,' as the captain was always called. As a boy I had often been with officers of this stamp on walks and expeditions about the country and had seen how they were everywhere made welcome. They would stay and talk with the older men, who had been recruits when they were young lieutenants, and all the mothers in the village would come out to thank them for kindnesses shown to their boys; and if the latter had run off the reel after leaving the Colours, they would go first to the 'Compagnie-Vater' for counsel, and not to the village priest.

When at length the war was over and the whole nation was wild with the enthusiasm of success, the recruits came gladly to the Colours, and, falling into the hands of such officers as these, who had themselves in those days been humanised by their experience in the field, the whole machinery of discipline moved as on well-oiled wheels. There was practically no crime at that time; the punishment list was far smaller than in our own Army, and certainly as far as those regiments with which I had been personally associated were concerned, no one could be amongst them without realising the tie of human sympathy which bound both men and officers together. Never in all my ten years of going and coming amongst them did I see even a non-commissioned officer strike or bully a man.

But then, beginning from about 1890, I noticed a very great change, and my old friends discussed it with me quite openly. About this period there was scarcely a captain left who had commanded men in the field, and the last of the old colour-sergeants were also passing away. At the same time the demands, both on the drill-ground and on the march, which were being made on the troops by the General Staff were becoming altogether too exacting, and those officers who failed to present their commands up to the full standard required of them were being mercilessly retired.

Every officer with the men was getting 'inspection fever,' worse by far than I have ever seen this disease anywhere else; also they were beginning to find out by experience the real weak point of the whole Prussian organisation—viz. the method of providing non-commissioned officers.

Since 1870 German industry had been booming, and any intelligent man who had in him the makings of an N.C.O., after our own pattern, knew quite well that, his time being up, he could command a big industrial future in the world. No State could afford to compete with the prizes these opportunities in business offered to the time-expired man, and the only men who could be induced to re-engage to serve on for pensions were either the very unenterprising, who were dear at any price, or the dangerous type who saw how to exploit the young 'one-year' volunteers, and other sons of wealthy page 4.

other sons of wealthy parents, to their own advantage.

Something of this sort has existed in all compulsory service armies since they first came into existence, but now, as it is shown in that exceptionally valuable contemporaneous study by Herry Beyerlen, Jena oder Sedan, this grew into an organised system of blackmail, and any honest man who tried to break down the conspiracy found himself very quickly outside the pale, and lucky indeed if he managed to escape without some serious courtmartial charge being trumped up against him, from the consequences of which even his officers could not protect him. Further, the relations between men and officers were changing, rapidly, owing to the spread of industrialism, and the constant augmentation of the regiments. Originally the 'Ur Adel' had only barely sufficed to officer the contingents, but now their numbers became quite insufficient, and men had to be commissioned from the bourgeois moneyed classes, who possessed none of the hereditary power of command that most undoubtedly was the birthright of the aristocracy. In no other country and in no other army with which I have been acquainted was the contrast between the two types so clearly drawn. There is no approach to it in England, and certainly none in France. The evil lay in the fact that of all the industrial employers of labour in Europe the German is notoriously the worst slave-driver. That much every travelled German I have ever met has always frankly admitted. Now it was the officers of this class who first felt the pinch of elimination at the hands of the inspecting officers. They were not very

popular at any time, and where an inspector with knowledge of men had to choose between, let us say, Lieut. Freiherr von and zu —— and Lieut. Meyer, the noble's sixty-four quarterings turned the scale every time. The Meyers and Müllers, poor fellows! however, felt the stigma of their removal even more keenly than did their titled comrades, when they were occasionally tried and found wanting, and in their attempts to evade it the bourgeois officers drove their men yet harder in their endeavours to escape the 'blue letter.'

Under the combined pressure of all these influences the army which, up to about 1890, had been looked upon as the surest corrective to Socialist tendencies in the young recruit, was now rapidly becoming a positive hot-bed for their propaganda.

The only palliatives the Higher Commands could devise took the form of enforcing vet stricter discipline, thus bringing about a vet harsher line of cleavage between officers and men, while culminating in a colossal effort to hypnotise the whole nation into a sense of its own invincibility as a military machine. It was the years before Jena over again. The spirit which had animated the troops after 1870 disappeared, and the letter of forms and exact prescription triumphed, leading step by step to the almost pitiful collapse of all higher leading, the results of which we are witnessing, both in Flanders and in Poland-machine-made devotion, carrying the men forward against hitherto almost unheard of punishment; only to collapse and leave them helpless against the bayonets of our determined counter-attacks. can take horses to the water, but you cannot make them drink.' You can lead conscripts forward almost up to the muzzles of an enemy's rifles, but they will not fight like the men who war of their own free will.

I confess I did not at the time foresee the degree of success which actually has attended this effort at national hypnotisation. I rather expected that disintegration in the attack would set in at a much earlier stage, and when I returned to England and took up the command of a Volunteer battalion I had lost all confidence both in the economic and military value of the universal service about which I had previously written so much.

Meanwhile I had discovered that all the Great Powers of the Continent had gradually dropped the idea of awaiting the completion of mobilisation before beginning actual hostilities. They stood with their frontier Corps—practically at full war strength—ready to spring upon one another at a moment's notice; and this knowledge completely altered the whole aspect of our Invasion problem.

The Volunteers rose to the occasion even before the War Office, and, quite unaided by official advice, the nineteen Field

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Brigades into which certain picked battalions had been grouped thought out a scheme of mobilisation, with transport and supply complete, which could be assembled for active service at about twelve hours' notice.

As yet, however, they lacked a reserve behind them, and it was while trying to find a method for providing one that I made my discovery of what the Auxiliary Forces generally had been doing, not only in keeping alive the fighting tradition in the country, which all admitted, but also in passing through their ranks the numbers that, taken in conjunction with the ex-Reserve soldiers and bluejackets of the Regular Services, brought our total of men available for an emergency very nearly up to the level of the other Great Powers.

At that time none of these nations expected to put into the field more than some two million men in the first line, leaving about two million more, approximately between the ages of thirty-five and forty-seven (the practice varied), to form Landwehr or 'Territorial' Commands, essentially for Home Defence.

Between the same age limits we could certainly have found about 1,800,000 of the first category, and 1,500,000 of the latter, and this material, grouped into battalions containing about ten to fifteen per cent. of ex-Reserve men, would, in my opinion, have made far better fighting units than any they were likely to be opposed to in any emergency sufficiently serious to call for their services.

Even the officers would, I contend, have been better leaders of men than would have been found in the opposing forces—for nearly all of them had been accustomed to handle workingmen without any military force to support their authority, and they were of such intelligence and keenness that they learnt all the technical details of command quite sufficiently well for the field in the course of the camps which they annually attended.

I may add that it was actually through my intercourse with German officers, some of them on the Kaiser's personal staff, that my eyes were first opened to the extraordinary potentialities existing in the Volunteer force, both in its officers and men. I recall a further testimony from the pen of a distinguished French officer, who had served all through the campaign of 1870 and was afterwards military attaché in London. Lecturing on his return to France before the Cercle Militaire in Paris, he described the British Volunteers in terms of extraordinary praise, at a time when they had, in their own country, hardly emerged from the sea of good-natured ridicule so lavishly poured on them by that most genial artist John Leech. The lecture can be found on the shelves of the Royal United Service Library, which will be again available after the War is over. I did not find it

myself till many years after it had been given and published, and with the experience I had gathered during eleven years of a Volunteer command I was simply astounded at the genuine insight of the writer, and could only marvel at the blindness of our own people in not discerning sooner the invaluable material lying ready to their hands.

The essence of the matter lay in this, that both the French observer and my German friends had recognised the true value of the Volunteer spirit. They had all seen conscripts of many nationalities under fire, and had spent many weary years trying to make soldiers out of them. They knew, or thought they knew, all that compulsion could effect and were far from satisfied with their experience. They felt at once—even in such ragged battalions as some of those which marched past the Kaiser at Wimbledon in 1887—just that life-spring of action which was missing from their own conscripted men.

General Langlois, the celebrated French artilleryman, who, had he lived, would have held the supreme command in France at the present moment, recognised the same force; and it is on record that it was his report on the potential value of the 'Territorials' (as they had then become in 1911) for defending these islands against invasion, and thus liberating our Navy and Army for their proper duties, which determined the many waverers on the French Staff to count henceforth on our effective assistance in case of an attack upon France by Germany.

It is worth while recalling at the present moment that opinion amongst the leaders of French military thought was at this time very strongly against the acceptance of any military co-operation from Great Britain, and even General Bonnal, the official founder of the modern French strategic doctrine, wrote strongly against us, on the grounds that since the course of the war would probably be decided in the first clash of the two frontier armies, which would move without waiting for complete mobilisation—as the Germans who attacked Liège actually did—our troops would arrive too late to be of service, alors ils se refugièrent dans leurs îles—rather a quaint interpretation of our conduct in the Netherlands during past centuries, and coming from the lips of a military historian!

If, therefore, I overrate the value of our Voluntary system, at least I do so in good company—company which is entitled to respect, since they had all seen and exercised responsible command over compulsory service troops in a great European War, an advantage none of the supporters of the National Service League are, I believe, entitled to claim.

But I have yet other and stronger reasons for my confidence in our own system—of which my friends were not at the time aware, or at least did not take into account—viz. the great superiority in composition that we could give to our battalions, owing to our being able to combine men of different ages in just the right proportions.

It is a fundamental difficulty in every compulsory system that the active corps, the first to move, are all far too young for solidarity, while the Reserve formations usually are far too old; and it is an admitted fact, based on the 'psychology of crowds,' that bodies of young men, all of about the same age, are, in spite of their dash, far more likely, not only to break down simultaneously under sickness, but to feel panic under conditions that would not materially disturb the equanimity of older men. Now, as I have shown, England could only be invaded seriously by a surprise raid, sprung on us at one and the same time as the delivery of an ultimatum; consequently we should have had only those corps composed of young men between twenty and twenty-five to encounter. The only valid objection to Voluntary Service came essentially from the Adjutant-General's side of the War Office, where it was urged, and not without reason, that something more binding in the form of enlistment was needed to ensure that the Volunteers would, in fact, turn up in full strength when the emergency bugles sounded the 'fall in.' That objection, I consider, was fully answered by the actual and immediate response to the first call for Volunteers at the time of the Boer War. A pound of practice, however, is worth a ton of theory; let us therefore turn to the results our Voluntary system has actually achieved during the past four months, and see how far my predictions have been verified, for, with variations too slight to notice, the Volunteers of whom I first thought and wrote are in all essentials the same as the 'Territorials,' and the same amount of money spent on the latter battalions would have produced just as good results had it been spent upon the former formations. Within less than forty-eight hours after the Declaration of War the Territorials were under arms, and ready to move; within the week they had recruited up to their authorised strength, very generally with time-expired ex-Territorials, and, therefore, they numbered 330,000.

The Regular Army was at once completed from its Reserves—no absentees at all being reported—and stood on parade some 300,000 strong, with about 100,000 waiting to follow. This was exclusive of the Special Reserves, nearly another 100,000, making in all some 830,000 men.

To these must be added the Navy and Marines, with their Reserves; the exact figure I have not been able to ascertain, but as the Navy Estimates provided for the payment of 130,000, their full total cannot have fallen far short of 200,000 more. This

makes it clear that, without counting the battalions in India and the Colonies, about 100,000 more, who do not figure in the British Census, we had already well outstripped the first million.

Everyone will remember the rush to enlist during the first few weeks of the War and the efforts of the War Office to keep the flood within bounds, so that it could be immediately handled. The limitation of age from 19 to 35, and a height standard of 5 ft. 6 in.—the greatest ever demanded since the year following the close of the Crimean War—did little to check it, for the men kept thronging in, astounding everyone with their excellent physique and bearing, until, when Lord Kitchener spoke in the House of Lords the first million of the new Armies had been reached, not counting very large enrolments in the Territorials (of which no figures were given), and still recruits were coming in at the rate of 30,000 a week.

Setting aside the unreported numbers of the Territorials, this gives us up to date about 2,500,000 men enrolled out of a total male population between the ages of 19 and 35 (according to the Census), in round figures, of 4,600,000 only! That is to say, well over the half of the males between these age limits are actually enrolled at the present moment; and raising the age limit to 40-it is still only at 38, but I allow the extra two years as a set off against uncounted Territorials and old soldiers up to 45—gives us only an additional 1,200,000. But even this does not exhaust all that we have done. Between the years 19 and 40 are included all the pick of the trades required for arming and equipping our ships, troops, etc.; all the railwaymen, who certainly cannot be spared, the merchant seamen (for the most part more indispensable than ever), the police, the fire brigades, and so forth; and after careful inquiry I cannot put the total number of these men at anything less than another million, leaving, out of the male population up to 40, only 2,300,000, which number includes doctors, Civil Servants, heads of many businesses, clergy, and those sick, crippled, and blind who under no conditions could be counted in the fighting strength of the nation. And the supply has not yet shut down by any means. Indeed since the Scarborough incident recruiting has again boomed.

For the moment we can leave out of account the further enlistments of older men for Home Defence and the men of the National Reserve detached for special duties, for the age, under 40, is the essential feature of all armies, and within these limits we have already drawn within a fraction of two thirds of the total men available—i.e. almost exactly the same proportion as the French law of compulsion, the strictest in Europe, would have given us, and one sixth more at least than the Germans have been taking out of their annual contingents.

What more in numbers could compulsion have afforded us? and what about the quality? After the distinction already won by many Territorial units in the field, it is hardly necessary to say anything on this point, and as to the Regulars, also volunteers, we will let the Prussian Guards and the German Staff tell us now what they really think of our Armies. Compulsion had done all that it could do, and more than even the best Prussians dared to expect, for their troops. It has carried them forward to almost certain death in a manner which has exacted the admiration of all our men and officers; but at that critical moment when the fate of empires hangs in the balance it has always failed them, and our men, Territorials and Regulars alike, have sprung forward upon them with the bayonet with a determination never dreamt of in warfare since the days of Waterloo and the Peninsula.

We know that our men-the immortal 7th Division, for instance—have often been exposed to extreme risks which they have most gloriously sustained and surmounted, but we know nothing of the causes that compelled their leaders to make this supreme demand upon them. It is conceivable that if we actually had had a compulsory system at work for some thirty years, and if everyone had known for certain that in 1914 we should be fighting in Flanders, we might have had more numbers available; but I submit that whereas we, the public, have absolutely no facts before us to justify the conclusion that mere numbers could have helped us, there is the strongest possible reason to believe that compulsion in England would have done more harm to the cause of the Allies as a whole than the available extra numbers could have redeemed. For on the day war broke out nine tenths of our factories would have automatically closed down, as they did in France and Germany. Had it not been for the power our manufactories preserved of supplying with absolutely necessary accoutrements, boots, etc., the millions of trained but unequipped soldiers of the Continental armies, we should not now hold the positions of such immense advantage which as a whole our combination of Allied Armies throughout Europe from East to West has now attained.

F. N. MAUDE.

## VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(II)

### AN INDIVIDUALIST'S PLEA FOR OBLIGATORY SERVICE

ALL of us who earnestly believe in the necessity of National or Obligatory Service, and earnestly wish to see it adopted during the War, ought to be careful not to speak or write a word which may appear like disparaging or 'crabbing' what has been achieved so far through voluntary enlistment. There is no occasion and no excuse whatever for doing so; and, as a fact, some of the most energetic recruiters to-day are wholly in favour of a law being passed without delay calling up to the defence of the country and the prosecution of the War the youth and manhood of the There is nothing in the least degree contradictory. illogical, or insincere in our rejoicing over the fine spirit which fires the men who have been rallied by the voluntary method and are now being made into an army, but at the same time in our pressing for the adoption of a national and obligatory scheme. This is not a question as to whether the theory of individualism ion the theory of collectivism, the theory of voluntaryism or the theory of compulsion is the right theory: that is a dispute for political philosophers—some will say, for political pedants—at a season of profound peace and safety, when time does not matter and the debate need not be concluded. It is to-day a question of life and death for our liberties and our Empire, and a time when we must all set aside our pride or prejudice about principle this and theory that, and simply and solely concentrate with all our might on the one practical, essential matter of building up, well within the next twelve months, such an army as can, side by side with France, (1) thrust the Germans out of Belgium-a giant's task clearly-and (2) be still a great and powerful weapon in the sheath at the settlement on the close of the War. This second point should not for a moment be forgotten, for a Power whose weapon is only big and enduring enough just to see it through a war like this will cut a sorry figure at the close. If we fail to forge and temper a weapon for War and Settlement, we may find ourselves at the end of the struggle not much good to our

Allies and Europe, and none at all to ourselves. Have the optimists who believe that ere long we shall be rolling the German army towards the Rhine thought what it may cost us to clear Belgium? Have they forgotten what it cost Germany to cover Belgium and a portion of the North of France?

We, then, who earnestly desire an arrangement for a national obligatory army without undue delay-even if all agreed to it to-morrow, the thing must take time to work out-are not going to disparage what has already been done through purely voluntary means, through inviting and instigating the men to come forward. We see that a great deal has been done by these means. Mr. Bonar Law claims that what has been done is wonderful. Clearly, he is perfectly right. It is wonderful, and it is a true sign of the splendid spirit of our people throughout the British Isles—including certainly Ireland—that so many men have sprung to the call; wonderful indeed when we remember-what it is extremely unfair and foolish to forget—that military service has never in recent times been greatly encouraged in this country, and at some periods has been miserably discredited. It is not so long, after all, since the Volunteers, since the Yeomanry, were almost a butt for cheap but general wit: Hood's poem on the subject held good long after Hood's time. At Oxford in the 'eighties I remember that this service was about equal in 'Varsity 'form' to golf somewhere by Shotover or to float-fishing on the Upper River. And was Oxford even then so out of touch with the general tendency? I think not. Well, Oxford has atoned for that sleepy indifferentism—so nobly has she atoned that it was a question towards the close of the 'Long' last year whether it was worth while to reassemble: and the country has been atoning in the same fine temper.

Decidedly, no reasonable or patriotic men will 'crab' or disparage the recruiting movement; and Lord Kitchener spoke the generous truth when lately he declared that he had nothing to complain of in the answer to his call for men. In short, the men who have rolled up in the five months of war are splendid and the army into which they are being moulded promises to be splendid—Codford or Salisbury Plain, Wool or Lyndhurst, or even the strip of churned mud which was the Guards' Cricket Ground at Chelsea, should persuade any doubter of that. We have begun the forging of a glorious weapon to carry out the Prime Minister's ideal; we are making a New Model Army for his policy of Thorough.

These are admissions in favour of voluntary work. I concede them frankly—and indeed gladly, because, as it happens, I have always leant towards the voluntary or individualist method in life rather than towards the compulsory or collectivist.

But events move very rapidly in this struggle; they have moved greatly even since Lord Kitchener spoke the generous words about the answer to his call; and the signs that they will soon be moving far too quickly for voluntary recruiting really cannot be much longer overlooked. Voluntary recruiting, despite its mettle and its high fervour, is essentially a thing of spurts, very heartening, and inciting us to throw up our hats whilst these spurts last. But spurts are succeeded by reactions, which are deadly and depressing. We have lately had an object-lesson in this; and do even the 'incorrigible optimists' doubt that when the householders' inquiry is over, and the forms are all in, and the, say, two hundred thousand or two hundred and fifty thousand new men thereby secured, there will not be an inevitable reaction? By then we shall be able to deal with far more men per week than we can deal with now. And suppose those far more men do not roll in, or suppose we then get not even so many men per week as we get to-day, what will be our position and prospects then? Prophets of evil we may be called for supposing anything of the kind; but that was the name-or a harder onegiven to those who watched Germany forging for years her mighty sword and dared to say she meant to use it. Besides, is it so prophetic? We saw a great spurt only a matter of weeks ago, and inevitable reaction followed. Is not the rash prophet he rather who predicts the steady and continuous flow from to-day on till we are that nation in arms which we must be if we are to (1) free Belgium, (2) cross the Rhine and march through Germany, and (3) be a great, dominant force at the settlement?

The steady and continuous current which fructifies the land it passes through, and can be utilised—that is the form in which we need our river of recruits to flow, like Denham's Thames by Cooper's Hill. Nothing else will serve us in the long run. The is sudden spate soon runs down and is largely wasted, leaving a bed b too dry and stony. It is no answer whatever to the overwhelm-incing case now for Obligatory and National Service to urge that, if so we had far more men to-day than voluntary recruiting brings thus, we could not avail ourselves of them; for an obligatory arrangement provides for the slack time coming—the slack time which is humanly certain to come presently, after we have exhausted the supply of men whom the Prime Minister's appeal to householders will doubtless gather.

But what are the serious arguments against adopting Obligatory Service for men between, say, twenty and thirty-five years of age? I pass over with a few words the more trivial and scarcely serious objections, such as (1) that it would net in the cowards; (2) that one 'free' soldier is worth three (or is it six?) 'pressed' soldiers; (3) that we are 'an Island Power' and cannot

adopt 'Militarism'; (4) that we cannot go back on pledges and speeches to our constituents. As to the frequent but unfortunate objections (1) and (2), have Australia and New Zealand, and has France suffered through their obligatory systems netting in 'the cowards '? And is it not insolent and highly impolitic to say that one 'free' British soldier is worth three or six 'pressed' Australians, New Zealanders, or Frenchmen? I am sure that is not a claim which any British soldier would for a moment make. It is grotesque; and, besides, an insult to our brave Kin and to our Allies—France, Russia, Serbia, and to Belgium where a national service was adopted in 1913 and is gradually coming into force. Objection (3) is palpably absurd, for even to-day under the voluntary system we are adopting 'Militarism'—there is no other way of winning the War. As for objection (4), surely no statesman pledged himself to oppose Obligatory Service even though of his own responsibility and initiative he should commit the country to war with a Power like Germany, and undertake a vast land campaign? No Unionist statesman, so far as I know, has pledged himself at all against an Obligatory and National Service; and no Liberal statesman has pledged himself against it in case of such a crisis for our Empire and our liberties as fronts us to-day. The political pledge objection may, therefore, be set aside as irrelevant.

But there remains, I admit, one serious and substantial argument against adopting such a system. It is this-that it would raise a considerable outcry among those who have scarcely realised as yet the exceedingly grave situation to-day; and that it would import rancour and party feeling into our midst once more. I quite see that there is force in this objection, and that it is affecting a great number of believers in National and Obligatory Service who dread and hate the idea of an outcry and divided counsels; and who, rather than cause that, prefer to wait awhile e and see whether the vast army which we still need cannot be in-, duced to join through pressure of public opinion, through educa- e tion and eloquent appeals, and through promptings of patriotism. I I recognise fully the force and sincerity of this objection; but I think those whom it honestly weighs with have not fully considered the rancour and smouldering passion and the bitter reproaches which the present system must lay up for the nation. Already we are getting a faint idea, a passing glimpse, of it; there is an angry dispute about football; there is talk about the white feather' and 'shirking' and 'skulking'-most of it very unfair, but unfortunately under the present system only too natural. Districts are being contrasted with districts, counties with counties; and even the Prime Minister himself the other day seemed to make a claim for Scotland as against other un-

named parts of the United Kingdom. Women are joining in these disastrous but, under the present methods, irremediable disputes; editors of daily and weekly papers receive many letters from the mothers and fathers of sons who have gone or are going to the War; and these letters are often terribly bitter against those who have not gone or will not go. All over the country indeed this dangerous feeling is springing up already. What will it be after the War? What will happen when the soldiers come back, and hundreds of thousands, even a million or two of them, want civilian work again, and in many cases a post cannot be found for them? What is likely to be the feeling between the families and friends of those who went and the families and friends of those who did not go? It is idle to reply that it will serve those men who did not go quite right if they are reproached and despised, and so forth; and that they will have to turn out of their snug berths when the heroes return. That will not banish the ills of rancour and of secret or open hostility

between family and family. By not adopting a simple, thorough, and perfectly fair and democratic service scheme, we are laying up for ourselves a world of ill-feeling, envy, and uncharity in the future, a world that may take a generation or more to pass away. Now by an honest Act all this ill-feeling, all these hideous comparisons must instantly Such a mischievous wrangle as that over football disappear. will cease automatically. Football can then go on much as usual, for the men qualified by age and physique to serve will obviously not be taken all at the same time. They will only be taken as there are the facilities for training and equipping them, and they will be chosen by the absolutely fair method of the ballot. Those who are not drawn at first will go on with their ordinary work and pursuits till their turn comes; and, of course, if the War is over far sooner than we expect, a very large number will not be drawn at all, and, therefore, will not be disturbed in their normal callings. But no invidious and hostile distinctions, under such an Act, will arise as between those who go to the War and those who stay at home. The Act will not tend to separate individuals and classes and particular villages, districts, or counties, as the present method unhappily is doing and will assuredly do far more as the War goes on.

The Prime Minister has declared a very great design: the country is not to stay its hand till the German war machine is destroyed. There is to be no compromise, no patched-up peace. It is to be Berlin or Nothing. He has pledged us irrevocably to this; and certainly Chatham never conceived nor Pitt carried through a more masterful design. Can anyone really doubt—with Belgium to-day one great entrenched German fort growing

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stronger every day—that the Prime Minister's is a design which necessitates a British Army on a European scale? To secure such an army we shall clearly have to disturb the trades and occupations of the country equally whether the men volunteer or whether the men are called up by an Act. Therefore, assuming we are to have the army for the Prime Minister's design, assuming we are to win the War, trade will eventually suffer not less through the voluntary method than through an Act. If trade is to be hit, it will be hit as hard by voluntary enlistment as by obligatory enlistment. The difference between the two methods is that the latter will (a) spare the nation from a festering sore of reproaches, taunts, and rancour; and (b) secure to the nation that quiet, even, and continuous flow of recruits which we so greatly need.

A general Obligatory Service law to-day in this country must be a democratic law, rightly considered. But why be scared by names at this time? Democracy means the strength of the people; and the strength of the people exerted to its utmost is after all the only way by which we can prevail in this War.

GEORGE A. B. DEWAR.

## VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY SERVICE?

(III)

## THE VOLUNTEER SPIRIT

One of our ablest historical scholars has claimed for the Retreat from Mons that it is 'the finest British feat of arms since Waterloo.' Many people, who persistently disbelieved in the possibility of this European War until it actually burst upon us, are now making capital from the glories of Mons and from the splendid behaviour of the London Scottish in their first action. There, we are told, is the true British spirit, the Volunteer Spirit, which no other nation possesses, and which will always carry us through to victory. A large section of the nation is deliberately settling down into its old thoughtless optimism, and now, as of old, the cry of 'Scaremonger' begins to swell up

against all who are trying to face the facts.

Let us, however, face the facts and shame all thoughtless abuse. Whose is the glory of this glorious Retreat from Mons? All glory, of course, to the men who actually fought in it: this will be most fully recognised, perhaps, by those who talk least noisily about it at the present moment. But to whom else has the Retreat brought glory? Will our sons, looking back upon all this, judge that it was a glorious affair for the Cabinet, or for the War Office, or for Parliament, or for the country at large? What precise proportion of this glory will an impartial posterity allot to the hundreds of thousands who were beginning to watch football matches before the Retreat had ceased? And how far is it glorious even to those other thousands who would have gone to the Front if they had been young enough, and who have now at last received grudging permission to enrol themselves in some sort of Citizen Force which Government shows no intention of treating seriously? The world has grown critical of military glory during the last generation or two, and rightly critical. Those who have taken most pains to trace the advance of civilisation during the last seven or eight centuries are those who have

There were 84,000 watching seven great Club matches, even as lately as November 7. These same Clubs had 126,000 spectators on November 17 of last year.—The Times, November 23, 1914.

most right to look forward to a distant century in which military glory will be a thing of the past. But, until that happier age comes, why should we shut our eyes to the actual world around us? How is it that we hear all this uncritical talk about military glory to-day from those very men who were most bitterly critical of military glory a few months ago? Why should we blink the fact that individual glory may mean national disgrace? Hannibal, perhaps the finest captain who ever led a voluntary army, perished at last because his country failed to back him up: because the Roman conscript armies could always be replenished, while his own was slowly wasting in quality, even when its actual numbers could be maintained. It is his peculiar glory that he gave all the best of himself to a thankless country, doing for his fellow-citizens what they refused to do for him. That which was most glorious in Sir John French's despatches may well seem, to our grandchildren, most inglorious for the country which sent him out. The Germans, it appears, were nearly three to our one; and their artillery at least four to one. It is splendid to read how one Briton faced three Germans; but where were the other two? At Mons, at Le Cateau, each of our soldiers fought for three and suffered for three. He earned glory for three; but can he transfer it to his absentee comrades? We say most truly of these soldiers 'They shed their blood for their country'; but we may add with almost equal truth 'They shed their blood for the Voluntary System.' If this nation had been armed only as the Swiss are armed, there would probably have been no war at all; or, at worst, a far shorter war, and one in which our soldiers would have fought at far greater advantage Anything which prolongs this War costs Great Britain alone, in hard cash, four million pounds a week; enough, according to Lord Roberts, to organise a really efficient nation in arms for a whole year; or, to take the controversial counterestimate of Lord Haldane, for six months. We have already spent, therefore, a ten years' Budget, even according to Lord Haldane's estimate; and the end is not yet in sight. If, then, this is the cost of a Voluntary System, let us ask ourselves, as a business nation, what we are getting for our money. We have tried to apportion the glory of Mons as our grandchildren will apportion it; let us try to see how our grandchildren are likely to judge of the theory that national success or failure in war ought to be left to the free choice of the individual citizen.

It is hard to reach fifty years forward in imagination; but we may often learn almost as much by measuring the same distance backward. Half a century ago, the question of compulsory education divided thinking men in Great Britain, much as they are now divided on the question of compulsory military service. The historical analogy, it will presently be seen, is

Until last August, really very close at the present moment. however, there was still one important difference. Fifty years ago, many men said openly, and far more thought secretly, that the education of the poorer classes was a thing rather to be discouraged than fostered; that educational efficiency was positively harmful to a State. These, however, were reactionaries, and bore the discredit of a decaying party. On the other hand, the ideal of military efficiency was decried as a false ideal, until a very few weeks ago, by a large party claiming to speak in the name of intellect and progress. In contrast with Continental Radicals and Socialists (who recognise clearly that a State unable to defend itself is a State in which social progress must be insecure), our democratic leaders have practically believed that war could be killed by ignoring war. One of the mainstays of Mr. Angell's Great Illusion was the plain fact that 'the Three per Cents. of powerless Belgium are quoted at 96, and the Three per Cents. of powerful Germany at 82 . . . all of which carries with it the paradox that the more a nation's wealth is protected, the less secure does it become' (p. 32). Thousands of well-meaning people, who prided themselves on being intellectual, swallowed this nonsense greedily, as thoughtless people will always swallow an illogical proposition stated in simple language and professedly based on an obvious fact. It has needed a bitter experience to awaken many Conservatives in Belgium, and many Radicals in Britain, to the fact that civilisation still depends to some extent upon military efficiency.2 But the lesson is now fairly complete on both sides; and those who are still opposed to military efficiency on principle are as negligible, at the present moment, as were our reactionary fathers who opposed educational efficiency as an ideal false in itself. The analogy, therefore, is now fairly complete; and we may learn much from the pleas of Voluntaryists (as they call themselves) in the middle of last century.

Let us begin with their doughtiest champion, Mr. Edward Baines, whose father had the honour of sitting as Macaulay's colleague for Leeds in the first Reformed Parliament. Our hero was himself chosen as Liberal candidate for Bradford, over W. E. Forster's head, and ended a distinguished parliamentary career as Sir Edward. He fought all his life for the Voluntary System; in honesty and abilities he at least equalled those who are now loudest against compulsion in military matters; we cannot take a better specimen. The Great Illusion itself was not more enthusiastically received, if we may judge from the 'Opinions of the Press':

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The apparent paradox that Belgian Liberals had for thirty years been working for compulsory military service, and Belgian Conservatives against it, is fully explained in the present author's Workers and War (Cambridge, Bowes & Bowes). This democratic plea for universal compulsion will be strange only to those who are ignorant of Continental politics.

The ability, the temper, the firm, fair, and argumentative tone . . . the genuine English spirit . . . admirable and unanswerable. . . . Nothing could more tend to deter the Legislature from meddling with the education of the people than the facts and arguments contained in these memorable 'Letters.'

Thus we read, from such opposite points of view as the Quarterly and the Patriot, on the back of a pamphlet which, by its very title, carries us at once into an almost antediluvian world. It bears the date of 1847, and runs 'An Alarm to the Nation, on the Unjust, Unconstitutional and Dangerous Measure of State Education, proposed by the Government.' It is only fair to premise that many of Mr. Baines's objections were religious; as a leading Nonconformist, he feared that the new educational movement would give undue influence to the Established Church. But he made it quite plain, as many more of his contemporaries did, that his objections to any compulsory system, as such, were insuperable. His very first words strike the keynote of this and of his other pamphlets: 'The measure proposed by his Majesty's Ministers, for bringing the Education of the People under the direction and control of the Government, is, in my solemn conviction, the most dangerous measure of the present age.' 'Naked despotism' (he presently pursues) 'is a clumsy form of government, which we have no reason to fear in England'; but here is a subtler and more dangerous despotism creeping in-the 'thin end of the wedge' so dear nowadays to all opponents of compulsory Territorialism. No ordinary type can do justice to his misgivings, which break out in a profusion of italics:

I fear it is [the Ministers'] wish to have every school in the land under Government inspection, and virtually subject to Government control. . . . It has been the boast of England that its people were self-governed and self-educated, and to these features in their national system has been owing in a great measure the robust energy of the national character. . . And, if every other argument failed, I would rely confidently on this alone, namely, the proud consciousness which swells the breast of the freeman and gives him a moral dignity beyond all that schools can teach. It is because the measure now proposed by the Government is calculated altogether to change this system, and to introduce a Continental system new and strange into England, from which we may expect the same fruits as it bears elsewhere, that I feel painful alarm.

A State system of compulsory education will 'lay anew the foundations of national character.' Apart from all religious objections natural to a Nonconformist, he is dismayed at 'the servile bondage into which all schoolmasters, their pupil teachers, and monitors, will be brought, and the effect of this on the principles and character of the rising generation.' What would Dunning, Fox, and Burke have thought of such State despotism?

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The character of Englishmen will depend on the training of the English children. And is any man so besotted as to think that you can make the schoolmaster a slave, and yet a trainer of freedom? That you can prostrate the educator and leave the educated erect? Nay, the proposed system would train the very children, from their earliest entrance into the school, to obsequious servility. . . . The very babe would become venal—the very boy a parasite!

These unanswerable arguments are in complete harmony with the author's almost contemporary Letter to Lord Lansdowne on the same subject. Here, however, he expresses still more plainly his fear lest the measure should introduce Prussian despotism and police surveillance into our free country. Government, having once established complete control over our schools, will inevitably proceed to take in hand the pulpit and the press: and 'the destruction of our liberties will be complete.' makes as much of the question of expense as Lord Haldane made against Lord Roberts. And, lastly, he is still more emphatic as to the absurdity of finding fault with that Voluntary System which was already educating a yearly increasing number of scholars, and which might some day be expected to reach even as many children as we needed to reach. 'It would be as reasonable to plough up the wheat in spring because it did not yet bear the full corn in the ear, as to denounce our educational institutions because they have not sprung at once into preternatural perfection.' This, it must be noted, was written by a shrewd man of wide experience, a leader of advanced thought, at a time when impartial foreign observers had long directed attention to the 'preternatural perfection' of compulsory schools, not only in despotic Prussia, but even in constitutional Saxony. Moreover, in other countries like France and Belgium, the proposed systems of thorough national education were being bitterly opposed, not by Mr. Baines's friends, the Liberals in politics or religion, but by Jesuits and their reactionary allies. In education at that time, as in military matters less than three years ago, the British Liberal fought tooth and nail against compulsion, without ever asking himself why the Belgian Liberal was fighting for compulsion. We were not only insular, but proud of our insularity.

For Mr. Baines, it must be repeated, gave expression to the ideas of a very numerous and influential section of the community, and a section which claimed to be saying to-day what England would be saying to-morrow. How persistent their campaign was may be judged from a very full contemporary reply to them by Dr. Charles Mackay of Glasgow, who was at great

<sup>3</sup> The Education of the People. Letters to the Right Hon. Viscount Morpeth, M.P. Glasgow. 1846.

pains to refute their arguments in detail. Dr. Mackay showed that the boasted progress of the Voluntary System had not yet enabled it to touch, even nominally, more than eighty per cent. of the children in an exceptionally civilised town like Glasgow. and that in Pollokshaws not one child in four could both read and write. But the men who quoted these plain facts were cried down exactly as we have been cried down for quoting similar Government statistics about the Territorials; they were condemned as the real enemies of education, who were trying to render Voluntaryism impossible by decrying it to the public. The result was that in 1870 Forster was obliged to produce even worse statistics in support of his Bill. At Manchester (tell it not in Gath!) there were 65,000 children of school age, of whom 16,000 were at no school at all; nor was the general population of Manchester ashamed of this fact. Liverpool was still worse; so was Birmingham; so was Leeds, where Baines had reigned supreme in the Liberal Party for at least twenty years. These were the recognised fruits of Voluntaryism; yet, even in 1870, the country in general was unripe for frank and universal compulsion, which was only gradually introduced as time went on.

How speciously Conservatism argued all this time under the guise of Liberalism transpires even more plainly from other sources than from Mr. Baines's pamphlets. As late as 1868 we find even Temple of Rugby opposing compulsion on the ground that 'it would create a new crime.' But the fullest array of argument is in Derwent Coleridge's address to the London Diocesan Board of Education, in 1867, on Compulsory Education and Rate Payment. The usual moving appeal to the pocket is here reinforced by arguments far more subtly ingenious than anything in Baines. Coleridge has not forgotten that our modern police, the 'Peelers,' had been at first opposed as un-English; and he would generously allow this objection 'if you can show that our present system of education is as inefficient as the old Charleys,' and that any compulsory schools are likely to be as But how can any compulsory efficient as the new police. measure be enforced in this free land? 'Who is to track these youthful breadwinners from house to house, from farmyard to farmyard, from workshop to workshop?' Moreover, you will only educate still more the already educated; 'your penalty will not touch the worst class of parents.' And, after thus anticipating most of the objections which we have read in recent years against Lord Roberts's proposal for Compulsory Territorialism, he ends with an apologue which will not be fully understood unless we realise the fear of foreign systems which haunted his generation, as it haunts many minds in ours. The good Prebendary has just explained, at some length, that a thing may work well in America, Prussia, or Sweden, and very ill in England. And now he continues:

A man has a bad leg. . . . 'Cut it off,' says the hospital surgeon, famous as an operator. 'I will supply you with an artificial leg, so fitted with springs and bandages, such an exquisite piece of machinery, that it will do as well or better than the old limb, and will give you no further trouble.' The man hesitates. 'Your machine may be very clever, but what if, like the Dutchman's cork leg, it jerks off of itself and carries me I know not whither? Or what if it prove a heavy incumbrance and will not march? At any rate it will not be vitally connected with my bodily frame; it will not beat with the pulses of my heart.' But what says his own medical attendant—a safe practitioner? He cannot suggest an immediate, he cannot even promise an effectual cure. He recommends constitutional treatment-a more generous and at the same time a more careful diet-with some local application. 'It will not get well soon,' he adds; 'perhaps it may never get quite well. Perfect health is hardly to be expected at your age, if at any age; and after all the leg is a fairly good leg; it has carried you along pretty well hitherto, and I advise you to try it a little longer.' My Lords and Gentlemen, compulsory education is this artificial leg.

In that very year, 1867, poor J. R. Green was writing from the Stepney parish, where he was spending his last few months as a Radical parson:

What hinders Reform? The want of education among the people. . . . Nothing can touch it but a general system of compulsory National Education, supported by a national rate. I wish people could see the waste of the present system—half a dozen schools, British, National, Private, where one good large school would suffice at one-third of the total expense at double the present results. But what chance is there of such a change? Just none whatever.

Two years earlier, J. S. Mill had written to a friend 'I am glad that you agree with me on the subject (much more urgent in this country) of compulsory education.' Mill was also frankly in favour of the Swiss system of compulsory military service, though Mill's political descendants conveniently ignore this nowadays. No doubt there were many reasons which made Mill and Green see so clearly to-day what Baines could not see even to-morrow; but one great difference lies on the surface: neither

Letters of J. S. Mill, vol. ii. p. 49: cf. pp. 72, 291, 303.

<sup>·</sup> Letters of J. R. Green, edited by Leslie Stephen, p. 171. 1901.

One of the worst of these recent offenders, who might be expected to know something, at least, of Mill's sentiments, is Mr. C. P. Trevelyan, in his extraordinarily inaccurate pamphlet on Democracy and Compulsory Service. Compare the present author's counter-pamphlet, True Liberalism and Compulsory Service (Miles & Co., 68 Wardour Street); and a criticism of Mr. Trevelyan's pamphlet by Captain Archibald J. Campbell in the Nineteenth Century last February, entitled 'A "Young Liberal" Pamphlet.'


Mill nor Green nursed, under a crust of Liberalism, the native British horror of all Continental fads.

Apart from the very serious religious question, that is what lies at the root of the whole Baines business. His Liberalism serves but to supply powder and shot for his ineradicable Conservatism. He is not content with negatively condemning compulsory education as un-English; it is far worse; it is positively Prussian, and would reduce us to the level of mere Prussians; it is 'the Dutchman's cork leg,' which will run away of its own accord, Heaven only knows whither! Samuel Laing, the well-known traveller, was at the same time bringing the gravest charges against the educational system of Prussia, and affirming its intimate connexion with the militarisation of that country. Neither he nor Baines troubled to notice that Prussian militarism had been even more rampant under Frederick the Great and his father; nor did they pause to consider whether the final effect of education must not be to undermine both militarism (in the evil sense) and all other forms of despotism. They did not compare the Prussia of their own day with the barbarous old Prussia before those days of national awakening which had freed her from Napoleon, and of which the double watchword had been that all citizens should go alike to school, and that all should alike take their share in national defence. They compared her, instead, with a Britain which had enjoyed constitutional government for three centuries; judged her from that narrowest British standpoint which Thackeray always exposed so unmercifully; and found her altogether wanting. Because the citizen-scholar and citizen-soldier of Prussia had not been able to reverse the traditions of a thousand years within half a century, therefore the national army system, and even the schools, were condemned offhand as mere engines of despotism. Thousands of intellectuals reasoned in 1850 as thousands of intellectuals reason in our own day, looking no further than the most obvious phenomena, and condemning the machine in itself, instead of condemning that immemorial tradition of despotism which has so often succeeded in guiding the machine. Often, but by no means The North German Constitution of 1867, for instance, was forced to grant universal suffrage, because the country already had universal education and universal service. It was impossible to draw any flagrant distinction of privilege among men who already shared so equally in the work of the State. As Colonel Stoffel wrote to Napoleon the Third, in a series of reports from Berlin which were never published until after the disaster of 1870: 'Chief among these regenerative forces there are two . . . compulsory military service, compulsory universal education. . . . And, Prussia having just adopted universal suffrage, none can

foretell where the destinies of this educated, energetic and ambitious people will stop.' 7

The most Pharisaical Briton must recognise that the German democracy has, on the whole, advanced even more rapidly than ours during this century of compulsory service; and one of the most probable results of this present War is an enormous further advance for those classes which are bearing its heaviest burdens. Nothing can be more fatal than to blink the fact that the German workman is bearing a crushing legal burden in the true Volunteer Spirit. We are shocked at the ignorance of Germans who deride our soldiers as 'hireling swine'; yet there is even less excuse for the silly delusion which three Britons out of four nursed last year, and which is nursed even now by many who pride themselves on advanced thought, that a conscript will not fight like a hero for his country. We have been too long deluded by that shallow pretence of philosophy which treats 'volunteer' and 'conscript' as mutually exclusive opposites. The Volunteer Spirit and the conscript organisation are to each other as soul and body; we may distinguish in theory, but in practice their interaction is enormous. Compulsory education has given such an impulse to voluntary study as the Early Victorian world of Baines and Coleridge never dreamt of. If the working man may now buy the classics of all literature for a few pence, this is due not so much to the improvement of machinery as to the fact that thousands of his fellows are volunteering to read the same books, and the thousands of pennies reward the publisher's venture. And (to return to a more direct, though less palatable, fact) conscripted Germany has, in this very War, produced more actual volunteers than free Britain. In Switzerland, after the immediate and compulsory mobilisation of an army which, in figures of our population, would amount to nearly three million men, the Government was forced to forbid volunteering by public proclamation. It is not necessary to allow two Swiss citizens to avoid soldiering in order that the third may volunteer. It is the same all over the Continent. Our insular and indiscriminate devotion to the Volunteer System can only be justified on axioms which are too shameful to be seriously It postulates that the Briton is the only man in Europe who will not fight well unless he has volunteered, and who cannot be expected to volunteer until the day of grace is Our so-called leaders of democratic opinion are secretly haunted by a craven distrust of their own democracy. They know that, in an armed world, civilisation must be armed in self-defence; yet they dare not arm the British people lest

<sup>7</sup> Military Reports, by Colonel Stoffel. H.M. Stationery Office. 1872. Pp. 145, 173.




we should pass from legitimate self-defence into the extremes of Prussian Junkerthum. Moreover, many of them are deluded by the devil's darling sin—the pride that apes humility, the conservatism that apes advanced thought. While Baines claimed to preach as an idealist to idealists, he took a firm stand on the basis of money and material comforts. Mill saw this clearly enough, and pleaded for compulsion because 'I do not see anything short of a legal obligation which will overcome the indifference, the greed, or the really urgent pecuniary interests

of parents.' 8

The Voluntary System does not inculcate a higher civic morality. On the contrary, it enables the shirker to pose as a more moral man than the 'militarist.' When a man tells us that the Volunteer Spirit must be kept on a pedestal, apart from all grosser contact, it is a safe speculation to bet five to one that he has never volunteered himself. Voluntary service is not the cross which these men take up, but the cross that they preach as a fetish, the vicarious sacrifice which excuses them from personal sacrifice. Hundreds, in their franker moments, deny even lip-homage to the Territorials. Mr. Benjamin Kidd, writing from Manchester to the Manchester Guardian, noted how that great city had not even given a send-off to its Territorials when they were mobilised at this awful crisis. An ironmonger in the South of England, advertising not long ago for an assistant, added 'No Territorial need apply.' He himself, and his trade journal in his defence, pleaded truly that he had only blurted out the maxim which necessarily guides nine out of ten men in his posi-They will praise this thin line of khaki for standing between their own persons and compulsory service; they will howl down as unpatriotic whosoever ventures to quote even the Government statistics of Territorial deficiencies; but their own patriotism goes no farther than this. It is the patriotism of a crowd which sits shouting and betting on its eleven champions at a football match, and which hustles the referee for trying to tell the truth.

And how far more flagrant does this injustice become in wartime! It is not only that the Territorial, who has hitherto only sacrificed his time for his fellows, may now have to sacrifice his life for them. Far worse than this; we are positively obliged to welcome a heavy butcher's bill pour encourager les autres; the Voluntary Recruiting Machine must be lubricated with blood. It is not only a commonplace of our newspapers, but it has been coldly proclaimed in Parliament, that nothing stimulates enlistment like the news of a reverse. X, Y, and Z will not come forward until they can read that A, B, and C have been killed. The thing is as inexorably true as it is morally



revolting: and our statesmen count upon it as a spendthrift gapes for his father's succession. A recent letter from a lieutenant who has received the Victoria Cross has attracted very little public attention, simply because we have read so many more of almost equal significance. He writes home to a friend of his old Bible-class:

The section and guns have gone, and I, the leader, am knocked out—a face torn with splinters, a bullet in it, too, and four holes in my shoulder. Nothing much because, fortunately, it did not blind me or smash my jaw. I do not want to come home; we need all our officers here. . . . God grant the country will realise the gravity of the crisis and send every able-bodied man to the ranks!

Of all defects in a defective system, perhaps the worst is that the moment of its final and undisguised breakdown is just the least propitious moment for abolishing it. The hero must still drag his mutilated body back to the Front, because the un-hero has his own prescriptive right of sitting at a football match, and the super-hero is busy writing claptrap in the New Statesman. The hero must shed his blood again because it is expedient, under the Volunteer System, that one man should die for two recruits; because, otherwise, we could not keep up even

the present rate of enlistment.

It is not one Minister's fault beyond that of his predecessor, or of that man's predecessor; because the whole nation has chosen to rely upon a system inherently incapable of proper prevision or provision. And the conflict itself has been precipitated, or even caused altogether, by an equally inevitable double miscon-While we have pharisaically despised the conscript, other nations have doubted falsely, though with more excuse, of our courage and honesty. Those who have known Germany for the last quarter of a century know also how steadily German scorn has increased for a nation in which the citizen hires another to discharge for him the imprescriptible duties of every ablebodied freeman. The Germans have great respect, on the other hand, for the Swiss system, which compels every able-bodied man to spend six months of his life in training for home defence, and produces extraordinarily favourable results. could pass all our able-bodied manhood through six months of serious drill for home defence, we could not only afford to make the fullest allowance for conscientious objections, but also leave all foreign service to the volunteer impulse. The compulsory minimum would give real effect to the voluntary maximum; and our men would go to the Front no longer in niggardly driblets, but in disciplined masses, so long as we were fighting a really national war.

G. G. COULTON.

. The Daily Telegraph, November 25, 1914.

### Jan.

# THOUGHTS ON THE WAGING OF 'GREAT WAR'

It has been well said that the secret of success in war is to be found in the harmony between policy and strategy, and that the possibility of this harmony depends upon the statesman and the strategist seeing things as they really are, upon the truth of their vision. The coming of a war is always a time of strong feeling from which neither the statesman nor the strategist can escape. Most men are carried away by it. How then are they to see clearly and to preserve, amid the hopes and fears by which they and everyone else are possessed, the even balance of the mind?

In times of trial a true man falls back upon the resolves deliberately made during the meditations of quiet hours. He abides by the principles which he has previously sought and found. Those of us who during many years of peace have tried to clear our minds about the nature and conditions of war probably do well now to trust rather to such insight as they may have gained in those past efforts than to any of the impulses or new thoughts of the moment.

Our statesmen and the public men who have written about the War have been occupied chiefly with the statement of the British They have been finding arguments to justify the nation's course in going to war. I think this is really an effort made rather late in the day to bring their own consciences into harmony with that of the nation which knew quite well as soon as the crisis began where its duty lay. I have met no one who had any serious doubt on that subject. There is a deeper question which should have been asked and answered before. An ideally perfect Government would not make war unless and until it saw clearly not only the purpose to accomplish which it chose the method of a fight, but also how by fighting it could attain to the fulfilment of that purpose. Perhaps no Government is ideally perfect. The German Government, which is steeped in the theory of war, knew very well, and has let all the world know, what it wanted to get by the War. It thought it knew how it could get it; yet there may have been an error in its vision, for it certainly did not see England as its inevitable antagonist. That is probably the explanation of its rage against this country.

There is only one theory of war-that which is set forth, with some differences of expression and of detail, by Clausewitz, by Jomini, by Mahan. It distinguishes between two sorts of wars. In the one class are small wars, the expeditions to which British Governments have been accustomed, and in the other class is 'absolute war,' 'great war,' 'national war,' the struggle of nations for existence, or, what is much the same thing, for the Everyone knows which kind we are now waging. The theory describes the lineaments, the large features of 'great war.' It is the war in which you aim at crushing the adversary, striking him down, disarming him, and dictating your terms. It is the kind of war made by Napoleon, the kind of war made by Moltke in 1866 with Bismarck to restrain him, and in 1870 with Bismarck to urge him on. It is the kind of war which in July Austria declared against Servia, though she mistook it for an expedition, and which in August Germany declared against Russia and France, and of which in Belgium she has manifested

the ruthlessness, perhaps the recklessness.

There are certain truths about 'great war' which can be deduced from its nature as a struggle between States for the mastery, and can also be gleaned from the experience of all the great wars of the past. The first is that if 'great war' is made against you, you can meet it only by 'great war.' The fundamental characteristic of 'great war' is that the whole nation throws itself into the fight. That is possible only when every man and woman realises that defeat means ruin to him and to her, and that there is no escape from it except by victory. When that happens a nation makes war with all its might; everyone contributes what he has-his money, his energy, his intelligence, his body if it is fit, his life if he has the chance. Then the nation is in earnest, and a nation in earnest will probably sooner or later evolve a plan grand enough for the occasion. It will perhaps not start with a grand plan. There have been nations which have been unexpectedly plunged into wars, even 'great wars.' In such cases the men at the head of affairs have not always thought out in advance the purpose of the war and the scope of the operations. They may have had quite other ends in view than victory in an international struggle. And if that end has not been constantly present to their minds they will not have been occupied beforehand with the means by which it is to be obtained. But a nation that means to have victory will find the right leaders, whether it starts with them or not, because when it is once awake it ceases to consider persons and reputa-

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tions. It goes back to the elementary principle by which men must ultimately be judged: 'By their fruits ye shall know them,' the difficulty being that time is needed to reveal the strength or weakness of leaders, and that in 'great war' time is infinitely precious.

The ruling principle of 'great war' is the concentration of effort in time and space. 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.' The aim in a war of this kind is to disarm the adversary, to crush his fighting forces, so that he is helpless and has no choice but to accept your terms. If that result is to be produced your forces must be so strong that they can shatter those of the enemy in a great battle or series of battles, and then go on to overrun his territory and occupy his capital. At sea you must destroy his fleet and coop up its relics in the ports in which they take refuge. Napoleon destroys an army at Ulm, seizes Vienna, and disperses a second army at Then he dictates peace. He shatters an army at Austerlitz. Jena, occupies Berlin, and then defeats the Russian armies that have come to the rescue. After that he does as he likes with Moltke defeats one army at Gravelotte, captures Prussia. another at Sedan, and then besieges Paris and defeats all the armies that try to relieve it. Then he expounds his terms. Nelson destroys a French fleet at the Battle of the Nile; after that the Mediterranean is his. He destroys a Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar; Great Britain could thenceforth treat all the ocean as her private property until in the third generation the Germans built a navy to remind her that the command of the sea is a matter not of right but of might.

It is popularly supposed that you can buy victory with blood, but history shows that you may shed blood in plenty and shed it in vain. For defeat you pay with bloodshed; for victory more is required. Victory as a rule is the result of forethought. To most of our people forethought has long seemed a trifle or an accident or a happy inspiration. But in truth the power of thought which wins battles is something that has to be acquired. It is a costly acquisition; a man gets it only by giving his life to it. That is the history of Alexander, of Hannibal, of Caesar, of Gustavus, of Frederic, of Napoleon, of Wellington, and of Moltke. At any rate, a man cannot possibly direct the operations of war successfully unless he has worked hard to master it, and that is a wrestle which requires his whole strength. Cromwell's letters reveal Cromwell at white heat, his whole soul thrown into his war. They do not reveal his labour in mastering the methods of Gustavus, but we know that he had mastered them.

Mr. Asquith has told us that the War must go on until Prussian militarism has been destroyed. I do not know whether



by force you can destroy an -ism, for an -ism is something spiritual. You can destroy the Prussian army and the German navy provided you go the right way about it. But I am sure that you cannot do it by Prussian methods, for a copy is not likely to be as good as the original. Prussia is a military despotism of the first order. Any attempt to imitate it in England would be an admission that Prussia is right. It would be an acceptance of the very thing which the Prime Minister says must be destroyed.

The conditions of victory in this War, in order of importance, though not necessarily of time, are first that the German Navy must be shattered in battle. It must be beaten in a Trafalgar or a Quiberon Bay or a Port Arthur. Secondly, the German army must be crushed in a Sedan, a Jena, or a Waterloo, or in a series of such battles. And, thirdly, the Allied Armies, victorious, must march to Berlin, to Munich, to Hanover. There might indeed be peace without these pre-requisites, but it would be only a truce. Unless she is well beaten Germany will begin it all over again.

The German navy, I say, must be destroyed. That is no light matter. There are German admirals who have paid the price of knowledge, having given their lives to nothing else. We shall have to pay dearly for victory over them. The price may be our own Navy. We must not grudge it. The purpose of our Navy's existence is to destroy the enemy's navy. If it succeeds it will have repeated Nelson's achievement and given England all the sea; no price is too high for that.

I hear men saying that it will be hard work to push the German army back to the Rhine. There is harder work than that to be done. The German army should never be allowed to go back across the Rhine. Nothing but its broken remnants ought to escape across that stream. The passage of the Rhine by the

Allied Armies ought to be the beginning of the end.

So much and no more as to the scope of the War in regard to which I merely wish to assert that we ought to think about it, to suggest the right way of looking at it, and to hint at the kind of thoughts which our admirals and generals must now be thinking, in order that we at home may adequately support them by our sympathy. To say more would be to trespass on their province, which is far from my intention.

The only question which occupies us all just now is not what our admirals or our generals ought to do, not even in the first place what they are doing; we are giving them and shall give them our full trust, knowing that they are doing and will do their best. The question is, What is the best that the nation can do to back them? What can any of us do to contribute towards

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victory? This is the joint affair of the Government and the people, which together make up the nation. To begin with, let us recognise that the Government, too, has done its best and that its best has been very good. When the crisis came the Cabinet felt that it must beware of entrance to a quarrel and paused before crossing the Rubicon. We can all understand that, although many of us were ashamed that there should be doubts of England's duty and shuddered at the consequences of delay. But once the plunge had been taken the Government showed that Wise measures were taken to prevent a it had large views. commercial panic and they were rewarded with success. prompt mobilisation of the Navy, followed soon after by that of all the military forces, and the vote for half a million men taken on the 5th of August were an awakening call to which the people But then came a series of measures by which a great many people were puzzled and which were accompanied by vague impressions among a part of the public which created a certain uneasiness. There was an impression that the Territorial troops were not appreciated at their full value, that an exaggerated importance was attached to the word regular-to the word rather than to what it really means—that perhaps the calls for recruits were made a little in advance of the organisation for dealing with them, and that rifles were a long time in coming. At the same time it was felt that all concerned must be loyally and heartily doing their best; that those who received the impressions I have described were necessarily unacquainted with the tremendous difficulties that inevitably beset the work of improvising armies, and that it would be impracticable for those charged with the military administration to give public explanations of all that they were doing, as such explanations might be useful to the enemy. People rightly felt that in a great war the Government must be supported, that it was no time for faultfinding, and that even the best of human efforts are full of im-This is the right spirit and we are all possessed with it. We are all contributing to the success of the country's efforts by sinking our pet theories and our fads, by remembering that le mieux est l'ennemi du bien and by throwing our whole energies into accomplishing the tasks given us even when their meaning is shrouded in obscurity. At the same time one of our strongest natural instincts is that which, if we were to express it, would perhaps take the form of the cry for more light. I cannot but think that the light for which men are longing

would be given by setting before them the idea or design which is to guide the effort which the nation is now making. I mean, of course, not the design of the naval and military operations. That could in no case be divulged; it would be worth millions to the enemy, and all the precautions of the censorship aim at nothing but preventing his discovering it. I mean the design for the making of armies, for solving the very special problem, of quickly, we might almost say suddenly, transforming a nation of citizens into a fighting organism. Here it is the large principles that are essential, and those principles all men are free to think about, free because thought is always free.

It may be well first to define two familiar words which, I think, denote two opposite perversions of thought—pacifism and militarism. Pacifism is the wrong thinking which mistakes peace, which is a means, for the end. Militarism is the wrong thinking which mistakes war, which is a means, for the end. As wrong thought always does, militarism carries with it further errors. For while right thinking sets up as the immediate object of the act of fighting, to gain the victory, to destroy the enemy's forces, and accepts every means consistent with self-respect which will conduce to that end, militarism, mistaking the means for the end, regards as vital the forms which at some time or other in past circumstances have been adopted as conducive to victory irrespective of those circumstances. Right thinking about war, like all right thinking, values forms only in relation to their meaning, to their use as means to an end.

The War has been sprung upon us in conditions which guard us for the moment against the error of pacifism. How are we to guard against the opposite error of militarism? I think by attempting to see as a whole the piece of work that is laid upon The Prime Minister's view implies that the forces of the Allies are to crush in a military sense the forces of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. That is a task of tremendous difficulty. In August last, Germany, besides her navy, upon the arming and training of which the German Government has for many years brought to bear its best thought and spent very large sums of money, had, as far as I can ascertain, about five million trained soldiers, for whom the arms and the military organisation were ready. She had also, I think, a further two million men capable of being trained and put into the field, and she had ready the plan and the means of training them. Her plan was to throw the bulk of her forces against France, while Russia was to be resisted by the Austrian army assisted by so much of the German army as could be spared from the great attack upon France. The British Navy was to be paralysed by the German navy's keeping itself within an area in which coast and harbour defences, mines, torpedoes, and submarines might protect it against attack and destruction, and, therefore, postpone indefinitely the acquisition by Great Britain of the absolute command of the sea. It is a sound plan to which, I think, Germany

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We must expect the German attacks in the will adhere. western theatre of war to be renewed again and again always with very large forces, or, if the pressure exerted by Russia should seriously diminish the German strength in the west, we must count upon an obstinate German defence of some such line as she now holds covering not only her Rhine provinces but She holds in support of this line the great fortresses of Metz, Namur, Liège, and Antwerp. Behind it she has the line of the Rhine, with the great fortresses of Strasburg, Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne, and Wesel. If the Allies are to fulfil Mr. Asquith's programme and dictate terms of peace to Germany, the enormous German army in this carefully prepared theatre of war will have to be attacked and decisively beaten. It is doubtful whether France alone, even with an extreme effort. can put into the field forces so superior to those of Germany as to suffice for the crushing blow required. The balance needed to produce this superiority must be provided by British forces. You cannot count on a crushing victory without greatly superior numbers, especially where you have to deal with an enemy whose troops are remarkably well trained, organised, and led. greatest of all writers on strategy, discussing between 1820 and 1830 a plan of campaign to be undertaken in case of need by the Allies against France, assumed that they would put into the field altogether 725,000 men, knowing that Napoleon at his best had never had a French army larger than 450,000. If three million Germans are to be crushed in the region which I have roughly defined, the Allies would do well to attack them with six millions, and if France provides four millions England ought to provide The difficulty lies not in finding the number of men but in arming and training them so that they may be fit to cope on terms of equality, regiment for regiment, with the troops of the German army. That is the problem which Great Britain has to solve.

Germany's immense number of trained men is the result of a military system which is a Prussian invention and which it is important that we should understand, as it has been adopted by all the Great Powers of Europe except Great Britain. In the United Kingdom every child born must be registered, but after its birth the State takes no means of following its life's history. In Germany the registration continues, so that the State can follow the career of every person. Every year there is a muster of all the males that were born twenty years before, and of these the larger part, a little more than half, those who are the strongest and most active, are sent for two years to be soldiers in the army. During those two years they are given a thorough military training, according to a carefully prepared programme

drawn up with a view to the exigencies of war. They are then turned out of the army, though they remain soldiers, and are liable to be called back to the ranks in case of war. When, at the end of July, the army was put on a war footing twenty annual classes were called to the ranks; all the young men who had been born in each of the twenty successive years and had served their two years in the army. Afterwards were called out men of the same classes who had been excused from training, and men of some classes born before or after the twenty years which had been covered by the first call. This system makes the standing army—the various regiments of infantry, cavalry, artillery, of the army service corps, and of the railway corps—a war school in which all the able-bodied young men are educated. And at the end of twenty years it produces the result that the better part of the male population, rather more than half of it, between the ages of twenty and thirty-nine, are ready for the field, either immediately or after a very short course for recapitulating the lessons they have learned. The system enables the nation that has adopted it, provided that it has been in force for twenty years, to begin a war with a very large army indeed. No one, as far as I know, has ever proposed that it should be adopted in the United Kingdom. The National Service League indeed advocated a scheme by which every young man should be compelled to receive a few months' military training. League, if I remember right, at first proposed two months, then four, and ultimately six, and there was to be no liability to fight England's battles except upon British soil. Five years ago, at the request of the proprietor of the Morning Post, I tried to show how the Prussian system might be adapted to the peculiar case of Great Britain, and what its costs and results would be on the basis either of a one year's or a two years' course; but I held that Great Britain's needs would not be met by the possession of any force the employment of which was to be limited to fighting in the United Kingdom, and that a British Army, if it was to be useful, must be ready to go and win its country's battles in any theatre of war in which England required victory. which it appeared to me needed to be cleared up was one of educational psychology. What is the shortest period of training which will suffice to produce habits? I think it is largely a matter of the spirit and method with which the training is conducted.

At the present moment the discussion of the Continental or Prussian method is a waste of time. Its whole value lies in its continuous application for many years, in its taking the young men in annual classes year after year, so that everything can be done without hurry in a leisurely and orderly manner. It is

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applicable for making an army which you may have to use twenty years hence or ten years hence, for its essence consists in its taking the young men in a manageable body composed of those of twenty and those of twenty-one. It is of no use whatever when you have to improvise a large army in a short time.

Some people seem to think that you can make an army quickly by compulsion. I doubt it. If you had a well-trained regiment you could increase its numbers a little by putting into it a few pressed men, because after a time most of them would catch the spirit of their comrades, though a few of them would always cause trouble. It could be done in old days for the Navy, because a few pressed men on a ship were actually in a prison from which there was no escape, and found it more convenient to do as they were told than to resist. But, again, it seems to me idle to talk of compelling men to come in at a time when the authorities have already many thousand more recruits than they are able either to arm, train, or equip. On the 1st of January 1914 the Regular Army numbered 156,000 and the Army Reserve and Special Reserve 200,000. In August and September supplementary estimates for a further million were voted, and in the middle of November, when a second million were voted, Parliament was informed that the first million had, roughly speaking, been raised, and that recruits were presenting themselves at the rate of 30,000 a week. These figures did not include the Territorial force, which numbered in January 250,000, was recruited early in August up to its full establishment of 315,000, and has since then been duplicated by the creation of reserve units. Thus the United Kingdom alone began the War with 350,000 trained men of the Regular Army and its Reserves, with 250,000 more or less trained Territorial troops, and has now nearly a million and a half of further recruits undergoing training. All the evidence points to a continuance of the influx of recruits in proportion to the popular grasp of the need for them, and to the strength of the conviction that the school to which they are sent is a good and successful school.

It is quite evident that the business of turning one or two million recruits into soldiers fit for the field in a few months is a very different thing from that by which standing armies in the course of two or three years transform a limited number of recruits into trained soldiers. The standing armies are not content with the mere drill and instruction of their new men. The British Army, for example, has for many years past been in the habit of giving its recruits a four months' course, in which the lessons occupy a few hours a day. But it has never thought that recruits so trained would be ready for war, because it has never passed men into the Reserve until they have completed three years in the

ranks, and it very much dislikes letting them off with so short a course as three years. The French and German Armies have for many years insisted upon a two years' course as normal. England's necessities now require her to turn citizens into good soldiers in something like six months. If this is to be possible it is evident that the school ought to be provided with the very best teachers and with the very best appliances. But the best officers have all been sent to the Front, and I know not how many battalions are still waiting for the rifles, without which their training for war cannot begin. These are the difficulties which have to be overcome and which ought to be thoroughly realised by anyone who should attempt at the present time to criticise the military administration.

I cannot but think that the work has been to some extent embarrassed and impeded by the survival of some traditions which are not those of war but of the militarism of peace. Everyone appreciates the great value of the thoroughly trained and seasoned soldier, and as in our own Regular Army the training is longer than in any other, while the relations between officers and men are better than in any other, the small British Regular Army, which since the South African War has so much improved, was probably when it mobilised at the beginning of August the best military force in the world. No wonder that those who know war set a high value on the quality of our Regular troops. They cannot be replaced, nor can troops of the same character possibly be produced in the time that is given us for preparation. Behind them were their own Reserves. which have been fused with them, and then the Territorial troops, which used to be known by the better name of Volunteers. These Territorials had their own officers, full of zeal and intelligence, most of whom well understood their duty and lacked only a period of continuous practice to make them fully competent for the field, while the men had mastered the elements and also needed but a few months of hard training, and especially of musketry practice, to make them very good troops. The bulk of them volunteered for the Front; a minority held to the terms of their engagement, which do not require them to serve out of the United Kingdom. Those who have volunteered for service abroad are, as regards the military law under which they serve and the pay which they receive, in precisely the same position as the soldiers of the Regular Army. When it was decided largely to increase the forces available and calls were made for further men, the extra recruits asked for were described as new 'Regulars.' It was like asking for new 'old china.' The special quality of our Regulars comes from their long period of training and their long association with a complete staff of

professional officers. To call the new recruits Regulars was to misuse the term Regular; to try to transfer the qualities which it implied to troops which cannot possibly have those qualities. It was a piece of wrong thinking and carried with it a second piece of wrong thinking, for it implied that the new Regulars would be better troops than the old Territorials. impossible, unless the new Regulars were given opportunities such as were to be denied the old Territorials, which would have been an injustice and would involve a loss of time and energy. Yet I find it hard to resist the conviction that this mistake has been made and that there has survived from the militarism of peace a prejudice against the Territorial troops which has been detrimental to the nation's effort to arm itself. I am familiar with the prejudices which in 1792 and 1793 impeded the development of the resources of the French Republic for war. There were then three classes of troops—Regulars, Volunteers, and Conscripts-and the attempt to maintain the distinctions between them greatly embarrassed the generals who were fighting in the field. Not until after two and a half years of war was it decided to abolish those distinctions and to treat all classes of French soldiers on the same footing as citizens fighting for their country. England would do well now to imitate that example.

The training of troops should be ruled by what they have to do in war, and in war the soldier must always be ready and able to march and to use his weapons. He must also be accustomed to follow the direction of his leaders, which implies that mutual understanding between leaders and followers which is called discipline. Discipline comes of itself when officers and men live together, provided that the officers have the qualities that make good leaders. To march is a matter of training and organisation; to use weapons a matter of skill, which comes only from These are the fundamental requisites of an army, and there are no others. The time it will take to acquire them depends upon the spirit of those immediately concerned. finest army ever made was composed of Cromwell's Ironsides, and Cromwell rightly judged that to make a good army he must get men of the right spirit. Since the 4th of August there has been only one spirit animating the people of this country, and it has given us men of the right stamp by the million. If you took a thousand such Englishmen determined to make themselves into soldiers, and gave them fifty men of the character, intelligence, and education that qualify them to be leaders, they would make themselves into soldiers without wasting time, even if there were not a trained officer among them. They can read, there are plenty of good text-books which they can master, and, provided they have the tools-that is the rifles and cartridgesthey would not be very long in learning how to handle them. If you could give to each thousand one first-rate officer, they would pick his brains in an incredibly short space of time. The ante-Boer-War type of officer could not help them, for he was brought up in ignorance of war and filled with the dead traditions of peace militarism, which in war are encumbrances to be got rid of. You cannot improvise an army by means of voluminous regulations; it is a question of the selection of first-rate men to

educate, to lead, and to command their fellows.

There is only one thing that the typical hypothetical thousand men with its leaders cannot do for themselves. They cannot supply themselves with arms and ammunition. The quickest way to get the new troops ready is for the central administration to concentrate its energies upon the supply of weapons, to leave the supervision of the training of the troops to local officers, who should be the best that the Army can find, even if they have to be withdrawn from the Front or promoted from the Territorial force, and to entrust the movement of troops that are ready for the field, at home or abroad, to the General Staff. To centralise everything and to decentralise everything lead equally to chaos. The art of organisation consists in doing at the centre only what can be done nowhere else, and doing in the localities everything that can possibly be done away from the centre.

SPENSER WILKINSON.

December 21, 1914.



## BELGIUM ON THE RACK:

#### A BYSTANDER'S TESTIMONY

In the last town of refuge left to the Belgian people there rest as a memory of old unhappy days the instruments of a religious persecution. The grim robe which the Judge-Executioner wore, the weapons of burning, of tearing, of stretching his victims are preserved in the torture-room, whose old timbers still, when the wind is high over the marshy plains of Flanders, seem to re-echo the sighs, the groans, the shrieks of that dead century.

When I write are preserved, I should say rather were preserved until very lately. To-day that room is stripped of robe and cowl and brazier and rack. In November it was thought that the Germans would enter the town, and the instruments of torture were hurriedly hidden away in a buried chest. Why? Was it that the fear existed that the sight of these means of cruelty would prompt the German invader to new efforts of 'frightfulness'? Was it with the symbolical idea of showing the flight of the old and the inefficient before the new and the scientific-the modest retirement of a brazier which could roast but one man at a time, before the great modern German army with its up-todate equipment for the burning and sacking of whole cities? Or was it merely that the fearful relics had a value and were therefore hidden, as everything of value should be hidden, from a German army which cannot be trusted to spare anything of public or private worth?

Often I asked and never knew quite clearly. The old torturemuseum, with its means of brazing and tearing the human flesh in the effort to conquer the human mind, will be restored no doubt when the tide of invasion has receded and Belgium is free again. Then the traveller coming on a fearful pilgrimage to the War scenes of 1914-15 may stand there by the side of the old

rack and call up to his vision the torture of Belgium.

The victim of the rack, helpless in its grip, had from his torturer the invitation to recant, to betray, before he had suffered anything but the agony of anticipation. Then, if he were steadfast, the penalty was not a swift death coming straight upon the glow and ardour of his heroic 'No.' One turn of the rack brought a quivering torture: and again the invitation to betray.



If his mind remained firm, little by little its fortresses were sapped, with increasing savageness its citadel assailed. With

every fresh pain came a fresh temptation to recant.

So it was with Belgium. The faithful courage with which she refused on the 2nd of August to sell the pass, so that one neighbour who had been her pledged friend and her promised protector should attack by a treacherous back-path two other neighbours, also her friends and protectors, did not end the test of her courage. After the first demand and the first blow came another demand with the threat of another blow and with the bribe of peace and ease for a word of betrayal. The nation was kept on the rack, the torture applied little by little, with more and more savagery in the effort to break down the first faithful 'No.' A new seizure of territory, another massacre, another sackage—after each the helpless victim was tempted with the demand 'Will you

yield now? There is ease for you if you will.'

For four months I stood by the rack whilst the strength of the martyr ebbed away: heard the shouted 'No' of Liège fade and fade until it came down to the barely heard whisper of Ypres. But always it was 'No,' indomitably 'No.' During those four months of the torture of Belgium there have been incidents of cruelty which went beyond the relentless, the fiendish, and were actually bestial. But no incident could equal in 'frightfulness' the cold, considered malignity which at every turn of the rack offered to the tortured victim surcease from agony at the price of treachery. Germany pleads that to pass through Belgium to attack France was a necessity of her war policy. In no court of national honour could such a plea be accepted. If Germany were not strong enough to come against France by the open road, let her have waited. It is vain to attempt to justify a murderous assault upon a little friend, to whom you have solemnly promised protection, with the plea that it was necessary in order to help a treacherous attack on a powerful enemy. But after the initial wrong, after the decision to try to murder Belgium, it was a madness of hate and pride to decide to accompany the killing with torture, and to accompany every phase of the torture with a new invitation to play the traitor. And that last was the unforgivable sin, the attempted outrage on the soul of a nation.

It failed. Belgium still whispers feebly 'No' whilst her executioner trembles at the sound of the forces of relief thundering at his gates. But if the German plan had succeeded—as it must have succeeded if Belgium had not saved, during a century of worldly prosperity, a moral courage of heroic strength? If it had succeeded, what expiation could have ever wiped out the record of the infamy? Those martyrs who withstood to the last a Nero's cruelty won life by losing it and could bless their execu-

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tioner as they died. But what of those who recanted and carried out of the torture-chamber their twisted limbs to continue a shamed life?

It was to that fate Germany tried to drive Belgium: and the effort was the most wicked of her cruelties. Having decided to attack her neighbour without a shadow of right, the German nation might have mitigated its guilt by following in the strictest way the humane rules by which international law limits the horrors of war. Instead, she conducted the War against Belgium with an extreme savagery that recalled the Huns of Attila. Yet that was not the final, the deepest infamy. The deepest infamy was reached in the constant invitation to the tortured victim to abandon her faith and save extremer pangs. As to what gave to the Belgian people and their ruler the courage to withstand this invitation the human mind must confess its failure to understand, and must fall back for explanation on a belief in a sustaining and ruling Providence. Writing now, at a time when the high fame of Belgium has been established without fear of any criticism, it is possible to say that the national history of the people before 1914 did not indicate clearly that they were of the stuff of which martyrs are made. Europe knew them best as people of an astonishing material prosperity whose wealth and good ease of living had inclined them rather to a national embonpoint. Julius Caesar had said that of all the Gauls the Belgians were the most brave; and in the Middle Ages the Low Countries showed a fine mettle of courage more than once. But the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was thought, had changed all that. Certainly German diplomacy so concluded and reckoned confidently that, if not its first, its second attempt to induce Belgium to betray France and Great Britain would be successful. second temptation (after the first mild turn of the rack and before any massacres of civilians) was plausible enough to give to the Belgians an easy road to faithlessness, if faithlessness had been in their minds. But the reply was as sturdy as the temptation was contemptible.

The offer:

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a courageous defence. The German Government regrets most deeply that in consequence of the attitude taken up by the Belgian Government against Germany such sanguinary encounters should have taken place. Germany does not come into Belgium as an enemy; it is only due to the force of circumstances that she has been compelled, on account of the French military preparations, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a point d'appui for her subsequent military operations. After the Belgian Army has, by an heroic resistance against greatly superior forces, maintained the honour of its arms, the German Government begs the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to save Belgium

from the subsequent horrors of war. The Government is ready to come to any agreement with Belgium which can be reconciled with its differences with France. Germany again solemnly declares that she has no intention of seizing Belgian territory, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is at all times ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of hostilities permits.

The reply:

The proposal which the German Government makes to us reproduces the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2. Faithful to its international obligations, Belgium can only repeat the answer it gave to that ultimatum, particularly as since August 3 its neutrality has been violated, a grievous war has been carried on in its territory, and the guarantors of its neutrality have loyally and at once answered her

Whenever terms of peace come to be talked of, Germany's rulers must be judged in the light of their continued invitations to Belgium to play the traitor, the first on the 2nd of August, the second on the 9th of August, and the several subsequent offers, the refusal of each one of which was followed by fresh acts of brutal outrage. If the British mind needs to be steeled to the task of seeing that those terms of peace make due provision for punishment and due precaution against repetition, the story of those invitations should be clearly known. Before the second invitation of the 9th of August, German 'frightfulness' was not made fully apparent to Belgium. After, the laws of war and the dictates of humanity began to be ignored. Each day the spirit of atrocity grew until the day of the fall of Antwerp, when-the last stronghold of Belgium fallen and the nation prostrate—there was a sudden relenting of the German torturer, seemingly because there was for the time being no further advantage in the policy of torture. That the torture was a policy, a deliberately, cold-bloodedly designed policy ordered from headquarters, is the conclusion established on the evidence; and the fact that the judges of Germany must keep in view.

Following on the heroic defence of Liège the Belgian Field Army, from a position flanked by Antwerp on one side and Namur on the other, 'contained' the German Army very cleverly. I was present at several of the little battles, such as that of Haelen, at which the Belgians baffled the reconnaissance in force of the German host. The delay, precious to Europe, was profoundly irritating to the Germans. The War became more savage: still, there were no organised atrocities to my knowledge, though there were many individual acts of savagery. On

the 16th of August, on the battlefield of Haelen, I wrote:

Many stories of atrocities are in circulation. These I refuse to record except on direct proof, but near here the body of a Belgian soldier cyclist has been found mutilated and another hanged. I have, on the word of officers, accounts of similar barbarities. Evidently these are due to the savagery of individuals; when German officers are present no outrages on the laws of war are recorded.

On the 18th of August the German army, tired of the delay inflicted by the 'slim' tactics of the Belgian commanders, developed a frontal attack towards Tirlemont in crushing force. Unable to get out of Brussels that night, I left the city at dawn, and, reaching Louvain about six, found the Belgian army in Anxious to know if the German main attack had actually developed, I cycled forward from Louvain until I came in touch with the German forces, was fully informed by the sight from a hill of their dense masses, and cycled back to Louvain in front of the Uhlan scouts. Louvain then was deserted to a great extent by its inhabitants: but its desolate streets were still sprinkled with fugitives making their way towards Brussels or Antwerp. The line of retreat of the army was clearly towards Antwerp. This was the morning of Wednesday, the 19th of August. I left Louvain that day just before noon, and was, so to speak, 'in touch' with the city until ten the following morning, when I left Brussels just in advance of the entering Uhlans. The Germans had established themselves at Louvain on the afternoon of the 19th, and their occupation during the afternoon and evening was to my certain knowledge peaceable in the sense that there were no massacres, and there was no sacking of the city. These facts are important to keep in mind in view of what follows.

We have now reached the turning-point in the history of the German campaign in Belgium. The Belgian army fell back on the Antwerp fortified position. The German army occupied Louvain and Brussels without serious opposition and without outrage on their part. The time had arrived for the third offer to the Belgian Government, which, I am informed,1 took the form of an invitation to withdraw the Belgian Field Army definitely behind the Antwerp forts, to leave the German lines of communication unattacked, and to observe an armistice until the end of the War. It was refused: and Germany began to wage on Belgium the form of war which there is much good evidence to indicate she had prepared for England, a form of war in which military strength was reinforced by the most callous and murderous cruelty to the civil population, and a nation was sought to be subdued through the tears of its women and children.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Since the formal offer of August 9 I have no official documentary records of the German parlementaires. I must ask the readers of the Nineteenth Century to accept as trustworthy my conclusions, founded on the confidential communications made to me from time to time by Belgian officers and officials, and on my own direct observation of the arrival at various times of German parlementaires.

The outrages of Dinant, Louvain, Aerschot—of a score of other places—followed.

On the 19th of August, as I have set out, the German army occupied Louvain peaceably. Up to the 20th of August, to my personal knowledge, and up to the 25th of August, to my knowledge on the most trustworthy evidence, there were no outrages. On the 24th and 25th of August a German force moving towards Antwerp was defeated, and withdrew towards Louvain in some disorder. On their arriving at Louvain on the night of the 26th of August, it is said that there was some mistake on the part of the German sentries in firing upon them, and that this let loose the flood of mischief which ravaged Louvain. It is a possible explanation, but hardly a full explanation. The sack of Louvain was so systematic that it could hardly have sprung out of the impulse of a moment. The circumstantial evidence rather points to the fact that it was a designed act of war, decided upon after the defeat of the 24th of August, and intended to warn Belgium of the consequences of continuing to harass the German advance. The Germans do not allege any incident of the 26th of August to justify the massacre: and, by putting forward a very palpable falsehood as their explanation, confess in effect that they have nothing true to say in palliation of the monstrous crime.

On this point let a German witness enter the box. At Liège the Germans in September established a paper, The Friend of the People, which in French and German gave their version of the course of the War for the benefit of the Liégeois. Friend of the People printed the German account of the entry into Louvain, and told the story of 'a great plot' of the Louvain people to murder all the German soldiers on the night of their entry, which plot led to the sack of the city that night. The story is a clumsy lie. Its details of the gay, cheerful appearance that Louvain presented on the day of entry 'as a mask for the murderous plan' I can deny from my own observation. I left Louvain that day in the rear of the Belgian army with a pitiable crowd of refugees from Tirlemont, whose tales of ruthless acts there set everyone fleeing from Louvain who could possibly do so. Before a single German entered, Louvain was desolate and in mourning, and abandoned by a great part of its population. But the German account speaks of crowded cafés and animated streets. In recording the massacre of the inhabitants as having happened that very night, owing to the treacherous uprising of the inhabitants, the Germans again lie There is the clearest evidence that the massacre occurred a week later, after the German force had had ample time to see that the civil inhabitants were not armed. But

perhaps the following can be accepted as a fairly truthful German account of their own doings in Louvain which follows the untruthful apologetic. It reads:

Our force concentrates at the railway station and opens fire on the houses around them and on other houses. We fire on the windows, force open the doors. The inhabitants are killed or dragged out, and the houses are burned. In a little while Louvain is in flames. At first we thought that the greater part of its inhabitants had been killed in the flames, for all who showed themselves in the streets received bullets. But after our return we found ladders placed in such a fashion as to facilitate the escape from the houses by their gardens at the rear. A very great number thus were saved, another proof that this attack on us had been prepared beforehand. That night at Louvain was a very grave experience, and we were lucky to get out of it so well.

It was in Malines on the 27th of August at noon that I encountered the first refugees from Louvain and heard their stories. The horror of that experience has not yet been effaced from my mind. The road from out of Louvain was crowded with refugees—nuns fleeing from their cloisters, priests from their churches, the sick carried on their beds, the aged tottering along with the help of their children, many carrying some poor article of household furniture. In one cart were collected seventeen children, evidently of several families. Another hand-cart held an old palsied woman, pushed on by her grandchild. All had terrible accounts of murder and outrage. In the fields were the more pitiful victims wandering distraught—the young women driven mad by rape, the old women and the old men driven mad by the massacre of their children.

Of all the terrible train one figure in particular stood out clearly for many weeks after, coming often to my bedside to rebuke sleep, putting out a hand of reproach before the dish set before me at table. It was that of a gaunt young priest. What particular horror he had seen or suffered I cannot say, for his words were distraught and he grinned vacantly as he spoke, saying chiefly that he 'knew English' and that 'it is a fine day.' But his lean face was twisted horribly, and his long cassock was wet, as if he had been through a heavy shower of rain, from the sweat of agony which poured from him. The procession of horror was long. Many of the fugitives could accuse in clear, stony words most foul deeds of rape, of burning and murder. Yet, of all, that distraught priest stands out in my memory.

Following close on the sack of Louvain came another invitation to the Belgian nation stretched on the rack to give the word of treachery and let such horrors cease. A civic dignitary of Malines brought to Antwerp the offer that the Germans would not attempt to attack further the Belgian people if the Fort of

Walhaem, the key of the Antwerp defences, were given up to them: otherwise Malines would be destroyed utterly. (Its bombardment had already begun, all the shells being fired at the noble cathedral—a fact of which I assured myself with certainty during several visits to the town.) The offer was refused.<sup>2</sup> By the 28th of August the Germans had found it necessary to set aside a force of 70,000 to 'contain' the Belgian army within the fortifications of Antwerp. It was to set free that army of 70,000 for service in France that the policy of 'frightfulness' was now directed with full force against Belgium.

It would be outside the purpose of this article to attempt to describe in detail or even to enumerate the record of German atrocities in Belgium. Its purpose rather is to establish the cause of those outrages, to invite an examination of the facts so that it may be seen clearly that they were not sporadic cases of military brutality, springing from drunkenness or lust of cruelty on the part of individual soldiers, but manifestations of an actual policy directed from Berlin. After the refusal of the Belgian Government to give an undertaking to keep the Belgian army within the Antwerp fortifications, and after a sally of the garrison towards Louvain, that noble city was sacked. Then Malines was threatened in order to extort the surrender of a fort, and partly destroyed. Perhaps the powerful influence in the Roman Catholic Church of Cardinal Mercier saved his cathedral city from utter destruction. But its churches were savagely wounded, and the neighbouring town of Aerschot suffered complete ruin, and many of its inhabitants were murdered and tortured.

In the case of Termonde 'cause and effect' show very clearly. It was destroyed for just the same reason as Louvain. On the 4th of September a German force came back from the field after a severe beating by the Belgians, and the German commander, Sommerfeld, announced: 'It is our duty to burn the town.'

The inhabitants were given two hours to leave; then with well-drilled precision companies of German soldiers marched through the streets, breaking windows on each side with rifles as they marched. They were followed by two files of men with machines, who sprayed kerosene through the broken windows. Most of these spraying machines were operated by hand, but one at least was a big engine of arson driven by motor-power. The next stage was for soldiers to pass along throwing lighted fuses

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> It is perhaps necessary to repeat that since August 9 I have no documentary evidence of the German offers to Belgium: possibly no documents exist, even the German mind recognising the infamy of its policy of torture and hesitating to put it on written record. But I have not a shadow of doubt as to the truth of the statements repeatedly made to me by credible, responsible witnesses as to the mission of the various German parlementaires which came to our lines at different times.

on the kerosene. Termonde was thus systematically destroyed. All the inhabitants of Termonde gave the same version of its destruction. The sack of the town was not marked by massacre, but eighty civic notables were taken away as prisoners to Germany, and there were a few incidental murders.

Some other outrages, such as those of Dinant,<sup>3</sup> seem to be explainable by the German rage at the French co-operation in Belgian defence, and do not fall into what may be called the main policy of the German racking of Belgium. Berlin may be acquitted thus of some of the murders of civilians (totalling at least 5000 in the districts where I was able to make direct investigations), and may be acquitted also of the horrible and sometimes bestial incidents which accompanied 'official' outrages. Nothing will be gained by attempting to prove too much. But I have cited enough to show the existence of an official 'policy' of outrage. That policy shows most clearly in the records of Louvain, Malines, Termonde, and in the sudden cessation of outrage when outrage was no longer useful.

The incidents of beastliness, the strange degenerate acts of nastiness and sacrilege, with which the Germans spiced their ordered and deliberate cruelties, must be set down to the account of the tiger and the ape still surviving in our human nature. German officers and soldiers were not always content to kill out of hand and to burn quickly. They had to torture men

3 A Belgian who lived through the Dinant massacre could give me no clear explanation of its reason. He told me that on August 15, when the first big combat took place around Dinant, the town suffered somewhat from shell fire, but its great misfortunes only began when the French evacuated the district under orders for a general retirement. On the night of August 21 a German armoured motor-car came into Dinant by the Rue St. Jacques, and without any reason began firing promiscuously in the street and at the houses. Many citizens were killed by this fire. A girl was mortally wounded in her cot. An innkeeper and his wife, who opened their door to see what was going on, A gas-worker going out to his work was killed on his were both killed. threshold. The assassins followed up their shots by throwing incendiary bombs at the houses and then went away. Next day a German force entered the town. The doors of the houses were forced open, men were killed, and women were driven up into an abbey, where for three days they were imprisoned without food except some carrots. Some workers in a cloth factory of which the director, M. Himmer, was murdered, took refuge in a drain. They were discovered and all shot as they cowered in their hiding-place. At the Brewery Nicaise, in the suburb of St. Pierre, the workers, with their employers, two venerable brothers, both aged over seventy, hid in the cellars of the brewery, and being discovered were all killed. At the Place d'Armes, in front of the prison, two hundred men were collected by the Germans, and to make the slaughter quicker they were moved down by a machine-gun. The people thus murdered were aged from twelve years to seventy-five years. These wholesale murders took place in the suburbs of Leffe, St. Pierre, and St. Nicolas chiefly. In the central quarter of the town the rage for slaughter was not so furious. Hostages were taken and driven out of the town almost naked to On August 23 the Ardennes. Then the town was systematically burned. hardly a vestige of it remained.

beforehand, and to desecrate and insult beautiful buildings before destroying them. A Belgian friend, talking to me on the point, used the illustration (borrowed from a Fourain cartoon) of a lowminded servant, in envy of her beautiful mistress, deliberately soiling the pillow on which she would sleep. It is exact. Beautiful churches, carved out in lace-like stone by medieval piety, were often deliberately befouled. In one château of rare beauty the German officers, after pillaging the cellar and destroying the marbles and bronzes, brought in a cow from the fields, disembowelled it, and spread its entrails and blood over the carpets and tapestries, so that they might be spoiled. Very frequently, too, there was physical and moral torture of the cruellest kind. Peasants were kept on their knees with hands uplifted for hours under the threat of instant death if they moved. They were shut up, and told to be ready to die in three hours, then released, then shut up again, and again sentenced to death. They were shut up for long periods, with hardly any food or water, and with no means to observe the decencies of life.

To such incidents the judges of the authors of the German War on Europe cannot wisely attach too great importance. They indict human nature rather than German policy. They show how deplorably low man may fall when the bonds of civilised restraint are loosed. But they cannot be said to have been ordered or foreplanned. Heavy as is their indirect indictment of the policy of 'frightfulness' which permitted them, they should not divert attention from the weighty evidence supporting the direct indictment, which is this: that the Berlin Government deliberately ordered and organised gross outrages against all the laws of war as part of a policy of frightening Belgium into an act of treachery, and continued that policy from the 9th of August until the middle of October, cold-bloodedly, resolutely.

It is with a glow of pride, as well as a sigh of compassion, that one can add 'unsuccessfully.' The heroic King Albert, as the mouthpiece of his nation, never quailed before the torture. That, too, the judges must remember who have to requite Belgium as well as to punish Germany.

FRANK FOX.

### VENGEANCE IN WAR:

# A STUDY OF REPRISALS IN PRACTICE AND THE CASE OF LOUVAIN

Vengeance is an ugly word. Nor is the idea which underlies it traceable to any noble sentiment. It is but the cold unvarnished expression of the least generous of the human instincts—the instinct on which the cruel criminal laws of our forefathers were based, the instinct of half-civilised or degraded peoples in countries where the spirit of revenge has survived, the spirit which those of chivalry, fair play, and justice are displacing in our civilian life.

As it is still practised in war in the name of 'reprisals,' it is desirable that we should closely examine the nature of reprisals and see whether those who label so inglorious a spirit as vengeance with a more or less respectable term are not confusing two totally different ideas.

#### T

In approaching the consideration of the subject we must bear in mind that there is no Law Court, no independent authority which can enforce belligerent observance of the laws and usage of war. Art. 3 of The Hague Convention relating to land warfare, it is true, provides that belligerent Powers are responsible for all acts of violation of the Regulations annexed to the Convention; but, obviously, this is merely intended to be an emphatic assertion of their obligatory character. The fact remains that the only sanction for enforcing observance of the rules of war is the power of the enemy to exercise reprisals for their non-observance. However barbarous the method at first sight may seem, being the only one by which an unscrupulous or cruel enemy can be coerced, the exercise of reprisals is and remains an indefeasible right of commanders in the field.

Christian morals and the public conscience of civilised mankind require certainly that in the exercise of reprisals there shall be a proportion between the reprisals and the acts which occasion their exercise. I shall revert to this later on. Meanwhile we must make some distinctions clear.



There are legitimate acts of violence in war affecting civilians which, however cruel, have nothing to do with reprisals. The destruction of a village for the purpose of preventing the enemy from using it as cover, the requisitioning of food, wood, and other goods, even of personal service, the removal, with little or no reference to comfort, age, or health, of thousands of people from whole areas within the war area, may all entail the most undeserved hardship and suffering on the victims. Yet as they may be inflicted by the military authorities of the nation to which the victims belong, the right of the enemy to inflict them is unquestionable. Such acts are ascribed in the language of the law and custom of war to military necessity or raison de guerre.

Distinct from these legitimate acts of violence in war are legitimate ruses of war, with which I dealt in my last article in this Review.

There are also illegitimate acts of war which, according to the British Manual of Land Warfare, 'owing to the advance of civilisation and the high state of discipline and training of modern armies . . . have become more and more uncommon . . .' Charges, nevertheless, have been brought by British commanders against German practices which conflict with this statement. Instances of the misuse of the white flag, Red Cross badge, etc., however, are obviously more likely to occur among the millions of men of all classes of society and degrees of education and morality who form a modern Continental army than among a small, highly trained and carefully recruited army like our own, in which officer and man are taught together the duties of chivalry and comradeship as indistinguishable from civilian honour. Still we must in justice to the enemy believe that acts of treachery would not be condoned by, at any rate, the vast majority of German commanders, especially as the Kriegsbuch im Landkriege, which authorises the most ruthless warfare, specifically forbids them.

We can now, I think, define 'reprisals.' 'Reprisals between belligerents,' says the British Manual of Land Warfare,' 'are retaliation for illegitimate acts of warfare, for the purpose of making the enemy comply in future with the recognised laws of war.'

My own definition is that they are 'one of the modes by which the belligerents obtain redress for violation of the laws of war.' <sup>3</sup>

The British Manual, it is seen, adds an element to mine, viz. that reprisals are 'for the purpose of making the enemy comply in future with the recognised laws of war.' I think,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Nineteenth Century and After, December 1914. <sup>2</sup> P. 97.

<sup>3</sup> Law and Usage of War, p. 114. London 1914.

with all deference to my respected friend, Professor Oppenheim, of Cambridge, joint author of the Manual, that this only applies where knowledge of such a purpose exists. Who is the enemy he refers to? The enemy in warfare is the opposing army, and reprisals against an army which does not comply with the recognised rules of warfare, says the Manual, as we have seen above, are rarely necessary, because violations of the recognised rules of warfare are now rarely committed by regular forces. The Manual explains that 'reprisals are an extreme measure because in most cases they inflict suffering on innocent individuals,' . . . and that 'in this . . . their coercive force exists.'

Whichever definition is the more correct one, reprisals are of so many kinds that some of them fit better into the one and others better into the other. One thing is certain. To exercise a coercive effect, reprisals have to be deliberately directed to producing it. Thus, at the beginning of the War, the German Government did not at once institute the Bureau de renseignements sur les prisonniers de guerre, for which provision is made by Art. 14 of The Hague Regulations.4 Or, at any rate, the German Government was unduly slow in furnishing information as to both British and French prisoners. Both the British and French Governments declined to furnish the German Government with their lists until it complied with The Hague Regulations. The desired effect was produced. This is a mild instance of reprisals in which the object was attained by direct appropriation of the retaliation to the offence. Non-observance of The Hague Convention as to granting a delay of grace and laissez-passers to merchant ships in an enemy port at the commencement of hostilities by one of the belligerents warrants the other belligerent in refusing to comply with the Convention, although the rule is one of established usage not dependent on the Convention. Such a case arose as between the British and German Governments. The German Government failed to respond to the British invitation to respect the rule. ships were not allowed to depart. Here the desired effect was not produced and the German Government, which left German merchant ships in British waters to their fate, seized British ships in German waters by way of reprisals.

These are direct instances. Let us suppose, however, that the enemy takes advantage of the immunity of hospitals from bombardment, for the purpose of saving armed forces from attack. To appropriate the retaliation to the offence would be to violate the rules of war in the same way, which would not be to the ultimate benefit of our own troops. In this case there is no

4 See op. cit. pp. 100 and 152.

penalty, apart from the universal reprobation of civilised communities, but the bombardment of the hospital.

Then, there is the abuse of the white flag, which seems to be regarded by some of the German soldiery as a fair ruse of war. To abuse it in return would not be in our own interest. Not to respect it would not be in our own interest either. The only remedy is to decline to regard the display of the white flag as in itself sufficient for its purpose, a sort of compromise between respecting and disregarding it.

The German Kriegsbuch permits the shooting of prisoners where they may be a danger to the capturing force. I am not aware that any case of the kind has occurred as yet in the present war, but, if it did occur, it is probable that a British commander, to prevent its recurrence, would shoot an equal number of German prisoners, and take care that the fact reached

the knowledge of the enemy's General Staff.

There are, however, reprisals of a much more complicated kind, reprisals where the retaliation is different in kind from the offence, where the object is at once punitive and deterrent, where no moral turpitude attaches to the offenders, and the nature and magnitude of the redress depend rather on the state of mind of the enemy commander than on any proportion or adjustment to the offence.

#### TT

The law of war grants belligerent rights only to those who carry arms openly and are under the command of an officer. Any others who attack or resist invading forces are not entitled to belligerent rights and, if caught, are not prisoners of war, but are entirely at the mercy of the enemy commander. There is only one exception-viz. where the population of a territory which has not been occupied, spontaneously on the enemy's approach take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organise themselves as military forces. Even in this case they are only entitled to belligerent rights if they carry arms openly. Against civilians who commit acts of hostility against an invading force the custom of war permits the commander to take such immediate measures for the punishment of the offender or offenders as he thinks fit. The Hague Regulations only step in to forbid any 'general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise,' being 'inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible (dont elles ne pourraient être considérées comme solidairement responsables).' I may say here that if the article had said, instead of 'cannot be regarded as collectively responsible,' 'is not collectively responsible,' this would have confined punishment



to the guilty individuals. As it stands the article authorises the infliction of punishment on the community for acts of individuals, though not the direct result of collective action.

An infraction of the laws of war having been definitely established [says the British War Manual], every effort should first be made to detect and punish the actual offenders. Only if this is impossible should other measures be taken in case the injured belligerent thinks that the facts warrant them. As a rule the injured party would not at once resort to reprisals, but would first lodge a complaint with the enemy in the hope of stopping any repetition of the offence or of securing the punishment of the guilty. This course should always be pursued unless the safety of the troops requires immediate drastic action and the persons who actually committed the offences cannot be secured.<sup>5</sup>

It may also be necessary, adds the Manual, 'to resort to reprisals against a locality or community for some act committed by its inhabitants or members who cannot be identified.' I have some doubt as to what kind of proceedings the War Manual contemplates when it speaks of lodging a complaint with the enemy. This question, however, is of minor importance. In the present War complaints have been made public on both sides, but in no case am I aware that they have been made as a method of obtaining redress preliminary to the exercise of reprisals. The above passages, it will be observed, seem to claim for the British commander in the field the right to exercise untrammelled discretion in the infliction of any such punishment as he may reconcile with his own moral sense.'

#### TTT

I have tried to make it clear that the object of reprisals is to obtain redress for offences against the law and custom of war. In civilian affairs justice and expediency require that there shall be a proportion between the offence and the redress. In war more or less in the same way any disproportion between the redress and the offence can only lead to a sense of injustice. Of the sense of injustice that of vengeance is begotten. In no war in recent times have we seen the dividing line more strongly marked than in the gigantic struggle now pending. German witnesses accuse Belgians of atrocities which if true are acts of vengeance due to revival of the primal instincts of mankind, instincts of those who have been driven to desperation by gratuitous and deliberate destruction of all they possessed. Atrocities are acts of vengeance, and herein the difference lies. For such acts I think we may assume no

<sup>5</sup> Section 456. 6 Section 458.

<sup>7</sup> This is confirmed in Section 459.

Government or military commander among those concerned in

the present War will admit liability.

This brings us down to the concrete instances of reprisals exercised by the German commanders in Belgium. That whole-sale and deliberate destruction not only of villages but of cities in Belgium has taken place by way of reprisals has been admitted by the German commanders. The ground alleged in justification of them has consistently been the firing by civilians on German troops. That there has been such firing I do not propose to question. It would be a miracle if under the provocation of invasion it had been otherwise. Nor do I doubt that the German commanders, like most other commanders (for instance, the commanders of the French regular forces in the repression of the Paris Commune in 1871), lost their moral balance in street fighting and took vengeance out of all proportion to the provocation. For this too we must make due allowance.


A doubt, however, is warranted as regards the genuineness of

the alleged reprisals as such. Were they reprisals at all?

Let us examine the greatest case of all, the sacking of Louvain, and to avoid bias let us, in examining it, confine ourselves to the evidence of German witnesses only. As regards the trivial ground alleged by German newspapers that the Belgian women poured boiling oil on the passing German troops we may give their accusers the benefit of it. If true, it would surely have been easy to locate the offence and convict the culprits then and there, in which case there would have been no call to burn down Officially the sacking of Louvain has been even a house. ascribed to firing on the German troops by its civilian inhabitants. It is admitted that there were two bodies of German troops in different parts of the town. It is denied by the Germans that the second body were fired at by the first, who are alleged by Belgians to have mistaken them for Belgian forces, or vice versa, or that it is true that the Belgian authorities had disarmed the whole population of Louvain before any German forces appeared on the scene. There may be a doubt as to the possibility of collecting every rifle in a city of the size of Louvain or of preventing acts of vengeance on the part of civilians goaded to fury.

It is reasonable to suppose that both the Belgian and the German allegations are relatively correct. That two bodies of German troops entering the town at night time from different sides should have immediately recognised each other as friends, while in so many other cases belligerents in the present war have made mistakes, is sufficiently improbable to warrant the belief

<sup>8</sup> Several wounded French soldiers in the hospitals at Bordeaux have told me they were wounded with French bullets, having been mistaken for the enemy.



that the firing in question may not have been confined to Belgian civilians.

Another fact which must be borne in mind, and which is not contested, is that there was an interval of a day between the two admittedly devoted to the burning of the city.

Still another, and a very important one, uncontested by German witnesses, is that the German officers who were told off to prepare the work of destruction had a list of houses to be sacked and burnt, that the list distinguished between inhabitants who were 'gute Leute' and those who were not, and that these officers wrote 'gute Leute' on the houses which were to be spared and marked with some other sign those which were to be destroyed.

No details have ever been furnished as to the part of Louvain in which the alleged shots were fired. Nor does any explanation seem to have been given of why there was an interval of a day between the two days devoted to destruction, nor of the distinction made between the houses spared and those destroyed, nor of the origin of the list supplied to the officers.

As an act of reprisal the sack of Louvain was out of all proportion to any of the acts alleged. The most indulgent view cannot ascribe to it any purpose of redress. Nor can it be regarded as an act of vengeance, seeing that it was deliberately and carefully executed, so carefully that every blanket or sheet or thing which could be of use to the invading army was methodically removed from each house before it was destroyed. Down to the mode of destruction nothing was left to the determination of any passing emotion.

The obvious surmise, in the absence of any explanation of the facts, is that the sacking of Louvain was not a case of reprisal at all, but an act of intimidation deliberately planned before the outbreak of the war and slavishly carried out on the third day by a new officer in obedience to orders incompletely fulfilled by his predecessor.

And this I say, after having had access to information from a perfectly unbiassed source, which I have refrained from using in order to rest my argument entirely on admitted facts—information, however, which in every particular confirms the above description of what took place.

In war a belligerent commander is tempted by many feelings which in peace he might think wantonly cruel or mean and unworthy of a man of honour. In peace he would sympathise with the civilian householder who strikes or even kills an aggressor deliberately setting fire to his dwelling, with the peaceful peasant who is driven from his home at the point of the bayonet, his



crops, his barn, and his cottage in flames while he aimlessly struggles with his wife, children, and what they can carry in any direction away from the terror of the booming artillery. At Boulogne some weeks ago, at five in the morning, I met 700 French refugees with babes heaped like sacks of vegetables on wheelbarrows, young children crying with hunger, the old men murderously angry, the women artificially cheerful, all mudstained and footsore. As I have said the devastation of war is not necessarily confined to acts of the enemy. This Boulogne episode was an object-lesson in the practice of war as it affects the most innocent civilians. They had been driven from their homes, not by Germans, but by war, victims not of the enemy, but of a fate in which those who were sacrificing life and limb in their defence were the unwilling cause of their ruin.

War implies hardships, cruelty and atrocities inherent to its bare exercise which make every sufferer a potential advocate of its cessation without need of artificial devices to reinforce the desire for peace. The methods of intimidation practised by German commanders in Belgium are in vain called reprisals. Nobody has been deceived by either official or non-official apologists. They have not only failed in their purpose, but have aroused throughout the civilised world a feeling of horror at the gratuitous addition of new cruelties to war. Instead of producing a longing for peace, they have only excited a thirst for revenge among their peace-loving victims, and among onlookers a contempt for the intelligence of those who are responsible for this supreme miscalculation of the German General Staff.

THOMAS BARCLAY.



## LICENSING REFORM: A NEW POLICY

By those who hope with Mr. Bonar Law that the new unity in our national life will not end with victory, the following article on Licensing Reform will be read with interest. Written by Mr. Alexander F. Part, the managing director of the most aggressive and successful of the various Trust Companies formed with the object of substituting 'Disinterested' for 'Tied House' management in the public-houses of the United Kingdom, it reveals with expert clearness the chief causes of the failure of our existing liquor legislation to lessen evils which up to now have been the despair of every patriot, and the standing proof of the helplessness of party politicians.

Mr. Part also shows with equal clearness how under the guidance of sane legislation, based not on irrational sentiment or blind prejudice, but on a scientific regard for cause and effect, the public-houses of the United Kingdom may be made instruments not of national degradation, but of national and social advancement.

I earnestly commend his article to the serious consideration of all who wish to divert to useful purposes a large portion of the huge annual unproductive expenditure of 160,000,000l. in alcoholic drink. This expenditure is not only unproductive, but tends to the deterioration of our national manhood, and to the impoverishment of our national resources which, depleted by war, it is more than ever necessary that we should vigilantly conserve. The policy described in the following article will be welcomed by the increasing number of Temperance Reformers who believe that the substitution of Disinterested for Tied House management in the public-houses of the United Kingdom will tend to increase the happiness of the people without injuring their morals or their health, and, by causing a gradual change in manners and habits, will help to make attainable a higher standard of National Life.

GREY.

In the true and permanent interests of the Trade, no less than in respect of the public well-being, Reform of Licensed Houses and of Licensing is a vital necessity.

The revolting conditions under which most of the drink of

the country is purveyed are evidence enough of the urgency of the matter, and if further proof were necessary a study of the latest available licensing statistics would give additional point to the need for a change.

The influence of the Trade is all-pervading, and affects a larger number of individuals than any other. Its power and wealth are enormous, its ramifications so widespread and diverse, its organisation so elaborate and complete, its revenue, which exceeds the national income, so huge, and its effects so ruthless and destructive that it has become, almost unconsciously, the most powerful and dangerous factor in the life of the nation.

From a growing sense of public decorum, the State, in the struggle to limit so mighty a factor, has evolved a system of control which in complexity, ineptness, inefficiency, and artificiality is probably unrivalled.

The purpose of this epitome of failure is merely to indicate, by reference to the mistakes of the past and present, a live policy more in accord with common sense and practical politics than the present system—a policy, in short, which, if carried out, would effect in very large degree the solution of the Licensing and Temperance problems, thorny and difficult though they are.

This assertion may appear to be presumptuous, but a close and intimate study of these questions from a practical point of view has shown that the main difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to elaborate a policy which will at once be effective and gain general support.

The comparative failure of the teetotallers warns us that, while the public demands a change, it requires one which will give individual freedom of choice, and equally one which is as just to the interests involved as is reasonably consistent with the public welfare. Excesses on the part of extremists are equally distasteful to the ordinary man, whether they are the manifestations of zeal or of indiscretion.

Real and lasting reform must be constructive and not merely restrictive, and it must be to some extent gradual and voluntary, otherwise the effect will be merely to drive the drink into other and even less desirable channels. Any attempt at a short cut to temperance will result in being the longest way round.

The common mistake is to lay all the blame upon drink, whereas the true evil is to be found in the conditions under which it is distributed and in over-indulgence. To insist, in the present state of the public taste, upon the prohibition of beer-drinking is as futile as to deny the value of the dietetic properties of pure malt and hop beer. In many working-class districts hosts of labouring men engaged in the hardest manual labour very largely live upon it.

Experience shows rather that guarantee of purity of alcoholics, limited indulgence, and healthy surroundings should be the first aims of the practical temperance reformer. Once concede this, and it is possible to instil some reality into licensing reform.

The whole tendency of the Acts of Parliament relating to this subject has hitherto been merely repressive in character. The want of certainty and uniformity in licensing practice, owing to the wide discretion given to Justices, has been and still is a very great hindrance to reform of a comprehensive character. Thus a practice which is well sattled in one division is frequently sternly discountenanced in one adjoining, although often apparently quite within the law. The variety of the conditions and amounts of monopoly value attached to new licenses furnish striking examples of this lack of uniformity.

The restrictive character of legislation and of the local rules of licensing Benches seems almost to assume that the sole endeavour of the average licensee is to overstep the bounds of decorum and good order, and this in spite of the fact that a man who wishes to acquire a license must produce certificates of good character, which, if strictly accurate, would place him above the angels. Nor is this, frequently, petty tyranny on the part of benevolent Benches and their clerks capable of acting as a real deterrent to a blackguard; at the most it restricts him to certain practices which are quite as undesirable as any of those

which are illegal.

On the other hand, the multiplication and complexity of the laws and rules when administered by an unwise or over-zealous and tactless constabulary, backed by a harsh and unsympathetic Bench, have been the downfall of many an honest man, and have prevented many another from entering the Trade. This is to be regretted, for, if experience teaches anything, it is that the personal equation is all-important. Every encouragement should be given to the best men to enter the Trade, and in any scheme of reform, if the publican is to give of his best, full play and wide discretion must, and can, be given for the exercise of his abilities.

Almost the whole of the reason for the existing undesirable condition of most licensed houses can be traced to the tied-house system, which places the retailer entirely in the hands of the merchant. The former is often tied down to purchase all his goods at usurious prices, compared with those charged to 'free' houses; and this applies sometimes even to sawdust and china. From his Brewer or Distiller, too, he generally obtains his capital, so that, in the result, though he is a tenant in name, he is often but a slave in fact. Everything therefore depends upon the brewer or the distiller, who, having acquired some eighty-five

per cent. to ninety per cent. of the licensed houses in the country, controls the situation.

Thus the old English hostelry, once so famous for its allround hospitality and good cheer, has been deposed, and has become, since the growth of the limited liability company, the mere catspaw and counter of the wholesaler; whilst its value is almost exclusively calculated nowadays in gallons of output of alcoholics.

Drink, in fact, instead of being a convenient adjunct to an eating-house, has now become the sole object of the existence of a licensed house; and legislation, which has been drafted largely upon the assumption that licensed houses are tied, has contributed to make it solely the object of everyone connected with the Trade to increase the alcoholic output to the greatest possible amount, by selecting, not the quantum of drink, but the size of the house, as the basis of taxation. So that it is to the tenant's advantage to limit the accommodation to the smallest extent, in order to secure as small a license duty, compensation charge, and assessments as possible.

Could any system be more insane than that which whittles down the ideal licensed house to one which is capable of distributing the greatest quantity of alcohol in the smallest possible space? Can anyone wonder that, with the additional pressure of recent taxation, the Trade has not hurried to add amenities beyond the bars?

Although public opinion has long revolted against this state of things, combined circumstances have prevented any real improvement. Music, dancing, cafés chantant, stage plays, cinematographs, and all games, save billiards, are either illegal or sternly discouraged, and in some licensing areas are absolutely forbidden. Thus, in the absence of counter-attractions, the only diversion left is to drink.

The Legislature effects nothing, because it realises that, short of drastic steps, which might reduce the revenue arising from the taxation of drink and licensed houses, it is powerless in the face of the tied-house system, which has been rendered impregnable, largely by reason of the technicalities of the licensing question, such as make a complete understanding of the subject a matter of difficulty to laymen. In these days of ever-increasing national expenditure no Government cares about reform at the expense of loss of revenue. The Justices, even with all the will in the world, see no course open to them, in the existing state of affairs and the present state of the law, other than to restrain and restrict the sale of drink as far as possible. They hesitate to create precedents, and prefer to follow the safest and easiest course.

So far indeed has this policy of restriction been carried that in many divisions temperance seems to be measured by the square yard, and permission to improve premises is refused merely on the ground that to grant it would be to increase the licensed area! In some divisions permission to improve licensed premises can only be obtained upon payment of a sum of money.

The Trade, in view of these restrictions, is unable to carry out improvements, or is unwilling to bear the burden of extra taxation, which would be the reward, and in the case of the provision of dining-rooms, etc., often the sole reward, for improving and enlarging the accommodation of its houses. The fact is that a very large proportion of the applications, made in the most specious manner, are only cleverly disguised attempts to increase the drinking facilities, while in the case of many honest applications the altered premises come to be used for a purpose very different from that originally intended.

Considering their elaboration, there is curiously little to be learnt from the latest Licensing Statistics upon which it is safe to deduce anything accurately and with certainty; but the following facts are, at any rate, incontrovertible. They show a considerable increase in the number of convictions for drunkenness, a very large increase in the numbers of registered clubs, and the fact that a high proportion of these have been struck off as not bona fide. They show, too, a constant increase in the convictions

of women for drunkenness.

From this it is fair to deduce that drunkenness has rather increased than diminished during the last four years, and that, although the number of licensed houses has been reduced, a very large part of the trade has been driven into clubs, which are free from license duty, and are not restricted as to hours of opening or closing, or subject to the same inspection as licensed houses. (During the War the sale of alcoholics is in certain districts suspended during certain hours both in clubs and licensed houses.) It is also incontrovertible that the great majority of registered clubs rely as much as, or more than, the ordinary public-house upon the sale of drink for their revenue. Clubs and off-licenses are very largely responsible for increased drinking among women. Brewers' vans (which in many cases are nothing but public-houses on wheels), clubs, off-licenses, and brewery taps compete very severely with the fully licensed house, and undoubtedly create far greater opportunities for secret drinking.

These facts, and the evidence presented by the conditions prevalent in many parts of our crowded towns and country districts, surely present a case for reform of a far-reaching character. It is evident that no sudden revolution would prove a

lasting success.

What then is the practical remedy?

Obviously, in the first place, the license duty should be levied, not upon the house, but upon the drink. It should vary with the quantity of drink sold or purchased, and not at all with the size of the premises. This plan would be an encouragement to licensees to extend their non-alcoholic trade at the expense of the alcoholic.

It is believed that hitherto the Excise authorities have objected to this very obvious reform on the ground of difficulty of collection. But if, as is the fact, it can be worked in the case of clubs, it can equally well be adapted to licensed houses. All that is necessary is to extend the 'permit' system, now in vogue in the case of spirits, to other alcoholics; to require every licensee to keep an account of his purchases of alcoholics, which he could easily do on the very simple 'permit' system, and to make his return. These returns could be checked by reference to the books of the merchants whence the goods were obtained, and the penalty for a false return should be the loss of the license.

By this plan, if the returns of tied houses were taken at the breweries, an enormous saving in the cost of collection could be effected, and license duties would bear equally upon all houses. The provision in the Finance Act, 1909 (1909-10), which gives a large rebate off license duty where licensees can show that two thirds of their receipts are referable to non-alcoholics, is a clumsy attempt towards this purpose. But there is ample evidence to show that these returns are frequently false, and there is no adequate machinery for checking them. Nor can many licensed houses which are honestly catering on an extensive scale properly produce two-third proportions.

No greater single incentive to temperance could be given than this reform of the incidence of license duty, and its tendency would be in all probability to break down the tied-house system. A license duty of 1s. to 1s. 3d. in the 1l. on purchases would probably produce a greater revenue than is now produced, and would affect all houses in like degree; whereas under the present system the duty varies from the equivalent of  $1\frac{1}{2}d$ . to as much as 5s. and 6s. in the 1l. on purchases, the houses with the best

accommodation being almost invariably penalised.

The next remedy is to place clubs upon the same footing, at least as regards taxation, as licensed houses; for it is obviously futile to expend large sums in reducing the number of redundant public-houses, if the result of such reduction is to increase the number of drinking clubs. Every club is run with a view to profit, otherwise it would not be continued, as a general rule; and, as we have seen, clubs compete directly with hotels and publichouses, so that it is difficult to see why they should not contribute

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substantially to the revenue. A large proportion are proprietary, either directly or indirectly, and only differ in technicalities from public-houses. Many of them indeed are tied and highly profitable to their owners, who most frequently are the nominees of brewers and distillers.

These two reforms would, it is believed, not be objected to by the majority of those interested in the Trade. Indeed the latter

would be warmly welcomed by licensees.

But these proposals by themselves could not be regarded as more than a step in the right direction and a first instalment. The next move is to effect the divorce of the retail from control by the wholesale trade. In the present circumstances this can be only effectively accomplished by enabling the State to regain control over the liquor traffic by means of an extension of the principle of the Public-House Trust.

The Trust system, which is now becoming tolerably well known, at least by name, may be roughly and shortly defined as the adaptation to English conditions of the principles which have proved so successful in Scandinavia. So far as the Scandinavian countries are concerned, it is not possible to find a responsible statesman who denies the efficacy of the system, or who would

return to the old order of things.

Let us examine shortly the result of the introduction of the Public-House Trust system into this country, where it exists only upon a voluntary basis, without any legislative or preferential

assistance, as in Norway and Sweden.

In the first place, it was commenced by inexperienced amateurs, who had to buy their experience, in some cases rather dearly. It had to fight jealousy and opposition from the Trade, misrepresentation and misconception by teetotallers, suspicion and distrust on the part of magistrates, police, and public, and all the prejudice which attaches to any new movement in this

country.

The Trust scheme was inaugurated upon an extensive scale by Lord Grey at the very commencement of the present century. Separate and independent companies, bound together only by a common ideal, a common principle, and similar methods, and all affiliated to a central organisation, were incorporated in many counties to acquire licensed houses of all descriptions by purchase or on lease, and to manage them on lines never before attempted upon a comprehensive scale, in the interests of the public rather than the publican. The dividend of each company is limited to a fixed maximum rate, and any surplus after provision for reserves is devoted to objects of public utility.

All the houses are 'free' for the purchase of goods in They are under the control of managers, the open market.

generally married couples, drawn from all ranks of life, according to the status of the house. These receive commissions upon all trade other than alcoholics, and thus the managers have a direct incentive to push the non-alcoholic side of the business. They also receive a fixed salary.

The business of the Company is controlled by directors, and the objects of the Trust are safeguarded by a council, who (through their trustees) hold all the deferred shares, which are of nominal value, but have a voting value equal to the whole of the ordinary (and preferred shares, if any), and thus retain a preponderating voting power. The council is composed of a large number of gentlemen of the highest standing.

The managers are bound by various rules, which effect the abolition of credit and other evils, such as the 'long pull,' but in the main they are given a large discretion and opportunity to indulge their individual idiosyncrasies and to give full play to their abilities. They are selected for their capacity as hosts and as caterers.

Since these companies were incorporated several have amalgamated, and a few have failed, until there exist to-day three companies of considerable importance, and a larger number of others each operating a comparatively small number of licensed houses. All the original objects and methods, as laid down by Lord Grey, have been retained, and more than 320 houses are at present being operated in various parts of the country on these lines.

It is perhaps unfortunate that no records of the whole of these companies are available, but the experience of one of the largest and most important of the companies, managing sixty houses in town and country, slum and village, colliery and other industrial areas, and in lonely districts, will give a good and sufficient indication of the success of the movement as a whole.

This company, which is the product of an amalgamation of several Trust Companies with the successful Hertfordshire Company, is registered under the title of Home Counties Public-House Trust, Limited.

It is a company limited by shares with a nominal capital of 150,000l., of which about 120,000l. is paid up. The annual turnover is at present about 150,000l., and the net profits earned during the last three years average more than ten per cent. upon the paid-up capital. The maximum dividend is paid to the shareholders, substantial reserve funds have been accumulated, and a considerable sum paid over to the trustees for objects of public utility.

The company employs approximately 900 managers and assistants, and during its ten years' existence has served more

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than eleven millions of customers. During the whole of that period not a single employé has been convicted of any breach of

the Licensing Acts or in respect of any other offence.

This immunity is the more remarkable when it is remembered that the company's houses are in many cases situated in very rough districts, that they have most frequently been acquired upon the failure of their previous occupants, and that they consist to the extent of one-half of houses acquired from the Trade and purchased in the open market. During the period of ten years the non-alcoholic receipts have risen from less than ten per cent. to more than forty-eight per cent. of the whole.

Games and music have shown themselves to be a powerful counter attraction to drink, and interesting experiments in cinematograph entertainments have also proved most successful. All classes of the public frequent the houses, and in one house alone

150,000 working men are catered for every year.

'The whole atmosphere of these Trust Houses,' says an independent observer, 'where flowers, pictures, and good taste in decoration have been substituted for vulgar and tawdry displays, is essentially different to that of the average Trade house.' Every house contains ample accommodation for the provision of non-alcoholics, and each contains an entrance separated from the bars. In several cases bars have been entirely swept away and refreshment-rooms substituted.

The success of this company is dependent upon and due to its managers and their assistants. At the outset it was difficult to get the best managers for such a novel experiment, but to-day the pick of the market are available, for in the absence of gross negligence and dishonesty they run no financial risk, and they share in all the receipts or profits, with the exception of those relating to alcohol, and are besides in receipt of a fixed salary.

Cordial approval of the work of these Trust Companies finds constant expression not only in the Press, but on the part of all classes and interests. If results such as these can be obtained by mere amateurs, working with poor material in the shape of houses, and in spite of fierce competition, what could not be effected by professionals, working in a monopoly area, with legislative and State assistance? There is in fact no practical obstacle to the adoption of this system upon a national scale.

It may be argued that if it is possible to effect so much upon a purely voluntary basis, it would be as well to continue to extend the movement in this way, and some colour can be given to such an argument by the success which has attended the efforts of most of the other Trust Companies. The answer is that expansion, on a voluntary basis, upon a very large scale is impossible. The growth and extent of the tied-house system is such



that more than ninety per cent. of the houses in England are tied. In many places all the licensed premises have been acquired by the Trade. Of the ten per cent. remaining, a considerable proportion are large hotels or restaurants, while most of the remainder, like the majority of Trade houses, are redundant, and worthless except as objects of compensation.

Another evil which requires remedy is the enormous percentage of redundant houses. Probably, with the doubtful exception of Middlesex, two thirds of the licensed houses in the Home Counties are redundant. The number of 'on'-licensed houses in England and Wales in 1912 was 89,849, and of 'off' licenses 23,815, and besides these there were 8209 registered clubs. This gives one on-licensed house to about every forty-two available customers.

The chance of making a living is, therefore, generally dependent upon adventitious attractions, or other employment. Thus, the weekly trade of many a house is less than one barrel weekly. The tied tenant, before the imposition of the so-called new War Tax on beer, paid 36s. for this and, if careful, obtained 48s. for it, a gross profit of 12s. per week, out of which he had to pay all the impositions, his rent, and his expenses. Such houses are either not licensed for spirits or, if they are, sell but little. How is a man in such case to live?

A barrelage of three per week probably represents approximately the average for the Home Counties. A loss is, therefore, almost a certainty if the house is to be carried on in a legitimate way, and this with working hours longer than any other business. Trading under these conditions is simply an invitation to malpractices and adulteration; the adulteration of beers and spirits is a most frequent evil. So also is selling under false labels. Small wonder is it that good tenants with financial means are difficult to find.

At the present rate of progress in reducing the number of licensed houses by payment of compensation, it will take seventy years to effect a reasonable reduction in their numbers, if the test of redundancy is that every licensee should be enabled to make a good living, without other occupation, in a strictly legitimate way.

Experience has proved that large houses are much more healthy, much less likely to lead to excess, much more easily inspected, than small ones. The only reason for which the police sometimes favour the latter is that they are in some cases the resort of the criminal classes. The advantage in every other respect lies with fewer and larger houses, where all drinking is coram populo. All back doors and dark entrances should be abolished.

All these, and many more reforms, too numerous to mention, can be effected by a State monopoly as regards public-houses; and experience has taught that, to obtain the best results,

monopoly is a vital necessity.

To bring this about upon a national scale it is advisable to divide all on-licensed houses into three classes, viz. (1) hotels, in regard to which the definition in the Scottish Licensing Acts might be of some assistance; (2) bona-fide restaurants, which could be limited to those where the non-alcoholic takings amounted to at least two thirds of the whole; and (3) publichouses, which would include the remainder. Of these, classes (1) and (2) would remain concerns of private enterprise, and should be encouraged as contributing to public convenience, but no counter bars should be allowed in hotels, unless they fell under the head of restaurants.

It is in regard to class (3) that legislation is requisite. This should provide a time-limit of fourteen years, during which the maximum compensation charge levy should be exacted, and this should be invested to form the nucleus of a compensation fund for the extinguished licenses. During the fourteen years such new licenses as are applied for, and granted, should pay their monopoly payments into the compensation fund. At the end of the time-limit all licenses, as now granted, should be extinguished, including grocers' and 'off' licenses (and these two

last mentioned should not be renewed in any form).

Statutory companies should be formed in every county or in sections of counties, based upon the lines regulating existing Public-House Trust Companies. Upon the termination of the time-limit these statutory companies should have the power to acquire, at their unlicensed value, such old-licensed or other premises as are deemed necessary, in 'populous places' according to a definite ratio of population, and in other places according to geographical area. Regard must be had and provision made for those places to which the public come in large numbers at intervals, such as market towns and tourist resorts, and for these machinery must be set up for the grant of occasional and seasonal licenses. The existing provisions in respect of occasional and seasonal licenses are very inconvenient and inept. All such houses as are acquired should be remodelled upon model lines. Existing Trust Companies furnish numerous examples.

So far as good order is concerned, the companies should be regulated and controlled by the Justices to the same, or to a similar extent, as at present. The power to regulate the number of hotels and restaurants should also be left to Justices. All the profits arising from the operation of the houses by the statutory companies should be paid into the Imperial Exchequer and not

to the local authorities. Additional reforms could be introduced from time to time, in accordance with the dictates of public opinion.

The brewers and distillers would continue to supply the statutory companies with such commodities as they required, upon fixed formulae as regards quality, gravity, strength, and age. In this way a much needed check upon the nature and

quality of alcoholics would be effected.

Commissioners appointed by and responsible to a central board, under the authority of the Imperial Parliament, should control the companies, direct their policy, and make rules in accordance with the needs of each district. Such rules should be as few as possible.

When some such system as that indicated is instituted we may see the end of the gin palace, which has forged the yoke of the working classes, demoralised their mind, lessened their capacity for labour and affected its quality. Then, and not till then, we may reasonably hope to see the last of the type of drunken mother, bearing and rearing a race of feeble-minded and unfit offspring, who carry from their birth the curse of over-indulgence in drink, and are besotted from their earliest years by their surroundings.

Improved housing is useless without improved habits of sobriety, and sobriety is largely influenced by environment. The environment of a licensed house should and can be fit in any locality for all classes and both sexes. It should be a place into which it is the privilege of the respectable to enter, and not the

refuge of the outcast.

It may be that drunkenness is less apparent in our streets and lanes than in days gone by, but statistics tell their own tale. If the statistics do not suffice, the inquirer can easily prove the case for reform by spending a few mornings at some of the police courts, or a few Saturday nights at or near licensed houses, or Sundays in some of the clubs, and it will then be patent to him that the Drink Question is the most urgent of the day, as drink remains, purveyed as it is at present, our great national curse.

ALEXANDER F. PART.


## THE SOUL OF RUSSIA

The other day I went to see a play, the scenes of which were set in many different countries. One of these, the bill announced, was to be in Russia: I whispered to my companion 'That scene will be about a revolutionary who has been exiled to Siberia.' Of course it was. Our popular imaginative artists, eagerly searching for the picturesque, have picked up no other information about this huge nation, have taught their public nothing else. 'Tis not that these thrilling incidents are untrue. They have all happened over and over again; the best is true and the worst is true of the Russian Empire.

It is quite easy to make a fancy picture of Russia. It is also easy to make a fancy picture of England; and it has been done by Treitschke and his German disciples-with results as surprising now to the artists as to the sitter. All such portraits are made with facts, just as all pictures are made with colours; but the truth of your picture depends upon your insight and your sense of proportion-otherwise your 'Portrait of a Master of the Hounds' may turn out to be a Sunset in the Sahara. If a foreign writer selects extracts from the speeches of Sir Edward Carson, Michael Davitt, Mr. Bonar Law, and a member of the Shinn Fein, adds a few picturesque tragedies from Ireland, a few incidents from the lives of Clive and Warren Hastings, with an account of the firing of Sepoys from the cannon's mouth in the reign of Queen Victoria, and a few gruesome facts from the history of Newgate; and appends to this a description of what Florence Nightingale found in the Crimea (without mentioning Florence Nightingale), and an account of how we lost our American Colonies, giving the whole a historical flavour by sketches of the characters of King John, Richard the Third, Henry the Eighth, Queen Mary, and Titus Oates: he may prove to the satisfaction of his hearers that our Empire was built up by crime, and is held by cowardly incompetence. Many Germans quite sincerely believe that this is a picture of England. They all believe in the picture they have made of Russia as a bloodstained Cossack: it was the bogie of 'Muscovite savagery,'

of 'Oriental Slavic quasi-civilisation'—or, to quote the Socialist and Pacificist Volkstimme, of 'Russian despotism,' 'Russian bestiality,' 'a merciless and barbaric enemy'—which closed their ranks at the beginning of the War; and learned philosophers, exact scientists and acute critics, like Eucken and Häckel and Harnack, wrote about 'Asiatic Barbarism,' as if this was a self-evident fact, a postulate common to them and to us. Yet Russia had never done England or Germany any harm; its 'hordes' had never descended upon Germany or upon us, though we had in the Crimean War, without any decent excuse and in the sole interest of the Antichrist of Stamboul, descended upon Russia; it was indeed these same Muscovite hordes which had saved Germany from utter destruction at the hands of Napoleon; had in fact emancipated her and made possible the formation of the German Empire.


Russia is one of the youngest brethren of the Christian family --almost as young as Prussia, which has had not nineteen but only six centuries of Christianity; for she was held back by the Tatar domination (just when we were establishing our freedom upon the basis of Magna Carta), and she was until modern times isolated from the West of Europe. Consequently she has had to cram an enormous amount of progress into the last century, and in certain ways is still a backward nation. It may with some truth be said that in Russia the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were all telescoped into the nineteenth; and consequently things were done then by the Russian Government which we used to do in the Tudor period. Russia had much leeway to make up; and moreover Russia is a country of extremes -externally of great distances and isolated satrapies, of extremes of heat and cold, which strongly affect the national character; and spiritually it is a country of extreme opinions, and of swift changes. Even when he is an unbeliever, the Russian is a man of intense faith; he transfers to his politics the same fervent receptiveness which he used to give to his religion. He is ever an idealist, and his politics become a religion. He wants to die for them. He is a 'whole-hogger.' In the West an extreme Socialist may sometimes seem to swallow Marx or Henry George intact; but, unless he is young, he has some reservations: visions of compromise are at the back of his mind, a touch of halfacknowledged scepticism, a tendency to substitute evolution for revolution, a sense that when Utopia comes it will be somewhat different from the Utopias. In Russia it is much less so: the revolutionary is apt to be passionately idealistic, to swallow whole the creed he has got from the West: he is still 'Orthodox,' still loyal to the death, and a martyr, with that strange Russian instinct for suffering, and that strange mixture of sanguine



buoyancy and sudden despair; he puts into his theory a faith which would surprise his Western teachers. Hence the horror which reactionaries of the Pobyedonóstseff stamp had both of Liberalism and of the West. The mildest Western ideas became a flaming sword in the hands of the Russian student. And this intensified the contrary evils of Prussian bureaucratic methods, which have been fastened upon Russia since the days of Peter the Great: they have been bad enough in Prussia; they have been worse in Russia, so sweeping in her thought, so casual in her action. Hence the clash of ideals; hence the sins, negligences and ignorances both of the Bureaucracy and its opponents.

The change of name from Petersburg to Petrograd-long desired by Pan-Slavists-is itself a sign that the evil of a Prussianised Russia is coming to an end; the far greater change—also long desired-of the virtual headship of the Church from the Oberprokuror of the Holy Synod to a revived Patriarchate of Moscow (or perhaps of Constantinople), will, when it comes, carry the process infinitely farther; for the Teutonic device by which Peter made the Church politically a department of his bureaucratic state has enchained the clergy and injured some of the deepest strongholds of religion. Indeed the qualities of Slav and Teuton do not mix well; Treitschke and Nietzsche are themselves results of the mixture, as is much of the peculiar Prussian spirit, for the blood of the two races is intermingled throughout the patrimony of the Hohenzollerns. The German virtues as we see them in the Bavarian peasant, and the Russian virtues as we see them in the Russian peasant, are better kept distinct. As with blood, so with customs and ideas. Russia has drunk at the source of Prussian methods, and they have not suited her. She can never have the persistent industry or the bovine docility of her neighbours: the very rigours of her winter climate produce a capacity for doing nothing during long periods which vitiates the methods of bureaucratic organisation. It is indeed perfectly true that the first words a stranger learns in Russia are Nichevó and Sycichass, which, with Pozháluista, make him realise that he is with a people easy-going, dilatory, and polite. None of us have had dealings with Russia who have not learnt to make allowances for men who will put off answering urgent letters for weeks or for ever, and who are perfectly charming, and enthusiastically active when we get to close quarters. German is a great organiser, and a sober, weighty unit in the machinery which he devises so well. The Russian is the most unbusinesslike person in the civilised world; his government is fitful, sometimes too cruel, often too kind, and generally too lax -laggard and tolerant for a generation, and then swiftly making a vast change that would take an Englishman centuries to effect.

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The real government of Russia has always been a government by intuition. The fatherland, to which the hearts of all Russians turn, is a family; the Russia in which every Russian believes is that large, patient, communal soul which not even the Tatar domination could quell or change, which caused her people to cling together by an inveterate instinct of solidarity at times when rulers were not to be found and nobles were false. Ruled by Moslems, overrun by Poles, invaded again to the heart of the land by Swedes, struggling desperately with Turks, trampled by the Grande Armée till she sacrificed her gloriously beautiful Moscow to be free—this enduring brotherhood has never weakened, but has waxed in every desperate adversity, like an army that can go on fighting when all its leaders are killed, because each man trusts and understands the other. The great poet Pushkin has described the spirit of his country:

By lasting out the strokes of fate, In trials long they learned to feel Their inborn strength—as hammer's weight Will splinter glass but temper steel.


Russia is a family as no other nation is; and the Tsar deserves his popular title of Little Father, because he is the head of a family: it is a title that certainly could not be applied to the Emperors who weld together twenty recalcitrant peoples in Germany and Austria; but it could not be applied either in the Russian sense to any other ruler in the world. For this reason is Russian patriotism so indomitable and Russian loyalty so intense. Under difficulties, and amid privations, which we in the West can hardly imagine, the nation has grown from the obscure principality which Vladímir made Christian in the tenth century, to the remote unconsidered Muscovy which Shakespeare had heard talk of, to the vast coherent Empire of to-day, which still we know so little: and the texture is still the same throughout; the people cling together and understand. Their quarrels are family quarrels, resounding and tragic; but when an outsider tries to thrust his hand between the bark and the tree he learns something about Russian unity, and about a wider unity still, the unity of the Slav race, which, if it makes all Russians brothers, makes first cousins of all the Slavonic nations. The Russian Government could not have avoided helping Serbia, for the Russian people would not have allowed the Tsar to stand aside, and when the people choose they rule. The Russian Government can defy the 'Intelligentsia,' but it cannot overrule the people-not even to bring the Kalendar up to date. Every



Russian felt a responsibility for Serbia, because the Serbians are Slavs and are Orthodox. And even the Poles, Westernised as they were in the Middle Ages, and severed as they are by religion, have rallied to Russia. The world has rung with the wrongs of Russian Poland, for the Poles are a brilliant and eloquent people; but when the War broke out the Polish members of the Duma did not hesitate for a moment. The quarrels of the past had been terrible; but they were family quarrels after all. The Pole has hated the Russian bureaucracy, and no wonder; but he hates the Prussian, man for man, with a continual vigour that must be seen to be realised. He remembers, too, that the crime of the partition of Poland was done by three Germans: Frederick the Great, Maria Teresa, and Katharine of Russia. Perhaps he remembers in justice too that before this it was Russia herself that had been carved by Poland, and that in the first partition she won back the White Russians who were her own people. But, if the rally of Poland is a wonderful thing, the rally of Russian revolutionaries is still more significant. Exiles come back and give themselves up to arrest, in order that they may be allowed to fight in the army. Advanced Liberals write to explain that all their cherished ideals are bound up with the future of Russia and her present success. They believe in their political faith, and yet, and yet—they believe in Russia more, and something within tells them that all will be well if Russia triumphs.

They are right. The future of the world lies in the accomplishment of brotherhood. And the future of the world lies in the peasantry; and the real, enduring Russia is the Russia, not of the Intelligentsia but of the peasant---that unspoilt child of nature and religion, simple, brave, faithful, loyal, and most mar-Foreigners speak of Russian vellously strong and patient. barbarism, and it is the peasant they have in their minds. Russians speak of the evils of Western corruption, and they too are thinking of the peasant: they see how badly Russia has suffered, in methods, in morals, in religion, since Peter 'opened a window to the West.' The gains they recognise also, and the necessity of competence in modern sciences and arts; but they see in the aristocracy, in the commercial class, in the Intelligentsia, in the industrials of the towns, abundant signs that Western influences may rot rather than ripen the Russian character. The Russian peasant, they feel, so long as he remains on the land, preserves the national character in its strength and purity; he changes rapidly for the worse, they say, in the industrial centres, just as we are told the Irish peasant loses some of his beautiful unworldly qualities when he emigrates to America. But the peasant is Russia, overwhelmingly he is Russia; and the other classes are but as the clothes and ornaments on a man. The peasant needs more education, like the rest of us; but if he can be kept free to develop on his own lines, and to lose nothing of his ancient virtues in the onward march, then it will be well with Russia, and she will contribute to the civilisation of the future quite as much as she borrows. The conviction of the ablest Russian Liberals that their country has an immense civilising mission in Europe as well as in Asia—and that the true democratic ideal cannot be established without her—is based upon this faith in the peasant. Tolstoy personifies the idea. He stands before the world in peasant garb, as one who has turned his back upon the gilded saloons of Petersburg (it was Petersburg then), to live on the land, to speak the thoughts and to use the well of Russian undefiled which is the language of the peasantry. And he finds the summary of his peasant ideal in the Gospel: Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.

'Russian barbarism,' say the Germans; and their dread of it has plunged Europe in war. Many of our own people have said the same thing-I notice that even Mr. Wells has occasionally fallen into the habit in his most able book about the crisis; while the little band of Liberals, who are telling us in a series of tracts how to avoid war for ever, continually press the accusation upon their English readers, and are thereby unwittingly sowing the seeds of another war; for this is the way that wars are made-the dragon's teeth are sown long before, and fear, hatred, and contempt accumulate till they can be contained no more, and the word goes out to kill. Now, what these denunciators all have in their minds when they speak of barbarism must be the Russian peasant; for no one in his senses could use the phrase of the brilliant and cultivated educated classes: to compare the education of the English middle class, for instance, with that of Russia would be, as Mr. Maurice Baring says, 'merely silly.' No, the Englishman who can speak no language but his own has at least learnt to respect the Russians as linguists. But the peasant? He is still largely illiterate -some 80 per cent. of the population in Russia, and about 40 per cent. (a significant drop) among the Russian colonists of Siberia; he is different from our peasantry in appearance, for he looks like a real peasant and does not wear the townsmen's shabby clothes; and he is poor. He is really proud of being a peasant. Would that we could say the same of England! And he has the thoughtful, retentive mind of the man who has not been spoilt by cheap reading. 'I belong to the shallow Intelligentsia,' said in all complacency one of Mr. Stephen Graham's half-Westernised Russians; and of how many in the West would this be true also! The Russian peasant is not shallow. He is full of natural poetry, his talk is shrewd and humorous, and he is observant and reflective as well as good-natured and sociable;



lazy and slow he often is, but wonderfully clever with his hands, and also unalterably stubborn. Like the Irish peasant, he has a mind steeped in folk-lore, folk-song, and religion. Some inquiring person instituted a census as to the favourite books in certain Russian village libraries. No one would ever guess the favourite work which these uncultured peasants read to one another. It was a translation of Milton's Paradise Lost! I have mentioned Tolstoy, whose estimate of the peasantry would deserve consideration even if it were not also that of most Russian writers. His peculiar literary excellence in the eyes of his fellow-countrymen is that he writes in such beautiful Russian, and the language he habitually uses is the simple speech of the peasants. There are no dialects in Russia; there is nothing like the Cockney accent. The peasant speaks like a gentleman.

Above all things, he is religious. We are apt, when people are not religious in our funny way, to call them superstitious. and so to dispose of them. And Russia we are apt to judge by her picturesque and moving acts of devotion-calling them superstitious if we think that beauty is a superstition. The outward religion of Russia is indeed wonderful and touching: it is so universal, in all places and among all classes, so free from Western threadbare chilliness—for indeed it is Oriental in its freedom from self-consciousness, in its simple fervour. A Western cannot but be immensely struck when he sees a general in uniform bowing at a wayside shrine, a policeman saying his prayers aloud in the snow, a fat merchant in astrakhan crossing himself with his cigar before an ikon in a crowded railway station. Devotion is poured out fervently at all times and in all places. And this gives the whole country an aspect of immanent Christianity, and we feel that it has a right to the title of Svyataya Russ, 'Holy Russia' -- more perhaps than we to that of 'Merrie England.' If Christ were to come through the streets of London to-day, comforting and healing people, we know that all our ways would have to be suddenly transformed. In Russia there would be no change—I had almost said no surprise. Indeed, underneath the gorgeous and elaborate rites of the Eastern Church which impress an Englishman and puzzle him, Russian religion is singularly evangelical. The Russian Church has many faults of organisation, and a wise reform will soon be a matter of terrible urgency; her clergy need a higher standard of education-they need, I think, a full and true intercourse with our English clergy, for the advantage of us all; but the Russian Church is the Church of the people, as is no Church of Western Christendom (except perhaps in some parts of Ireland, for here again the geographical extremes of Europe meet); she belongs to the people, and the people belong to her; and the common faith is Gospel Christianity-in many ways more evangelical than anything we have in the West. We often say here that the Sermon on the Mount is impracticable. It is not impracticable in Russia. The spirit of it comes naturally to the peasants, the *Krestianye*<sup>1</sup>; they have learned through a long endurance lessons which may one day work as a leaven throughout Christendom. I think, if Christ came down to earth to-day, He would gather the peasants of Russia together, and say over them the Beatitudes.

If the future of the world lies in the men of the soil, if it lies in the spread of brotherhood, if it lies in religion, as the past has lain, then Russia has great and precious treasures to bring to the building of the new age. She has many faults-there is something medieval in the sharp mixture of violent sins and violent virtues, of unworthy acts and ecstasies of worship; her peasants are not saints, though they are the stuff from which saints are often made—their character has been marred by drunkenness and its resultant crimes; her Government has been guilty of base blunders, of cruel and foolish policies of repression, her statesmen have sometimes run after wild and aggressive ambitions; acts of medieval savagery are nearer in her history than in ours. All Europe has heard of the Tatar in the Russian character. All Europe has heard of the worst in Russia-of the knout, of serfdom, of exile to Siberia, of pogroms, secret police, a persecuted Press, and military executions. Her vivid mixture of black and white is very unlike our Western grevness. But much of the black has gone already: the knout and the clanking of exiles' chains, so dear to melodrama, have gone, and serfdom has been long abolished; drunkenness has even now been swept away, and we here in our shame look with envy at the nation which has purged itself-with a great price has obtained this freedom. That is so like Russia! We pity her faults; and, lo, with a bound she has passed far ahead of us, and it is we who are still wallowing in our Occidental barbarism! Now, every Russian is confident about the future because he knows that his nation has this wonderful vitality in reform. The evils which we think peculiarly Russian he attributes to foreign influences; he remembers that few of her leading statesmen in the nineteenth century were of Russian birth, that the chief Foreign Minister from the time of Napoleon to the Crimean War could not even speak the Russian language; he thinks of his country as the champion of Christendom against the Turk and his atrocities-alas! that England opposed her in her workas the protector of free Montenegro, the liberator of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, of half Armenia-and now of all Armenia. He knows that the secret police are a temporary body

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A Christian in Russian is Christiánin, a peasant Krestyanin, from Krest, the cross; Muzhik is a more familiar expression.

whose crimes are a disgrace and whose days are numbered; the ordinary police are as kindly as our own. He attributes the persecutions in his country to the officials of the past-to a system that was not Russian, trying to defend itself against very dangerous doctrines, and driven to repression as our own Liberal Government was driven by the far milder excesses of the militants here. He admits that his country is behind ours in political freedom; but he is confident. The Duma for all its disabilities is very much alive; the electoral system is indeed deliberately undemocratic, but not worse than the three-class system of Prussia; and the freedom of the executive from parliamentary control is only another Prussian fault. Henceforward the influence will be that of England and France alone, and there will be no Dreikaiserbund. The Duma has secured the principle, and practice will not follow on so slowly as it has often done in Russia; the peasant has the instinct of self-government, long traditions in the village communism of the Mir, and much practice in the more modern Zemstvo. Russians often speak of their country as the most democratic in Europe, and socially this is true. In social freedom, too, a Russian will insist that he is ahead of us—that people live their own life, that there is no tyranny of public opinion as with us, that the woman's movement is more advanced than in England, and far more than in France or Germany.

He will perhaps ask us whether it is really true that we have a dramatic censor who forbids the production of Maeterlinck's Monna Vanna! There is a saying that in Russia everything is forbidden but everything is done: an enormous list of rules hangs in the railway stations, but no one has ever read them. Russia is very tender, very lenient—too lenient in some ways. Many terrible things have happened in Siberia; but yet it is true that prisoners were generally released when they arrived there; and now that transportation is in principle abolished, Russian criminals must regret that they have to put up with the monotonous certitude of a convict prison-though even the prisons, as Mr. Bernard Pares describes them, are pleasant places compared with the solitary horror of our British cells. to think of Russia as a country of torture and death; and yet Russia is ahead of us in having no capital punishment—except when martial law is proclaimed, as too often has been the case. The story of Dostoyévsky's famous novel Crime and Punishment would be impossible in England, for the neurotic student who is its hero would with us have been summarily hanged for his very bad case of murder; as it is, he gets a few years in Siberia, is converted by the devotion of a woman who had been driven on the streets and follows him to exile, and the story ends with a



As Maria Theresa, the Austrian Empress, refused to take a hand in the partition of Poland, he began to work upon her son and successor. Joseph the Second, born in 1741, was at the time young, enthusiastic, inexperienced, hasty, vain, and he thirsted for glory. He envied Frederick's successes. Playing upon his vanity and upon that of Prince Kaunitz, the leading Austrian statesman, Frederick the Great obtained their support for partitioning Poland. After a long but fruitless resistance against her son and her principal adviser, Maria Theresa signed, it is said with tears in her eyes, on the 4th of March 1772, the Partition Treaty. However, in signing it, she expressed her dissent and disapproval in the following prophetic phrase:

Placet, puisque tant et de savants personnages veulent qu'il en soit ainsi; mais, longtemps après ma mort, on verra ce qui résulte d'avoir ainsi foulé aux pieds tout ce que jusqu'à présent on a toujours tenu pour juste et pour sacré.

To preserve the appearance of legitimacy the partitioning Powers wished to receive the consent of the Polish Diet to their act of spoliation. Frederick the Great describes how that consent was obtained. After mentioning that each of the partitioning Powers sent an army to Poland to overawe the people, and that Warsaw was occupied by troops, he wrote in his Memoirs:

At first the Poles were obstinate and rejected all proposals. The representatives did not come to Warsaw. Having grown tired of the long delay, the Court of Vienna proposed to appoint a day for the opening of the Diet, threatening that in case of the non-appearance of the delegates, the three Powers would partition not merely part but the whole of the country. If, on the other hand, the cession of the outlying districts was effected by voluntary agreement, the foreign troops would be withdrawn from Poland. That declaration overcame all difficulties. The Treaty of Cession was signed with Prussia on the 18th of September, and Poland was guaranteed the integrity of her remaining provinces. . The Poles, who are the most easy-going and most foolish nation in Europe, thought at first that they could safely consent because they would be able to destroy the work of the three Powers within a short time. They argued thus in the hope that Russia might be defeated by Turkey.

At the first partition Prussia, Austria, and Russia were, according to their treaty concluded with Poland, to take certain vast but clearly defined territories from that unhappy State. However, by fraud and violence they greatly exceeded the stipulated limits. Frederick the Great tells us with his habitual cynical candour:

The Poles complained loudly that the Austrians and Prussians increased their shares without limit. There was some reason for these complaints. The Austrians used a very wrong map of Poland on which the names of the rivers Sbruze and Podhorze had been exchanged, and making use of

this pretext enlarged their portion very greatly beyond the limits agreed upon by the Treaty of Partition. The basis of the Treaty had been that the shares of the three Powers should be equal. As the Austrians had increased their share, King Frederick considered himself justified in doing likewise, and included in Prussia the districts of the old and the new Netze.

Careful study of the Memoirs and of the diplomatic and private correspondence of the time shows convincingly that Frederick the Great was the moving spirit, and that he was responsible for the first partition of Poland, that Russia and Austria were merely his tools and his dupes. He has told us in his Memoirs that he sent the original plan of partition to Petersburg, attributing it to the fertile brain of a visionary statesman Count Lynar. The late Lord Salisbury wrote in his valuable essay 'Poland,' published in the Quarterly Review in 1863, in which, by the by, he treated the claims of the Poles with little justice:

By a bold inversion of the real degrees of guilt the chief blame is laid on Russia. Prussia is looked upon as a pitiful and subordinate accomplice, while Austria is almost absolved as an unwilling accessory. . . .

To Frederick the Great of Prussia belongs the credit of having initiated the scheme which was actually carried into execution. It is now admitted, even by German historians, that the first partition was proposed to Catharine by Prince Henry of Prussia on behalf of his brother Frederick, and with the full acquiescence of Joseph, Emperor of Germany. Frederick had never been troubled with scruples upon the subject of territorial acquisition, and he was not likely to commence them in the case of Poland. Spoliation was the hereditary tradition of his race. The whole history of the kingdom over which he ruled was a history of lawless annexation. It was formed of territory filched from other races and other Powers, and from no Power so liberally as from Poland.

The fact that Frederick the Great was responsible for the first partition of Poland is acknowledged not only by leading German historians, but even by the German school-books. As an excuse, it is usually stated that necessity compelled Frederick to propose that step because the anarchy prevailing in Poland made impossible its continued existence as an independent State. However, German writers never mention that the Poles themselves earnestly wished to reform the State, and that Frederick not only opposed that reform but greatly increased disorder by putting his own nominee on the Polish throne, by causing civil war to break out in the country, by raising the Polish Dissenters against the Government, by occupying Poland in conjunction with Russia, by interfering with its elections and Government, and by bribing and overawing its Legislature by armed force.

The second partition of Poland in 1793 is perhaps even more disgraceful to Prussia than was the first, because it involved that country and her King in an act of incredible treachery.

Frederick the Great died in 1786. His successor, Frederick William the Second, was a worthless individual, and he brought about the second partition by means which his uncle would have disdained. Mr. M. S. F. Schöll, a German diplomat of standing, described in Koch's classical Tableau des Révolutions de l'Europe, which is still much used by students of history, and especially by diplomats, the infamous way in which Prussia betrayed Poland at the time of the second partition in the following words:

While in France, during the Revolution, the nation was seized by a sudden rage and abolished all institutions and all law and order, giving itself up to excesses which one would have thought to be impossible, another nation in the North of Europe, which was plunged in anarchy and oppressed by its neighbours, made a noble effort to establish good order and to throw off its foreign yoke.

The Poles had persuaded themselves that they might be able to change their vicious constitution and to give renewed strength to the Government of the Polish Republic during a time when Russia was occupied with wars against Sweden and Turkey. An Extraordinary Diet was convoked at Warsaw, and in order to abolish the inconvenience of the liberum veto, which required unanimity of votes, it adopted the form of a Confederation. The Empress, Catherine the Second of Russia, approached the Polish Diet and endeavoured to conclude with it an alliance against the Turks. Her pian was spoiled by the King of Prussia, who, in consequence of arrangements made with England, did all in his power to rouse the Poles against the Russians. He encouraged them by offering them his alliance to undertake the reformation of their Government which Prussia had recently guaranteed. A Committee of the Polish Diet was instructed to draw up a plan of a constitution designed to regenerate the Republic.

The resolution taken by the Diet was likely to displease the Empress of Russia, who considered that step as a formal breach of the Treaty between Russia and Poland concluded in 1775. As the Poles could foresee that the changes which they desired to effect were likely to involve them in differences with the Empress of Russia, they ought before all to have thought of preparing their defence. However, instead of improving their finances and strengthening their army, the Diet lost much in discussing the projected new constitution. Prussia's protection, of which they had officially been assured, made the Poles too confident. The alliance which the King of Prussia actually concluded with the Republic on the 27th of March 1790 gave them a feeling of absolute security. King Stanislaus Augustus hesitated a long time as to the attitude which he should adopt. At last he joined that party of the Diet which desired to draw Poland out of the humiliating position in which she had fallen. The new constitution was proclaimed on the 3rd of May 1791.

Although that constitution was not perfect, it was in accordance with Poland's conditions. It corrected the vices of her ancient laws, and although it was truly Republican in spirit, it avoided the exaggerated ideas to which the French Revolution had given rise. The throne was made hereditary. The absurd liberum veto was abolished. The Diet was declared permanent and the legislative body was divided into two chambers. The lower one was to discuss laws. The upper one, the Senate, presided over by the King, was to sanction them and to exercise the veto. The

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executive power was entrusted to the King and a Council of Supervision composed of seven responsible Ministers. . . .

The exertions made by the Poles for ensuring their independence aroused Russia's anger. As soon as the Empress of Russia had concluded peace with Turkey, she induced her supporters in Poland to form a separate confederation which aimed at revoking the innovations which the Diet of Warsaw had introduced. It strove to bring the old Polish constitution once more into force. That confederation was concluded on the 14th of May 1792, at Targowice, and the Counts Felix Potocki, Rzewuski and Branicki were its leaders.

The Empress of Russia sent an army into Poland in support of the new Confederation, and made war against those Poles who were in favour Only then did the Poles seriously think of of the new constitution. vigorous counter measures. The Diet decreed that the Polish Army should be placed on a war footing, and a loan of 33,000,000 florins was arranged for. However, when the Prussian Ambassador was asked to state what assistance the King, his master, would give in accordance with his pledges contained in the Treaty of Alliance of 1790—according to Articles 3 and 4 he was to furnish the Republic with 18,000 men, and in case of need with 30,000 men-he gave an evasive answer which threw the patriotic party into despair. The refusal of the Polish Diet to sanction a commercial proposal by which Poland would have abandoned the towns of Danzig and Thorn to Prussia had angered that monarch against the Poles, and the Empress of Russia did not find it difficult to obtain the Prussian King's consent to another partition of the country. The aversion which the sovereigns felt against everything which resembled the French Revolution, with which, however, the events in Poland, where King and nation acted in harmony, had nothing in common except appearances, strongly influenced the Berlin Court and caused it to break the engagements which it had contracted with the Republic. The Poles understood the danger of their position. Their enthusiasm cooled, and the whole Diet was seized with a feeling of consternation. Having to rely on their own strength, and being torn by dissensions, the Poles were unable to face their Russian The patriotic party was unfortunate in the opponents with success. campaign of 1792. After several victories the Russians advanced upon Warsaw and King Stanislaus, who was easily discouraged, joined the Confederation of Targowice, denounced the Constitution of the 3rd of May, and subscribed on the 25th of August 1792 to all the conditions which the Empress of Russia prescribed. An armistice was declared, and in consequence of its stipulations the Polish Army was reduced. In virtue of the Convention of Petersburg of the 23rd of January 1793, concluded between Prussia and Russia, the Prussian troops entered Poland and spread throughout the country, following Russia's example. Proclamations of the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg were published, by which these States took possession of those districts of the country which their troops had occupied. The adoption by Poland of the principles of 1789 and the propagation of the democratic principles of the French by the Poles were given as reasons for the second partition of Poland. . . .

The partitioning Powers renounced once more all rights and claims to the territories of the Republic, and bound themselves to recognise, and even to guarantee, if desired, the Constitution which the Polish Diet would draw up with the free consent of the Polish nation.

Notwithstanding the reiterated promises of respecting the integrity of the much-reduced country, the third partition took place in 1795.

From the very beginning Prussia, Austria, and Russia treated Poland as a corpus vile, and cut it up like a cake, without any regard to the claims, the rights, and the protests of the Poles themselves. Although history only mentions three partitions, there were in reality seven. There were those of 1772, 1793, and 1795, already referred to; and these were followed by a redistribution of the Polish territories in 1807, 1809, and 1815. In none of these were the inhabitants consulted or even considered. The Congress of Vienna established the independence of Cracow, but Austria-Hungary, asserting that she considered herself 'threatened' by the existence of that tiny State, seized it in 1846.

While Prussia, Austria, and Russia, considering that might was right, had divided Poland amongst themselves, regardless of the passionate protests of the inhabitants, England had remained a spectator, but not a passive one, of the tragedy. She viewed the action of the Allies with strong disapproval, but although she gave frank expression to her sentiments, she did not actively interfere. After all, no English interests were involved in the partition. It was not her business to intervene. Besides, she could not successfully have opposed single-handed the joint action of the three powerful partner States, especially as France, under the weak Louis the Fifteenth, held aloof. However, English statesmen refused to consider as valid the five partitions which took place before and during the Napoleonic era.

The Treaty of Chaumont of 1814 created the Concert of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna of 1815 the frontiers of Europe were fixed by general consent. As Prussia, Austria, and Russia refused to recreate an independent Poland, England's opposition would have broken up the Concert, and might have led to further wars. Unable to prevent the injustice done to Poland by her opposition, and anxious to maintain the unity of the Powers and the peace of the world, England consented at last to consider the partition of Poland as a fait accompli, and formally recognised it, especially as the Treaty of Vienna assured the Poles of just and fair treatment under representative institutions. Article 1 of the Treaty of Vienna stated expressly:

Les Polonais, sujets respectifs de la Russie, de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, obtiendront une représentation et des institutions nationales réglées d'après le mode d'existence politique que chacun des gouvernements auxquels ils appartiennent jugera utile et convenable de leur accorder.

By signing the Treaty of Vienna, England recognised not explicitly, but merely implicitly, the partition of Poland, and she did so unwillingly and under protest. Lord Castlereagh

stated in a Circular Note addressed to Russia, Prussia, and Austria, that it had always been England's desire that an independent Poland, possessing a dynasty of its own, should be established, which, separating Austria, Russia, and Prussia, should act as a buffer State between them; that, failing its creation, the Poles should be reconciled to being dominated by foreigners, by just and liberal treatment which alone would make them satisfied. His Note, which is most remarkable for its far-sightedness, wisdom, force, and restraint, was worded as follows:

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna, in desiring the present Note concerning the affairs of Poland may be entered on the Protocol, has no intention to revive controversy or to impede the progress of the arrangements now in contemplation. His only object is to avail himself of this occasion of temperately recording, by the express orders of his Court, the sentiments of the British Government upon a European question of the utmost magnitude and influence.

The Undersigned has had occasion in the course of the discussions at Vienna, for reasons that need not now be gone into, repeatedly and earnestly to oppose himself, on the part of his Court, to the erection of a Polish Kingdom in union with and making a part of the Imperial Crown of

Russia.

The desire of his Court to see an independent Power, more or less considerable in extent, established in Poland under a distinct Dynasty, and as an intermediate State between the three great Monarchies, has uniformly been avowed, and if the Undersigned has not been directed to press such a measure, it has only arisen from a disinclination to excite, under all the apparent obstacles to such an arrangement, expectations which might prove an unavailing source of discontent among the Poles.

The Emperor of Russia continuing, as it is declared, still to adhere to his purpose of erecting that part of the Duchy of Warsaw which is to fall under His Imperial Majesty's dominion, together with his other Polish provinces, either in whole or in part, into a Kingdom under the Russian sceptre; and their Austrian and Prussian Majesties, the Sovereigns most immediately interested, having ceased to oppose themselves to such an arrangement-the Undersigned adhering, nevertheless, to all his former representations on this subject has only sincerely to hope that none of those evils may result from this measure to the tranquillity of the North, and to the general equilibrium of Europe, which it has been his painful duty to anticipate. But in order to obviate as far as possible such consequences, it is of essential importance to establish the public tranquillity throughout the territories which formerly constituted the Kingdom of Poland, upon some solid and liberal basis of common interest, by applying to all, however various may be their political institutions, a congenial and conciliatory system of administration.

Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion of Europe, can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manner and sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has only tended to excite a senti-

ment of discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes.

The Undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial concurrence with the general sentiments which he has had the satisfaction to observe the respective Cabinets entertained on this subject, ardently desires that the illustrious Monarchs to whom the destinies of the Polish nation are confided, may be induced, before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institution they may think fit to govern them, the portions of that nation that may be placed under their respective sovereignties. The knowledge of such a determination will best tend to conciliate the general sentiment to their rule, and to do honour to the several Sovereigns in the eyes of their Polish subjects. This course will consequently afford the surest prospect of their living peaceably and contentedly under their respective Governments. . . .

This despatch was sent on the 12th of January 1815, exactly a century ago. The warnings were not heeded and the past century has been filled with sorrow for the Poles and with risings and revolutions, as Lord Castlereagh clearly foretold.

In their reply, the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian representatives promised to act in accordance with England's views. However, soon after the overthrow of Napoleon, reaction set in. The promises made to the peoples at the Congress of Vienna, and the claims of the nationalities, were disregarded. Representative government was either not established, or, where established, was destroyed. Under the guidance of Prince Metternich, the evil genius of Austria, an era of petty tyranny and of persecution began. An example will show how the Poles were treated. On the 15th of May 1815 King Frederick William the Third of Prussia, on taking possession of the Polish territories which fell to him under the Treaty of Vienna, addressed the following proclamation to the inhabitants:

Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland! In again taking possession of the district of the former dukedom of Warsaw, which originally belonged to Prussia, I wish to define your position. You also have a Fatherland, and you receive proof of my appreciation for your attachment to me. You will be incorporated in the Prussian Monarchy, but you need not abandon your nationality. You will take part in the constitution which I intend granting to my faithful subjects, and you will receive a provincial constitution similar to that which the other provinces of my State will receive. Your religion shall be respected, and the clergy will receive an income suitable to its position. Your personal rights and property will be protected by the laws which will be made with your collaboration. The Polish language shall be used side by side with the German language in all public transactions and affairs, and every one of you shall be able to obtain official positions, honours, and dignities according to his ability.

In 1813, at the beginning of the War of Liberation against Napoleon, Frederick William the Third had solemnly promised a constitution to the Prussian people. At that moment he needed

their help. That promise, which was received with the greatest enthusiasm, was renewed in the document given above and in many others, but it was not kept, although the King lived till 1840. He and his successors treated the Poles with absolute faithlessness. Not a single one of the promises made to them in the Proclamation quoted was observed. During a century Prussia has disregarded her pledges of fair and equal treatment. Instead, the Poles were persecuted and oppressed in Prussia, and their persecution in Austria, and especially in Russia, was largely, if not chiefly, due to Prussia's instigation.

Since the time of Frederick the Great, and in accordance with his advice given in the beginning of this article, Prussian statesmen, distrusting and fearing Russia, aimed at maintaining the most intimate relations with that country, for Russia's support was most valuable, but her hostility was dangerous. Fearing and distrusting Russia, they strove to keep that country weak. Animated by fear and distrust, they aimed at possessing themselves of a powerful weapon which could be used against the Northern Power in case of need. These three purposes of Prussian statesmanship could best be served by inducing Russia to pursue in her Polish districts a policy which exasperated the Poles, which created disaffection on her most vulnerable Russia was an autocracy, and the Poles, remembering their ancient Republic, have always been democratically inclined. An autocrat is naturally afraid of revolution and conspiracy. Taking advantage of these feelings, Prussia succeeded during more than a century in influencing and guiding Russia's policy to her advantage. She unceasingly pointed out to the Czar that the three States which brought about the partition of Poland were equally interested in combating democracy and revolution. The Poles were depicted to the Russians as born revolutionaries and anarchists. Russia had good reason to fear a Polish rising on her western, her most vulnerable, frontier, on which dwell nearly 12,000,000 Poles. The Poles are exceedingly warlike, and Russia has in the past found it extremely difficult to suppress their risings. Besides, an invader could always hope to raise the Poles against the Czar by promising them liberty, as was done by Napoleon the First in 1812. Prussian statesmen never tired of pointing out to the Czar that the danger of a Polish revolution could be overcome only by severe repressive measures taken jointly with Prussia. Thus Prussia and Russia were to remain partners, being jointly interested in the persecution of Poland. Poland's unhappiness was to be the cement of the two States. For the same reason for which Frederick the Great desired to preserve disorder in Poland, his successors desired to see chronic dissatisfaction prevail in Russia's Western Provinces.

Prussia contemplated with fear the possibility of Poland receiving her independence. It is clear that the re-creation of an independent Poland within the limits of 1772 would affect Russia only slightly, but would damage Prussia very severely. The Prussian Poles dwell in dense masses in Southern Silesia, one of the wealthiest coal and industrial centres of Germany, and in the provinces of Posen and Western Prussia. If the province of Posen should once more become Polish, the distance which separates Berlin from the eastern frontier of Germany would be reduced to about one half. The capital would be in danger. If the province of West Prussia should once more become Polish, Prussia's position in the province of East Prussia would be jeopardised, for Polish territory would once more separate it from the rest of the Monarchy. Russia, on the other hand, with her boundless territories, could easily bear the loss of her Polish provinces, especially as her capitals lie far from the frontier. Prince Bülow stated, not without cause, in the Prussian Diet on the 19th of January 1903: 'The Polish question is, as it has ever been, one of the most important, nay, the most

important, question of Prussia's policy.'

In modern Russia there have always been absolutist and liberal-minded Czars and a reactionary and a progressive party. Those who depict Russia as a land of pure and undiluted absolutism, and her Czars as a race of cruel and unenlightened despots, are not acquainted with Russian history. While the reactionary party in Russia favoured the policy of oppressing the nationalities, the liberal-minded were in favour of a wisely limited constitutionalism. They desired to give representative institutions to the people and some suitable form of self-government to the Poles. In 1859 Bismarck became the Prussian Ambassador in Petrograd. At that time Russia was recovering from the effects of the Crimean War, and many of the most enlightened Russians had become convinced that her defeat was largely due to her backwardness, that her backwardness was caused by her unprogressive institutions, that a more liberal policy in the widest sense of the word was needed. himself and his principal adviser, Prince Gortchakoff, were in favour of Liberalism and of Constitutionalism. Both desired to give greater freedom to the Poles. However, Bismarck, following the policy of Frederick the Great, resolutely opposed their policy in Prussia's interest. Owing to his persuasiveness and personal magnetism, that great statesman obtained the ascendant over the Czar and induced him to pursue a reactionary policy towards the Poles. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, reported to Earl Russell on the 26th of March 1863:

I have had a curious conversation with the Prussian Ambassador, and not altogether without importance, as showing that the Prussian Government has, if possible, greater repugnance to the restoration of Polish independence than the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself. Adverting to the well-known desire of the Emperor to accomplish this event, Count Goltz said that it was a question of life and death to Prussia. . . . In the course of this conversation Count Goltz said that M. de Bismarck, while Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, had strenuously and successfully opposed the few concessions made to Poland by the present Emperor.

In his Memoirs Prince Bismarck candidly described his anti-Polish policy in Russia as follows:

In the higher circles of Russian society the influences which made for Poland were connected with the now outspoken demand for a constitution. It was felt as a degradation that a cultivated people like the Russians should be denied institutions which existed in all European nations, and should have no voice in the management of their own affairs. The division of opinion on the Polish question penetrated the highest military circles. Those Russians who demanded a constitution for themselves pleaded at times in excuse for the Poles that they were not governable by Russians, and that as they grew more civilised they became entitled to a share in the administration of their country. This view was also represented by Prince Gortchakoff.

The conflict of opinion was very lively in St. Petersburg when I left that capital in April 1862, and it so continued throughout my first year of office. I took charge of the Foreign Office under the impression that the insurrection which had broken out on January 1st, 1863, brought up the question not only of the interests of our Eastern provinces, but also that wider one, whether the Russian Cabinet were dominated by Polish or anti-Polish proclivities, by an effort after Russo-Polish fraternisation in the anti-German Panslavist interest or by one for mutual reliance between Russia and Prussia.

For the German future of Prussia the attitude of Russia was a question of great importance. A philo-Polish Russian policy was calculated to vivify that Russo-French sympathy against which Prussia's effort had been directed since the peace of Paris, and indeed on occasion earlier, and an alliance (friendly to Poland) between Russia and France, such as was in the air before the Revolution of July, would have placed the Prussia of that day in a difficult position. It was our interest to oppose the party in the Russian Cabinet which had Polish proclivities, even when they were the

proclivities of Alexander II. That Russia herself afforded no security against fraternisation with Poland I was able to gather from confidential intercourse with Gortchakoff and the Czar himself. Czar Alexander was at that time not indisposed to withdraw from part of Poland, the left bank of the Vistula at any rateso he told me in so many words-while he made unemphatic exception of Warsaw, which would always be desirable as a garrison town, and belonged strategically to the Vistula fortress triangle. Poland, he said, was for Russia a source of unrest and dangerous European complications; its Russification was forbidden by the difference of religion and the insufficient capacity for administration among Russian officials.

. . . Our geographical position and the intermixture of both nationali-



ties in the Eastern provinces, including Silesia, compel us to retard, as far as possible, the opening of the Polish question, and even in 1863 made it appear advisable to do our best not to facilitate, but to obviate, the opening of this question by Russia. It was assumed that liberal concessions, if granted to the Poles, could not be withheld from the Russians; Russian constitutionalists were therefore philo-Polish.

Russia's history has often been most unfavourably affected, and the clearly expressed will of the Czar himself been totally deflected, by the incompetence of a single powerful individual. The Czar Alexander was a kindly, liberal-minded, and broadminded man, and he was, as we have learned from the testimony of Bismarck and Lord Cowley, very favourable to the Poles and to their aspirations. He intended to give the Poles a full measure of self-government, and he entrusted an eminent Pole, Count Wielopolski, an old revolutionary of 1830, with that difficult task. Wielopolski, though probably well meaning, was tactless, rash, and inclined to violence. Some of his measures had caused dissatisfaction among the Poles and had led to riots. Wielopolski resolved to rid himself of his opponents, who were chiefly young hot-headed enthusiasts, by enrolling them in the army, and sending them for a long number of years to Siberia and the Caucasus. By his orders numerous young men, belonging to good families, were to be arrested in their beds by soldiers during the night of the 1st of January 1863. In the words of Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, 'the opposition was to be kidnapped.' That foolish and arbitrary step led to a widespread revolt and a prolonged but hopeless struggle between Polish guerillas and Russian soldiers. Bismarck, who had unceasingly recommended a policy of reaction while he was in Petrograd, made the best use of his opportunity, and he did so all the more readily as Prince Gortchakoff was a friend not only of Poland but also of France. Foreseeing a struggle between Prussia and France, Bismarck desired to obtain Russia's goodwill, to create differences between that country and France, and to discredit the Francophile Prince Gortchakoff with the Czar. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Lord Russell on the 21st of March 1863:

Prince Hohenzollern, in speaking to me some days ago with regret of the foreign policy of the Prussian Government, said that one of its principal objects has been the overthrow of Prince Gortchakoff, whose wish to promote an alliance between France and Russia is, they believe, the only obstacle in the way of re-establishing the relations which existed between the three Northern Courts previously to the Crimean War.

Bismarck exaggerated to the Czar the scope, character, and consequences of the Polish revolt to the utmost, and while France and England expressed their sympathy with the Poles, and

reproached Wielopolski for his blundering, Bismarck hastened to demonstrate his attachment to Russia and his devotion to the Czar by offering Prussia's assistance in combating the revolutionists. On the 22nd of January 1863 the first sanguinary encounter took place. Ten days later, on the 1st of February, General Gustav von Alvensleben was despatched by Prussia to the Czar with proposals for joint action against the Poles. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed on the 12th of February to Earl Russell:

Insurrection in Poland extending, and numbers of Russian troops said to be insufficient for its suppression. . . . Two corps of observation are forming on the frontier, and assistance, if required, will be afforded by Prussia. Bismarck says Prussia will never permit the establishment of an independent Kingdom of Poland.

Two days later the British Ambassador telegraphed:

. . . General Alvensleben, who is now in Warsaw, having arrived there two days ago from St. Petersburg, has concluded a military convention with the Russian Government, according to which the two Governments will reciprocally afford facilities to each other for the suppression of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland. . . .

The Prussian railways are also to be placed at the disposal of the Russian military authorities for the transport of troops through Prussian territory from one part of the Kingdom of Poland to another. The Government further contemplate, in case of necessity, to give military assistance to the Russian Government for the suppression of the insurrection in the kingdom; but I am told that no engagement has yet been entered into with respect to the nature or extent of such assistance. In the meanwhile, however, four corps of the Prussian Army are concentrating on the frontiers under the command of General Waldersee, whose headquarters are at Posen.

To demonstrate Prussia's zeal for Russia, one third of the Prussian Army was placed at Russia's service on the Polish frontier, to help in suppressing the rising of a number of men armed chiefly with scythes and pistols.

For reasons given in these pages, Bismarck was alarmed by the possibility that the Czar might establish an independent Poland on Prussia's border. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Earl Russell on the 14th of February 1863:

M. de Bismarck, in acquainting me a few days ago with his intention to take measures in concert with the Russian Government to prevent the extension of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland, said the question was of vital importance to Prussia, as her own existence would be seriously compromised by the establishment of an independent Kingdom of Poland. I asked whether he meant to say that if Russia found any difficulty in suppressing the insurrection, the Prussian Government intended to afford them military assistance; and he not only replied in the affirmative, but added that if Russia got tired of the contest and were disposed to withdraw from the kingdom—a course which some



Russians were supposed to think advantageous to her interests—the Prussian Government would carry on the war on their own account. . . .

The Emperor William the First, who at the time was only King of Prussia, frankly said to the British Ambassador, according to his telegram on the 22nd of February 1863:

It was equally the duty and the interest of Prussia to do everything in her power to prevent the establishment of an independent Polish kingdom, for if the Polish nation could reconstitute themselves as an independent State, the existence of Prussia would be seriously menaced, as the first efforts of the new State would be to recover Dantzig, and if that attempt succeeded, the fatal consequences to Prussia were too evident to require him to point them out.

While Prussia, for purely selfish reasons, advocated a policy of persecution and repression towards the Poles, which would only increase their resentment to the advantage of Russia's enemies, Great Britain, following her traditional policy of disinterested detachment and wise humanity, recommended once more the adoption of a liberal policy towards the Poles in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. Earl Russell sent to the British Ambassador in Petrograd on the 2nd of March 1863 the following most remarkable despatch:

My Lord,—Her Majesty's Government view with the deepest concern the state of things now existing in the Kingdom of Poland. They see there, on the one side, a large mass of the population in open insurrection against the Government, and, on the other, a vast military force employed in putting that insurrection down. The natural and probable result of such a contest must be expected to be the success of the military forces. But that success, if it is to be achieved by a series of bloody conflicts, must be attended by a lamentable effusion of blood, by a deplorable sacrifice of life, by widespread desolation, and by impoverishment and ruin, which it would take a long course of years to repair.

Moreover, the acts of violence and destruction on both sides, which are sure to accompany such a struggle, must engender mutual hatreds and resentments which will embitter, for generations to come, the relations between the Russian Government and the Polish race. Yet, however much Her Majesty's Government might lament the existence of such a miserable state of things in a foreign country, they would not, perhaps, deem it expedient to give formal expression of their sentiments were it not that there are peculiarities in the present state of things in Poland which take them out of the usual and ordinary condition of such affairs.

The Kingdom of Poland was constituted and placed in connection with the Russian Empire by the Treaty of 1815, to which Great Britain was a contracting party. The present disastrous state of things is to be traced to the fact that Poland is not in the condition in which the stipulations of that Treaty require that it should be placed. Neither is Poland in the condition in which it was placed by the Emperor Alexander I, by whom that Treaty was made. During his reign a National Diet sat at Warsaw and the Poles of the Kingdom of Poland enjoyed privileges fitted to secure their political welfare. Since 1832, however, a state of uneasiness and discontent has been succeeded from time to time by violent commotion and

a useless effusion of blood. Her Majesty's Government are aware that the immediate cause of the present insurrection was the conscription lately enforced upon the Polish population; but that measure itself is understood to have been levelled at the deeply-rooted discontent prevailing among the Poles in consequence of the political condition of the Kingdom of Poland.


The proprietors of land and the middle classes in the towns bore that condition with impatience, and if the peasantry were not equally disaffected they gave little support or strength to the Russian Government. Great Britain, therefore, as a party to the Treaty of 1815, and as a Power deeply interested in the tranquillity of Europe, deems itself entitled to express its opinion upon the events now taking place, and is anxious to do so in the most friendly spirit towards Russia, and with a sincere desire to promote the interest of all the parties concerned. Why should not His Imperial Majesty, whose benevolence is generally and cheerfully acknowledged, put an end at once to this bloody conflict by proclaiming mercifully an immediate and unconditional amnesty to his revolted Polish subjects, and at the same time announce his intention to replace without delay his Kingdom of Poland in possession of the political and civil privileges which were granted to it by the Emperor Alexander I in execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1815? If this were done a National Diet and a National Administration would in all probability content the Poles and satisfy European opinion.

You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff and give him a copy

of it.

Earl Russell's wise suggestions were sympathetically received at Petrograd, and on the 31st of March Czar Alexander published in the Journal de St. Pétersbourg a manifesto in which he stated that he did not desire to hold the Polish nation responsible for the rebellion, and promised to introduce a system of local selfgovernment in Poland, admonishing the rebels to lay down their arms. Unfortunately, they did not do so. A prolonged campaign was necessary to re-establish order in Poland, and meanwhile the Czar had been so much embittered through the agitation of the Russian reactionaries and their Prussian friends, and by the follies of some of the Polish leaders, that he deprived Poland of her constitution. Urged on by the statesmen at Berlin, another period of repression began. On the 23rd of February 1868 Poland was absolutely incorporated with Russia, and the use of the Polish language in public places and for public purposes was prohibited.

Ever since, Bismarck and his successors have endeavoured to create bad blood between Russia and her Polish citizens, being desirous of retaining Russia's support at a time when she was drifting towards France. Solely with the object of demonstrating to Russia the danger of the Polish agitation Bismarck introduced in 1886 his Polish Settlement Bill, by which, to the exasperation of the Prussian Poles, vast territories were bought from Polish landowners and German peasants settled on them. When the Conservative party wished to oppose that policy in the Prussian Parliament as being unpractical, its leader was,



During a century and a half Russia's Polish policy has been made in Germany. During 150 years Russia has persecuted and outraged the Poles at Prussia's bidding and for Prussia's benefit. The confidential diplomatic evidence given in these pages makes

that point absolutely clear.

Until recent times Russia was a very backward nation, and, not unnaturally, she endeavoured to learn the arts of government and of civilisation from Germany, her nearest neighbour. Unfortunately, Germany did not prove a fair and unselfish friend to Russia. Germany aimed not so much at advancing Russia as at benefiting herself. German rulers and statesmen saw in the Russians good-natured savages to be exploited. Impecunious German princes and noblemen went to Russia to make a fortune, and poor German princesses married Russian princes. German influence became supreme not only in the Russian Army and Administration, but even within the Imperial Family.

During 150 years German influence was supreme in Russian society. While, during this period, Prussia, and afterwards Germany, unceasingly urged Russia to oppress and ill-treat her Poles, England consistently recommended Russia to adopt liberal

treatment as being in Russia's interest.

One of the first British diplomatic despatches dealing with the partition of Poland is that of Mr. Thomas Wroughton, dated the 15th of June 1763, and given in these pages. In that remarkable document the forecast is made that Russia would scarcely consent to a partition of Poland, partly because such a partition would strengthen Prussia too much, partly because an independent Poland would form an efficient buffer State between herself and the Western Powers. He wrote: 'Russia is inattackable on that side at present, which she would not be if she appropriated to herself that barrier.' Since then Russia has more than once had occasion to regret that she was the direct neighbour of Prussia, and that she had given large Polish districts to that country.

Soon after the beginning of the present War the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, addressed an appeal to the Poles of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary in which he promised them the re-creation of a Kingdom of Poland, comprising all Poles dwelling within Russia, Austria, and Germany, under Russia's protection. The full text of that remarkable manifesto will be found in my article, 'The Ultimate Disappearance of Austria-Hungary,' which appeared in the November number of this Review. The enemies of Russia have sneeringly described that document as a death-bed repentance, and have complained that it was not issued by the Czar himself. Of course, the Grand Duke acted in the name and on behalf of the Czar. That needs no explanation. If the Czar was not of the Grand Duke's mind he would have disavowed him. Besides, Russia's resolve to give full liberty to the Poles was not born from the stress of the War. It was formed long ago: however, it was obviously impracticable to give full selfgovernment to the Russian Poles without laying the foundation of a Greater Poland. Hence such a step on Russia's part would have met with the most determined opposition and hostility in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and it would most probably have been treated as casus belli. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, informed Earl Russell, on the 26th of March 1863, 'The Russian Government could make no concessions of any value to the Polish Provinces which would not lay the foundation of the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland.' Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, informed his Government on the 6th of April 1863 that 'The restoration of the Polish State on the basis of nationality will assuredly not be effected while the strength of Russia and Germany remains During the struggle, whatever may be the fate of Poland, the frontier of France would be pushed to the Rhine.' That remarkable prophecy seems likely to come true before long.

Formerly there was no Polish nation. The Poles consisted of 150,000 nobles and of many millions of ill-treated serfs. Hard times and misfortune have welded the Poles into a nation. The property-less serfs have become prosperous farmers, and the people of the middle and of the upper class have become earnest Between 1900 and 1912 the deposits in the Polish Co-operative Societies have increased from 12,420,057l. to 46,970,354l. In every walk of life Poles have achieved most remarkable successes. Although education among the Poles, especially among those in Russia and Austria-Hungary, is still extremely backward—there are only two Polish universities—the Poles have created a most wonderful literature. literature is the richest among the Slavonic literatures, and it need not fear comparison with any of the Western literatures. In music and in science also Poles have accomplished great things. Among the leading living writers is Sienkiewicz, among the greatest living musicians is Paderewski, among the leading living Formerly, the Poles scientists is Madame Curie-Sklodowska. were thriftless and incompetent in business and agriculture. How wonderfully they have changed may be seen from the fact that in the Eastern Provinces of Germany they are rapidly ousting the Germans, although these receive most powerful support



from the State. Notwithstanding the enormous purchases of land made under the Settlement Acts, by which 35,000,000l. have been devoted to the purchase of Polish land for German farmers, the Germans have on balance since the year 1896 lost 250,000 acres of land to the Poles in the Polish districts.

The Poles are to a certain extent to blame for their misfortunes. In the past they have lacked self-command and a sense of proportion. It is noteworthy that during the revolution of 1863 Polish leaders published in Paris maps of an independent Poland, which comprised large and purely Russian districts with towns such as Kieff, on the ground of historical right. Yet Kieff was the cradle of the Russian Orthodox faith.

In Western Russia, in Eastern Prussia, and in Galicia, there dwell about 20,000,000 Poles. If the War should end, as it is likely to end, in a Russian victory, a powerful kingdom of Poland According to the carefully worded manifesto of the Grand Duke the united Poles will receive full self-government under the protection of Russia. They will be enabled to develop their nationality, but it seems scarcely likely that they will receive entire and absolute independence. Their position will probably resemble that of Quebec in Canada, or of Bavaria in Germany, and if the Russians and Poles act wisely they will live as harmoniously together as do the French-speaking 'habitants' of Quebec, and the English-speaking men of the other provinces of Russia need not fear that Poland will make herself entirely independent, and only the most hot-headed and shortsighted Poles can wish for complete independence. having developed extremely important manufacturing industries, requires large free markets for their output. Her natural market is Russia, for Germany has industrial centres of her own. She can expect to have the free use of the precious Russian markets only as long as she forms part of that great State. At present, a spirit of the heartiest good will prevails between Russians and Poles. The old quarrels and grievances have been forgotten in the common struggle. The moment is most auspicious for the resurrection of Poland.

While Prussia has been guilty of the partition of Poland, Russia is largely to blame for the repeated revolts and insurrection of her Polish citizens. The late Lord Salisbury, who as a staunch Conservative could scarcely be described as an admirer of the Poles, and who in his essay 'Poland,' printed in 1863, treated their claims rather with contempt than with sympathy, wrote in its concluding pages:

Since 1815 the misgovernment of Poland has not only been constant but growing. And with the misgovernment the discontent has been growing in at least an equal ratio. Yet they ought not to have been a difficult race

to rule. The very abuses to which they had been for centuries exposed should have made the task of satisfying them easy.

Russian statesmen might well bear in mind the recommendations of that great statesman as to the way by which Russia might satisfy her Poles. Lord Salisbury wrote:

The best that can be hoped for Poland is an improved condition under Russian rule. The conditions which are needed to reconcile the Poles to a Russian Sovereign are manifest enough and do not seem very hard to be The Poles have not only been oppressed but insulted, and in their condition insult is harder to put up with than oppression. A nation which is under a foreign yoke is sensitive upon the subject of nationality. . . . If Russia would rule the Poles in peace she must defer to a sensibility which neither coaxing nor severity will cure. All the substance of power may be exercised as well through Polish administrators as through Russian. The union between the two countries may for practical purposes be complete, though every legal act and every kind of scholastic instruction be couched in the Polish language.

It would be hazardous, and it would probably be foolish, to give Poland complete independence. Poland has grown into Russia and Russia into Poland. After all, it cannot be expected that Russia will abandon her principal and most promising industrial district with two of her largest towns. In politics one should endeavour to achieve only the practical. The question therefore arises: How much self-government will Russia grant to Poland? Will she give her a separate legislation, taxation, post office, coinage, finances, army? The arrangement of these details may prove somewhat difficult. It is to be hoped that during the negotiations between Poles and Russians regarding a settlement the Poles will endeavour to be cool and reasonable, and that the Russians will be trusting and generous. Happily, a spirit of hearty good will is abroad in Russia, the Czar is kindhearted and liberal-minded, and the reactionary party is weak.

The greatest grievance of the Polish nation is not that it lives under foreign rule, but that it lives under oppression and that it has been parcelled out among several States. Owing to the partition of Poland, Poles have been taught to consider as enemies men of their own nationality living across the border, and now they have been compelled by their rulers to slaughter each other. At present more than a million Polish soldiers are engaged against their will in a fratricidal war. terrible fact alone constitutes a most powerful claim upon all

men's sympathy and generosity.

Although Russia has in times past treated the Poles far more harshly than has Prussia, and although the German Poles are far more prosperous than are the Russian, the Poles see their principal enemy not in Russia but in Prussia. After all, the Russian is their brother Slav, and they are proud of their big brother. Besides, they recognise that Russia has been misguided by Prussia, and that Prussia was largely responsible for Poland's partition and for Russia's anti-Polish policy. The bitterness with which the Prussian Poles hate Prussia may be seen from the Polish newspapers published in Germany, which, during many years, have successfully advocated the policy of boycotting Germans and everything German, both in business and in society. The Dziennik Kujawski of Hohensalza wrote on the 18th of January 1901:

To-morrow the Kingdom of Prussia celebrates the second century of its existence. We cannot manifest our joy, because Prussia's power has been erected chiefly upon the ruins of ancient Poland. Prussia's history consists of a number of conquests made by force and in accordance with the old Prussian principle revived by Bismarck, 'Might is better than right.' Prussia's glory has been bought with much blood and tears and she owes her existence chiefly to Poland's destruction.

In the Gazeta Gdanska of the 24th of November 1906, published in Dantzig, we read:

The Prussian and the Russian.—If one asks a Pole whether he would rather live under German or under Russian rule his reply will be 'I would a hundred times rather have to do with Russians than with Germans, and the Prussians are the worst of Germans.' Many Poles will scarcely be able to tell why they hate the Prussians. Many will find their preference illogical. Still it is there. From the fullness of the heart speaketh the mouth. After all the worst Russian is a better fellow than the very best German. That feeling lies in our blood. The Russian is our Slavonic brother, and in his heart of hearts every Pole is glad if his brother is prospering and when he can tell the world 'There you see our common Slavonic blood.' The more we hate the Prussians, the more we love the Russians.

The Gazeta Grudzionska, of Graudenz, wrote in March 1899:

Take heed, you Polish women and Polish girls! Polish women and Polish girls are the strongest protectors of our nationality. The Poles can be Germanised only when Germanism crosses our Polish doorstep, but that will never happen, if God so wills it, as long as Polish mothers, Polish wives, and Polish maids are found in our houses. They will not allow Poland's enemies to enter. For a Polish woman it is a disgrace to marry a German or to visit German places of amusement or German festivals. As long as the Polish wife watches over her husband and takes care that he bears himself always and everywhere as a Pole, as long as she watches over his home and preserves it as a stronghold of Polonism, as long as a Polish Catholic newspaper is kept in it, and as long as the Polish mother teaches her children to pray to God for our beloved Poland in the Polish language, so long Poland's enemies will labour in vain

Innumerable similar extracts might easily be given.

When the peace conditions come up for discussion at the Congress which will bring the present War to an end-and that event may be nearer than most men think-the problem

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of Poland will be one of the greatest difficulty and importance. Austria-Hungary has comparatively little interest in retaining her Poles. The Austrian Poles dwell in Galicia outside the great rampart of the Carpathian mountains, which form the natural frontier of the Dual Monarchy towards the north-east. The loss of Galicia, with its oilfields and mines, may be regrettable to Austria-Hungary, but it will not affect her very seriously. To Germany, on the other hand, the loss of the Polish districts will be a fearful blow. The supreme importance which Germany attaches to the Polish problem may be seen from this, that Bismarck thought it the only question which could lead to an open breach between Germany and Austria-Hungary. According to Crispi's Memoirs, Bismarck said to the Italian statesman on the 17th of September 1877:

There could be but one cause for a breach in the friendship that unites Austria and Germany, and that would be a disagreement between the two Governments concerning Polish policy. . . . If a Polish rebellion should break out and Austria should lend it her support, we should be obliged to assert ourselves. We cannot permit the re-construction of a Catholic kingdom so near at hand. It would be a northern France. We have one France to look to already, and a second would become the natural ally of the first, and we should find ourselves entrapped between two enemies.

The resurrection of Poland would injure us in other ways as well. It could not come about without the loss of a part of our territory. We cannot possibly relinquish either Posen or Dantzig, because the German Empire would remain exposed on the Russian frontier, and we should lose an outlet on the Baltic.

In the event of Germany's defeat a large slice of Poland, including the wealthiest parts of Silesia, with gigantic coal mines, ironworks, etc., would be taken away from her, and if the Poles should recover their ancient province of West Prussia, with Dantzig, Prussia's hold upon East Prussia, with Koenigsberg, would be threatened. The loss of her Polish districts would obviously greatly reduce Germany's military strength and economic power. It may therefore be expected that Germany will move heaven and earth against the re-creation of the kingdom of Poland, and that she will strenuously endeavour to create differences between Russia and her Allies. The statesmen of Europe should therefore, in good time, firmly make up their minds as to the future of Poland.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

# PAUL FORT, THE 'PRINCE OF POETS'

### PHILOMEL.

(From the French of Paul Fort.)

O sing, in heart of silence hiding near, Thou whom the roses bend their heads to hear! In silence down the moonlight slides her wing: Will no rose breathe while Philomel doth sing? No breath-and deeper yet the perfume grows: The voice of Philomel can slay a rose: The song of Philomel on nights serene Implores the gods who roam in shades unseen, But never calls the roses, whose perfume Deepens and deepens, as they wait their doom. Is it not silence whose great bosom heaves? Listen, a rose-tree drops her quiet leaves.

Now silence flashes lightning like a storm: Now silence is a cloud, and cradled warm By risings and by fallings of the tune That Philomel doth sing, as shines the moon, -A bird's or some immortal voice from Hell?

There is no breath to die with, Philomel !--And yet the world has changed without a breath. The moon lies heavy on the roses' death, And every rosebush droops its leafy crown. A gust of roses has gone sweeping down. The panicked garden drives her leaves about: The moon is masked: it flares and flickers out. O shivering petals on your lawn of fear, Turn down to Earth and hear what you shall hear. A beat, a beat, a beat beneath the ground, And hurrying beats, and one great beat profound. A heart is coming close: I have heard pass The noise of a great Heart upon the grass. The petals reel. Earth opens: from beneath The ashen roses on their lawn of death, Raising her peaceful brow, the grand and pale Demeter listens to the nightingale.

<sup>1</sup> The new anthology of Paul Fort's poems, Choix de Ballades françaises (Figuière, 6 fr.), may be recommended to intending readers whom our poet's prolific output might otherwise bewilder and repel. In it Paul Fort has for the first time properly classified his work.

What a large contribution French literature of the last ten years has made to the splendid unity achieved by France in face of the great but long foreseen danger of war, how firmly that reaction to heroic ideals of discipline and religion has been led by men like Barrès and Maurras, is hardly realised in England at all, where the Press, choked with articles on unimportant and obscure curiosities like Strindberg 2 or Tagore, has no time to attend to the one foreign literature worth reading. Indeed, the only modern French writer known in England is Anatole France, imagined a solitary star in a waste of night!

It cannot be pretended that Paul Fort has been a direct leader of this renovating movement in France; indeed, it would be vain to expect the Poet to take the didactic lead. A poet should teach discipline by the severity of his verse, courage by the strength of his line, honour by the scrupulous sincerity of his achievement. But that is merely to say a poet should be a good poet. Paul Fort gives us more than this-he gives us the new spirit of France, that brave commonsense that bursts out in gaiety and imagination, and gives the impression that though

the world is deadly serious it is still disreputably young.

The possibility of the creation of poetry like this may be said to mark a revolution in the French mentality. A few years ago French critics did really and honestly consider that literature and civilisation had reached their last stage of cynical corruption. But of late the whole youth of France seem to have been recaptured by the old ideals of the peasant, the soldier, the priest; and though neither militarist nor clerical, Paul Fort yet has all the irrepressible hopefulness of the young generation that drives on the soldiers of France in charge after charge against their monstrous enemy. For him a few mechanical inventions or scientific improvements have not spoilt the sunrise; and accepting the civilisation of to-day as Homer accepted that of three thousand years ago, he celebrates simply, but with startling novelty of inspiration, the scenery and actors of that once so pleasant stagethe France he lives in.

The Prince of Poets is no Futurist, though Marinetti has bidden his followers admire him. He writes no odes on aeroplanes or automobiles. He does not lay a particular stress on the mechanical side of modern life, being too fond of his contemporaries to insult them by considering them less interesting than machines. The minor poets of the Futurist school, in their struggle to escape those trammels of the centuries which oppress all timorous minds, adopt any childish eccentricity of metre,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Mr. E. Gosse, who wrote a charming criticism of Paul Fort some years ago, has lately given a crushing opinion on Strindberg in the first number of the New Weckly.

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go, the language or subject that comes into their heads. At the same time they impose upon themselves a harder law than any Academy ever yet invented for the suppression of that free play which is so necessary for the expansion of genius. They are not allowed by their leaders to write a line, except in derision, about the past. Paul Fort has described the past as well as the present; but when, as often, he deals with modern life, he has courage enough to envisage it in its proper relation to the past and genius enough to reveal its fascination without distorting its reality. He is only able to do this because he has dug down to the bed-rock of human nature, because he understands the good old basic things of life-the soil, the sun, the rain; the labour, sorrows and songs of the people. He can himself actually write Folk Songs—a unique achievement for a great literary artist folk songs that seem as if they must be traditional, must have been composed hundreds of years ago. When one thinks of the evolution of French poetry during the last few generations, with its imposing array of schools-Romantics, Parnassians, Symbolists, Unanimists, and the rest-one realises what superb detachment is required (not to mention other and higher qualities) for a Frenchman and a Parisian to write a poem as finely unadorned as this:

Si toutes les filles du monde voulaient s'donner la main tout autour de la mer elles pourraient faire une ronde.

Si tous les gars du monde voulaient bien être marins, ils f'raient avec leurs barques un joli pont sur l'onde.

Alors on pourrait faire une ronde autour du monde si tous les gens du monde voulaient s'donner la main.

It is natural that a poet so much haunted by the peasant should have sought inspiration from medieval France. Paul Fort's longest work, le Roman de Louis XI, is a fantasy half in verse half in prose, remarkably close in feeling and in style to Rabelais. The hero is presented with humour and sympathy, for the King, who had nothing but a shrewd wit to save his impoverished kingdom from the menace of the bellicose, parading, pompous Duke of Burgundy, is a man after the author's heart. critics have quoted as a masterpiece of pathos the little scene in which Louis discovers that his son Joachim is dead. But the most memorable passage in the book is the hilarious description of the siege of Beauvais with its catalogue of the missiles (beginning with paving stones and ending with complete houses) which the besieged dropped with gorgeously noisy effects on to the heads of the besiegers. It must have been this passage that awoke in Marinetti an admiration for Paul Fort, for granted that realising in poetry the effect of a tremendous noise be a Futurist ideal, Paul Fort has certainly beaten Marinetti on his own ground. The latter's Battle of Tripoli is very thin piping

compared with the Siege of Beauvais.

Yet neither the excellent Louis XI nor that ambitious poem sequence, l'Aventure Eternelle, is the real achievement of Paul Fort. It is by his lyrics that he will be remembered, lyrics so numerous, so brilliant, and so diverse that even briefly to discuss their leading characteristics is rather a bewildering task. However, of these characteristics, the most obvious and pervading one beyond any doubt is humour—humour of the great lyrical quality, which can remind us at times of Heine, of Cervantés, of Browning, and, as will be hereafter observed, most specially of Shakespeare—vet a humour which combines with an impudence almost English a lightness entirely French:

## Les Baleines

Du temps qu'on allait encore aux baleines, si loin qu'ça faisait mat'lot, pleurer nos belles, y avait sur chaque route un Jésus en croix, y avait des marquis couverts de dentelles, y avait la Sainte-Vierge et y avait le Roi!

D'u temps qu'on allait encore aux baleines, si loin qu'ça faisait mat'lot, pleurer nos belles, y avait des marins qui avaient la foi, et des grands seigneurs qui crachaient sur elle, y avait la Sainte-Vierge et y avait le Roi!

Eh bien, à présent, tout le monde est content, c'est pas pour dire, mat'lot, mais on est content! . . . y a plus de grands seigneurs ni d'Jésus qui tiennent, y a la république et y a le président, et y a plus de baleines!

A still more extravagant poem, called *The One-Eyed Cat*, recalls nothing written in the French language except the *Poèmes en prose* of Baudelaire:

La femme est aux varechs, l'homme est à la Guyane. Et la petite maison est seule tout le jour.

Seule? Mais à travers les persiennes vertes, on voit luire dans l'ombre comme une goutte de mer.

Quand le bagne est à l'homme, la mer est à la femme, et la petite maison au chat borgne tout le jour.

Among scores of poems in this vein the reader may be specially referred to Le Marchand de Sable, La Reine à la mer, Le Paysan et son âne, perhaps the most amusing of all, and to one unaccountably excluded from the anthology, Le petit roi du Nord. Similar in humorous treatment, but more subtle, are some of the poems on Shakespearean characters, to which Englishmen will turn with special interest. Hamlet begins thus:

Hamlet, que la folie des autres importune, a fait le tour du monde mais dans le clair de lune il retrouve Elseneur qu'il n'avait pas quitté.

Hamlet a fait le tour du monde, comme il fait tout, en pensée.

Still more exquisitely subtle is Seigneur Fortinbras:

Moi que l'on attendait, j'entre en disant ma phrase... Je viens clore le drame avec un clairon d'or—tout seul—car mon immense armée ne viendra pas, que voulez-vous? Je l'ai perdue dans les décors ombreux de la coulisse. Enfin! Taratata!

The genius of all this is near enough to the pathetic, and Paul Fort is as clever as Verlaine or de Banville in catching what may be called the Pierrot mood. The Dead Clown is rather an obvious subject charmingly treated, the Song of the little Valet who hanged himself is as delicately mysterious as a lyric by Mr. Yeats. His masterpiece of humorous pathos is the Complaint of the Little White Horse, who worked so bravely on in a country of black rain where there was never any spring:

Il est mort sans voir le beau temps: qu'il avait donc du courage!

Paul Fort has more ambitious flights than these, but his humour seldom deserts him; indeed it often breaks out in unexpected places with a most startling effect. His Poèmes Marins and ballads of modern Paris have plenty of laughter in their realism. The Poèmes Marins need special attention as being perhaps the most powerful volume the Poet has produced. They are ballad poems of modern life somewhat in the tradition handed down from Béranger to Richepin and the singers of Montmartre. But Paul Fort's sailors-sentimental, coarse, amusing, passionate-put Richepin's tedious 'Gueux' out of court. They hate every one who is not washed clean by the sea-farmers, beggars, priests, soldiers, opoponaxed Parisians. And above all, says one of them, 'tu me dégoûtes, ma garce.' It is not gallant, but French mariners are a privileged race and know it. 'Je ne suis pas marine, mais il n'y a que les marins' cries a mountain lass in her sailor's arms. Excellent too is the young fisherman who complains to his mother that he loves three girls at once, and they will not understand! But there are savage and bitter poems in the book, and the description of the drunkard who kills his wife is terrible enough for a Russian novel:

Ne gueule pas comme ça, l'ciel n'est pas solide. Y tourne comme un fou: le bon Dieu s'est soûlé. Qui, c'est ça, tais-toi . . . bois ton rhum salé. Eh bien quoi? . . . t'es morte? Tiens, tu n'as plus de rides!

Ma petite chérie, ma petite chérie! T'es morte, moi je suis soûl. L'bon Dieu bat la crème. Toutes les étoiles tournent. Y a des loups dans l'eau qu'ont d'l'or plein leur gueule. T'auras pas ma paye!

A striking contrast to this realistic work is afforded by the poems which he has in this anthology called 'Hymnes'—heroic odes in praise of nature. They are powerful in expression and grand in conception, but one of them, a poem, called *Le* 

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Dauphin, is so passionately inspired as to make the magnificence and brilliance of the other Hymnes seem almost frozen in comparison. Swinburne himself has no better song on the joy of swimming and the enchantment of the sea. The chase of the dolphins as the swimmer 'turns with the wheel of the sun' among the waves, the seaweed and the flying fish, is not so much described as seen and heard in the sparkling splashing verses, while in the vision of the sea's floor the poem assumes a note of grandeur—one of the rarest notes of Paul Fort's brilliant lyre:

Je vois! (la petite mort est entrée dans mon cœur) j'ai revu tous ces monts soulevés de douleurs. En eux la mer contente sa destinée sauvage. Elle fouille la terre, elle s'accouple aux laves, ensemence leur sein de toute sa vigueur, et mille bouches de feu bavent des coquillages. Volcans, brûlez la mer des feux de votre cœur! Les étincelles vivent: ô que de poissons nagent! Les étincelles meurent et c'est là votre ouvrage: vous attirez les morts qui vont en vous reprendre la chaleur et la Vie. O cendres, cendres, cendres. Etincelles! . . . et déjà, vos rochers sont couverts de coraux, de varechs, d'épais ombrages verts, de crabes fourmillants et de ces belles pieuvres envahissant la mer de leurs bras amoureux; les hippocampes noirs s'échappent de vos feux; la bleue holothurie scintille: c'est votre œuvre; le bas limon s'étoile à l'exemple des cieux. Qu'un jour tout cela meure, vous attendez les cendres. La mer, buvant la mort, devient phosphorescente. Vous l'aspirez. Vos feux déjà, se renouvellent —et les oiseaux marins volent jusqu'au soleil!

The Hymnes lead us naturally to the poems dealing with classical subjects, grouped in the new anthology as Hymnes heroiques, Eglogues, and Chants paniques. These lyrics are hardly the most characteristic work of the author, whose sympathies are medieval rather than Greek. Paul Fort sings of Jason, of Hercules, of Orpheus simply because he loves all delightful tales, not because he has a special appreciation of the But he is at his best when he deals with classical world. Morpheus, with the nymphs and fauns—with all those suggestive whispering little gods who have haunted Christian Europe far more tenaciously than the white Olympians. One of these pictures is unforgettable—the old faun clumsily dancing round the frozen lake, trying to reawaken the old magic voices which have abandoned the forest for ever.

Yet, though we hold these 'classical' poems to be a mere side issue of Paul Fort's genius, what great poems they really are—le Voyage de Jason, Orphée, les Néréides, with what freshness does the poet attack the age-worn themes, with what humour does he charm Olympus! It is surely with these poems, moreover, that we should class the most beautiful lyric Paul Fort has ever written, the haunting Philomèle.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> A verse translation of Philomèle precedes this article.

English readers who study for themselves the Poèmes Marins will be bound to remark the extraordinary, almost pagan innocence of their author, which seems to enable him to deal with any subject under the sun without prudery and without licentious-Certainly Paul Fort never feels himself obliged, like so many modern English writers, to adopt a tone of fictitious manliness to palliate anything which a very timorous curate might find shocking. And he is no less innocent when he deals with the externals of religion. Coxcomb, half poem half story, is a masterpiece of merry humour-blasphemous only as Benozzo Gozzoli blasphemes when he turns the laughing girls and boys of Florence into saints, angels and virgins. To the truly and deeply religious mind, far more dangerous than this quaint irreverence is the utilising of the aesthetic beauty of Christianity to decorate poems that are not quite sincere, a moral fault from which our author is not entirely free, and in which our own PreRaphaelites revelled.4

To discover the real religion or philosophy of Paul Fort we must turn to one of his later poems, Vivre en Dieu, a work more interesting in thought than happy as poetry, in which he has made a direct, but still amusing, attempt to state and arrange his views on God and the world. The divine function, according to the poet, is to dream, for dream or imagination is a creative force. There is no creative dream in stone, but everything that is alive has a certain power of vision and is, therefore, God: 'l'herbe est un Dieu hâtif doué de rêve ayant une âme Trees are gods, men are gods-but there are visionnaire.' degrees. The Poet, who above other men possesses the faculty of creative imagination, is the greatest god on earth. All lives dream each other into existence; 'no other explanation of the universe,' adds the writer with his accustomed laugh. ' Messieurs, levez votre chapeau.'

This conception of the universe is more arresting at least than the admired Wordsworthian pantheism, but it is neither particularly new nor important taken purely as philosophy. It possesses nevertheless both personal interest and poetical force, being very well adapted to provide a logical background to the inexhaustible gaiety and lovableness of the poet's disposition. There is always something religious in Paul Fort's attitude to Nature; his whole work is bathed in spiritual sunshine, and when

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Yet what rings false in these thrilling lines from le Plus doux Chant?
'Mais oh! le chant que j'aime . . . Il me faut l'air câlin plus nonchalant

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Mais oh! le chant que j'aime . . . Il me faut l'air cam pus sont le triste dont Marie enchanta l'ouïe au petit Christ, et que siffla si doux Joseph le menuisier qu'il fit naître à ce chant le Rêve de l'Enfant.

<sup>&#</sup>x27;O les plus frêles sons! le suprême chant que répétait Jésus au ciel de Bethléem, et que les Syriennes, éveillant les cithares, murmuraient—s'y penchant—aux ciels de leurs fontaines!'

he is closest to tragedy the consolation he evokes wears the traditional Christian raiment:

Do not believe in death. Here are the birds who have flown out of their cages, which were the dark and silent woods. Shed no more vain tears, Heaven is singing like your soul, is dumb no longer—and here is radiant Death.

And here is luminous and tuneful Death, and here is Life. Here is the pearl of your soul that an angel of that calm world is threading, and here the radiant music of the Archangel's song.

A vast section of Paul Fort's work is devoted to delightful poems in which the country towns and villages near Paris are described with incomparable charm and sentiment. The poet wanders from Reclose, from Velizy, from Morcerf (whose sweet name reminds him of fairies dancing round a sleeping Knight), to Nemours:

Pure Nemours, silver seal on France's noblest page, or great lily of the isle, is not thy destiny, white town, soul of a sky like pearl, to school in elegance the proud world itself?

to la Ferté Milon, where seven distinct houses claim to be the birthplace of Racine, like the seven islands which disputed Homer, and to a hundred little towns beside—and we have their history, their legends, the girl at the window, the ducks in the pend, the ghosts in the castle, the auction in the town hall, all set forth in a whirl of humour or sentiment. But there is pathos now in the exquisite poems on Senlis, which recently, as a result of special and atrocious barbarity on the part of the Germans, has been irretrievably destroyed, Notre Dame and all.

### Senlis Matinale.

Je sors. La ville a-t-elle disparu ce matin? Où s'est-elle envolée? Par quel vent dans quelle île? Je la retrouve, mais n'ose plus étendre les mains. Senlis est vaporeuse comme une mousseline.

Moi, déchirer Senlis? Prenons garde. Où est-elle? Toits et murs sont un transparent réseau de brume. Notre-Dame livre à l'air sa gorge de dentelle, son cou si fin, son sein léger couleur de lune,

Où bat l'heure irréelle, que seuls comptent les anges, tant l'écho s'en étouffe dans l'oreiller du ciel fait des plumes doucement étendues de leurs ailes, où Dieu repose un front qui vers Senlis se penche.

Alas, Senlis is torn, and the tower of Notre Dame will shine in the morning mist no longer!

It is for the glory of France that these poems were written—and such passionate patriotism is almost too personal a thing to be discussed by the foreign critic. One would naturally conclude that Paul Fort, considering the great patriotic reaction, would be at least as popular in France, were it on the score of this section of his work alone, as, say, Mr. Masefield in England. One could well imagine such a national, direct, simple, and

humorous poet holding a position in his lifetime somewhat similar to that which Carducci used to hold in Italy. Yet Paul Fort—and this would appear to be a very curious fact of literary history—however much he may be the idol of the young literary circles who this year elected him Prince of Poets, however numerous and enthusiastic may be the articles on his work which appear from time to time in the literary reviews, is hardly more known to the general public than was the classicist Moréas or, to take an

English example, that fine poet Mr. Delamare. Moreover, the reason for this comparative neglect, for these second and third editions of work which one would expect to sell by the ten thousand, cannot possibly be that Paul Fort stands Nationalism, regionalism, in any way apart from his time. medievalism, the love of country and the soil have been the very breath of the gospel of Maurice Barrès, and of a thousand lesser pens, and are enormously in fashion. Again, while Paul Fort is perhaps hardly like Barrès a Catholic, yet he has an unshaken belief in the Catholic virtues and a sure insight into Catholic ideals. The antipathy-almost hatred-of the Parisian mind for humour may have something to do with the neglect of Paul Fort. Humour to many Frenchmen is a gross extravagance, and they are all a little apt to take poetry too seriously. Yet there is plenty of good work in Paul Fort which is not humorous, and one is driven to the only conclusion possible, queer as it may sound to English readers, that the chief reason of this comparative neglect is to be found in our poet's metrical peculiarities As will have been seen by the extracts given in French, Paul Fort has abandoned the general practice of writing out poetry line by line and writes it out verse by verse instead. He also has a habit of letting his poetry 'degenerate' either into a prose with internal rhymes, similar to that Oriental prose of which the curious can find a horrible parody in Beaconsfield's Alroy, or (as often in the longer poems) into pure prose. In addition to this our poet frequently disregards the rule that the final e mute counts as a syllable for poetic purposes. This is a licence frequently used in popular poetry and songs, but Paul Fort does not take the trouble to mark the suppression of the sham syllable in the regular way by omitting the e mute and substituting an apostrophe. Indeed the effect if he did so would be very ugly and tiring. These innovations do not seem to an English student very terrible, and indeed about half of Paul Fort's poetry could perfectly well be printed out in lines and be read as popular poetry, and no one would any more dream of cavilling at it as a breach of tradition than at Richepin's

> Il y avait un' fois un pauvre gas Oui aimait cell' qui n'l'aimait pas.

words.

Besides it might be observed there is nothing very revolutionary in the printing of verse as prose. It might even be called on the contrary a return to the old tradition, for a monkish scribe copying Virgil would go to greater lengths than our author in jumbling up the lines—would in fact jumble up the very

This is not to say, however, that Paul Fort's practice in this respect is perfectly reasonable and wise. The greatest enthusiast for his work must admit that in the longer poems it is often very puzzling to know, without careful scrutiny, whether the poet has any rhythmical intentions or not. It is also invariably difficult to discover the words which are intended to rhyme. It is at least doubtful whether the 'half-way house' and quick transition from verse into prose, at which the author says he aims by his peculiar typography, would not be better served by simply printing verse as verse and prose as prose. The only real advantage about the system, as far as one can see, is that the reader is imperceptibly led to read the lines more rapidly, and that the licences taken, which include, besides those already mentioned, the occasional use of very vague assonance in the place of rhyme, 5 look less alarming. Certainly the innovation attracted attention and discussion to the poet's early work, but unfortunately as years went on critics continued to discuss the metre instead of the poetry, and the French with their passion for order and tradition are still very worried about this comparatively trifling aspect of a great achievement-so that for many Frenchmen even to-day Paul Fort is 'the poet who writes in prose,' and is unjustly confounded with a thousand maudlin writers of amateurish prose poems. I believe that if he were to publish his shorter lyrics printed in the old-established way they would be received with immense enthusiasm not only by a literary clique but by the whole French nation.

The ranking of poets is a tedious and rather childish pastime which many critics at once deride and enjoy; yet there is somehow an undoubted pleasure in constructing a hierarchy, in picturing modern French poetry to oneself as being led by two great chiefs, Henri de Régnier and Paul Fort—two men of genius strikingly dissimilar to each other and only alike in towering above all possible rivals of the present day. Unfortunately this is no very high compliment, for if we count Verhaeren as a Belgian—and even he seems to write steadily worse year by year—there is very little left in modern French poetry, since the untimely deaths of Samain and Moréas, which calls for more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Assonance is frequently used by Francis Jammes and even by the classical Henri de Régnier.

than respect outside the work of these two men of genius. Exception must be made in favour of the delicate and charming spirit of Francis Jammes.

But a more interesting and more legitimate part of the critic's task is the study of affinity. In criticising this author one is apt to make endless comparisons with the great writers and especially with the great humorists of the past. But strangely enough it is Shakespeare himself who, more than any other writer living or dead, is recalled by the work of Paul Fort. In this assertion, of course, no comparison of value is implied; the Tragic and the Sublime are not regions into which Paul Fort has entered. It is to the Shakespeare of the Midsummer Night's Dream, not to the Shakespeare of Macbeth, that our Frenchman has affinity. But the affinity is very striking nevertheless; there is something deep in the nature of both poets that positively coincides. Is it perhaps their exuberance that makes them kin, their bravado air of looking at the world, their delight in Nature not as a pantheistic manifestation but as a delightful and complicated toy? the absence of all bitterness from their godlike laughter, an absence of bitterness not due, as in the work of our modern English cartoonists, to a mawkish desire to hurt nobody's feelings, but to an innate loftiness of soul? One cannot say exactly, but I think that many English readers of Paul Fort will admit that had Shakespeare been born a Frenchman of to-day he would have written, at least when in comic or lyric mood, work closely resembling this. One might even add that Shakespeare handles his classical subject in Venus and Adonis much as Paul Fort has handled les Néréides, and, as if to clinch our argument, what insight do the little poems-some of them already quoted-on Hamlet, Ophelia, Lear, show into even the tragic Shakespeare. Few French poets ought to be so profoundly appreciated by English readers.

JAMES ELROY FLECKER.

# THE 'DEVIL-DIPLOMATISTS' OF PRUSSIA:

AS SEEN IN THE HOTHAM PAPERS

In a recent speech Mr. Lloyd George referred to the 'pressgang of Frederick the Great of Prussia,' by means of which he asserted that monarch was wont to procure men of abnormal stature for his army. The idiosyncrasy specified, however, belonged to the father of Frederick the Great, Frederick William the First, second King of Prussia, an ancestor of the present German Emperor, and a Sovereign whose career in the light of the events of to-day it is of singular interest to review. This interest is moreover greatly enhanced owing to the fact that in the possession of Lord Hotham, by whose kind permission I have been enabled to inspect them, are papers bearing on this period of history, certain of which have never before been made public, so that with them Thomas Carlyle and other authorities on Prussian history were unacquainted.

It was in 1701 that Frederick, Elector of Brandenburg, was raised to the dignity of King of Prussia, that being the only independent portion of his dominions, and the emancipation of the family of Brandenburg from the yoke of Austria was at first viewed with some amusement by a country which, in the assumption of sovereignty by so inconsiderable a Monarch, saw little cause for alarm. Nevertheless it was remarked by those possessing greater perspicuity 'that the Emperor of Austria, in consenting to such an arrangement, ought to hang the Ministers who had given him such treacherous advice'; and the event proved

that there were grounds for this opinion.

Yet for a while all seemed well. Frederick, that first King of Prussia, was a vain and frivolous Prince, feeble alike in mind and body, who contented himself by expending his time and money in devising fresh pageants, processions, and more precise etiquette for his little Court. It was not till Frederick William, his son, succeeded him upon the throne that Austria began to realise the grave mistake which she had committed. For this second King of Prussia was obsessed by one idea—the aggrandisement of his little kingdom. To this end he held no

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sacrifice too great. In two months he had reduced the previous outlay of the Royal establishment to one fifth of what it had been during the lifetime of his father; all needless expenses in every department were similarly curtailed; his efforts, before referred to, to ensure a race of giants for his troops, his pressgang which tore priests from the altar and kidnapped men of abnormal stature throughout the countries of Europe roused universal indignation; and in brief, while encouraging commerce and industry, he increased the army till at last a population of two-and-a-half million souls were supporting the unheard of number of 83,000 men under arms. When success attended his methods, Austria, alarmed, viewed with dismay the growing power of Prussia, and further cause for disquietude was soon her portion.

Without entering into the intricacies of the political situation, the main cause for what ensued may be briefly stated. In 1717 Charles the Sixth of Austria had founded an East Indian Company in Ostend. He had given this company, to the exclusion of all his other subjects, the right and privilege for thirty years of extending their trade to Africa and India. In 1725 he further made a secret treaty of commerce with Spain in favour of such trading, one of the articles of this agreement being an undertaking on his part to compel the restoration to the Spaniards of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, which were then in the possession of the English. The principal maritime Powers having discovered the plans of Austria, and recognising therein the ruin of that commerce upon which their own greatness depended, forthwith concluded amongst themselves a defensive alliance in which Prussia joined. Austria, terrified at this league which she had not power to resist openly, determined upon dissolving it by means of intrigues. Specially inimical to her project therefore was any closer link between England and Prussia, two countries whose Sovereigns were already united by the tie of relationship, for Frederick William had married Sophia Dorothea, daughter of George the First and sister to George the Second. Moreover, for long the ambition of the Queen of Prussia had been to see her eldest daughter, the Princess Wilhelmine, wedded to the heir of that throne of England which had been occupied in turn by her father and her brother. The project had been discussed since the Princess's earliest childhood, and with it was involved another, that of the marriage of Frederick, the Prince Royal of Prussia, with Princess Amelia, daughter of George the Second. Nevertheless, while the friendship of a powerful country like England was palpably to the advantage of the new principality of Prussia, the achievement of this double union which would have cemented it was hedged about with difficulties that, but 500

for a comprehension of the secret diplomacy of Austria, would seem incredible.

For Austria, in furtherance of her secret schemes, had despatched to the Court of Prussia her Minister Seckendorf. The character of this envoy, if we may trust the description given of it by Frederick, Crown Prince of Prussia, afterwards Frederick the Great, was 'sordid and venal; his manners were vulgar and uncultivated. Falsehood was become so habitual to him that he had lost the power of speaking the truth.' Arriving at the poor Court of Berlin well plied with gold, this emissary found his way made easy before him. He had previously been a friend of Grumkow, Prime Minister to the King of Prussia, a diplomat of more polished exterior but equally unscrupulous as himself. Grumkow at once played into the hands of the Austrian spy, and to their schemes Reichenbach, the Prussian Minister at the Court of St. James's, was likewise won over. The task to which this trio of intriguers forthwith devoted themselves was primarily that of preventing any further strengthening of the tie between England and Prussia; still more of promoting, in so far as was practicable, a disruption between the two countries. Although both projects involved persuading the King of Prussia that his advantage was his disadvantage, in view of the character of that monarch this was not so difficult as at first sight appears.

For the very foibles of Frederick William lent themselves to the plans of his enemies. Like all autocratic natures, his terror of being ruled made him a ready prey to those astute enough to play upon this propensity. 'The King,' writes his daughter, 'had the misfortune to be always deceived by those who least deserved his confidence; and these, knowing his violent temper, used his weakness to assist them in attaining whatever end they wanted.' Obstinate as he was arbitrary, he was totally without ballast; an asylum rather than a throne had been more fitting for such a Monarch of Moods. The ungovernable violence of his temper, the vindictive brutality of his anger overpassed the limits of sanity. As has been aptly remarked, he viewed his sceptre as a cudgel, while he ruled his family and his subjects with equal harshness. Vain of his very failings, to cross his selfish will at all times meant disaster—or death; to bow to it was to feed his pride and to earn his unbounded, if transient,

Thus the sufferings and privations to which his family were subjected baffle description. In the rigid economy which prevailed at his Court, not only was the semblance of luxury denied them, but they lacked for bare necessities and seldom had sufficient to eat. The King personally was a gross feeder, and

habitually ate, as he invariably drank, too much, more especially when such food and drink could be obtained through the hospitality of one of his subjects. But, partly through malevolence, partly through miserliness, he delighted in starving his family and their retinue, while the existence to which he condemned them, the complete lack of happiness or of any intellectual interest, is piteous reading. Despite the creed of that age that kings, though butchers, could do no wrong, and parents, though tyrants, were sacred, Wilhelmine, Princess of Prussia, has, as we know, left behind a Memoir of her life which is exceedingly curious, and a few quotations from this bring before us more vividly than any laboured description what she endured. In this she speaks of the Royal Family dining off 'coarse potherbs'-i.e. carrots and parsnips, which they particularly detested; while in 1726, when they were at Potsdam, she gives an account of their daily life there which is eloquent in its simple statement of facts:

We led a most sad life. We were awakened at seven every morning by the King's regiment, which exercised in front of the windows of our rooms, which were on the ground floor. The firing went on incessantly-piff, puff-and lasted the whole morning. At ten we went to see my mother, and accompanied her to the room next to the King's, where we sat and sighed for the rest of the morning. Then came dinner time; the dinner consisted of six small, badly-cooked dishes, which had to suffice for twentyfour persons, so that some had to be satisfied with the mere smell. At table nothing else was talked of but economy and soldiers. The Queen and ourselves, too unworthy to open our mouths, listened in humble silence to the oracles which were pronounced.

When dinner was over the King sat himself down in a wooden armchair and slept for two hours. But before doing so he generally managed to make some unpleasant speech for the Queen or for us. As long as the King slept I worked, and as soon as he woke up he went away. The Queen then went back to her room where I read aloud to her till the King

returned. . . .

Supper, from which we generally got up hungry, was at eight in the evening. The Queen played at cards with her lady-in-waiting and mine. who were the only attendants. . . . My only resource was my books. I had a small library which I hid under all the beds and tables, for the King despised all learning, and wished me to occupy myself with nothing but needlework and household duties or details. Had he ever found me writing or reading he would probably have whipped me.

At a later date the Princess describes the daily life at the Court of Berlin, where economy and dreariness appear accentuated:

I had to be with the Queen at ten. We then went with her to the State-room, which was never warmed, and remained there doing nothing till noon. After this we went to the King's private room to bid him good-morning, and then went to dinner, to which four-and-twenty guests

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were invited. The dinner consisted of two dishes, the one vegetables, which were boiled in water on the top of which floated some melted butter with chopped herbs, the other pork and cabbage, of which every one got only a very small portion. Sometimes a goose was served, or a tough old chicken, and on Sundays there was one sweet dish. A very long-winded person sat at the middle of the table over against the King and narrated the news of the day, on which he then poured forth a flood of political nonsense which engendered a deadly weariness. After dinner the King sat in his armchair near the fire and went to sleep. The Queen and my sisters sat round him and listened to his snores. . . . We went to supper at nine. This meal lasted four or five hours, after which everyone retired to bed. Such was the life we led, it never varied in the least, each day resembled its predecessor.

One pictures that dinner for the large Royal Family, their attendants and twenty-four guests with its one dish of pork, of which each person present could expect only a 'very small portion,' and were fortunate if they got that. One pictures, too, the mental stagnation, the wasted hours of unspeakable tediousness which that life further represented. Yet the existence thus described was a halcyon one compared with the tempestuous interludes which too frequently relieved its monotony.

The members of the Royal Family on whom the tyranny of the King pressed most mercilessly were the two involved in the projected double marriage, the Crown Prince Frederick and his sister Wilhelmine. The unfortunate heir to the throne who excited his father's malevolence was, the Princess emphasises, 'the most amiable Prince possible, handsome and well-made. His intellect was superior to his age, and he possessed all the qualities which make a perfect Prince.' But his very talents were a crime in his father's eyes, his appreciation of literature, his love of music, his prepossessing appearance, his taste in dress, above all his popularity. The King designed this Prince, brilliant and profound, to submerge all his faculties in the art of drilling; he lost no opportunity of humiliating his defenceless son, whose life was in constant danger, while the known devotion to each other of the brother and sister undoubtedly involved the Princess in the jealous hatred with which the Sovereign regarded his heir.

In that Memoir, wherein the Princess vented something of the uncontrollable misery of her existence, she describes how, when the King was suffering from one of his periodical fits of religious mania, 'We lived like Trappists, to the great grief of my brother and myself. No one dared laugh or be cheerful in his presence.' She relates too that, scanty as was the daily allowance of food when they were permitted to partake of it, there were occasions when even this was denied them. When 1919 1111 1919 111-111 11911111111

the King, for instance, had a fit of gout, 'the pain of which added to his natural violence of disposition,' the Princess states:

The pains of purgatory could not equal those which we endured. We were obliged to appear at nine o'clock in the morning in his room. We dined there, and did not dare to leave it for a moment. Every day was passed by the King in invectives against my brother and myself. . . . He obliged us to eat and drink the things for which we had an aversion, or which were bad for our healths, which caused us sometimes to bring up in his presence all that was in our stomachs. Every day was marked by some sinister event, and it was impossible to raise one's eyes without seeing some unhappy people tormented in one way or the other. The King's restlessness did not suffer him to remain in bed; he had himself placed in a chair on rollers, and was thus dragged all over the place. His two arms rested upon crutches which supported them. We always followed his triumphal car like unhappy captives about to undergo their sentence. . . . We were become as lean as hack-horses from mere want of food.

On another occasion the Princess writes:

The King almost caused my brother and myself to die of hunger. He always acted as carver and served everybody except us; and when by chance there remained anything in a dish he spat into it in order to prevent our eating of it. We lived entirely upon coffee and milk and dried cherries which quite ruined my digestion. In return I was nourished with insults and invectives, for I was abused all day long in every possible manner and before everybody.

Moreover, this King who, as we are told, would fling plates at his children during meals; would try to hit them with his crutches, careless whether he killed them or not; who caned his grown-up son in public till he bled, or endeavoured to strangle him with his own hands; who once, having felled his helpless daughter to the ground, was only with difficulty prevented from kicking her to death—this King, autocrat in the bosom of his affrighted family, did not hesitate in like manner to thrash defenceless prisoners of State who were brought before him, or to belabour the judges of his kingdom and fling them downstairs when they had given a verdict not in accordance with his wishes. 'On one occasion,' Lavisse relates, 'he obtained the reconsideration of a judgment pronounced by one of the Courts by means of blows upon the heads and shoulders of the judges, who ran away spitting out their teeth as they fled, pursued by the King.' In short, Lavisse adds:

No slave-driver, I believe, ever dispensed more blows than this King. Not to mention here his family tragedies, there was no class of his subjects, save the officers, who had not felt the weight of his stick. He beat his servants on the smallest provocation. It was said in Berlin that 'he has furnished a small room with a dozen sticks of great weight, placed at a certain distance apart, so as to be ready for him to seize and apply to whomsoever approached him and did not satisfy his every whim.' A blow followed every answer he did not like; whether it were really bad or whether it were so good as to be unanswerable did not signify. He one day met the Potsdam brewer in the street. 'Why is your beer so dear?' asks he.

'Because I regulate it by the price of barley. If your Majesty will allow me to get barley from Stralsund where it is cheap I can reduce my prices.' Nothing could be fairer than that, so the King gives him twenty cuts with his cane.

On one occasion, we are told, Frederick William scaled a living fish and compelled his guests to eat it; on another he beat a doctor who, he decided, took too long to cure one of the Princesses of smallpox; on yet another he threatened that he would send the whole of the medical faculty in Prussia to the fortress of Spandau if they did not within a given time rid him of some blisters on his tongue. Although such incidents may be taken as an indication of insanity, Lavisse insists that in the Royal outbreaks of fury the effects of alcohol were clearly discernible, and he considers that Frederick William was largely responsible for his own bad temper and sufferings.

Be that as it may, it was with such a human anomaly, such a monster of uncontrollable impulses, that the intriguers who surrounded the Prussian throne had to deal; yet the material which they desired to mould was sufficiently plastic if handled

with an astuteness devoid of scruple.

'Seckendorf, Grumkow!' exclaims Carlyle, 'we have often heard of Devil-Diplomatists, and shuddered over horrible pictures of them in novels, hoping it was all fancy; but here actually is a pair of them, transcending all novels, perhaps the highest cognisable fact to be met with in Devil-Diplomacy.' 'The whole story,' sums up Lavisse, 'is perhaps that of the greatest network

of deception ever conceived.'

By the time that George the Second had acceded to the throne of England the friendly relations between the Courts of England and Prussia had cooled down. The negotiations respecting the marriage of Wilhelmine with Frederick, Prince of Wales, made little progress, and finally the Queen of Prussia, in despair, despatched to her sister-in-law, the Queen of England, a missive the tactlessness of which was little calculated to further the object which she had at heart. pointing out that 'je crois qu'il serait tems de conclure cette affaire, sur tout puisque je craint que si cela trainoit encore long tems, le Roy ne prit d'autres mesures,' she added, 'Il faurroit pour cet effect la demander sans conditions.' George at once saw in this the handiwork of his brother-in-law of Prussia. The idea that England was thus to be dictated to by Berlin, that she was ordered to beg for the hand of the Princess Wilhelmine 'without conditions,' roused the ire of his Britannic Majesty. Wherefore, while his Consort returned to her sister-in-law a conventionally civil answer, the appeal of the latter produced exactly the opposite effect to that which its writer had desired. The negotiations proceeded no further, and at last Frederick William, hesitating between different policies, perpetually irritated by his Ministers against England and fearful of offending the Austrian Emperor, decided to betrothe his daughter to one of two other suitors for her hand, both of whom she particularly disliked.

At such a crisis Dubourgay, the English Minister at Berlin, and those favourable to his cause, decided to make one last attempt, ere it was too late, to bring about the alliance with England. For this purpose they despatched as emissary to the Court of St. James's Dr. Villa, the English tutor to the Princess, who would be able to plead in his native tongue the cause of the unhappy Queen and her family. So well did this Envoy exert his eloquence, imploring his Majesty to send to Berlin 'some Man of Distinction' to treat about the marriages while it was yet possible to do so, that King George could not ignore his appeal. True, there was but scanty love lost between the rulers of England and Prussia. George, when referring to the warlike Frederick William, was wont contemptuously to style him 'The Corporal of Potsdam'; Frederick William retaliated by calling his irascible little brother-in-law 'Mon beau-frère le Comédien!' Yet so long as George could make advances without any infringement of his cherished dignity, he was willing to enlist his sympathies actively on behalf of the victims of Frederick William; and he therefore cast his eyes about his Court to discover the 'Man of Distinction' worthy to be entrusted with this delicate and important mission.

He soon decided that nowhere could he find a man more qualified for his purpose than Sir Charles Hotham, who, by a strange coincidence, was an old friend and college contemporary of Villa, the emissary of the Queen of Prussia. Of ancient family and unblemished record, a courtier and a soldier from his earliest manhood, Hotham was of striking appearance, of polished manners, and noted for his learning and accomplishments. The fact that he was likewise the brother-in-law of Philip Dormer, the celebrated Lord Chesterfield, then Minister at The Hague and a man of Continental celebrity, was calculated to enhance his prestige abroad.

Forthwith George, in a document of many pages, proceeded to ply his Ambassador Extraordinary with instructions respecting the conduct of the mission with which he was to be entrusted, and these dealt at length with the crucial point in the proposed negotiations—the rock upon which it was possible that they might split.

The King of Prussia, as already stated, had long shown himself willing for the marriage of his daughter to the Prince of Wales; that was a matter in which great issues for the Court

of Berlin were not involved, and, since the Princess must needs wed some Prince of suitable rank, the English alliance promised a provision for her future at which Frederick William could not look askance. But the marriage of the Prince Royal with a Princess of England was a far other matter. If such a union were permitted to take place, it meant, in the present, a certain measure of protection for the son-in-law of the King of England, it meant recognising the manhood, strengthening the power and importance of that heir whom Frederick William hated, that victim whom as yet he could torture with impunity; it meant for the future a close alliance between a reigning Sovereign of Prussia and the Court of England-the enemy to Austria. Frederick William, the tool of unscrupulous Ministers and his own evil passions, disliked the prospect thus presented both in the present and the future, and was minded to permit the marriage of his daughter, but to forbid the marriage of his son. George, whose principal object was to bind the interests of Prussia with those of England and to enlist on his own behalf the gratitude of the future Sovereign of that country, was equally minded to achieve both marriages or consent to none.

The instructions to Hotham concluded with the significant sentence:

It is to be hoped that the errand you go upon will procure you an easy access to the King of Prussia and all manner of civil treatment from him. But if he should fly out at any time into expressions not becoming our Minister to bear, you will support our Honour and Dignity with Resolution and Firmness.

It is entertaining to observe that at the same date Reichenbach, the Prussian spy at the Court of St. James's, is describing in somewhat similar terms the comportment of his Majesty of England for the benefit of his Majesty of Prussia:

On sçait d'une bonne main que le Roy d'Angleterre s'emporte quelque fois extremement, et appelle en presence propre le Chevalier Walpole et my Ld Townshend Coquins, Cujons (cochons), Diable vous emporte, allez vous en, etc., etc.

Hotham, in short, considering the nature of the monarch whom he represented, and the monarch to whom he was to make representations, had no enviable task; yet it is doubtful whether he was at first aware of the secret forces leagued against him. Even as he set forth upon his journey Reichenbach wrote regretfully to the Devil-Diplomatist, Grumkow, at the Court of Berlin, 'Ce Grand Oracle est un homme fort joli!' Lest therefore the dangerous fascination of the English Ambassador Extraordinary, and his supposed importance as 'le beau-frère de my Lord Chesterfield,' should weigh too seriously with his Majesty of Prussia, Reichenbach, at the instigation of Grumkow, pre-

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pared a counterblast. The modern lie-bureau at Berlin had its origin far in the past. 'The time has now come,' wrote Grumkow in cipher to his tool at the English Court, 'when Reichenbach must play his game'; and ten days later he adds: 'Reichenbach will tell his Prussian Majesty what Grumkow

finds fit.' This news of the Court of England, concocted by Grumkow in Berlin, may be summarised as follows: Reichenbach, the faithful servant of his Prussian Majesty, devoutly hoped that that great and good monarch would not allow himself to be duped by the wiles of his enemies. The nefarious design of St. James's was to reduce Prussia to the position of a province dependent upon England. When once the Princess Royal of England should be wedded to the Prince Royal of Prussia, the English by that means would form such a powerful party in Berlin that they would altogether 'tie his Prussian Majesty's hands.' If, lamented Reichenbach, the beloved King but knew the truly base schemes of England which were concealed beneath this apparently harmless mission of Hotham, how that good monarch would be on his guard! But Prussia was in serious danger of being innocently made the catspaw of Britain, and the despicable intrigues involved in this affair were truly inconceivable. Dexterously, indeed, did Reichenbach play upon the foibles of the credulous King, instilling into the mind of that choleric Corporal of Potsdam the belief that England was only looking forward to the day when the Prince, a son-in-law of King George, with his Consort, an English Princess, would be seated on the throne of Prussia, which would then be merely a tributary to Great Britain. But besides thus cunningly arousing the ire of the weak monarch, Reichenbach strove to diminish the supposed lustre of the Ambassador Extraordinary in the eyes of Frederick William by insinuating that his Britannic Majesty in his choice of deputy had done but scanty honour to Prussia. In England, he announces, 'ce grand Oracle is of so little importance that no one had even heard of his existence till he was named Ambassador!' Few things, he was aware, could be better calculated to wound the vanity of the Corporal of Potsdam than the insinuation that this Envoy on whom he and his people were prepared to look with awe was in truth a man of small account in the country whence he came; that even the great Lord Chesterfield himself, from whom the 'Knight Hotham' derived an additional lustre, occupied in his native land a far other position than that which the Continental Powers ignorantly assigned to him. the 27th of March 1730 Reichenbach wrote sarcastically:

Ce grand Oracle est arrivé à Berlin, dont on n'a pas sçu s'il existait dans le Monde ou non; et à la Court on fait d'abord un bruit de luy

comme d'un autre Alexandre; c'est une affaire bien étrange qu'on a une idée trop petite icy des Allemands, et que nous autres Allemands avons une Idée trop vaste et magnifique des Anglois, et croyons que c'est un Ange même qui vient; par exemple, Ld Chesterfield passe icy pour un bon homme, qui est en crédit aupres de Sa Majesté Britannique, mais on n'a pourtant une Idée si extraordinaire de lui icy, comme on a de lui en Allemagne.

Hotham, arriving in Berlin, was destined soon to discover that the task which he had undertaken was far less simple than he had been led to anticipate; nevertheless the letters in which he describes his mission, and all which befell him in that infantine kingdom of Prussia, afford a striking contrast to the other documents among which they are preserved. Through the tortuous intrigues of his opponents, through the timorous championship of his supporters, his narrative darts like a gleaming shuttle, direct, unwavering, carrying with it an unbroken thread of statement, fearless, uncompromising, exact. His private correspondence and his despatches alike show him to be a loyal subject, a staunch friend, an excellent hater, too proud to be a sycophant, too sincere to be a diplomatist. They show that, through all the intricacies of his negotiation, never once did he stoop to court those Devil-Diplomatists whom he despised, and that from the first he was minded to risk the success of his undertaking rather than the integrity of his conduct.

Further, those yellowing papers which he has left are endowed for us with a curious magic. Reading them, out of the silence of the grave there springs once more to life that little Court of long ago, with all its petty, troublous existence resuscitated. We are in the midst of it—the babel of tongues, the clash of schemes, the intrigues, the lying, the heart-burnings, the heartbreakings, the note of vice triumphant, the plaint of integrity oppressed. Once more the puppets strut across the stage, once more each plays his appointed part—that rôle apportioned to him by Fate-so all-important then, so piteously insignificant now after the lapse of nigh upon two centuries. We watch that King of Moods, that Queen of Plots, that wan, handsome Prince, that Princess with her tortured brain and failing health, those diplomatists pursuing their eternal game of Chance, toiling warily along a treacherous road with dazzling heights above and a bottomless pit beneath. We see the tall grenadiers shouldering arms; piff, puff, go the guns, the game of mimic warfare echoes noisily through the busy kingdom; the undercurrent of Statecraft progresses silently. And still, with the wisdom of the centuries, we see how each human unit is striving for Self; how that King of it all, that autocrat of cudgels and fisticuffs, is but

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a madman, the dupe of every unscrupulous knave, a Monarch of Thunder crowned with a fool's cap.

Nevertheless, his Majesty of Prussia could recognise that there were occasions when he must discard his rôle of official bully, and he received the English Ambassador with good humour and gracious condescension. Yet even in this affability there was a danger. The first brief audience over, Hotham relates:

We went to dinner, where his Majesty was pleased to make both himself and the Company inordinately drunk. The Company consisted of General Grumkow, Seckendorf, Borch, Cnyphausen, and several other foreign Ministers and Persons of distinction. The King of Prussia in his Cupps began his Majesty's health, the Queen's, and to the Royal Marriage and good Union of the two Familys. I observed that it had been strongly insinuated to him that the marriage of the Prince of Wales and the Princess Royal, his daughter, was the only Purport of my Commission, and though I took frequent opportunities of insinuating to him that I begged to know what his Prussian Majesty's intentions and propositions were upon the Subject that I might transmit the same to his Majesty, yet I could at that time get no other answer than that on Saturday I should be acquainted with them, and therefore in the good Humour he was in I did not think it proper then to urge Matters further to him.

All, indeed, was uproarious merriment at that banquet. The lean dishes of pot-herbs and water which too often formed the sole diet of the starving Royal household were now replaced by savoury meats and ample abundance; servants, magnificently dressed, paced the gaily lighted apartments-for once regal splendour prevailed in the Royal Palace. And beneath the genial glow of that unwonted festivity, 'in his Cupps' Frederick William threw discretion to the winds; he proposed the health of his 'dear son-in-law, the Prince of Wales,' and Hotham found himself confronted by an unexpected dilemma. He had to hold in view two opposing aims-the mandates of his Master and the happiness of that Master's sister. Aware of the dire need for keeping the King of Prussia in a good humour and thus ameliorating the condition of Queen Sophie and her family, he yet might be held blameable if he allowed any misapprehension to exist on the part of Frederick William with regard to the true nature of the mission from England, which was to arrange two marriages, not one.

Meanwhile, news of the supposed betrothal sped through Berlin, and the partisans of Austria were dumbfounded. On the 8th of April 1830 Grumkow wrote to Reichenbach:

I returned dead drunk as the post was going, and I was not in a condition to write. The audience lasted only a quarter of an hour, and, after having read the letter from the King of England, the Master said to Seckendorf and his Friend: 'This speaks only in general terms of blood relationship, and of the marriage, and I think that it is humbug.' At table there were witticisms to the effect that a German ducat was worth

as much as an English ducat, and that all well and good to marry a daughter, but it was not necessary for that to marry a son—and other picoteries. But you would have fallen from the skies, when all at once the King announced that the Princess was promised to the Prince of Wales, and his Majesty received the congratulations of the whole table, while Borch cried with joy. The King was dead drunk, and Dubourgay and Hotham, who appeared in no hurry to offer their congratulations, affectivent un grand froid. At the close the drinking was terrible, and the King returned much inconvenienced to Potsdam; but the next morning he caused to be conveyed to the company who had been at Charlottenbergh that they had better not mention what had taken place; and Hotham had a grand conference with Cnyphausen and Borch, but as they cannot so far agree about conditions, he has sent a Courier to get further instructions. In short, no one ever witnessed any scene to equal it. For myself, I am distracted at all this.

Grumkow in truth, at this juncture, might well have considered his position desperate. His back was against the wall; he was fighting not only for all which made life palatable, but for life itself. Frederick William, self-constituted supreme Magistrate of Prussia, had a short way with those who fell from his favour; and Grumkow, conscious of double dealing, might have trembled at this knowledge had he not gauged with unerring accuracy the power of his wit when pitted against that of his Royal Master. Neither Frederick William, with his besotted intellect, nor the 'Knight Hotham' with his rigid integrity, was likely to prove a match for the cunning of a Grumkow. In Hotham, Grumkow had speedily recognised not merely a political antagonist, but an enemy so frank that he did not trouble to disguise that enmity. Hotham, he likewise discovered, was not to be bought. The Englishman resisted all the friendly advances of Grumkow, he refused Grumkow's proffered hospitality, he responded coldly to the oily speeches of the Minister. 'Reichenbach has depicted Hotham to perfection!' wrote Grumkow angrily to his accomplice; 'his manners are - extremely haughty and impertinent, and I cannot sufficiently admire the patience of the brother-in-law of the King of England to be able to endure them while awaiting the conclusion of this affair!' Hotham, on his side, with an accuracy equal to Grumkow's own, had taken the measure of his antagonist. In a letter dated the 18th of April he writes:

Grumkow knows every word that passes at the Conferences, and has already been playing tricks with me. . . . Grumkow is ever at the King's elbow. I meet every day with fresh instances of his Power, and there is hardly a Person who is often about the King that is not either in his pay or Seckendorf's. Upon my arrival he made a great many advances and Professions of Service, but meeting with no other Returns but Personal Civilities, he has since set all his Engines to work to prepossess the King against me.

To the onlooker of a later generation who can watch each movement of both players, that game between the astute Prussian and the Englishman with 'les manières fort hautaines et impertinentes' is one of absorbing interest, all the more that at this time each antagonist believed himself secure in a measure which would inevitably checkmate his opponent. With feverish energy Grumkow was plying Reichenbach with material wherewith to frustrate the plans of England. His accomplice was to furnish him, for use in Berlin, with every available scandal against the Prince of Wales, with every trivial gossip disadvantageous to the King and Queen of England, with any news, true or untrue, which would serve to portray in lurid colours the miserable existence that awaited a Prussian Princess amid such surroundings. He even strove to rouse the animosity of England itself against the match. In a letter designed for Reichenbach to show in England, he described the Queen of Prussia as 'frantic to get rid of the Princess Royal, who has become thin, ugly, and spotty,' a description obviously calculated to affright the fastidious, pleasure-loving Prince of Wales. But the trump-card of Grumkow lay in his ability to whisper in the ear of Frederick William the warning that Hotham had come to negotiate two marriages, not one, as his Majesty fondly imagined; that he could urge the King, before proceeding further with the negotiations, to insist upon a clear understanding on this point -a point which Hotham was not prepared without further instructions to elucidate.

Hotham's counter-move was nevertheless a potent one. The secret correspondence between Grumkow and Reichenbach had been intercepted in England, certain of the letters had been deciphered, and while the originals were despatched to their destination, in order that the intriguers should not be put on their guard by any knowledge of the discovery, copies of the incriminating correspondence had been transmitted to the British Envoy at Berlin. Hotham, thus furnished with proofs of the duplicity of his foe, was only deterred from taking immediate action in the matter by the timid policy of the Prussian Minister Cnyphausen, who, although friendly to England, was fearful of any too precipitate measure. Forced thus to abide his time, Hotham, however, determined to strengthen his hand against the moment when he should be ready to strike. He at once foresaw that the defence proffered by Grumkow would be that the copied letters were forgeries; therefore, when describing to Lord Townshend the manner in which Grumkow had been manœuvring against him, he added feelingly:

As I should be glad, therefore, before I leave this Place to do him also some Service in my turn, I beg your Lordship would, if you think con-

venient, stop an original letter of his to Reichenbach whenever you can meet with one strong enough to break his neck, and upon a proper occasion I shall with great pleasure put it with the Rest myself into the King's hands.

Meantime, the tide of the negotiations with regard to the proposed alliances ebbed and flowed continuously. The King inclined first to this course, then to that. One day he lent a willing ear to the insinuations of Grumkow and Seckendorf; another he recognised the advantages which might accrue from the proposals of Hotham. Finally he announced that he would consent to the marriage of his son if the Crown Prince and his bride could be established as Stadtholders in Hanover. 'It is very plain,' wrote Hotham to St. James's, with extreme frankness, 'that he will sell his son, but not give him. If no prospect of advantage be in view it will be impossible to bring the King of Prussia to reason on that head, considering the excessive jealousy and avarice of his temper.'

Awaiting instructions on this proposal, Hotham was bidden to be for a few days the guest of Frederick William at Potsdam; and there for the first time, to his extreme curiosity, he saw the Crown Prince, who had hitherto been carefully kept out of the way of the English Ambassador, as he himself stated: 'De peur

que le vent Anglais ne le touchât.'

The Prince was also at table, and it is impossible to express the dejection and melancholy that appears in him. There is something so very engaging in the Person and Behaviour of this young Prince, and everybody says so much good of him, that one is the more moved at the unhappy Circumstances he is under. As I was presented to him in the King's presence our conversation was soon over.

A few days later Frederick William again invited Hotham to visit him for some hunting, and again the Envoy was haunted by the sight of that Prince of romance and misfortune.

All I can say is the more I see of the Prince Royal, the more I wish for everything that can facilitate the conclusion of that match, for, if I am not much mistaken, this young Prince will one day make a very considerable figure, and from his good Qualities and engaging Person, there is all the reason in the world to believe that it will prove a most happy marriage.

But while these plans were being secretly formulated, Hotham was still chafing at the persistent refusal of Cnyphausen to consent to the incriminating letters of the Devil-Diplomatist being shown to the King of Prussia, and thus, as he believed, scoring an advantage before the arrival of the expected Courier from St. James's.

Let the proposals from England be what they will [wrote Hotham in disgust], I do not see why that should hinder the King of Prussia from doing himself justice and punishing two of his own servants that have

so infamously abused him; besides I cannot help thinking that these letters, if delivered now, might very much facilitate the Success of any Overture that may come from his Majesty (King George) by defeating at once the Opposition we meet with from that Quarter. However, as I was absolutely tied down by my instructions to have Mr. Cnyphausen's entire approbation of the steps I should take in this matter, I was forced to acquiesce in his opinion.

Since I have wrote this letter I have been to Potsdam, and found the King not altogether in so good a humour. . . As I am determined a Day or two after the Arrival of the Courier to lay open the whole scene of Villainy to the King of Prussia, and to put the Letter's into his hands, it is hazarding nothing now to stop an original of each, which may be produced in case his Majesty be so credulous as not to give


entire faith to them without seeing their own handwriting.

At last the long looked-for messenger returned from England bearing tidings which Hotham believed would place the game in his hands. George, it must be remarked, had first secured from the Prince an understanding that, when bidden, he would return from Hanover to reside in England. Having thus rendered such concessions a negligible quantity, his Majesty of England unhesitatingly subscribed to the proposition of his Majesty of Prussia. Hotham was indeed instructed to make a formal proposal for two marriages, not one, but in so doing he had permission to state that the Crown Prince and his wife would be installed in the Government of Hanover as Stadtholders. The English Princess would have no fortune but this appointment; but, on the other hand, England exacted no marriage portion with Wilhelmine.

Armed with these good tidings, and with the letters which he believed were further to strengthen his position, Hotham triumphantly demanded and obtained an audience from Frederick William on the 5th of May. He unfolded the purport of his message from England, pointing out that 'both his Prussian Majesty's children would thus be provided for in the greatest and most honourable way, and he himself entirely eased of the burden of maintaining them'; and Frederick William, although observing that in an affair of such consequence it was impossible for him to give an answer without consideration and consulting his Ministers, nevertheless seemed so gratified that Hotham seized the moment to introduce tactfully the subject he so long had had at heart:

I said I was sorry that as to one of his Ministers he had acted so infamous a part towards us and so treacherous a one towards His Majesty that I hoped his opinion would have little weight with him; and then I laid open the whole Scene of villainy between Grumkow and Reichenbach, and made him sensible that, without any regard to truth, Reichenbach writ nothing but what was dictated to him from hence by Grumkow.

I remarked in reading ome passages of Reichenbach's letters, wherein he reflects upon the King of Prussia himself, that it moved His resentment; but as to Grumkow's (which 'tis true are not altogether so strong



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as Reichenbach's) His Prussian Majesty seemed rather inclined to excuse him. Tho' he said that Grumkow had indeed informed him of the Correspondence he had with Reichenbach, but that he always understood it was only to have an account of the news of the town and the Transactions in Parliament.

I endeavoured as much as I could to stir up his Indignation against Grumkow, being very sensible how much my success depended upon his Ruin, but am sorry that it did not seem to me to make all the Impression I wished for.

Through the reticence of Hotham's account one reads the bitter disappointment occasioned to him by this signal failure of his carefully prepared scheme. The bomb had fallen which was to have annihilated the Devil-Diplomatists, and they remained smiling, unscathed. Frederick William, the choleric over trivialities, could be unduly phlegmatic when it suited his policy to play a different rôle; and though later Hotham sent him a second batch of letters, begging that, if he doubted their authenticity, he would compare their contents, dictated by Grumkow, with the pretended information supplied from England by the 'incendiary' Reichenbach, yet Hotham writes in despair:

Every day produces fresh instances of Grumkow's power. I can give no stronger instance of the strange Ascendancy he has over the King than that ever since his Prussian Majesty has read all the intercepted letters he is still as much in his favour as ever. . . . I am informed General Grumkow says that ever since he has known that his Letters are opened in England, he has filled them with nothing but what relates to me. I don't suppose he used me very favourably!

Grumkow, as Hotham had anticipated, promptly denied his authorship of the intercepted correspondence. The letters, he stoutly maintained, were forgeries; names had been interpolated which he had never written, sentiments ascribed to him of which he was guiltless. The whole, he boldly asserted, was a gigantic fraud-of a piece with the rest of the conduct of England. In consequence, the vacillations of Frederick William increased. Although his avarice was tempted by the proposals of England, yet his vanity—his dread of being duped by that rival Power and his genuine fear of Austria-prevented his arriving at any decision. Moreover, his Ministers in the pay of the latter country never ceased to point out to him that if he once consented to the marriage of the Crown Prince he would no longer be master of the person of his son. 'It will be difficult,' Hotham wrote, 'to propose anything to him that will remove his jealousy'; while the Prince, in a letter conveyed secretly to Hotham, frankly stated his opinion that 'the real reason why the King will not consent to this marriage is that he wishes always to keep me in an inferior position, so that he can plague me all his life whenever the spirit moves him.' Finally, Frederick William, determined that, if his consent were wrung from him, he would make yet better terms with England, sent word that before the marriages could take place King George must first ensure to him the right of succession to the coveted Duchies of Juliers and Berg. To this the British Ministry replied that the question of this succession had nothing to do with the marriages, which must be concluded without any political motives, and that England would never agree to one marriage taking place without the other.

Ere this decision from the Court of St. James's reached Hotham, he had journeyed into Saxony in the wake of the King of Prussia, who had arranged to be present at the fêtes which the King of Poland designed to give at Muhlberg at the end of May. This meeting between the two Kings at the Camp of Radewitz, in its reckless extravagance and splendour has been compared to the Field of the Cloth of Gold; and historians throughout succeeding generations have loved to dwell on the pomp and the pageantry which immortalised it, the parading of 30,000 men in new uniforms, the tedious reviews beginning at daybreak and ending only when the spectators were wearied to exhaustion; the ceaseless banquets, concerts, theatrical displays, and, beneath all, that tragic under-current of intrigue in which the Ambassador Extraordinary from England, the hapless Prince, and the half-demented Monarch were the chief performers. For the fantastic grandeur and the regal display of which Frederick formed one of the central figures but served to enhance his misery and his humiliation. To the nobles, the Ambassadors, the officials who bowed before him-nay, to the very scullions who served him-he saw himself an object of pity, more of a slave than the humblest carl who paraded before him in the dust and heat. The more importance he acquired by taking his true position in the pageantry, the more did the mad hatred of his father determine to humble him to the earth. 'Never,' writes Lavisse, 'had the King treated him with such brutality. One day he had beaten him cruelly, thrown him on the ground, and dragged him about by the hair. had to appear on the parade ground in a very disorderly condition.' All the world knew and discussed his plight, all eyes scanned him with curiosity. His fate had become past endurance; and when, amid the thunder of guns and the tramping of troops, Hotham succeeded in establishing further communication with the unhappy Prince, it was to learn that he had definitely determined on attempting an escape to England.

Immediately Captain Guy Dickins was despatched to the Court of St. James's with this intelligence, under the pretence of carrying from Hotham a request for further instructions with regard to the protracted negotiations respecting the Royal marriages. Soon after his departure the great military display at the Camp of Radewitz terminated in a protracted orgy. First, a bewildering exhibition of fireworks which lasted from ten o'clock one evening till sunrise the following morning; next, a gigantic banquet, whereat every man feasted and drank till he could swallow no more; finally, a hunt conducted on the same colossal scale, where above a thousand stags, wild boars, and roebuck were slaughtered. Then the Kings dined together for the last time, and afterwards bade each other an affectionate farewell.

Their parting was, however, marked by a tragi-comic incident, of which Hotham makes amused mention. Frederick William's craze for giants remained irrepressible, and he had noted with considerable jealousy the abnormal stature of some of the components of King Auguste's infantry. On a previous occasion, when he had ventured to solicit the transference of certain of these desirable units of the Polish Army to his own, King Auguste had responded curtly, 'Qu'il n'était pas marchand de chair humaine.' At Radewitz, on the contrary, Hotham relates:

The two Kings parted with great protestations of Friendship for each other. . . It was impossible, however, for the King of Poland to withstand the importunity of his Majesty of Prussia in an affair not altogether, it is true, of much consequence, for he made him a present of twenty-four tall true, much against his will, and to the inexpressible grief of the poor Fellows!

It was on the 2nd of July that Hotham re-entered Berlin. Within a week from that date Captain Guy Dickins had returned from England bearing, to the surprise of all, fresh suggestions from King George which were calculated to fan into a brief flame the expiring negotiations between the Sovereigns. Dickins had pleaded the cause of the unhappy Wilhelmine and Frederick till he had obtained this concession—that his Majesty of England would consent either to delay both marriages so that they might be celebrated together, or to conclude the marriage between the Prince of Wales and Wilhelmine under a definite promise from the King of Prussia that the marriage between Frederick and the Princess Amelia should take place within a given time limit. To the Prince, his uncle sent secret assurances of his commiseration and desire to aid him, but he pointed out that the present moment was unsuitable for putting the Prince's plans into execution. He begged Frederick to delay taking the fatal step at least till he saw the result of the fresh concessions made by England in the matter of the negotiations for his marriage.

But in the eyes of Hotham all other news brought from England sank into insignificance when he learnt that Captain Dickins was the bearer on his behalf of an original letter which had been intercepted from Grumkow to Reichenbach. With what feelings Hotham received this treasure which he had so long coveted may be imagined. The precious document was brief—only one page was covered by writing. The autograph was all but illegible—tortuous and difficult to unravel as Grumkow himself. But its authorship was incontestable; its contents such as Hotham believed must at last carry conviction even to the stolid brain of Frederick William.

Immediately upon hearing of the return of the messenger from England the King of Prussia granted an interview to Hotham, which took place early on the 9th of July, and lasted four hours. Perplexed at a new development of the situation, the irresolute Monarch, who neither wished to terminate nor to comply with the proposals from England, was more than ever unable to come to a decision. Finally, seizing any loophole for further delay, he declared that the marriage of Wilhelmine to the Prince of Wales was with him a point of honour; as for his son, when the time arrived he would doubtless prefer an English Princess to any other, and the marriage should be celebrated, at the latest, within ten years. This reply Hotham was to take back to England.

Was the King sincere? Who shall say? Ten more years of torture and humiliation for his hated heir, ten more years of procrastination for himself, ten more years in which the affairs of Europe should mature, and then—well, matters might decide themselves.

It was a long way off, that ten years' limit of which he spoke. Nevertheless, at the moment when Frederick William announced this decision the negotiations seemed approaching a definite completion more nearly than had ever previously been the case.

But that same evening, after the interview with Hotham, the Devil-Diplomatists, according to their time-honoured practice, sowed mistrust in the mind of their Royal Master. Amid the smoke of their evening pipes, and doubtless after the fumes of wine had as usual clouded the judgment of the King, Grumkow told him that in the first proposition, the postponement of Wilhelmine's marriage, England was deliberately attempting to play fast and loose with him. If in the future she required to make use of his Prussian Majesty, she would do so; if her policy did not require him, he would go to the wall. Frederick William at once veered round. He was enraged to think that he had so nearly been made the tool of England's perfidy, and it was in no amicable frame of mind that he received Sir Charles Hotham on the morrow.

Hotham, for his part, came to this, his final interview, light Vol. LXXVII—No. 455

of heart and full of confidence. It was now the 10th of July, and his mission had extended over many weary weeks. Eagerly he anticipated his return to England, and the conclusion of his negotiation, if not so entirely satisfactory as could have been wished, was not wholly a failure. But more than all, within his grasp, for the present safely hidden away, was that precious document which, in disclosing the treason of the King's chief adviser, might yet turn the scale and leave the English Ambassador triumphant in the hour of departure. Hotham had determined to conclude his mission by a master-stroke.

It was mid-day when he entered the Palace with Guy Dickins, whom he had come to present as the British Minister about to succeed Dubourgay. Frederick William received the credentials of the new Ambassador with outward civility, and for a quarter of an hour the conversation drifted into desultory channels. At last Hotham, considering the moment propitious, took the step

for which he had so long been waiting.

'As General Grumkow has denied that he is the author of the letters I handed your Majesty,' he announced, 'I have received orders from the King, my Master, to place in the hands of your Majesty an original letter from the General.' He drew the precious document from his pocket—with its peculiar tortuous writing, its brief damning evidence-and held it towards the King. Frederick William, scarcely realising all it purported, took it from him; but, as the King's glance fell on the well-known autograph, in a lightning-flash there was brought home to him the unpleasant conviction that that little slip of paper in his hand proved him to be a dupe and a fool. And the anger of Frederick William blazed forth. The restraint which he was so little wont to exercise forsook him. He forgot that he could not with impunity treat the Ambassador of England as he had treated his own son, his judges, his family, and his subjects. 'Monsieur,' he stormed, 'j'ai eu assez de ces choses là!' and, abruptly leaving the room, he slammed the door upon the astonished Ambassadors.

In Hotham's subsequent despatch he related the incident as above, treating it with a reticence which encouraged Carlyle to doubt the full extent of the King's ill-behaviour on that memorable occasion; but the more explicit account preserved among the Hotham muniments, coinciding as it does with the account written by the Princess Wilhelmine, unquestionably may be accepted as correct:

H.M. the King of Prussia . . . was offended at the message which Sir Charles delivered. He burst into a furious fit of passion . . . and threw the letter in the face of the Ambassador, raising his foot as if he meant to kick him. Sir Charles stepped back and laid his hand upon his sword.

The King retired in anger, clapping the door after him with the utmost violence. Sir Charles on his part withdrew, indignant at the gross affront which had been offered him as representative of his Britannic Majesty and shocked at so great a violation of his sanctity of character and privileges of an Ambassador of England. He called together all the foreign Ministers, and, bitterly complaining of the insult which his Master had received, declared his fixed determination to return to England.

'Where,' asks Carlyle, 'is the Original Letter? Ask some Minute reader. Minute readers the *ipsissimum corpus* of it is lost to mankind. . . . It (has) no date of its own, we say, though by internal evidence and light of Fassmann, it is conclusively datable Berlin, May 20th, if anybody cares to date it. . . . Prussian Dryasdust is expected to give it in Facsimile, one day—surely no British Under-Secretary will exercise an unwise discretion and forbid him that pleasure!'

But Carlyle need not have feared that the publication of this curious document would be prohibited. Hotham, in his despatch descriptive of the incident in which it played so important a part, expressly states that after Frederick William had left the room- 'I took the letter that he had thrown upon the floor.' It returned in Hotham's keeping to England, whence it had already journeyed, and for nigh upon two centuries it has reposed peacefully among the family muniments of that Ambassador Extraordinary. There it lies to-day, that yellowing paper which the Devil-Diplomatist of Prussia once sent to his spy in England; which the Prime Minister Newcastle intercepted and conveyed to his Royal Master; which George the Second fingered thoughtfully, then, writing 'Yes, send it,' decreed that it should go back with Captain Guy Dickins to Berlin, greatly to gladden the heart of the 'Knight Hotham.' There it lies-that paper which a mad Monarch once flung into the face of an insulted Ambassador, which decided the fate of two Royal marriages and God knows what besides between two great nations—that paper of ill-omen which, after the passing of generations, by a strange coincidence has again come to light when an issue of yet mightier import than it once determined hangs in the balance between the Courts of Berlin and Britain:

Je vous felicite de tout mon cœur de l'augmentation de Gages de mil ecus que le Roy vous a accordé, avec le titre de vice-president du Consistoire, et jespere que celle cy vous trouvera encor a londres, et que vous debarqueres bientost en bonne sante, on se vante icy quon a des originaux de lettres que je vous ai ecrites en main, quoyque je ne vous ai rien ecrit, que de fort innocent, je ne puis croire que vous les ayiez garde, puisque vous maves souvent mande, que vous bruliez les lettres que je vous ai ecrites, pour les bagatelles que vous m'avez ecrites je les ai dabord brulees et je defie au diable de les produire, Hier les fiancailles (die verlobung) du prince de beven fil aine du Prince de beven Feldmarsch[all] de lempereur

s'est faite au chateau au grand contentement du Roy et de toute la famille Royale, il y a eu [un] bal et grand souper je suis sans reserve tout a vous. Cele. 20 de May, 1730.

A harmless letter this, to the ignorant reader, nevertheless so damning in its insisted innocence that, when despatching it to George the Second, Newcastle had written in regard to it: 'It seems so material acknowledging all the other originals, and shows such an apprehension lest they should have been stopped, that I most humbly submit it to your Majesty whether it may not be proper to stop this original letter.' And in sooth it had proved a greater firebrand than Newcastle even can have anticipated. Within an hour of its reception by the Prussian King the news of what had occurred sped through Berlin. The tale lost nothing in the telling. Wilhelmine heard it, and uncertain whether to rejoice or lament at the escape of wedlock with the vicious Prince of Wales, trembled for what might be in store for herself and her brother. Frederick, the unhappy Crown Prince, heard it, and read in it the end to his cherished desires, the destruction of that romance which alone had lent a ray of brightness to his intolerable existence. Yet one hope still remained to him. He personally would plead his cause with the British Envoy, hitherto sympathetic. It is said that at the instigation of the Danish Minister, and with the approval of his mother and his sisters, he made a last appeal to Hotham to accept the apology offered by his father; indeed, Wilhelmine purports to give a brief letter which the Prince thus indited and which Carlyle quotes, not without misgiving, together with the answer made thereto by Hotham. But the true document, hurriedly written by Frederick on receipt of the tidings which confounded him-showing by its penmanship and its wording the agitation and haste of the writer-a pitiful human document palpitating with despair, appears to have been unknown to Wilhelmine, as to Thomas Carlyle and historians of a later date. remained in the possession of Hotham, a memento, together with the letter of Grumkow, of his strange mission to the strange Court of Prussia and-like that other document of different import—only to-day to be presented to the public in all the freshness of its first appeal.

Sieur, je viens d'aprendre dens ce moment que vous voulez partir je ses la reson pourquoi et tout, mais je vous prie au nom de Dieu ne renversez pas tout ce que vous avez acomodez jusq'a present, le Roy ce repent exstremement de tout ce qui c'est pace, et je suis persuade que tout jra le mieux du mondé pourvu que vous voulez rester, pencez y, encore Monsieur il y va du bonheur de la familye de votre Roy car ce qui regarde sa sœur le regarde ausi, je vous prie par tout ce qu'il y a de Seins ne prenez point si haut, tache de racomoder tout a l'amiable et pences que

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c'est votre amie qui vous en prie et que vous me metez le poigniar au cœur ci vous rompez avec ma Sœur, tenez vous me rendre le plus grand service du monde ci vous ne rompez point cete afaire, mon dieu pasez l'histoire de la lettre sous silence, vous avez les promeces en mein tout est a la vellye d'etre heureux encore une foix au nom de la parolle que vous m'avez donez pour faire tout ce que vous pouvez pour faire reusir ce maryaje ne prenez point cela ci haut enfein reste et racomodez tout, je vous en prie au nom de tout ve qui vous peut flechir, adieu.

FREDERIC P. R.

P.S.—Je suis persuade que vous ferez reflection a ceci, et que ma lettre

ne sera pas ecrite pour rien.

P.S.—Notre Roy a dit aujourdui a la Reine qui l'ne Souhaitait mieux que le maryage de ma sœur, il m'a conte ce qui c'est pase hier et dit qu'il seroit au desespoir de voir tout rompu, Au nom de tout les dieux monsieur ne gatez don rien que le regret du Roy vous tiene lieu de satisfaction.

But Hotham was inexorable. It was not his personal pride which was at stake, but that of his Royal Master; and neither the piteous plight of the unhappy Prince nor the fretful repentance of Frederick William could shake his resolution. He had received his instructions in the first instance: 'If he (the King of Prussia) should fly out at any time into expressions not becoming our Minister to bear, you will support our Honour and Dignity with Resolution and Firmness.' The attention of Europe was directed towards his conduct, and never must it be said that the Corporal of Potsdam had insulted with impunity the representative of the Majesty of England. Frederick William had behaved badly, and Frederick William must be punished.

Bitterly did the Royal culprit-possibly for the first time in his life-repent his momentary ebullition of temper by which he had irretrievably placed himself in the wrong. Accustomed as he was to vent unhesitatingly every passing mood on defenceless victims, the recognition must have come somewhat in the nature of a surprise that he had at last met with defiance, that he had attacked where the blow had rebounded upon himself. It was annoying, too, to reflect that his conduct would be freely criticised and condemned by the Courts of Europe. Wilhelmine relates that he had scarcely reached his own room than he began to regret what he had done, foreseeing the result, 'he was in perfect despair.' Like a spoilt child who despises what is within his grasp and craves the unattainable, no sooner did he see the alliance with England, 'that comfortable possibility,' slipping from him than he desired it-temporarily, perhaps, but nevertheless ardently. Like a child, too, he bemoaned his fault plaintively: 'My temper got the better of me. I was in a bad humour, and when that happens I must relieve my feelings.' He even added, 'Had it been a letter from the King of England which I had treated thus, well and good; there would have been some reason for being so angry. But the letter of a

porter like Grumkow! What is there to be said? Am I not master to do as I please? The English are very touchy!

But Hotham was not to be beguiled. Vainly did Frederick William invite him to dinner, vainly did he send Ministers first to remonstrate, then to plead. Hotham's reply was to demand post-horses; and only two days after that momentous incident he set off on his journey to England.

And so Hotham [relates Carlyle], spirited, judicious Englishman, rolls off homewards, a few hours after his courier, steady there henceforth. He has not been successful in Berlin: surely his negotiation is now out in all manner of senses! Long ago (to use our former ignoble figure) he had 'laid down the bellows, though there was still smoke traceable'; but by now, by this Grumkow letter, he has, as it were, struck the poker through the business, and that dangerous manœuvre, not proving successful, has been fatal and final! Queen Sophie and certain others may still flatter themselves, but it is evident the negotiation is at last complete. What may lie in Flight to England and rash, desperate measures which Queen Sophie trembles to think of, we do not know; but by regular negotiation this thing can never be.

And what of the aftermath? Of the Prince's desperate attempt to escape, of the betrayal of the project by his page on the 6th of August, of the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of Frederick on the charge of being a deserter, and of all the brutal treatment meted out to him till his reason and his life were at stake, historians have written fully. Reports of these dire events followed Hotham to England and filled him with a horror which was shared throughout the civilised world. 'All over Europe,' we are told, 'nothing was talked of save the cruelties of the King of Prussia.' But Hotham had shaken the dust of Berlin from his feet for ever; and that mission on which he was despatched with all the anxiety and diplomacy it entailed, the sharp encounter of brilliant wits, the fierce antagonism of stubborn wills, all the hundred-and-one influences at work, crossing and re-crossing each other in tireless conflict—all this finds its sole tangible result in those packets of yellowing papers which lie amongst the Hotham muniments, and which for us to-day are filled with a strange significance. For even as we lay them back into the box, even as the puppets which we have conjured up vanish and that phantom world sinks back into the silence of the grave, still the cannon of Frederick William is echoing in our ears, still we hear the tramp of the legions which he created, still we see Austria and Prussia bound by a link at which each secretly chafes, and still is England the antagonist of both.

A. M. W. STIRLING.

## SOME PERSONAL MEMORIES OF TREITSCHKE

AFTER years of studied neglect Heinrich von Treitschke is having a posthumous boom in this country. His name is on every lip, his writings and savings are quoted every day on the platform and in the Press, and the essence of his political philosophy has lately been reproduced in quite a number of popular volumes. 'Why have we not heard of Treitschke's teaching before?' naïvely asked a reviewer of one of these books recently. We have heard, but we have not heeded. Treitschke has, of course, been known always to English students of modern German history, but it is certainly a singular irony of fate that the most brilliant annalist of modern Germany and of German unity should have come so tardily into prominence amongst us, and then only because of the close relationship between his political theories and the events which preceded and have accompanied the war. For it is more than half a century since Treitschke began to write on historical and political subjects, and he has now been dead eighteen years.

Even now the haziest notions appear to be current about the man, his character, and his influence. Only a few weeks ago a distinguished novelist spoke of him as a disciple of Nietzsche. Apart from the fact that Treitschke was Nietzsche's senior by ten years, and began to write when Nietzsche was a schoolbov. the idea of his strong, masculine mind being fed on the excitative pabulum served out to the neurasthenic young men and women of Germany by the inventor of the Superman is humorous enough for tears. Another writer describes him as spare of form and of only medium height-again a curiously inaccurate picture. He was tall and massive, the very embodiment of his own doctrine of power. I see him still, as I saw him in Berlin over twenty-five years ago in his own study, and constantly while hearing his lectures (for one term he signed me into a place just in front of him, for a reason to be explained), a man of commanding presence, finely built, his large head firmly poised, his hair and beard full and dark, his keen eyes flashing restlessly. unspectacled even in that much-bespectacled country. He was no weakling, no half-man, but as strong and masterful in figure and bearing as in spirit and word.

Outwardly Treitschke suggested rather the officer than the scholar, and indeed he came of an old Saxon military family, which has given a General to the present war. His parents intended him likewise for the army, but to their sorrow this career was closed to him by the misfortune of total deafness, left by illness in boyhood. It is said that before the final choice of scholarship was made—and here Treitschke followed his own bent-his relatives inquired whether, as he could not be an officer, an opening could not at least be found for him under the Royal Saxon Master of the Horse.

Treitschke had attracted the attention of the Prussian Government before he was invited to Berlin University early in the 'seventies. Even in his native Saxony he had preached national unity, the extinction of the small States, and the obligation and right of Prussia to take the lead in the creation of a Germanic empire. Just as Bismarck was the strong man he had waited for, so he himself was to prove the pre-eminent apostle of Germanism and of Prussian hegemony. All his life the interests of Germany, and particularly of Prussia, were everything to him, and nothing else in God's earth greatly mattered.

Ranke said that his task as an historian was to tell 'the naked truth without gloss, with no romance even in the least degree, and no fancies of the brain,' and it is recorded that he consented with much misgiving to become the official historian of the Prussian State and Crown, knowing that his scientific conscience and love of objectivity would be sorely tried by the duties associated with that position. Such scruples never troubled Treitschke when in due time he took Ranke's place. It was characteristic of him as an academic teacher that he combined political philosophy and history, and both bore the Prussian-Hohenzollern stamp; his political theories were drawn from the life of the Prussian State in practice, and in his teaching of German history Prussia was the centre and its glorification the purpose. He may be said to have reduced the Prussian State to a single formula, which was the formula of power. No other modern German writer of the first rank taught so systematically the doctrine that 'force rules the world, has ruled it, shall rule it.' His influence as the theoretical representative of the force doctrine was as great as Bismarck's success in its practical application.

This enthusiasm for Prussia and all things Prussian was the more remarkable since Treitschke was not himself a Prussian, and, strictly speaking, only partially a German, for he came of Slav ancestry. It is noteworthy, however, that in his



German History he in one place uses the words 'we Prussians,' and it may be surmised that he changed his political nationality on settling in the northern kingdom. His admiration for Prussia was primarily the political admiration of a glowing patriot who saw no hope for German unity and for the progress of German ideas and influence unless Prussia became both Germany's leader and its interpreter to the rest of the world. The particularism of the past had disgusted him, as it disgusted Hegel, and, seeing in it the changeless enemy of every aspiration towards national unity, he wiped his hands of the Central and South Germany of nearly twenty States, Courts, and Parliaments, embraced the ideal of Germanism realised through and in Prussia, and made Prussia his home and the scene of his labours. Treitschke can rebuke the 'boastful self-complaisance of Teutonism.' but of Prussia he speaks as 'not only the most powerful but the noblest and most intelligent of the German States' -a verdict in which the rest of Germany has never concurred.

Since the death of Ranke no one has disputed Treitschke's pre-eminence amongst contemporary German historians, omitting, of course, Mommsen, whose dominion was unique. Treitschke's colleagues in historical science crowned him with their own hands, and his countrymen cordially confirmed the choice. The glorification of Germany in European history, and of Prussia in German history, was his mission for over thirty years, and he pursued it with singular fidelity and success in elaborate books, in a long succession of essays published in his own and other historical reviews, and still more in the lectures which he delivered as a professor of Berlin University. Yet the peculiar merit of Treitschke as an historian suggests his peculiar defect. Germany and Prussia bulked so large in his mind that he fell into a partiality and a partisanship which were inexcusable in an historian. He viewed the world and mankind from the Teutonic angle of vision, and theorised and judged accordingly. His strong prejudices lessened the value of his work when tried by such a test as Niebuhr or Ranke would have applied, but they increased rather than diminished his position and authority with his countrymen.

Treitschke's Prussian one-sidedness was even more conspicuous in his spoken addresses as a professor than in his writings. In the lecture-room no one expected complete objectivity from him, and seldom did a lecture pass without drastic judgments upon some country or other that had failed to take Germany at its own valuation, or that stood in Germany's light. German Kultur was never the 'culture' of the English drawing-room, and even in Treitschke's day that Kultur was becoming a prickly, Noli-me-tangere sort of thing, proud and puffed up,



the Kultur of the Cynic who bade Plato remark that the straw of a tub was better than all his fine carpets. Now it was Russia, now France, now England, now the United States which came under Treitschke's censure; each had its turn, but on the whole England and France received more than their share of unfriendly attention. Extreme in opinions, he was extreme, too, in language, and if he had a dislike he expressed it strongly and at times offensively. Often his passing outbursts of sarcasm and ill-will had no relation whatever to either history or political philosophy, but it was 'Treitschke's way,' for so the indulgent verdict went. It was not a gracious or a persuasive way, but the man's candour and earnestness, and the impression which he gave at all times—even when in his worst humours—that he was uttering his honest convictions, disarmed serious resentment. Moreover, Treitschke's tendency to exaggerate Germany's place and importance in the world was in part a natural reaction against the old national spirit of excessive humility. It will be found that much of his aggressive polemic fell to a time when Germany had only just ceased to be a geographical expression, and Germans to apologise for their nationality, as Boswell excused his to Johnson, 'because they could not help it.'

Treitschke's attitude towards England was distinctly less friendly in the later than the earlier part of his public life. I am inclined to think that for some reason or other there came a turning point in his political development at which his attitude towards this country, which had formerly been benevolently neutral, became positively hostile, and that from that time onward his Anglophobism increased to the end. It is certain that some at least of his prejudices were due to the fact that his opinions of England and English institutions, once formed, were never modified, however English life and thought might have broadened. In his lectures to the last he spoke of the English as a nation of sour-tempered Puritans, and in the course of a more than usually bitter attack upon the Anglican Church, he said (I quote from my notes of his lectures) 'All the livings are sold to the rich. The Anglican clergy make it their business to teach the small folk that it is their duty politely to get out of the way of the well-to-do.' He believed that the English mind was full of hypocrisy, and English national life built upon shams. Here are equally impressive dicta taken at random from the same source: 'A German could not live long in the atmosphere of England-an atmosphere of sham prudery, conventionality, and hollowness; it is too much for us.' 'The English imagine themselves to be the most moral of nations, but happily they are not.'

It may be questioned whether Treitschke's political theories

alone would have found such a ready acceptance had they not been enforced by a singular brilliancy of language and an enthusiasm which to the young in particular counted for more than fidelity to fact. Of Treitschke's literary style his books speak, but the fascination of his vivacious periods was not half so great as the vivid eloquence of the living voice, an eloquence whose effect, strange to say, seemed not to be spoiled in the least by a monotonous and somewhat indistinct articulation due to his deafness from childhood. His command of language was complete, and once you were able to follow him there was no resisting his charm. Without haste, vet literally without rest. he would pour out from the treasure of an inexhaustible vocabulary a continuous stream of language, every sentence as perfect in construction as though read from one of his books. He never faltered unless overcome by feeling, for his passions were vehement. Beginning his lecture directly he had ascended the desk, he gave you no breathing space until he had spoken his full three-quarters of an hour or hour and a half, as the case might be. and then suddenly and without warning the voice ceased, and a moment later he had disappeared. Yet a more finished, more concise, more logical manner of address was seldom heard. On one occasion I discussed Treitschke with one of his Berlin colleagues, Professor Koser, who succeeded him as Prussian Historiographer, and I remarked on his prejudices. 'Yes,' was the sudden reproving rejoinder, 'but think of his language!' If brilliancy of language could redeem historical partiality, then indeed Treitschke would be bevond reproach.

I doubt whether he had a sense of humour. So profoundly serious was he in character, so absorbed by the importance of his message, that I never once saw any trace of a smile pass over his face, even when he was launching mordant sallies which

moved his hearers to laughter.

There can be no question that Treitschke's teaching has been an immense power in Germany. Successive generations of students, comprising the officers, scholars, statesmen, politicians, administrative officials, and journalists of the future, sat at his feet, and his class-rooms were always crowded. A number of his colleagues also invariably attended the 'public' lectures which he, like certain other leading Berlin professors, was expected to give during the winter term. They occupied chairs on each side of the reading desk, and formed a guard of honour when, at the end of his oration, he went out to the accompaniment of thunderous applause. Only the foremost lecturers enjoyed this flattering attention from their peers. The physicist, Du Bois Reymond, was another who at that time was always sure of it.

Thus there went forth from his lecture-room powerful influences and impulses which reached into every part of the national life. The effect was not altogether good where Treitschke's pupils accepted his teaching as a whole, for with the pure gold of political wisdom there was much alloy. Let me recall some words of another colleague of Treitschke, my revered friend the late Dr. Friedrich Paulsen—beloved of gods and men—who sincerely admired the man without endorsing his 'tendency': 'Amongst contemporary historians Treitschke has exercised the greatest influence upon the political thought of the rising generation. With the characteristic vehemence of his eloquence he preaches the maxim that the State is power, and war is its first, most elementary function.' For that conception modern Germany, to its hurt, has largely to thank Treitschke.

On the other hand, while his lectures might be faulty presentations of history, warped by prejudice and full of un-charitableness, they were powerful incentives to high living and to unselfish conceptions of citizenship. If he was dogmatic beyond the right of an instructor addressing men who had already tasted of the tree of knowledge, his enthusiastic nature, his fervid eloquence, and his unique power of interpreting to Germans their own minds and aspirations made him the idol of the rising generation. Above all, no writer or teacher of his time did so much to stimulate the patriotic spirit of Young Germany as Treitschke. His patriotism was one-sided, blind, and not always just, and it saw no good save in Judea, but it was intensely sincere. It was no sentiment of the lip, but a passion of the heart; it was no patriotism d'occasion, no Sunday, bandbox patriotism, but one for every day, and all his life. Love of the Fatherland may be said to have been the motive of his literary work and his public action. Hence he talked patriotism vehemently because he so felt, and because he was under a sacred compulsion. The burden of his thought was 'Woe unto me if I preach not this gospel.'

And how he preached it! I happened to be present when in March 1887 Treitschke brought to a close a course of lectures on German history. At that time the public mind was more unsettled on the question of war with France than it had been since 1875. Just before, Bismarck had made in the Reichstag one of his most famous speeches (it was my good fortune to hear it), wherein he made known the terms of the Austro-German alliance and pressed for a large increase in the army estimates on pain of imminent national disaster. When he had finished his lecture, Treitschke spoke of the conflict which many believed to be impending. 'We live in troublous times,' he said, 'and war may occur at any moment. But whether it

come in a few weeks or be deferred for a few years, the certainty is unquestionable. Bear in mind, young men, all I have said about the rise of our country. Patriotism is the highest and holiest of passions'—and here the tears rolled down the professor's cheeks—'and if before we meet again some of you are called to fight, remember that it will be for the unity of the German Empire, which has just been won, and against the anarchical tendencies of the times.' He could not go further, and ended in sobs, but the feelings of his hearers had been worked up to the highest point, and for some moments all we could do was to look at one another in silence. Those who know anything of the impressionable German character will be able to picture to themselves the rapturous enthusiasm which followed. I know how I felt myself under the spell of Treitschke's appeals, for the sensation has stayed with me ever since.

This demonstrative avowal of patriotic sentiment is far more respectable in Germany than in our own country of dignified reserves and mighty repressions, and it may be, as we are sometimes told, that our quieter mood is that of a higher order of citizenship. What we are apt to forget is that the great majority of men and women do not belong to that order; they are honest, stolid folk whose torpid imaginations need to be vigorously fanned into flame, and who often only get their emotions, the emotion of patriotism amongst them, as they get certain diseases—by infection. How otherwise explain the fact that in this immensely grave crisis of our national history we are still footballing and horse-racing, business is going on 'as usual,' and Kitchener is slowly working to the end of his first

million men, instead of having completed his second?

These memories must not end with any suggestion of captious criticism of Germany's supreme modern patriot. I for one find myself unable to join in the popular hue-and-cry against Treitschke, as though he were a sort of political outlaw and his influence wholly pernicious. As a nation we owe him no thanks. From the English standpoint he was a Chauvinist, but so from the German were Seeley and Cramb-alas! too soon taken from us, to our loss-and they, too, were both professors. And vet I am confident that upon those of my countrymen who heard Treitschke's lectures his glorification of Prussia to the disparagement of the rest of the world had an effect which he cannot have anticipated. For when he spoke of 'Prussia' we heard 'England'; the pictures of Prussia's deeds and prowess called up in the mind the mightier deeds and brighter lustre of England's far older history; and we found ourselves asking (for one hearer I can speak with confidence): 'If Prussia, which has done so much for itself, so little for the world, be really so great and

glorious, what of the mother of races, at whose breast new nations have been nourished and from whose genius new civilisations have sprung-the England which has given her very self, body, soul, and spirit, to mankind?' In his judgments upon this country, Treitschke was often unjust, sometimes badmannered, but even under provocation one had the comforting thought that England was big and big-hearted enough to bear both abuse and spite. Besides, Treitschke's dislike of England came unquestionably from the traditional invidia of his nation, and people do not at heart think unworthily of those whom they envy. Hence, in spite of himself, one could mentally put this Prussian swashbuckler into the witness-box, and make him, even against his will, turn Crown evidence for England's greatness. Thus it was that many an Englishman owed to Treitschke a welcome and precious deepening of his own national consciousness, new and larger perceptions of his country's place in the world, its mission and destiny, and a brighter glow of his patriotic ardours.

Even at this long distance of time the instincts of loyalty and gratitude refuse to be overborne, and I confess that I, for one, am still so unredeemed that, were I required to throw stones at Heinrich von Treitschke, I should wish my stones to be pebbles, and when I had thrown them I should want to run away.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

## THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON NON-CHRISTIAN PEOPLES

A FELLOW-TRAVELLER from London to Gloucester last month propounded to me the following question: What are the Indian troops in Europe likely to think about Christianity now? The question is not an easy one to answer by itself, but it becomes much more difficult when the worldwide character of the War is taken into consideration. The far-flung battle lines of France and Flanders do not occupy the whole stage of the theatre. confused sounds have literally gone forth into all lands, and they have echoed over the uttermost parts of the sea. One of the fiercest contests outside Europe has taken place upon Chinese soil. There Japanese troops have fought side by side with ours, as Indian troops are doing, not only in Europe, but also in Egypt. in East Africa, and around the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Germans have foretold unutterable results that will ensue from the entry of Eastern troops into a Western quarrel, but on the other hand they have called into the fray the Turks, and through them has been preached a Jehad among the Mohammadan tribes of Asia and Africa. There may be few bold enough to attempt an estimate of the ultimate result of this War upon the future relations of the human race, but there are few foolish enough to deny that it will have a profound effect throughout the world, and not least, one might think, upon the future of the Christian religion.

In attempting to form an estimate of the effect that the War may exercise upon the attitude of the non-Christian peoples towards Christianity, I write with great diffidence. It is only because it affects a matter of policy that no man can afford to disregard that I venture to do so at all. For whatever view men take of Christian Missions they cannot overlook their formative influence in the world. To remain uninterested in the 'moral religious future' of mankind is not so much irreligious as it is stupid. Before doing anything else, however, let me frankly confess that I consider the conditions of our social life that made this War as inevitable as a Greek tragedy are profoundly unchristian. The late Professor Cramb expressed his conviction that

the spirit of materialism, or Napoleonism as he called it, is contending with Christism for domination over the souls of men in Europe. In Germany alone—and particularly in Berlin and the places coming under the influence of Berlin-has this spirit acquired something of the clearness and consistency of a formulated creed. Throughout Europe he opined 'Corsica in a word has conquered Christ.' No one who has wandered to and fro in the world with open eyes, as I have done, can doubt that the spirit of materialism is at work everywhere. It is to be found in Tokio and Pekin just as surely as it exists in Europe. Yet my appreciation of this momentous fact has not convinced me that Christianity is bankrupt, nor that all Christians are either false or self-deluded. There are to be found still those who have never bowed the knee to Baal and whose lips have never kissed him. But this War has shown indeed how vital and persistent are the forces against which Christianity is pledged to contend. It is therefore a legitimate question to ask: if in Europe men and women have been tempted to turn aside with disgust from a religion which appears to be identified with bloodshed on so huge a scale, will not a similar nausea be felt by non-Christian peoples who look upon Christianity from without, and assess it by the way in which these Christians love one another?

It is humiliating to say so, but in order to understand the conditions of the inquiry it must be remembered that non-Christian races are not swayed, to any appreciable extent, by pacificist ideals, Christian or otherwise. The Indian troops, instance, are peoples that delight in war. In the main they have been recruited from amongst the Rajputs, the Gurkhas, the Mahrattas, the Sikhs, the Pathans, and the other fighting clans of Mussalmans. Their warlike traditions stretch far back into the misty past. For over a hundred years some of them have been fighting side by side with the British. then, from being shocked by the spectacle of bloodshed on so huge a scale, they are much more likely to be pleased at it. view has received confirmation from a recent letter of an artillery officer at the front published in the Morning Post. In response to a question, a Gurkha advanced with a delighted smile this opinion: 'All war is good: this is heaven.'

A furious indictment of Christianity, or rather of American civilisation visualised as Christian, has recently been made in the Forum by a Muslim gentleman called Achmed Abdullah. The article is entitled 'Seen through Mohammadan Spectacles.' The argument runs thus:

If you wish to conquer with the right of fire, and the might of sword, go ahead and do so, or at least say so. It would be a motive that we Muslim, being warriors, could understand and appreciate. But do not

clothe your greed for riches and dominion in the hypocritical nasal singsong of a heaven-decreed Mission to enlighten the poor native, a Pharisee call of duty to spread the word of your Saviour, your lying intention to uplift the ignorant pagan. . . You are deaf to the voice of reason and fairness, and so you must be taught with the whirling swish of the sword when it is red.

Putting aside, for a moment, the accusation of hypocrisy, which is largely deserved, and Mr. Achmed Abdullah's confusion of thought, which is understandable, this estimate of war, in contrast to what is euphemistically called 'peaceful penetration,' is not without interest and importance.

The next point is one that can be approached with less reluctance. In one form or another it is constantly affirmed that the 'moral side of the War is the Allies' best asset.' This is true all over the world. Count Okuma, the Premier of Japan, in a dignified statement in the Japan Magazine, reiterates with moving conviction the Japanese outlook upon the moral issues at stake. He says:

It will be our one ambition at this time to show the West, what it is slow to believe, that we can work harmoniously with great Occidental powers to support and protect the highest ideals of civilisation even to the extent of dying for them. Not only in the Far East, but anywhere else that may be necessary, Japan is ready to lay down her life for the principles that the foremost nations will die for. It is to be in line with these nations that she is at this time opposing and fighting what she believes to be opposed to these principles. Japan's relation to the present conflict is as a defender of the things that make for higher civilisation and a more permanent peace.

Indian opinion is not likely to be divergent from Japanese opinion. Here again let me produce a witness from the country. Saint Nihal Singh, in an article in the London Magazine upon the Indian troops, writes of the Rajputs thus: 'Haughty, easily provoked, the Rajput's word is his bond. His loyalty once pledged is never shaken.' Is it conceivable that men of whom this can be said could be incapable of realising the principles involved in the 'scrap of paper'? The faithfulness of the Gurkhas has been proved unto death over and over again. The Sikhs everywhere have won unstinted praise from their British officers and foreign critics as much for their faithfulness as for heroism. The same is true of other races who have sent their sons to fight for the British Raj. All are perfectly capable of understanding the simple moral issues at stake. If there was little danger of their being offended at Christianity because of the War, there was a very real danger of their despising both us and our religion if we had been false to our oath to Belgium. To a man they would applaud, if they ever heard of it, the

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simple fidelity displayed by the Archbishop of Canterbury when he declined to sign the appeal for peace which hailed from Sweden, on the ground that the 'conflict forced upon Europe, now it has begun, must proceed for the bringing to an issue the fundamental moral principle of faithfulness to a nation's obligation to its solemnly plighted word.'

A deep interest in China, and many years' close observation of Chinese character, emboldens me to write with greater confidence upon the attitude the Chinese are likely to adopt with regard to this 'fundamental moral principle of faithfulness.' As all the world knows, they are an astute, capable, level-headed people. They are, perhaps, far more swayed by emotion than it is the custom to assume. But they possess a highly developed ethical sense. A perusal of the translated writings of Confucius, Mencius, Lao Tzu, and other Chinese sages, leaves no doubt upon this point. Any merchant who has lived in the East, and has had regular dealings with Chinese traders, will testify to their general probity and respect for contracts. The Chinese aliens of Northern Australia are not without their gleams of moral idealism. Some few years ago I dedicated a Chinese church in North Queensland. The title of the dedication, at the request of the Chinese Christians, was 'The Church of the Perfect Way.' The title has a strange sound to Western ears. It had a very familiar ring to the Chinamen themselves, for Lao Tzu, the 'old philosopher,' in the sixth century before the Christian era, had tried to teach his countrymen a Way of Life. I gladly accepted the suggestion, judging that they would be no worse followers of Him Who called Himself 'the Way,' because they did not despise one of their own sages who had felt after Truth that haply he might touch the fringe of His robe of Righteousness. Those who know the East, and Eastern character intimately, may be tempted to smile at this incident. They may say that Chinese ideals are very far ahead of Chinese practice. But are Christian ideals so easily realised as all that? Do we never find our actions limping far behind our sentiments? Are not our best endeavours baffled and incomplete? of this War should at least rebuke any easy smile. For my own part, for many years, I have tested Chinese converts in Australia by the same standard I rightly could apply to white men, and I have not found them wanting. They proved by their lives that they were sincere. But it is my experience, not of Chinese Christians alone, but of the non-Christian Chinamen also, that emboldens me to assert that they are well able to appreciate the fundamental moral issues of the War. They realise, perhaps more clearly than we do, that not all masquerading in the dress of Christianity is Christian. They will recognise

equally clearly that the Allied Forces, in contesting for the stability of treaty obligations, for the rights of weak States, for democracy against militarism, are moved by moral considerations. They will regard them as more truly representative of Christianity—even though they see that the Prince of Peace has been grievously wounded in the house of His friends.

Look at another point. The racial question has become urgent in America during this present year—on the one hand, between the United States and Japan, and on the other hand, as an open quarrel between some Indians and the British Columbian authorities. By great care, and by the co-ordinating forces of a common cause, the question has been postponed, at least for a time. Mr. Achmed Abdullah speaks of racial prejudice, as 'that terrible blight which modern Christianity has forced upon the world.' I am not concerned with the writer's confusion of thought as to Christianity and Western civilisation. But I have found, over and over again, that not only the Chinese and Japanese, but the South Sea Islanders, and even the Australian Aborigines, are seriously puzzled, not by the fact that Christianity enjoins a brotherhood of all men, but that this brotherhood is so often set at naught by those who call themselves The exact point that I desire to elucidate is the relative position of the racial problem in regard to Christianity in the light of the present War. So far as India and the Far East is concerned, I believe the general leading opinion will be that the Germans have shown themselves as far below the Christian idea of racial interdependence as they have been found wanting in the 'fundamental moral principle of faithfulness to a nation's obligation to its solemnly plighted word.' When the Kaiser grandiloquently bade the members of his contingents in China so to bear themselves that not a Chinaman dare look askance at a German, he did a deadly dis-service to his own people. He laid up in Eastern minds a debt that the Chinese have never forgotten. The same is true of Japan. With a national self-control that should be impressive even to the Prussian mind, the Japanese have taken no outward notice of the many ferocious insults hurled at their country from Berlin. but it is impossible for those of us who have any intimate knowledge of their character to think that the Japanese do not see because they are silent, or to fancy that they forgive because they smile.

Writing in the Asiatic Review, Colonel A. C. Yate substantiates this view with regard to India. He remarks:

It has probably escaped the memory of most people to-day that in 1900, during the relief of Peking, the German troops under Field Marshal von Waldersee treated the natives of India with studied insolence. Sir Pertab

Singh will not have forgotten that, and we can hardly doubt that those who served in the International Force which relieved Peking will have told their comrades in arms now ordered to Europe that there is an old score to be wiped out.

Again, let me make it quite clear that I am not stating these facts with anything approaching satisfaction, neither do I regard the racial question, so far as it affects ourselves and our Imperial administration, as being anything more than quiescent. The point I desire to elucidate is that the War has not appreciably affected the non-Christian outlook upon Christianity in the East. On the contrary, as may be assumed, indeed, from Count Okuma's remarks, it has fired non-Christian people concerned with the ambition for proving to a dull-sighted West that they can work harmoniously with Occidental Powers to support and protect the higher ideals of civilisation—Christian as opposed to Napoleonic ideals. The position of affairs is so far improved, and the abiding status of Christianity among non-Christian races may be said to depend upon the way in which Christianity will

be applied after the War has been brought to an end.

It is not easy to construct any satisfactory estimate of the exact position that Christianity occupies among non-Christian peoples. Missionary statistics are obviously inadequate. They show organisation in process of growth, and little more. Western civilisation, on the other hand, cannot be reduced by any known form of denominator. Regarded as wholes, there is much that is truly Christian in Western civilisation, while there is not a little amongst Christian converts and in definitely Christian methods that the truest friends of Missions, and believers in their great usefulness, openly deplore. In order to estimate even tentatively what non-Christians Christianity a certain breadth of outlook is required, and an appreciation of tendencies which cannot be adequately divided into their component parts. Let me again adduce China. We have been watching the progress of a revolution, social and political, in an ancient and great nation. So far the revolution has been practically bloodless, and it has progressed with a rapidity and thoroughness that is simply astounding. It would be ridiculous to assert that the development of China has been inspired by Christian influence apart from the Christian element in Western civilisation. It would be equally short-sighted to disregard the direct influence of Christian Missions. Many of the Republican leaders were Christians-some were the sons of Chinese clergymen. The Christian Churches were used, often without the knowledge of the missionaries themselves, for disseminating Republican views. It is not easy to state accurately how much there was in these views that was materialistically

Western, or ideally Christian, or frankly Eastern, but the fact remains. Furthermore, no one who has any intimate knowledge of Chinese affairs would desire to identify Christianity with all the devious steps by which Yuan Shi Kai is now leading China forward to unity and effective government. On the other hand, no one with insight can fail to realise that the idealism which lies behind his political actions was affected, let it be said, by the tenets of Western civilisation in its non-materialistic aspects. The Presidential Mandate on the Cardinal Virtues, issued on the 20th of September 1912, is an example in point. The Mandate is recorded in the Official Year Book of the Chinese Government for 1913. The text concludes thus:

Good principles and morality are the same all the world over. The change of a Governmental system should certainly not be taken as a warrant to depart from the well-established ethical principles of morality. Nowadays, agitated by the great political changes made in our country, many seekers of foreign ideas, who have failed to grasp the real spirit of Western sciences and who have simply been impressed by its material progress, begin to deprecate the great moral principles of our nation which have been handed down for hundreds of generations. I am well convinced of the fact that no nation can be called civilised without making the eight great virtues as the basis of its government. I, the President, firmly maintain that the great danger of to-day is not in the material weakness of our nation, but in the condition of the human heart. If every person has his heart turned towards good, the country will be set on a firm foundation.

It will be remembered that little more than a year ago Yuan Shi Kai made an appeal to Christians in China for prayers on behalf of the Republic. The appeal was responded to in this country-a contingency probably never contemplated by the statesman himself. A few days later a coup d'état followed, and Europe was shocked or scornful according to personal bias. Europe had made the mistake of thinking Yuan Shi Kai was a Christian with an objective belief in prayer, which was not the case. The fact Europe had overlooked was that the President's appeal was symptomatic of the changed attitude in China towards the Christian religion regarded as a political and social asset. The actual number of Chinese Christians is little more than half of one per cent. of the whole population, but this gives a very inadequate idea of their importance, and still less of the influence Christianity is felt to be exercising at the present time. So also the establishment of Confucianism has been regarded by some as a serious blow to Christianity. This is not the view of many devout Christians who believe that Confucius should be regarded as an ally, not as a foe, and who believe, further, that a worse thing than the establishment of a Pagan religion would happen if a nation were left morally rudderless at such a critical period of its history.

Those Europeans who have had any intimate intercourse with the Chinese and Japanese are always inclined to be tentative in their estimates of the values the Far East places upon Western ideas. But, from what I have observed, I do not for one moment think that China 'might be willing to accept our Christianity for the sake of our civilisation,' or that the Japanese 'might turn to Christianity for a social, not for a spiritual or even moral motive.' Both these theories have been suggested to me confidently during the past few days. On the contrary, I venture to maintain that such conceptions are profoundly at variance with Far Eastern thought. A very casual study of the Chinese daily Press, the Peiching Jih Pao, or Peking Daily News, leaves no room for any misapprehension as to how the Chinese regard Western civilisation qua Western civilisation. While a far more convincing witness has arisen in Japan since the commencement of the present War. Mr. Uchimura, a well-known educationalist, writing in the English column of the Yorodsu, asks this question:

What is the Western civilisation after all? They say it is Christian. But is it? Is it civilisation based upon the Crucified One? Certainly it is not. It is a civilisation based upon the crucifying one. . . . The present conflagration of Europe is the veriest evidence . . . that theirs is a sham civilisation beautiful upon the surface but within dead vacuity.

The conclusion Mr. Uchimura reaches is that this War will 'leave the world clearer for better and more beautiful things,' and that the 'European heathen' may realise in happy case more clearly than he does now the things that belong to peace.

I have little heart at such a time as this—indeed, if I ever have had the desire—to be dogmatic upon the progress of Christianity throughout the world. For reasons I have indicated, I do not believe that the War, regarded as a war, has had, so far, any disastrous effect upon Christianity in the eyes of non-Christian peoples. The real weakness of the situation lies in the fact that Western civilisation is so largely materialistic, frankly or covertly, and in the subsidiary fact that the individual Europeans that call themselves Christian are not sufficiently alive Sir William to what should be implied by their claim. Macgregor, whose unflagging zeal for humanity in many parts of the globe has done so much for the course of Christianity, once discussed with me the relatively rapid progress of Mohammadanism in West Africa as compared with that of Christianity; 'It's just this,' he said, 'every Mohammadan regards-himself as a missionary; the majority of Christians think it is another man's work.' Will Christians maintain this attitude? That is the critical question. And I am by no means hopeless as to the answer. The national trial has revealed unexpected depths of

earnestness and self-sacrifice in our midst. It has torn aside much of the frivolity that was maining our social life. It has demonstrated that all men are not materialistic nor unready to hazard their lives for an ideal. I am not one of those that rejoice in war, but I have never felt so confident as I am now for the future of England, and, what is infinitely more important to the world, for the future of Christianity.

GEORGE H. FRODSHAM (Bishop).

## DISRAELI THE THIRD'

He said many things that were strange, yet they immediately appeared to be true.—Sidonia in Coningsby.

THE third volume of Disraeli's Life (and he lives in it) unfolds a corresponding stage in his development. His broodings and aspirations have taken shape. His wild oats have been sown, and, though debt still hampers him, his course is clear. Bohemia has receded. He is happy in his home and devoted to his 'guardian angel,' soon to become the 'Lady of Hughenden.' Aggressive exuberance he has chastened in more ways than one. There is less of the meteor, more of the fixed star now about him. And on every side he has grown in stature. perience has reinforced genius, while scope has been added to a success which, though signal, is not yet free from struggle. His power and his influence have matured. Like the Genie of the Arabian Nights he has escaped from the narrow bottle, and can now rise to his full height. At last he finds room alike for his statesmanship and his fantasy. Nevertheless these faculties have not yet been wholly accepted, and later volumes must reveal what a hold they took, how they were to ripen into national habits. Already they have come to stay. If some misjudge or malign them, this is only natural. Newness and strangeness perplex and provoke, and ideas remain alien till they are naturalised among the people. Disraeli's was no ordinary remoteness whether of source or affinity. Yet more and more he wins upon such as know him best, and gains ground (and converts) by the mastery of his mind despite the mystery of his manner, which, wrote Lord Malmesbury even in 1848, 'has much of the foreigner about it,' adding, however, that it was but 'a mask for his great abilities.' To the 'Conservatives' Disraeli still often seemed a revolutionist, to the Radicals a reactionary. But his intimates knew better, and they comprised men and women of the most manifold distinction. He could not be called 'remote' or 'unfriended,' and if he could, under no circumstances could he have been called 'slow.' His imagina-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. By William Flavelle Monypenny and George Earle Buckle. Vol. iii., 1846-1855. John Murray.

tive speeches, to which humour literature, and paradox were sparkling tributaries, pressed truth home and gave a new delight to debate. So did his informal letters to his friends, and especially to the clever and beautiful Lady Londonderry, for whose benefit he 'unbuttoned his brains.' All round he begins to modify the conventional scene and to rehearse for the serious future. He discerns those new ideas in the air which he wants to acclimatise, and when he expresses them he robes them in fancy dress and lends them a brilliant background. more he makes for growth as opposed to upheaval, for popular stability. And he correlates in all their bearings the big, contemporary movements to which, as they march past, his ear is abnormally sensitive. Already he speaks with authority-there is a touch of Napoleon about him. The world is becoming aware -as one puts it-of his 'directing' mind, or as Lord Ponsonby avows, that he should be the leader for whom they wait. Lord John Manners, his dear comrade, bears witness to his charm and fame, while European celebrities, like Metternich, swell the chorus. Lord Derby himself, a prejudiced colleague, bates his imperfect sympathies and pays his tribute not merely to intellect but to 'self-sacrificing generosity.' Palmerston, always sympathetic, after Disraeli first took office actually rebuked Gladstone for the pharisaism of his condescensions; and Bright himself owned Disraeli's fairness to opponents. Indeed, Lord John Russell contrasts it in debate with Gladstone's bias. representations of the Whigs,' as one calls them, begin to pause, but sarcasm has made too many enemies for them to cease, and in a number of episodes he is wrongfully taken to task.

These pages conclusively disprove those detractions of the ignorant or ignoble. His truthfulness is constantly confirmed, its contemporary impugners cut rather shabby figures, and to such as still consider him a clever charlatan this volume may be specially commended. Indeed, he towers above the throng. He is a statesman born and trained, not, like so many, an amateur, a subsidiary, or an understudy. He has both length and width of view, and to statesmanship he brings artistry with the world for his studio. Amid the mistrust of some and the derision of others he calmly pursues his way, even courting unpopularity in his predestined path. Opportunist in beliefs he certainly never was. He was far too proudly persuaded of their truth, far too romantically ambitious. Men and moments, doubtless, he used: he was creating a party, not clinging to any, breathing a spirit into the British instinct for 'work and order.' Above all, he is a man of ideas as opposed to set and colourless ideologues. He was perhaps more a man of ideas than any of his time in England. While Gladstone-then, oddly enough,

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not nearly so prominent as his future rival-was lecturing on the virtues, in which he wrapped himself up as in some professor's gown, Disraeli steeped them in the glow of atmosphere. His mind-at once versed and vivid-played like firelight round the main problems and, under its flicker, linked them together in strange, central pictures. Everywhere he made wonderland. His eloquence and epigram-often melodramatic-were not his main armour. They formed the popular appeals of his ideas. But even his criticism was creative, and his insight has over and over again proved prophetic. That is part of this volume's fascination. It is contemporary with the present, and it supplies what we lack—a commanding imagination. Disraeli's life like his own Contarini's—is 'a psychological romance.' other expression so well fits it. And his psychology made him a seer. Not only are many of his forecasts in process of being accomplished, but, as chief actor in a piece of which he was also the author, he himself often conduced to their fulfilment.

Surely Mr. Buckle trips (as occasionally elsewhere) in attributing inspiration to 'aloofness.' 'Aloofness' may stand for much but not for that. It is the power of vision that divines the future, and he who sees foresees. Such a visionary was Disraeli. Commerce with the world is no obstacle to such foresight. Was not Isaiah a prince and historian as well as a prophet and poet? 'Aloofness' may rather contribute to Disraeli's other side-his tact and management of men, for dispassionateness is an aid to diplomacy. 'When,' wrote Bolingbroke, 'great warmth of imagination is united to great coolness of judgment we get that happy combination which is called a genius.' There we get Disraeli. Doubtless these combined faculties often wrought fantastically—in spirals or arabesques; but it was reality that they enriched. And they proved irresistible. Another form of his duality was the double-perhaps treble-strain in him of mission and career. I say 'perhaps treble,' because they were derived from race ('All is race'), Italy, and the English eighteenth century. These were his provenance, and by virtue of them a sense of career and mission was inextricably blended. He himself was conscious of the combination, which more than once he symbolised in his novels. There was thus the day-by-day Disraeli and ever latent the Disraeli of the day after to-morrow. On the one hand he was the nonchalant wit, the wise worldling, the cheery cynic; on the other he was intense-a prophet dreamer and idealist. Indeed, it was the clash and union of these elements in and around him that called forth his irony-at once tears and laughter, satire and pathos, invective and enthusiasm. His attitude was most consistent, and it was so spontaneously. It was himself. Never was there a man more inwardly at one, and

J. J.

this book confirms what was not generally conceded when I pointed it out long ago—that there is a Disraelian philosophy. Indeed, its weakness perhaps is that, however flexible its form, it is inherently invariable. Not that it is monotonous. grasp is comprehensive; in each particle may be seen the whole. And his romance and humour render him lively even when most profound.

The thrilling story of the present volume is illustrated by snatches from his own cursive pen-so picturesque and pointed that we might well have been favoured with more of them. It embraces that little explored half-decade between the fall of Peel and the first throes of the Crimean War, a period brief, yet crowded with events and pregnant with influence. Politically, it tracks Disraeli's penetrating purposes through all the vexed issues of the day-enfranchisement, emancipation; Ireland and, for a moment, India-both congenial to his imaginative sympathy; imperialism, in a sense far in advance of his generation; foreign policy-while crowns tottered abroad and sedition stalked at home; rumours of wars-and at length the war itself. It was a time of storm. Capital and authority were in danger. Everywhere the old order fled and took shelter.

In career, it sees him climbing the ladder of leadership, gradually, grudgingly, recognised as the inevitable head of Opposition-its brain and its courage. We mark him at first as a philosophic waiter on Derby's fumbling providence, a keen critic of Palmerston's careless dash. After Derby's abortive attempts at office in 1851, after place without power in the succeeding year, when Disraeli surpassed himself and his rivals-even in the uncongenial sphere of finance, after the rash, the fatal, the farcical Coalition first came in, we witness Derby's second fiasco at the very moment when his hour had struck-a fiasco which his lieutenant forgave but could not forget. The deaths, too. of great figures accentuate great changes and seem to cut steps Bentinck dies, Peel dies, Wellington fades for his career. away. In performance, we read-and can almost revive-those amazing speeches of 1848, the second of which-a review of the session-won him the leadership; his bold and peculiar championship of the Jews; his resolve to compensate the land by relief rather than by any recurrence to rigid and 'abrogated' protection; his foreseeing and farseeing pronouncements on the suffrage, on every issue of peace or war. In literature we study his Tancred, the deepest of his novels, and that 'Political Biography' of his dear Lord George Bentinck, which I have been told was acclaimed by a circle, of which Gladstone was one, as the best work of its kind in existence. We view him founding, inspiring, furthering his own organ-the Press. We


see him hailed as 'the most remarkable man of the time' by Lady Blessington shortly before she died-Lady Blessington whose 'sympathy, grace and affection' he had prized so gratefully. He receives the 'inimitable' D'Orsay's last farewell. He comes to know the Queen who was one day to be his devotee, and he finds in Prince Albert the pink of education. We watch him on a great stage and in a great part. In society he marches from strength to strength attaining and maintaining a supremacy. We find him turned, despite embarrassments and as if by some spell of Aladdin's lamp, into the Squire of Hughenden, whose trees and glades and châtelaine he loves. He is active beyond belief, a centre as well as a cultivator of distinction, an employer of more than one aristocratic 'agent,' a student of secret societies, feared only when in alliance with some popular movementalways behind, always before the scenes. Yet often alone drudging unceasingly over Blue books nor immune from the blue devils, but ever comforted by his wife and sister; his father whom he lost but a year after his mother's death (and of whom he finely said that the best consolation for his death was his life); and at length by that little fairy godmother of an old lady whom he met so romantically and with whom he pursued so regular and charming a correspondence—the Mrs. Brydges Wylliams, born Sarah Mendez Da Costa, who rests, at her own request, next to his own grave and Lady Beaconsfield's. hardly was he worked that he could write of having no time even to eat, and, later on, of feeling himself 'something between a notary and a house-steward,' and this, he added, 'was ambition.' Yet his spirits rose to—indeed beyond—every occasion, and, as in his boyish days, when he planned out the Representative, El Dorado was always in sight directly large schemes allured his imagination. A strange blend he was of rashness and prudence, but his rashnesses were daemonic, and usually brought him into port. All along, however, under a marble calm, lurked both passion and melancholy. Disappointments were many; he had often much to complain of privately in Lord Derby, who, as presented in these pages, was a prime opportunist—save in loyalty to the land—and loitered as brilliantly over affairs of State, in the gout, as Godolphin, the Vizier of Queen Anne, had done long before him. And the gout excused more.

As for our chief [sighs Disraeli in the August of 1854 to Lady Londonderry], we never see him. His house is always closed; he subscribes to nothing, though his fortune is very large, and expects nevertheless everything to be done. I have never yet been fairly backed in life. All the great personages I have known, even when what is called 'ambitious' by courtesy, have been quite unequal to a grand game. This has been my fate and I never felt it more keenly than at the present moment with a

confederate always at Newmarket or Doncaster when Europe nav, the world-is in the throes of immense changes and all the elements of power at home in a state of dissolution.

Yet he never flew out at Fate. He only sighed and persevered. Did he not write of his own grandfather 'He never made difficulties but always overcame them '?

While convulsions and dissensions boded a new birth, and perhaps a new world, the Whigs under Lord John Russell jogged on with their old and stale prescriptions for 'the people.' They were a most uncomfortable alliance with the Radicals, whose schemes they only nursed in the certain hope of their death in infancy. Meanwhile the Peelites, who retained most of the orthodox talent, held themselves fastidiously apart as men too good for a wicked world, although in 1853 they were as rapacious as the worst for office-in such a hurry for it, wrote Disraeli, that they quite forgot 'a policy.' In the House they now trimmed the party-balance, at one time supporting the Whigs; at another occasionally even Disraeli-for at least twice Gladstone voted in his favour, though he disliked him a shade more than he Palmerston, moderate at home, immoderate did Palmerston. abroad, attracted Disraeli and was attracted by him. Both of them were men of the world who knew what they wanted, and patriots who preferred country to party. They flaunted no broad phylacteries, nor did they shrink in horror from anyone they could not understand-for the simple reason, if a 'bull' may be pardoned, that they had the wit to understand him. Meanwhile the Whigs staggered on, lingering, like all weak Governments, till in despair they coalesced with the too candid Peelites and struck up a league less coherent than any since the Ark. That Coalition had no common creed, nor, as Disraeli said of it, even 'any principles-for the present.' It was composed of elements incongruous, mutually indifferent and sometimes repugnant. And so it brought forth the Crimean War, a blunder of incompetence and the crime of virtue-the war which would never have happened but for their self-satisfied hesitations about a French entente. This unlucky bag of all the talents was perpetually wearing out. So perpetually did they peddle with theory that as There was an earlier often they were ruined by practice. moment when Disraeli thought that some of the Whigs-especially Palmerston-might have joined him as against some of the Radicals, or even some of the Radicals as against some of the Whigs. And one night in the 'forties he actually dined with John Bright just as much later—at the close of 1852—he appealed to him personally about the budget. Yet neither of them certainly believed in abolishing poverty by removing riches. I should like to have been present at that dinner and that interview-



'Job Thornberry' and Sidonia-Tancred in conclave! He was always ready to waive his claims. Among the Peelites, however, Graham and Gladstone were the sole accessions he ever dreamed of as possible, and of the second—that 'Jesuit of the closet, sincerely devout'—he only dreamed three years beyond the bounds of this volume. That was the crisis when he solemnly adjured him with 'Deign to be magnanimous.'

There was a general break-up of the old party lines, and, step by step, Disraeli recalled Toryism to its first elements. In the confusion and dislocation a lull ensued, by which he profited. He began to breathe life into the dry bones. He associated ideas with the Tories as Bolingbroke had done with 'the boys.' He dived deep into the recesses of things, contrasting, like his father, 'causes' with 'pretexts.' He took large and long views, perceiving that any Jacobin democracy was unnational, abstract, metallic, insatiable, but that an English democracy—as an element, not a class-must be re-rooted in the soil. What should fence round a free and ancient monarchy was those institutions which express the English character and are yet infinitely expansive. National character he regarded as the one thing needful. Character was above all 'measures,' and measures must be judged by their ultimate effect on character. He had headed the mutiny against Peel not merely as the champion of a betrayed interest which was yet the backbone of England-for fiscal expedients were not principles; but firstly because for him the commercialisation of England-the gospel of the 'cheapest'-was the antithesis to that real reciprocity which he had always regarded as the freest trade. And, secondly, he headed it—indeed, mainly -because, with all his fine qualities, politically Peel stood for mummification, and even chimeras were better than mummies. For what had Peel 'conserved'?—remnants not realities, 'phrases' not 'facts.' Disraeli's first postulate was vitality—a real Church drawing force and fire from those mystic origins which he always averred that it still misunderstood; a really 'national' party answering national needs and aspirations-in fine, a nation rather than a 'State,' everywhere 'It is always,' the organic rather than the mechanical. outburst uncited in this he exclaimed in an 'always the State never Society, always machinery never sympathy.' This is the clue to his whole outlook, and in all the big problems of the time he alone seems to have discerned an interplay and interconnexions. When the national verdict indiscriminately reversed the protective system, the squirearchy was as indiscriminate in its obstinate adherence to the obsolete-'whole-hoggers' like the cut-and-dried among our modern Tariff

Disraeli alone saw that-pending some equally Reformers. national reversal of the new system—'unrestricted competition' was a question quite as much social as economical—a still burning question. Agriculture was hurt, urban labour would also, in the long run, suffer. 'Free' trade would lead to overstrain and overcrowding, to feuds between town and country, to class-provocations, to all the tendencies, including despotism, of the new, detached democracy. It involved even taxation which would more and more tend to be 'direct' in incidence and perhaps confiscatory in character. Again, the Colonies, which he, in great advance of his hour, wished to see linked in a close chain of imperial consolidation and represented in the mother of parliaments, would be discouraged, not to speak of the bar to that Colonial preference which he was the first to forecast. Empire would be set back. All the elements, too, of government were fast being weakened, and with these a doctrinaire democracy would play the devil. Free-trade, in fact, spelled the mob, and the Book of Numbers is rarely the Book of Wisdom. As a counter-poise, a democracy native not imported, loyal not arbitrary, a genuine democracy, was imperative. It should be choice, not common in character. It was there all the time, though demagogues might pervert it-at heart 'aristocratic' in the best sense of the word, proud to earn privileges, ashamed to extort 'rights' or exploit them, equal to responsibility. Real rights it certainly had-the great rights of Labour, which must be recognised, as must be also its But the rewards must be no bureaucratic bribes. 'Democracy' should be a leaven, not an explosive. his was the democracy of Bolingbroke, not the Socialism of Rousseau-no gushing formula. 'Nothing is calculation,' he makes his Baroni exclaim in Tancred, 'all is adventure.' So as 'adventurer' let him stand. He set sail for discoverv.

The collapse of Peel rent in twain the whole fabric of party. It was a great misfortune, for party, thought Disraeli, means organised opinion, and great parties mean opinions greatly organised and fights that are not factious. And parties then meant more than they can ever do again, for the newspapers did not yet create opinion—they only advocated or advertised it. Strong personalities did the thinking for the mass and symbolised the issues. Disraeli did so dramatically, and as a foil to him Gladstone was to do the same. The old Tory party was dead, or rather embalmed—an image of itself. Disraeli set himself to reconstruct it, to give it resurrection. He looked both before and after. He would have no 'leaders who are not guides.' What he missed in the anaemic anarchy of parties was the living

flesh and blood of the past which alone in England can develop the future. He desired

the disciplined array of traditionary influences—the realised experience of an ancient society, and of a race that for generations has lived and flourished in the high practice of a noble system of self-government. For these the future is to provide us with a compensatory alternative in the conceits of the illiterate, the crotchets of the whimsical, the violent courses of a vulgar ambition that acknowledges no gratitude to antiquity—to posterity no duty. . . . I trace all this evil to the disorganisation of party. I say you can have no Parliamentary Government if you have no party.

And by party he means a free party unfettered in discussion.

For five years we mark him watching, waiting, workingoften alone—to bridge over the gulf between abrogated protection (one day, he thought, after suffering to revive) and some form of compensation to outraged land, still the backbone of Englanda great industry in disorder, as much an industry with 'material' as trade. At the same time, by every resource he sought to reconcile the town and country parties, to cause parties in lieu of factions. In 'parties of progress' he descried a cosmopolitan disruption which could only convert 'a first-rate monarchy into a second-rate republic.' Their theories of physical equality implied internationalism, for, if one reflected, they were only compatible with unlimited employment. 'Progress! Whither?' It was vain, as he mused in Tancred, to 'mistake comfort for civilisation.' Utilitarianism gave no firm footing whatever. No wonder that in the same poetic allegory his 'Guardian-spirit of Arabia' announces to the pilgrim on Mount Sinai, 'Power is neither the sword nor the shield, for these pass away, but ideas which are divine.' This is the highest aspect, the deepest teaching of Disraeli. Infinite were its applications. 'Some three years ago,' he urged, in a spirited speech of 1849,

we thought fit to change the principle on which the economic system of this country had been previously based. Hitherto this country had been, as it were, divided up into a hierarchy of industrial classes, each one of which was open to all, but in each of which every Englishman was taught to believe that he occupied a position better than the analogous position of individuals of his order in any other country in the world. . . . I have heard it stated that the superiority of these classes was obtained at the cost of the last class of the hierarchy-at the cost of the labouring population of this country. But . . . I know of no great community existing, since, I will say, the fall of the Roman Empire, where the working population has been upon the whole placed in so advantageous a position as the working classes of England. . . . In this manner in England Society was based upon the aristocratic principle in its complete and most magnificent development. You set to work to change the basis upon which this Society was established; you disdain to attempt the accomplishment of the best; and what you want to achieve is the cheapest. But I have shown you that, considered only as an economical principle, the principle is fallacious; that its infallible consequence is to cause the impoverishment and embarrassment of the people. . . . But the wealth of England is not merely material wealth; it does not merely consist in the number of acres that we have tilled and cultivated, nor in our havens filled with shipping, nor in our unrivalled factories, nor in the intrepid industry of our mines. . . . We have a more precious treasure, and that is the character of the people. That is what you have injured. In destroying what you call class legislation you have destroyed that noble and indefatigable ambition which has been the best source of all our greatness, of all our prosperity, and all our power. I know of nothing more remarkable in the present day than the general discontent which prevails, accompanied as it is on all sides by an avowed inability to suggest any remedy. The feature of the present day is depression and perplexity. That English spirit which was called out and supported by your old system seems to have departed from us.

Three years onwards, and he put before the country the parting of its ways.

This country will have to decide whether it will maintain a Ministry formed on the principles of conservative progress; whether it will terminate for ever by just and conciliatory measures the misconceptions which have so long prevailed between producer and consumer and extinguish the fatal jealousy that rankles between town and country; whether our Colonial Empire shall be maintained and confirmed; whether the material development of Ireland shall at length be secured; whether such alterations as time and circumstances may appear to justify in the construction of the House of Commons shall be made in that spirit of revolution which has arrested the civilisation of Europe or in the spirit of our popular, though not democratic, institutions. . . .

A year later he wrote to the following effect in the *Press* of Reform:

There were two men in England occupying intelligible positions, and only two. They were both Liberals, both Reformers, and both Lancashire men. . . . Derby was a disciple of progress as much as Bright. But Derby's [i.e. Disraeli's] was English progress in the spirit of the English Constitution and the national character, while Bright's was American progress in the spirit of the American Constitution and the American character. Derby would effect change by a wise management of traditionary influences. Bright by means of a tyrant majority. Between these two intelligible systems the people of this country must sooner or later choose.

Has it not chosen? Bright for the moment has won, but Disraeli's outlook will surely recur. He regarded land as a possession fraught with duty and to be invested with power because by its nature it must be held for the common good. In his biography of Lord George Bentinck he had pressed the inapplicability of any American models to England. There was between the two great countries 'sympathy and feeling,' but 'no analogy in their political conditions.' 'In America there was a virgin soil, no tradition, and no surplus population.' For aristocracy he demanded that variety which he claimed always for every department, for representation, for franchise, for finance—that dull finance which he actually once declared 'must consult

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people's feelings.' It is only through variety that elasticity can be secured. In this instance he thus delivers himself:

The governing aristocracy must be broadly conceived and widely recruited. The aristocracy of England absorbs all other aristocracies and receives every man in every order and every class who defers to the principle of our society which is to aspire and excel.

There, surely, he hits the mark and touches the weak—the fatally weak—spot of modern Socialism. That is why he wished to cement the country and the town together. He had a way of regarding and handling such matters as fragments of eternal history—a habit distasteful to utilitarians. 'Your system and theirs (the agriculturists),' he told the Manchester Radicals, who were ready to dispense with agriculture so long as England remained 'the workshop of the world'—

Your system and theirs are exactly contrary. They invite union. They believe that national prosperity can only be produced by the prosperity of all classes. You prefer to remain in isolated splendour and solitary magnificence. But, believe me, I speak not as your enemy when I say that it will be an exception to the principles which seem hitherto to have ruled society, if you can succeed in maintaining the success at which you aim without the possession of that permanence and stability which the territorial principle alone can afford. Although you may for a moment flourish after their destruction. . . . I see no reason why you should form an exception to that which the page of history has mournfully recorded; that you, too, should not fade like the Tyrian dye and moulder like the Venetian palace. But, united with the land, you will obtain the best and surest foundation upon which to build your enduring welfare. . . . I wish to see the agriculture, the commerce, and the manufactures of England not adversaries, but co-mates and partners, and rivals only in the ardour of their patriotism and in the activity of their public spirit.

And so he opposed 'popular principles' to 'Liberal opinions'—a watchword which forms the refrain of his historical address in May 1847 to the electors of Bucks, as it was to form the refrain of a great speech nearly a quarter of a century afterwards:

... I hope ever to be found on the side of the people and of the institutions of England. It is our institutions that have made us free and can alone keep us so; by the bulwark which they offer to the insidious encroachments of a convenient yet enervating system of centralisation which, if left unchecked, will prove fatal to the national character. Therefore I have ever endeavoured to cherish our happy habit of self-government as sustained by a prudent distribution of local authority. . . . It is unnecessary for me to state that I shall support all those measures the object of which is to elevate the moral and social condition of the working classes by lessening their hours of toil—by improving their means of health and by cultivating their intelligence.

His was no lip-service. He reached forward towards reforms—social, fiscal, federal, Irish, Indian, imperial. He realised that the lessons of his Sybil might be completely thwarted by

the benevolence of the Manchester millennium and its laziness of Laisser faire. Disraeli was no waiter on Providence. He believed that as events marched a statesman should march at their head, and so he lost no time in pressing his contrast home. The eighteenth century Tories had been the popular party, and modern doctrinaires should not rob them of their birthright. Very soon after his Address, in a speech at Newport Pagnell:

It was a popular principle, he said [I quote Mr. Buckle's summary], to interfere to protect the factory workers; but the advocates of Liberal opinions said that in no circumstances must labour be interfered with. It was a popular principle to make a difference between the industry of our fellow subjects and that of foreigners: Liberal opinion treated them alike. It was a popular principle that the National Church should be independent of the State, exercising a beneficial effect on public feeling and morals, and vindicating the cause of liberty; but Liberal opinion treated the Church [this is true still] as a mere stipendiary of the State. That the administration of justice should be conducted by an independent proprietary was a popular principle; that it should be conducted by a man paid by the State a Liberal opinion. In one word, it is a popular principle that England should be governed by England, while the Liberal opinion is that England should be governed by London.

Bureaucracy he abhorred, and much later he denounced and deprecated (as if by anticipation) 'its equipage of clerks.' Sympathy not machinery, Society not the State, that remained his attitude, it has been said, towards the Chartists. The cause of the factory hands he again urged three years later, and that too in the teeth of Whig compromise:

Why abrogate the act? [he said]. . . . The honour of Parliament was concerned in not taking advantage of a legal flaw. The voice of outraged faith is no respecter of persons. Its cry cannot be stifled. . . . The most important elements of Government are its moral influences.

Years afterwards we know how largely his performance fulfilled his promise. But in the case of another reform, the inspection of coal mines, he was not so sympathetic and (apropos of Lord Londonderry the coal-owner), in the words of Mr. Buckle, he 'seems rather to have listened to the voice of friendship than followed his natural political course.' All along he was against interference except in the redressal of great wrongs, against compulsion, against cutting up the human spirit into those paper patterns which windy theorists devise for despotic demagogues to enforce.

Nothing could exceed his mislike of the new crop that had sprung up of professional agitators. His denunciation of them formed a striking episode in his great Reform speech of 1848, but he traced their usurpations to the true source. It was not because the gentlemen of England, the natural leaders of the people, the dispensers of local influence, were becoming lukewarm in their

trust, or inclined to abdicate their duties, that quacks and hirelings stepped into the breach. As regards his devotion to the land both from sentiment and conviction, it was in this regard that he first quoted the 'Imperium et Libertas' of Tacitus. It was in 1851 on his Motion on agricultural distress. The passage is characteristic both in its historical breadth and its train of association:

I now appeal to the House of Commons. . . . They may step in and do that which the Minister shrinks from doing—terminate the bitter controversy of years. They may bring back that which my Lord Clarendon called 'The old good nature of the people of England'—that land to which we owe so much of our power and of our freedom; that land which has achieved the union of those two qualities for combining which a Roman Emperor was deified, Imperium et Libertas. And all this too, not by favour, not by privilege, nor by sectarian arrangements, but by asserting the principles of political justice and obeying the dictates of social equity.

Perhaps his broad political position is best summed up by a brief passage from a speech of 1851 (on the franchise) which Mr. Buckle omits:

". . . I am for the system,' he proclaimed (and he was 'educating' his party), 'which maintains in this country a large and free Government having confidence in the energies and faculties of man. Therefore I say make the franchise a privilege, but let it be the privilege of the civic virtues. Honourable gentlemen opposite would degrade the franchise to the man, instead of raising the man to the franchise. If you want to have a free aristocratic country, free because aristocratic—I use the word . . . in its noblest sense—I mean that aristocratic freedom which enables every man to achieve the best position in the State to which his qualities entitle him, I know not what we can do better than adhere to the mitigated monarchy of England with power in the Crown, order in one estate of the realm, and liberty in the other. It is from that happy combination that we have produced a state of society that all other nations look upon with admiration and envy.'

There, in a nutshell, lies his political creed. It differed in tone and teaching from the creed of his contemporaries; year after year, to the very end, he impressed it on England—and for years it was made light of. Still he persisted. It is not made light of now—it is justified, it is missed. When Disraeli brought forward long afterwards his last scheme for enfranchising the artisan—a scheme constantly preluded by him during this transition of the 'fifties, he accompanied it by the checks of what Bright and Gladstone then derided as 'fancy franchises,' franchises for education and the like which they expunged. These very franchises were urged by him at this quite earlier period, so far were they from being impudent inventions of the moment. In the same way—and this among many other persistent misunderstandings Mr. Buckle has definitely cleared up—he was violently attacked for declaring, after Protection had

become 'obsolete,' that since the definite repeal of the Corn Laws he had never advocated any return to a strictly protective system. Yet it was literally true. And thus it was ever-so long as he repeated what some wished to misunderstand, others grudged to his understanding, and the ruck who want plain roast and boiled could not understand at all. Lord Derby himself, when the Coalition was still in office, and he had learned to know Disraeli far better, emphasised in a letter the jealousy that dogged the footsteps of genius. Everything is often forgiven to a man but genius-at least till he is dead, and when ideas take bizarre shapes this is perforce doubly the case. People like the speakers who (in Metternich's distinction) utter their own thoughts rather than the orators who give out theirs. People love platitude, believe in platitude, and it is platitude that they hope for. Often doubtless a speaker's manner, or the presumption of it in the minds of his audience, may be responsible for their irritation. People resent being put in the shade by any kind of superiority, especially if any air of superiority be supposed. It affronts their intelligence, and though nothing succeeds like success, nothing fails like success in evidence. But there is no affront in platitude, nothing to lower self-esteem. Now platitude was exactly what Disraeli could not utter, though he sometimes took refuge in oracles. And then he had so biting a wit. When Gladstone and the Peelites deigned to be associated with Palmerston, and the former brought in his first budget after procuring Disraeli's overthrow on his second, he still looked back with regret on 'the rupture of ancient ties' (casting an injured glance on the anti-Peelites), and forward with 'hopes of reunion.' This gravity fairly upset Disraeli's, and a passage in one of his early contributions to the Press (undoubted in its absolute attribution, though others instinct with Disraeli's ideas and even with his accent are here proved to have come from the pen at least of Bulwer Lytton)—a passage omitted by Mr. Buckle-thus satirises the scene. It is too good to neglect.

. . . Amiable regret; honourable hope! Reminding us of those inhabitants of the South Sea Islands who never devour their enemies—that would be paying them too great a compliment; they eat up only their own friends and relations with an appetite proportioned to the love that they bear to them. And then they hasten to deck themselves in the trappings and feathers of those so tenderly devoured, in memorial of their 'regret' at the 'rupture of ancient ties' and 'hope of some future reunion.' Do you feel quite safe with your new ally? Do you not dread that the same affectionate tooth will some day be fastened on your own shoulders?

That same 'tooth' had already been gnawing at the traditional obligation to pay his share (in this case most modest) for his predecessor's furniture in Downing Street. His evasion is not

dignified. It is to be regretted that Gladstone, who could be noble when he was not spiteful, behaved so poorly in this transaction. Lord Derby's earlier attitude (before he was yet Lord Derby) is also much to be deplored. It was much more that of a suspicious usher than that of a 'Rupert of debate,' and whatever he may then have felt or imagined it was quite unworthy of him. Disraeli, it is true, excused or condoned it, but Lord George Bentinck, in the February of 1848, told Stanley flatly and frankly that he had not played 'a generous part.' His words must be quoted:

Disraeli [he said], who was earning by his writings 6000l. or 7000l. every two years or so, was dragged out of his retirement by special invitation [a forgotten fact] from the Protectionist Party before I was even thought of as their leader; and the reward he has met with (were it not that a manly, a generous, and an honest English indignation promises to be expressed to-morrow) would leave a blot on the fair name of the gentlemen of England.

When those country gentlemen, either from bewilderment or the suggestions of others, or from the position taken up by both Bentinck and Disraeli on Protection and the Jew Bill, failed temporarily to support the man whom they had once cheered and were bound again to cheer to the echo, how did Disraeli behave? He treated them with a delicate consideration which his enemies might well have imitated. Writing in 1851 to his old family friend Thomas Baring about the 'broader' basis which he craved for Conservatism, he thus continues:

. . . Totally irrespective of all personal considerations which I trust I never intrude, I am naturally grievously distressed at leaving in so forlorn a condition a body of gentlemen who have conducted themselves to me with great indulgence and cordiality, and for many of whom I entertain a sincere affection.

Mr. Buckle seems surprised that Disraeli did not assign a more prominent part to Stanley in his Lord George Bentinck with regard to the campaign against Peel. I would venture to suggest that Stanley's part in the episode of the letter to Peel, which was regarded as soliciting office in 1841, may have had much to do with the feelings in the breasts of both men. What Disraeli could not ignore was what Stanley perhaps still mistrusted. But Lord Derby came to acknowledge Disraeli's single-minded devotion to his party, his unselfish readiness to give way now to Graham, now (it was thrice if I remember) to Palmerston, now even to Herries, if by so doing he could consolidate the cause, and his invariable refusal to put any blame on another man's shoulders. And so, in 1852, he owned to Prince Albert how 'straightforwardly' Disraeli had behaved, and he added that Gladstone was quite unfit to lead the House, while Disraeli

possessed the confidence of his followers. He came to recognise that in his colleague there was no grain of pettiness, nothing retail-that always, whether in ideals or ambitions, it was 'the high game' that he played. Indeed, there is a long list in this volume alone of Disraeli's magnanimities both towards persons and parties, some of which, such as that underlying his so-called pushfulness when Bentinck retired, have been shamefully misconstrued and are now set right. So is the worn charge of 'plagiarism' in the matter of the speech on Wellington. It was an affair of subconscious memory not uncommon in literature and the literary mind. 'I am a plagiary,' wrote Disraeli (remembering Sheridan), 'but I must bear the mortification, and not at least be Sir Fretful.' Even in these elucidatory pages some insinuations still seem to linger without a cause.2 No doubt sometimes Disraeli made false steps, but these were not due to falsehood. No doubt he was passionately ambitious, but his ambition was noble. No doubt during his earlier career there was debateable ground, there were perhaps debateable frontiers, but it was the point of view that decided the point of honour. We can see this even in such a trifle as the conflict of Gladstone's afterrecollection of Peel's last relations to Disraeli with Disraeli's own clear and supported memory of the matter. But never has a great man been less vindicated. It is surprising, when we consider his standing at this time, his impact and influence, that mediocrities unworthy to fasten his shoe-strings and the Tartuffes of 'unctuous rectitude' should have combined, like big bullies in a second-rate school, to belittle their superior. We have only to read of how Wood and Grey sniggered together openly during the superb speech, in 1852, on his second budget to realise the impertinence, and to admire the electric retorts which avenged him -or again the graceful ease with which they were afterwards withdrawn when he tendered amends. Another time when his eyes again flashed fire was in 1854, when Lord John Russell twitted him on abstaining from voting on the Jew Bill, though he well knew that Disraeli only did so because he deemed that, by its then association with other emancipations, his championship of this cause of his heart as a right (and this, too, has escaped emphasis) would be prejudiced. Nothing could have been more courageous and honourable from first to last than his disinterested conduct in this struggle, and it is only fair to add that Lord John, never prejudiced, did him ample amends.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> On p. 267 for example, why say of the letter to the Lord Lieutenant (which in 1850 Disraeli sent to the *Times* as a counterblast to the 'Durham Letter' of Lord John Russell) 'contrived to get in,' and why in the spirited 'defence' (on p. 79) of his disinterested courage on the Jew Bill, write 'it cannot be gainsaid'? Why, too, in another place again vindicating him, leave an impression that he was not so well born and bred as, say, Graham, for instance?

Apropos of Wood, I happen to know a good mot of Disraeli's. Sir Charles gave notoriously poor dinners, and when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1846 invited Disraeli to one of them. A fellow-martyr inquired of Disraeli on the eve of the infliction what he thought they would lead off with. 'Oh, deferred stock for the soup of course,' was the reply. When he let himself go in his natural style, at once terse, playful and vivid, as he shows himself throughout his informal letters, nobody can be more effective than this master of sentences. Over and over again—to Lady Londonderry among others—he hits off a scene, a character, a comedy to perfection—and of how many strange scenes and characters was he not a spectator!

The driest themes, the dullest people, live under the magic of his touch. Of Protection he said that it was not only dead but damned; of the papist scare in 1848, that while Sir Robert Inglis was horrified at the idea of red stockings, he had 'less fear of them than of blue'; of the doctrine of perpetual peace (which he traces back to the Abbé St. Pierre at Utrecht) that it really spelled perpetual taxation; of the Peelites in 1851 that they were 'a staff without an army'; of the Duke of Wellington's statue, when it was set up on the arch opposite Hyde Park Corner, that now he should call him an Arch-duke; of Sin and Sorrow, attributed to his friend Smythe [Lord Strangford] and his sister, that the sin must be Smythe's and the sorrow the lady's; of Lord Aberdeen's mixed Government during the Crimea, that the country had refused it nothing but confidence; of its progressive ministers, that they justified their epithet by standing still; of its home-reforms at the outset of war, that we seemed to be making war not on Russia but ourselves; of the stock cries in 1850, that 'there we have only two subjects, and both gloomy ones-religion and rents. Schisms in the Church and the ruin of landed proprietors are our only themes. . . . Gracious Majesty much excited and clapped her hands with joy when the critical decision of the Privy Council against the Bishop of Exeter was announced to her. On this you may rely.' And this is a fraction of a long account (like all Disraeli's running diaries —literature) of the pourparlers and preliminaries connected with the abortive Cabinet of 1852. It is a picture worthy of Hogarth:

... All this time Henley, whom I believe Lord Derby did not personally know, or scarcely, sat on a chair against the dining-room wall, leaning with both his hands on an ashen staff, and with the countenance of an ill-conditioned Poor Law Guardian censured for some act of harshness. His black eyebrows, which met, deeply knit; his crabbed countenance doubly morose; but no thought in the face, only ill-temper, perplexity, and perhaps astonishment. In the midst of this Herries was ushered, or rather tumbled, into the room exclaiming 'What's all this?' Then there were explanations how and why he had not received a letter, and had not been there at twelve o'clock in the morning to know that he was to be Chancellor of the

Exchequer. If Henley were mute and grim without a word, suggestion, or resource, Herries . . . was as unsatisfactory in a different manner. He was garrulous and only foresaw difficulties. . . . Lord D. and I exchanged looks. . . We dispersed. Lingering in the hall, Lord Lonsdale said never was such an opportunity lost. . . . 'The best thing the country party can do,' said Malmesbury, 'is to go into the country. There is not a woman in London who will not laugh at us.' Herries, who seemed annoyed that all was over, kept mumbling about not having received his summons till three o'clock, and that he remembered Governments which were weeks forming. Henley continued silent and grim. Beresford [the Whip-wirepuller] looked like a man who had lost his all at roulette, and kept declaring that he believed Deedes [a nonentity] was a first-rate man of business.

His letters are fascinating and in more than one respect recall Byron's. There is one to Lady Londonderry of extraordinary interest recounting with brilliant accessories his visit to his old friend Louis Philippe (whose good offices years before he had begged for Palmerston), and also he has left his own record of that historical conversation. It is clear that it was the secret societies (on whose foreign influence Disraeli laid immense stress) that profited by the King's vacillations and struck the chance blow that felled him. Louis Blanc triumphed while the 'Republicans' were indulging in expensive affectations of simplicity. There was a rumour of his impending arrest:

What a noise for so little a man, not so tall as Tommy Moore at his best, and twelve months agone calling in vain at a café for a waiter. But such is the magnetic power of brains. Who would ever have supposed that Louis Blanc would have beaten Louis Philippe?

Forthwith Louis Blanc found asylum with Monckton Milnes—the Vavasour in *Tancred*, of whose eclectic breakfasts Disraeli has left another picture—a lighter pendant to the political conclave previously portrayed. Not only are Disraeli's letters amusing and exhilarating, but in their power of suggestion what he said of Metternich's epistles holds good of his own, 'They are too full of thought ever to be obsolete.'

As for his Parliamentary wit, it is inexhaustible, and a booklet might be made of the similes alone which sally forth, as it were, from the fortresses of literature to do battle with stupidity. In his crowning oration of 1848—the dies irae of revolutions—and Bank crises—he added to his ingenious illustration of St. Januarius' Day ('congealed circulation') a satire on Sir Charles Wood's three budgets in a single year. It was drawn from Cervantes and recalls the simile of the Reform Ministry and Ducrow's circus in the 'thirties:

I never shall forget the scene. It irresistibly reminded me of a celebrated character who, like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had four trials in his time, and whose last was the most unsuccessful. I mean the great hero of Cervantes when he returned from his fourth and final



expedition. The great spirit of Quixote had subsided; all that sally of financial chivalry which cut us down at the beginning of the session and which trampled and cantered over us in the middle, was gone. . . . He returned home crestfallen and weary. The villagers, like the Opposition, were drawn out to receive him; and Cervantes tells us that, although they were aware of his weakness, they treated him with respect. His immediate friends-the barber, the curate, the bachelor Samson Carrasco-whose places might be supplied in this house by the First Lord of the Treasury [Russell], the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Palmerston], and perhaps the President of the Board of Trade [Labouchere], were assembled, and with demure reverence and feigned sympathy they greeted him; . . . but just at the moment when everything, though melancholy, was becoming-though sad, was in the best taste-Sancho's wife [the Government of the middle classes] rushes forward and exclaims 'Never mind your kicks and cuffs, so you've brought back some money.' But this is just what the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not brought. . . .

This is the speech, too, in which we learn that, at the prospect of a doubled income tax, an 'unearthly yell as of a menagerie before feeding time' 'went up' from the bourgeoisie, 'those friends of Free trade.'

Another instance, but of unadorned sarcasm, comes from the sugar debate of the same year, and may appeal to us now.

The Government [he said], however a class may be beset, have always their stock remedies—'a certain number of abstract qualities and cardinal virtues.' Competition is always at hand at the head of the list; then follow, you may be sure, energy and enterprise. . . . What is this competition of whose divine influence we hear so much? . . . It inspires all their solutions of economical difficulties. Is the shipping interest in decay? Competition will renovate it. Are the Colonies in despair? Energy will save them. Is the agricultural interest in danger? Enterprise is the panacea.

Not the least of his virile qualities was his independence. 'I am not the organ of any section,' he repeated at the Bucks election, as years before he had affirmed at High Wycombe, 'or the nominee of any individual.'

. . . I cannot take a seat in the House of Commons if I am not the master of my political destiny. I have not gained the position which I am proud to remember I occupy there but by my own individual exertions. It has cost me days of thought and nights of toil—it has cost me unwearied industry, frequent discomfiture, and many unequal contests. I have gained that position by myself, and I must maintain it by myself.

He was the same in the everlasting conflict yet combination of intrigue with politics, ideals with statesmanship. This finds a literal expression in *Tancred*, where the higher conquers:

Send forth a great thought, as you have done before, from Mount Sinai, from the villages of Galilee, from the deserts of Arabia, and you may again remodel all their institutions, change their principles of action, and breathe a new spirit into the whole scope of their existence.



Dependence on what or whom could achieve such an ambition as this? He was the same again in his extreme courage and peculiar attitude in everything relative to the Jew question. Indeed, it is constantly forgotten that his nurture was outside Jewish surroundings. He was a precursor of Daniel Deronda, and perhaps Joseph in Egypt may typify both.

It is race [he confided to Mrs. Brydges Willyams] not religion that interests me in the instance in question. All Europeans and many others profess the religion of the Hebrews. I, like you, was not bred among my race and was nurtured in great prejudice against them. Thought and the mysterious sympathy of organisation have led me to adopt the views with respect to them which I have advocated, and which, I hope I may say, have affected in their favour public opinion.

It was so personally always. He was an adherent, never an onhanger, and independence in his views, studies and purposes was the breath of his nostrils. He was so with regard to science. He had been so in connexion with Peel, and in the very letter which puts down a firm foot on Lord Derby's first attempts at suppression he snubs him by consoling him for the gout. His independent action cast temporary occasions to the winds, and in 1850 he supported a ministerial motion for the repeal of the malt tax because it wholly tallied with his views-practically to be expressed in his second budget. Eminently independent he was, too, in his refusal of any pledge to Gladstone in 1852 of a dissolution; in his whole course of action, despite Derby, during his first brief tenure of office. Nowhere, however, was his independence, both of insight and foresight, more displayed than in his firm handling of foreign affairs. Europe was in him. It will be remembered that in Endymion he presses the need of a foreign minister's acquaintance with the controlling figures abroad. He knew Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon, Metternich, Prince Jerome, Prince Frederick of Holstein, with hosts of others, and at one time it was believed he would be minister for foreign affairs. He was ever a warm advocate for an entente cordiale with France, and (with Bolingbroke in his mind) urged a commercial treaty with her long before Cobden negotiated one. He discerned the future of the Slavs, above all he sighted in two remarkable speeches of 1848 the destinies and hidden ambitions of Prussia. There had been rumours of designs by Potsdam on Schleswig-Holstein under the plea of German nationality-'dreamy and dangerous nonsense' he called it (for, if one reflects, nationality is the union under a common ideal of different races, not merely a geographical extension), and he denounced, to Denmark's delight-this pretext for invasion.



What was the real reason? It was the lack of a northern port, a design to gain the harbours of the Baltic:

. . . Hitherto in the Baltic Russia and the Scandinavian Peninsula have prevented this project of Germany. . . . This I wish to lay down as a principle that it is for the interest of England, and not of England alone, but of all Europe, that peace should be maintained. . . . I never can believe that the peace of Europe is to be maintained by hiding our heads in the sand and comforting ourselves with the conviction that nobody will find us out.

He added that we had guaranteed Schleswig-Holstein and were therefore bound to fulfil our obligations. The other speech concerns Prussian ambition. He is answering the perpetual pacificists—it is the piece already mentioned about St. Pierre and Utrecht:

. . . Only a few years before St. Pierre laid down his principles Prussia did not exist. But Margraves of Brandenburg, conscious of great talents and power, determined, instead of being Margraves, to become Kings of Prussia, and that produced many struggles, and among them a seven years' war. . . .

The professional pacificists usually conduce to the worst breaches of peace, for their appeals to sentimental indolence prevent that preparation which is the truest—the cheapest—insurance. Indeed, it was partly the pacificism of Lord Aberdeen that landed us in the Crimean War.

He held that 'the presence of England is the best guarantee of peace,' but he held also that the fussy interventions of Palmerston were a mistake. This is true. We were always trying our constitution on to figures it would not fit, and then assuring remonstrants that the clouds were big with blessings and would break on every sainted head. Who were we to 'teach politics in the country where Machiavelli was born '?:

You looked on the English Constitution as a model farm. You forced it on every country. You laid it down as a great principle that you were not to consider the interests of England, or the interests of the country you were in connection with, but you were to consider the great system of Liberalism which had nothing to do with the interests of England, and was generally antagonistic to the country with which you were in connection.

And then he set on its proper foundations the natural friendship with France:

If you mean by an alliance with France, by a cordial understanding with France, or whatever other phrase you may use, that those important affairs and those great events which periodically and surely occur in the world should be regulated and managed in concert by these two leading nations, after previous counsel, animated by a wise spirit of concession and compromise and leading to a cordial co-operation, that is a system of which I shall ever be a feeble but a warm supporter.



He instanced Queen Elizabeth and Henri Quatre, Cromwell with Mazarin, Bolingbroke and Walpole, so different yet united in the desire for an Anglo-French entente.

But an understanding which is only founded on forced occasions and forced opportunities—the incidents invented to justify and occasion the co-operation instead of the co-operation arising from the natural order of the events—that is an understanding and that is an alliance which before this time has occasioned the greatest evil, and which, in the present case, might lead to the greatest possible disasters.

With regard to the Crimean War (mismanaged by a vacillating 'clique of doctrinaires'), not only did he lay down the principles which should actuate a patriotic Opposition (and this perhaps the other day Mr. Bonar Law may have forgotten), but he showed both by precept and practice how these could be conjoined with helpful criticism. Of Russia, as of Austria, he was mistrustful, and in this conflict, oddly enough, he named the Czar a modern Attila.

We are instantly menaced [he wrote at the opening of 1854] with war and domestic revolution, and neither of these calamities has arisen from the necessities of things, but from the incompetence or short-sighted ambition of second-rate men. . . . They were a Coalition [he urged in the next year] each with an arrière pensée. . . . They expected that their negotiations would end in peace and that they would never be called upon to act; from the first they flattered themselves with the belief that the circumstances they had now to encounter would never happen in their lifetime.

Surely history repeats itself. It was rumoured that France might invade Italy. He denied that she had any right to do so. And he protested against any concert with the Parisian Jacobins who were then in power.

It is the system [he adds with a force justified by history] that commences with fraternity and ends with assassination; it is the system which begins by preaching universal charity and concludes by practising general spoliation.

Your theorist likes robbery without risk.

There is no space to pursue his prophetic views as to Ireland and India. In the first he advocated, during this very period, those railways that have proved such material benefits, the commerce which was indispensable, and that 'complete code for Irish land' which might have saved years of waste and friction. He attempted a Tenant Right Bill. Not without cause did he claim in 1870 that if this and another measure had become law there would have been no need for Gladstone's remedies. And the following passage of 1851 shows with what inward sympathy and foresight he diagnosed the eternal dilemma of Celtic government. Mr. Buckle well styles it a 'remarkable deliverance.'

Jan.

It is utterly impossible that Ireland can be again governed, openly or covertly, directly or indirectly, on the principle of Protestant ascendancy. But equally certain it is that no Government can exist which is not faithful and devoted to the Protestant Constitution of this country. In its maintenance are involved greater interests than the existence of a Government, the fate of a Crown, and the destinies of an empire; and trust me, among all the blessings which it assures to us, not the least important and not the least precious are the civil and religious liberties of the Catholics themselves.

Could he have better balanced the problem that is still with us? His Indian policy-which the succeeding volume will probably elaborate—was equally psychological. He understood both the people and their past, and he discerned—as befitted one who had long known his Burke by heart—that so vast an Empire could not advantageously remain under the sway of John Company. His prophecies are perpetual, and he read the weather-

signs at a glance.

Prophetic in another sense is his Tancred; it is the tracking of inspiration to its source. It blends in a remarkable degree the duality on which I commented at the outset, and I cannot but think that in more than one regard these pages have treated it imperfectly. They describe it, and with justice, as a protest against materialism, but it is more than that. Both its irony and its peculiar import have been missed. And first let me clear up at least three misunderstandings which have some connexion with the meaning of this spiritual romance. Disraeli always held that Christianity was the completion of Judaism, and in so holding he really only repeated our Saviour's own announcement that He came not to take away but to fulfil, or St. Paul's meaning in the fifteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. But so far from inventing this theory for any purposes of Tancred, as this volume hints, it was, if I mistake not, the elder Disraeli's conviction that the son—as so often—developed. Then, again, when Lord Henry Bentinck, as the brother of Disraeli's intimate, certainly aware of the Christianity which Disraeli not only practised but proclaimed in more than one debate on the Jew Bills—when Lord Henry speaks in a letter to him of 1849 about 'your Church,' Mr. Buckle, who has arranged so much so well, adds a footnote to explain that Lord Henry 'wrote as if he thought that Disraeli was a Jew in religion.' He must have forgotten a letter of the previous year from Disraeli to Lord John Manners (given only a few pages back), where he speaks of 'Samuel Oxon' (Wilberforce) as 'a pillar of the Church in our sense'—the italics are mine. What Disraeli, what Lord Henry meant, of course, was a real, an ideal Church, at once spiritual and unpolitical, a Church not 'the stipendiary of the

State,' a Church that reseeks the true fountains of its inspiration and remounts to its first origins. That is one of the significances of Tancred, and of that Disraeli and his disciples must often have discoursed. Then, again, we are told that in Tancred our Church dignitaries are by no means exalted, and this is supposed to be in some way dissonant from the theme. But, surely, this very contrast is one of the book's main purposes. More than this, since this criticism alludes presumably to a passage unfavourable to our theologians, it may be as well to point out a pertinent sentence from a letter of Disraeli's, in 1852, to his new and youthful friend Lord Henry Lennox, referring to some printer's mistakes in the famous twenty-fourth chapter of his Lord George Bentinck. He continues:

. . . I don't know of any other errors, for the passages denounced as heterodox by English clergymen, who are more ignorant of theology than any body of men in the world (the natural consequence of being tied down to Thirty-nine Articles and stopped from all research into the literature which they are endowed to illustrate), are only reproductions from St. Augustin and Tertullian.

Now, as regards the message of Tancred. The central idea, so laughed at as 'the Asian mystery,' is that we profess not only a creed but a religion that springs from an Arabian tribe. Our worship, its poetry and its prophecies, its message and its meaning, are admittedly Semitic ideas. The Bible is the fatherland of the spirit. What, then, are these sacred Semitic ideas-are they the conventional screeds that we repeat by rote? Disraeli answers emphatically 'No.' If religion be politicised, he would seem to say, where then is your Christianity? Has it become forced and full of formula? Is the parliament which regulates it a theocracy? Are votes divine? But ideas are. Truth is divine, and the Church should be so too. Religion is man's craving for direct communication with God. Where did He reveal art but in Athens, or law but in Rome, or man's spiritual nature and power but in Jerusalem? Disraeli recalls us to the land which he declares-if we believe what we believe-should still shed inspiration. He shows us even there, in varying characters at once ideal and ironic, the contrasts and conflicts between spiritual ideas and political intrigues, between the bustle of Europe and Syrian repose. It is a wonderful fairytale, and it is essentially true. Since, then, these ideas are not quite what they often seem to ordinary England, since, so to speak, St. Paul was not a rural dean, it may be necessary to requicken faith and to reinspire religion. 'We cannot save ourselves,' exclaims Eva, the ideal incarnation of Judea in the person

of a banker-prince's noble daughter. It is the young, the highborn Englishman who replies:

Send forth a great thought, as you have done before, from Mount Sinai, from the villages of Galilee, from the deserts of Arabia, and you may again remodel all their institutions, change their principles of action, and breathe a new spirit into the whole scope of their existence.

Did Disraeli himself feel no such divine call? I think, bearing other sentences in mind, that he did, but then again intrigue constantly intruded on faith. Yet faith rose superior. And in him it sprang from race. 'All is race,' and race embodies itself in individuality. There is a passage which the critique on *Tancred* omits: 'What on the whole,' asks Eva in her Bethany garden, 'is the thing most valued in Europe?' Tancred pondered, and after a slight pause said:

I think I know what ought to be most valued in Europe; it is something very different from what I fear I must confess is most valued there. . . . I think that in Europe what is most valued is—money.

And this also may be repeated; it occurs in one of the ironical bits of the Emir's would-be worldly wisdom:

. . . The English are neither Jews nor Christians, but follow a sort of religion of their own, which is made every year by their bishops, one of whom they have sent to Jerusalem, in what they call a parliament—a college of muftis—you understand.

He smiles as, alternately, he turns the tables both on East and West.

This irony pervades the whole, which is a dramatic dream floating among memories, and midway between earth and heaven. So far from its abrupt close being imperfect, it must be regarded as most poetical. The dream opens directly this Childe Harold of the Church quits the realities of roast beef and lands on the dreamland of the Syrian soil, '... Sunny regions laved by the Midland Ocean.' It ends when, amid affectionate bustle, the Duke and Duchess with their retinue re-enter like a refrain. Their incursion chases away the dream. The rapt dreamer, as it were, rubs his eyes and awakes to the recurrence of the West. The hour, too, is in keeping. It is the moment when Tancred avows his love. It is the twilight.

There are further omissions, the humour of those honest servants Freeman and Trueman, who so miss the home-brewed and the family prayers in the desert of 'this 'ere Siny'; the symbolic fantasy of the Baronis; Queen Astarte's pageant of sculptured Greek Gods in her hidden galleries—a fancy which, I have been assured, has been since found to be a fact.

The strength of Tancred is in its spiritual appeal; its weak-

ness, perhaps, that ideas are not always 'divine,' but sometimes hover in the regions between sense and spirit. Yet always they are a medium. Through them it is that the spirit, blowing where it listeth, inspires. And with the dead letter of the sectaries ideas have nothing to do. 'The letter killeth, the spirit giveth life.' In this sense Disraeli, for all his joy in the whirligigs of life—nay, perhaps, because of it—is a force far more spiritual than Gladstone's ecclesiasticism or the dissenting dogmas of Bright. At Tancred's very outset Disraeli scathes the policy 'that confounds the happiness with the wealth of nations.'

You have announced to the millions [he cries out in the wilderness] that their welfare is to be tested by the amount of their wages. . . If you have seen an aristocracy invariably become degraded under such an influence; if all the vices of the middle class may be traced to such an absorbing motive—why are we to believe that the people should be more pure?

Do we still believe it?

'The Spirit giveth life.'

WALTER SICHEL.

## LETTERS FROM PARIS AND SOISSONS A HUNDRED YEARS AGO

II

## THE 'HUNDRED DAYS'-AND AFTER

Two letters written by Madame de Pougens in 1814, which in their natural sequence should have appeared with the correspondence in last month's issue of this Review, have only just come into my possession, and appear here by way of preface to the letters of 1815. Their publication at the present time has a singular appropriateness, for they afford the most convincing proof of the overbearing and cruel conduct of the Prussian and Russian troops following on the invasion of France by the Allied Powers in 1814. In view of the stories which for some months past have thrilled the world with horror, it is worthy of note that while the Russian troops have long since discarded the barbarities of a hundred years ago, the Prussians appear to have moved steadily on the downward path, and to-day show even greater cruelty in their methods of warfare than was the case in 1814 and 1815.

Paris, Rue du Bac, No. 18, Faubourg St. Germain. 20th March, 1814.

I am sure you will be glad to hear we are alive and tolerably well, which is saying a great deal after all we have suffered. . . . You are happy my good friends to feel the calamities of War only in your pockets, be assured next to a wild beast a Cosaque is the animal the most to be dreaded, though we were rather less exposed than the poor City of Soissons, still our pretty quiet retreat has suffered much; two poor old paysans died of the ill treatment they received, our good Lorin had many a lash, and the knout was once held over dear M. de Pougens' head. Our house was pillaged from top to bottom, all our provisions, so that one day we remained with 11 eggs among 15 and a few potatoes; we were obliged to kill our old hens to make some soup, but that was the least of our cares, the horrible presence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It will be remembered that Madame de Pougens' letters were written to Mrs. (afterwards Lady) Dundas, who resided at Richmond.

of these Tartares du désert armés jusqu'aux dents continually entering our house, and menacing us with their drawn sabres, was too much, and as soon as the road was safe, we removed hither. Poor M. de Pougens is grown so thin, his friends here were much shocked to see the alteration, for 6 weeks he had never undressed except to change his linnen. Though upon recollection I am glad to find I have more courage than I ever thought I possessed, yet I own it was nearly exhausted, and my poor nerves so shattered 'the least noise appalls me.' An Army of heroes headed by a Hero have driven the enemy from Soissons, still we shall remain here till a more quiet moment.

Meantime I must say we have supt full with horrors, like Macbeth. We were at Soissons the first time the Town was taken by assault, but most marvellously preserved by a Cosaque officer, a Polonais 'full of the milk of human nature,' and Heaven directed, I think to us. I said how I trembled for M. de Pougens. he answered 'Ah Madame, qui pourrait faire du mal à une figure aussi respectable?' but few were like him. The next time our poor Soissons was taken the Town capitulated, and was treated still more cruelly than the first time, the women especially, no age was safe from violence. A poor old woman above 60, who makes my corsets, was a victim to their brutality, a poor girl on the body of her dead mother, and 2 thirds of the inhabitants stript of all their effects and clothes. A friend of ours had 40 Cosaques at once in her house, her Apartments are on the ground floor, they rushed into her Bedchamber with their horses, carried off all she possessed in linnen and clothes, broke all her fine china and frightened her out of her senses almost, as you may well believe. My old English friend was at first so little alarmed she remained quietly in her fauteuil, and sent them word not to smoke in her house! However she presently found she was no longer Maîtresse chez elle, but though the General was so méchant he beat her servants, yet she lost less than her neighbours.

The Bishop of Soissons told me that having 3 Generals lodged at his house, he remonstrated with them on the conduct of their soldiers after the Town had capitulated, one answered 'ce ne sont pas mes Soldats,' another answered 'ce ne sont pas mes affaires,' the third 'cela ne me regarde pas.' Happily we had concealed all our valuables and the best part of our clothes, but the servants and the household linnen have been pillaged, M. de Pougens had buried his manuscripts, but they did not disturb his books; the proprietors remaining in their houses, at least in our Village, was a safeguard, where the soldiers found nobody they broke and destroyed without mercy. At Château Thierry the good Curé (a man of great merit and who having inhabited

their country some years understands their language) filled his Church with poor helpless women and children. These barbarians forced the doors in spite of his prayers and entreaties, and treated the women with the most savage brutality even on the Altars, and would you believe it they never departed from our house sans faire le signe de la croix and many would not touch meat or butter because it was Lent! Since their departure we have had many of our officers and soldiers to lodge, they are all so exasperated, they declared continually 'nous nous ferons hacher en mille morceaux plutôt que de reculer,' others 'nous ne voulons pas de canons, nous ne demandons que la baionette,' and accordingly they have performed prodigies of valour. . . .

Vauxbuin, près Soissons, (Aisne) October 14th, 1814.

You will, I think, be as tired of hearing of the Cossacks as we were seeing them, but as they are the general subject of conversation, everybody having some terrible history to relate, they naturally find their way to the tip of my pen. Indeed we ought to be very thankful we suffered so little, Major Lewestein protected us one night by giving us Ivan the Cossack for a guard, and the next the sauve garde sent by Count Woronsow though composed of insolent officers yet they certainly prevented our being all treated like poor Lorin who was lashed and pillaged pretty handsomely.

The other day a Mdme. Aubriot who lives at a village about 2 leagues off, came to visit us, she remained at her house with her husband and little girl all the time, except indeed that she and her child passed some time in the woods, her poor husband was near being minced into small meat by them, and all from a mistake. They accused him of having a dragon français concealed in his house, he denied stoutly, at last happily for him (who is but a simple Cymon) somebody had the wit to find out it was Dragon the housedog, whose name they heard repeated, they were still hard of belief and held the lance at his throat till the good animal appeared to the call of dragon and relieved his poor trembling Master.

Amongst many traits of barbarity one was glad to hear of at least one trait of humanity, Mdme. Aubriot says the soldiers entered a cottage in their village which was deserted by the inhabitants, who had left behind a poor child in a cradle; they took cradle and child and carried it carefully to a neighbouring cottage where they found an old woman, they gave her the child in charge, assuring her they would not take her cow or anything she possessed if she would promise to take care of the poor child, which you may be sure she did; they staid to see her give the

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child milk for it was half starved, and then departed. The inhuman parents only returned 2 days after. Mdme. Aubriot says and so does M. Dansé that the Prussians were worse than the Russians, happily for us they only arrived here after our departure and then the General Thielman lodging in our house protected it in some measure.

They tell a good story of a thief who was taken the other day in the very act of stealing, a guard was ordered to convey him to prison to which place said M. le Voleur proceeded slowly and reluctantly, the Guard impatient said 'S—ė Cosaque marchez en avant'—le voleur répondit—'Monsieur c'est votre devoir d'arrêter les voleurs, non pas de les insulter.'. . . Though we seldom talk of fashions I must tell you they wear caps à la cosaque 2 which puts Mdlle Thiery in a fine passion, she would make a bonfire of them all.

Alas! the vintage is not only bad but small and the wine will be hors de prix, the allied Armies have exhausted the Country so entirely, we give 150 fr. for what used to cost 70, and after all not so good. An acquaintance of ours who lives at Crouy (a village on the road to Laon pillaged and re-pillaged by the Cosaques) says their grapes are all frozen, the poor paisans in despair. They had lived on the credit of what they should get at the vintage, and that has failed them, meantime they are threatened by the tax gatherers to seize all they have left, and we sufferers gave in a list of our losses, being so required and thus do they make compensation. A poor man in our village lets a cottage for 30 fr. a year and he is taxed at 33, a mistake no doubt, but such is the confusion which reigns, a general augmentation having taken place instead of the contrary.

I was amused the other day with an article in the Moniteur, the King of Prussia is going then to dress up his old Protestant religion with a little Roman Catholic finery, our good stiff Presbyterians would say turning it into Queen Jezebel, or the W. of Babylon, but bigotry seems to be the order of the day everywhere and not confined to Spain and the Inquisition. But it is the Pope who amuses me, ought he not according to his own principles and above all according to the judgment he passes on others, to have suffered martyrdom rather than submitted to crown the *impic* as he now calls him? We are all impatience for the result of the Congress, I think it will be difficult amongst all the other potentates to shut the door against the Goddess of discord. . . Adieu, Adieu,

Ever, ever yours,

F. J. de Pougens.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> To-day the same thing is happening and fashions à la Cocaque are much in vogue in this country.

To determine the arrangements for carrying into effect the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris on May 30, 1814, the signatory Powers had stipulated that a general Congress should be held at Vienna in the following autumn. The month of August was fixed for the sittings to open, but to meet Lord Castlereagh's parliamentary engagements, and allow of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia making a brief sojourn in their respective capitals at the conclusion of the English visit, the plenipotentiaries did not assemble till late in September. Prince Metternich presided over the proceedings of this illustrious and important gathering which may be said to have paved the way for its successor in title, the Concert of Europe.

During the period of the Congress the Emperor Francis, as well as the city of Vienna itself, dispensed the most lavish hospitality and, for the time being, the attention of Europe was concentrated on the Austrian capital and its distinguished guests. No one in power, least of all Louis the Eighteenth, appears to have given so much as a thought to Napoleon, whose career it would seem was considered to have ended with his abdication at Fontainebleau and subsequent acceptance of the island of Elba as his future home and dominion. In short the man who for so many years had dominated an entire continent had passed out of mind, absolutely and entirely forgotten by the very Powers that but a few months before had regarded him as their most formidable and deadly foe.

Not so the French people. They had never taken kindly to the changes brought about by the new regime, and in spite of the privations and losses they had undergone still looked back with regret to the reign of Napoleon. By creating a Parliament, Louis the Eighteenth may be said to have brought political liberty where before there was none, but on the other hand, he and his Court unsettled domestic affairs, the prospects of the Army and the titles of estates. The holders of national property were also becoming alarmed at the encroachments of the Church, and, except in the case of the more highly placed officers, the prevailing feeling in the Army was one of general Hardly had Napoleon left France than the dissatisfaction. soldiers who had fought under his leadership were praying for his return. 'They guarded the Emperor's Eagles as their household gods, kept the tricolour cockades with pious care in their knapsacks, spoke with raptures of his exploits in their barracks and worshipped his image in their hearts.'3

Such was the position when on the 7th of March, 1815, while a ball given by Prince Metternich was in progress, the disquiet-


<sup>3</sup> Alison's History of Europe, vol. x. p. 800.



ing news reached Vienna that Napoleon, accompanied by Generals Drouot, Bertrand, and Cambronne, had landed at Cannes with a force of 1000 men. The intelligence spread consternation at the Congress, where it was an open secret that instead of the permanent accord expected to result from its deliberations, a combination against Russian aggression was by no means a remote possibility. However, with the return to France of the common enemy, as Napoleon was so often called, unanimity again prevailed, and the Great Powers bound themselves together, not for the purpose of securing the throne of France to the Bourbons, but to place it out of Napoleon's power ever again to disturb the peace of Europe.

The Congress was brought to an abrupt conclusion, and the Allies set about organising three large armies, the first to consist of Austrian troops led by Prince Schwarzenberg; the second, the Russian contingent, with the Emperor Alexander in command; and the third to comprise the British, Hanoverian, Prussian, and Belgian forces under the Duke of Wellington and Field Marshal Blücher. To place these armies in the field, and to equip them for another campaign in France, occupied the attention of the Powers during the next few months. The necessity of making a supreme effort to crush Napoleon was impressed upon the British Government by the Duke of Wellington, whose views, however, did not go unchallenged. The Whigs, led by Whitbread, protested against the war; but they failed to carry their resolution, the Budget of the year was raised to 90,000,000l., and the Duke proceeded to Belgium to prepare for the approaching hostilities.

Meanwhile Napoleon was making rapid strides, the army rallying to his standard as, step by step, he advanced towards the French capital. That he was fully conversant with the affairs of Vienna may be gathered by the observation he is credited to have made on landing at Cannes- 'Le Congrès est dissous,' while that he was en rapport with the feeling in the Army may be gathered from his action when, for the first time, he came face to face with the Royalist troops. Advancing alone, he exclaimed 'Soldiers, if there is one among you who desires to kill his General, his Emperor, he can do so; here I am.' Needless to say, these inspiring words did not fail of their effect, and the Emperor's march to Paris may be described from beginning to end as a triumphal progress. Once only was there danger, and that was from Marshal Ney, who had pledged his word to Louis the Eighteenth that he would 'bring back the Corsican to Paris in an iron cage.' Fate, however, willed it otherwise, for on meeting his former chief the Marshal's professions of loyalty to the King quickly evaporated, and both he and the troops he commanded ranged themselves under Napoleon's



banner. Louis the Eighteenth left Paris on the 19th of March, and Napoleon took up his residence at the Tuileries on the following evening, his reception being of the most enthusiastic kind, all classes vying with each other to do him honour.

Practically no resistance was offered to Napoleon, who now posed not as an autocratic sovereign but as a constitutional monarch. With the object of satisfying the demands of the patriot or liberal party he framed an Act giving greater popular liberty than the Charter promulgated by Louis the Eighteenth, and the new constitution was proclaimed on the 1st of June at a ceremony designated by him as the Champ de Mai.

It became apparent to Napoleon that if he wished to hold France he would have to fight against a united Europe. Accordingly he set to work with something like his old determination to reorganise the army, and, with the assistance of the veterans who had returned from captivity in Russia and Germany, he succeeded in getting together, in addition to the National Guard. an army of 284,000 men. With this force on the 14th of June he crossed the Belgian frontier, hoping to attack Wellington and Blücher before assistance could arrive from other quarters. Four days later the Battle of Waterloo was fought and Napoleon's sun was set. He fled to Paris, where, at the dictation of the Chambers, he tendered his abdication, at the same time drawing up a Declaration addressed to 'the French people,' in which he proclaimed his son Emperor of the French under the title of Napoleon the Second. Thus ended what is known in history as the Hundred Days.

Meanwhile the Allies had entered Paris, and Louis the Eighteenth, returning from Ghent, where he had taken refuge, occupied once more the throne of France. Unlike what happened on the former occasion, the Allies, especially the Prussians, treated the French capital as a conquered city, and its inhabitants with much unnecessary harshness. Indeed, it is said that Blücher was with difficulty restrained from blowing up the Pont d'Iéna and destroying the column of the Place Vendôme.

For some months peace negotiations had been proceeding, and conferences between France and the Allied Powers, protracted and acrimonious, had taken place; but it was not until the 20th of November that the final Treaty of Peace was signed. During the intervening period the greater part of France was overrun by foreign troops, who committed many excesses, and the humiliation of the French people was complete when it became known that the provisions of the new Treaty provided for the frontiers of their country being garrisoned by foreign troops for a period of five, afterwards reduced to three, years.

The command of this army, known as the Army of Occupation, was placed in the hands of the Duke of Wellington.

It is with the events narrated above that Madame de Pougens' letters now deal

## Vauxbuin, près Soissons (Aisne) Monday April 10th 1815

If you knew how I have longed to write to you dearest Friends during all these wonderful, almost miraculous events, you would I am sure pity me for the restraint laid on my pen first by fear and prudence and since by the assurance here that the letters did not pass. But to-day I have received a letter from M. de Pougens who is at Paris, he tells me the couriers pass as usual, and that several English are arrived at Paris, so I hope the sweet blessing of Peace will be continued to both countries. What a revolution, I call it a révolution à la violette. You know doubtless the soldiers during the last year gave the Emperor the name of le petit père la violette, and used to say to each other 'allons camarade allons boire à la violette' which continued a profound secret amongst themselves.

An almost universal discontent prevailed against the regal government at Paris, the Emigrants and Priests had rendered the King very unpopular, the Duc d'Angoulême a mere cypher, always drunk after dinner, and the Duc de Berri detested, especially by the Army, the proprietors of national lands not able to sell them, or to mortgage them, so universal was the opinion that the Emigrants would enter in possession again. Enfin all prepared the way for our great Emperor, never so truly great as at this moment, but till ye 20th we were so in the dark.

I was extremely uneasy about M. de Pougens who set out for Paris the day before we heard the news. I was reading quietly in my room when Mdme. Louise came and told me. I could not at first believe it, and when it was confirmed I was very anxious for the state of Paris, and wrote letter after letter to entreat M. de Pougens to return. Happily though every means was tried to enflame the people, Paris, thanks to the good conduct of the National Guard, remained perfectly quiet, a detachment went out the memorable 20th to meet the Emperor another detachment had escorted in the morning the King to St. Dennis. I think the Emperor was too good to land with 1000 men, his valet de chambre was quite sufficient, the troops sent out against him he used to pass in review tout de suite they say—poor Mdme.

<sup>\*</sup> Le petit Père la violette was a name by which Napoleon was secretly known practically throughout the entire French Army; it was commonly rumoured that 'he would appear with the violet in Spring on the Seine, to chase from thence the priests and emigrants who have insulted the national Flag.—Alison's History of Europe, vol. x. p. 800.



Martenot was very uneasy, knowing her husband's real sentiments, he was in Garrison at Metz, but since arrived at Paris, his regiment the Old Imperial Guard had hid their eagles and their cockades. When the Emperor reviewed them they bent one knee to the ground, the whole was so affecting M. Martenot wrote word that the Emperor shed tears as well as his soldiers, enfin voilà les Aigles de retour et les Dindons sent a grazing.

M. de Pougens though he did not share my fears returned here before his books were ready to be sent to St. Petersburg, but as soon as he heard the Institute was to go en corps to the Tuileries, he set out and arrived just in time, the Emperor received them most graciously and spoke to M. de Pougens d'une manière très aimable. All the works at Paris, the improvements, are resumed especially at the Louvre, suspended for the last year. Clarice Dansé at school at Paris writes word she was taken by some friend to see the Emperor, she was near him as he stept into his carriage, a voiture bourgeoise avec un seul laquais derrière . . . he has been to see David's celebrated picture just finished, Leonidas aux Thermopyles, they say it is a chef-d'œuvre . . . I hasten to dispatch this letter, it must be sent to Soissons early to-morrow in order to set out from Paris Wednesday. M. de Pougens is still at Paris accablé d'affaires. I expect him in a day or two and will soon be in continuation. Adieu, adieu, Ever yours, most truly,

F. J. DE POUGENS.

Vauxbuin, Tuesday, April 18th, 1815.

I think it was last week that I wrote to you my dear friends a very hurried letter, having heard from M. de Pougens that the post still passed between the two countries I was impatient to avail myself of it for fear of what might happen. Since then I have lived in fear lest all intercourse should be stopped but a letter I received this morning from my Caro sposo (who is still at Paris) puts me in such good spirits it has set my pen agoing immediately. He says 'Je ne puis nommer la personne, c'est une bien bonne tête, je viens d'avoir une conversation bien tranquilisante sur l'espoir fondé de n'avoir point de guerre.' He says too on vient de tirer le canon pour le sédition de Marseille, and that several English were at Paris. The civil war then (a mere feu de paille) is quite at an end and indeed if you are tempted to let slip once more the dogs of War God knows where or when the havoc may end.

The Army is filled with the most surprising enthusiasm, which added to their sense of lost glory and to their revenge

for the invasion of last year I am certain would make them perform wonders. The Baron Martenot came to visit me yesterday, he is not young or flighty, but a sober sedate character, he says there are now two hundred and fifty thousand vieilles troupes, he added 'Nous jurons de vaincre ou de mourir.' The National Guards are organising all over the Country and Mr. W. Dundas can tell you what a fine body of men they compose at Paris.

Enfin, I fear you have in England a very mistaken idea of things here-in the name of common sense how could the Emperor have performed his journey with a poignée d'hommes, if the Country had not been devoted to him, as well as the Army? M. Martenot says when he, with the Old Imperial Guard, stationed at Metz, were summoned to Paris by the late Government, passing through Champagne (a province which you know had suffered cruelly by the War) the peasants met them in troops crying out 'Vive l'Empereur, vive la vieille garde,' and the Emperor was not then amid Paris; he added too the peasants were mostly armed with fire-arms collected by them during the march of the allied troops and were determined on all the resistance they could make. Mdme Louise has just told me a conversation she overheard between two labourers in the garden, who did not know she was in a bosquet near them, one said to the other 'Je ne voudrions pas que ce vieux Cagotan (Louis 18) revint avec ses Callotins, je ne sommes pas cagot moi, et ils me mettent à l'amende pour faire un petit brin d'ouvrage le dimanche,' the other answered 'Bah, il ne reviendra pas, nous ne le connaissions pas, nous sommes nés pour ainsi dire sous l'Empereur' and a great deal more which I forget but which she represented very pleasantly. Our friend Dansé is an Elector and will be a performer in the champ, no longer de Mars, but de Mai. If they all had as good a head, as sound a judgment as our said friend, one might expect great or rather good things; the sight will be very fine as well as very interesting. . . . I do assure you I feel not the least fear we should be otherwise defended in case of War than the last time when we were betrayed on all sides, but I must indeed hope for the sake of humanity such a calamity will be spared. I think it will.


Meantime we are much amused with the absurd reports which one hears continually. M. de Pougens writes me 'Il y a trois jours on m'a dit avoir parlé à un homme arrivant de Soissons, qui avait vu de ses propres yeux qu'on dépavait la ville à cause des ennemis qui en étaient à une petite demilieue, je t'entends rire d'ici,' ainsi du reste. . . . I expect my dear M. de Pougens



to-morrow morning and shall wait his arrival on the Mountain top in spite of the cold which is very severe, there was ice this morning and the vines (very forward) have suffered cruelly, a sad loss to the poor *paisans*.

Wednesday morning. M. de Pougens certainly communicated a part of his activity to the slow unwieldy diligence for it arrived an hour sooner than usual, I was dressing when Annette exclaimed 'voilà la diligence sur la Montagne.' scrambled on my clothes put on my seven league boots and was just in time to meet him in the little winding path down the hill; a good fire, a good breakfast awaited him in my room and such a talking, for Mdlle Thiery arrived brim-full of news and anecdotes, I wish you could have heard her it would have amused you as would the caricatures she mentions but none of which she has brought, for which I scold. One she described is the Duke d'Angoulême-at the head of a number of old Emigrés, cy devants (as the vulgars say) bien poudrés bien coiffés à l'ancienne mode, and seated in Sedan chairs, the Duke says 'marchez en avant' to which they gravely answer 'Monseigneur, nous attendons les porteurs pour nous porter en avant,' it seems flat on paper but they say the costume, the different faces are admirable.

General Drouot is an intimate friend of a relation of Mdlle. Thierv's, he was the first who landed in France with only 8 men, he says a troop of country people met him on the shore and almost stifled him with their embraces, congratulations, etc., and when the Emperor landed a voung man threw himself at his feet saying 'Sire je vous apporte cent mille francs et ma vie '- 'Je les accepte' was the answer. On the Emperor's arrival at the Tuileries he found his old Ministers assembled to receive him, he immediately began his travail with them and worked hard till 5 in the morning. Meantime the old Imperial Guard who had followed him from l'Isle d'Elbe, remained 8 leagues from Paris, fatigue preventing them going further; some fugitives from Paris spread the report of tumults, disasters, etc, the poor soldiers tired as they were, snatched up their knapsacks and marched in all haste to Paris, arrived at the barrières they were informed all was quiet, however they would proceed to the Tuileries where they arrived at one in the morning and finding all things safe and well, they threw their knapsacks on the ground in the court and were going to make that their bed but the National Guard hastened to them, carried them to the corps de garde where all the officers got up, gave them their beds, even the Emperor. Mameluc, an ungrateful creature, did not follow him to l'Isle d'Elbe, he is now ready to hang him-




self and lays it all on his wife. You have seen in the papers with what acclamation the Emperor's bust was replaced on the Colonne Place Vendôme, the shouts of Vive l'Empereur are so frequent and so loud they are heard in the Champs Elysées, and he is obliged to show himself continually at the window. The soldiers call la Duchesse d'Angoulême la Nonne Sanglante—

Ye Duke of Wellington has rendered himself very unpopular, even to the former government, they say (but that I cannot believe) that he dated his dispatches de mon quartier général à Paris, but what is very true, I believe, is that invited to a very great dinner by one of the Maréchaux (I think Macdonald) he made them wait about 2 hours, and then arrived en bottes. The Maréchal said to him 'votre Excellence a eu sans doute de grandes affaires'...' Non, je viens de me promener au bois de Boulogne'—but if I was to repeat all I hear I should be perhaps a greater liar than all the newspapers put together and yet I cannot resist gossiping with you chère amie, especially

when anything interesting is on the carpet.

M. de Pougens confirms to me the hope of peace or else I should not be so gay, though I can assure you and from the bottom of my heart without one fear for my personal safety, and yet I am no great heroine and suffered much last year . . but now a little word on the politics of our village, our pretty Mdlle. de Chandelas was married the day before yesterday, I was invited à la Messe du Mariage, and to pass la Soirée, which, when I heard her sister was brought to bed early in the same morning, I, like a sober Englishwoman thought, as it was to consist of a Ball and Supper, would not take place, the Salon being under her room. Saying so to my Maid she answered 'Oh non, Madame, nous autres françaises nous ne sommes pas comme ça; si Madame la Baronne entend la musique cela l'amusera.' Accordingly the Ball was given, the pretty Misses danced, and happily the petite accouchée (for she is less than I am and very delicate) is not the worse for it.

The Bride was very pretty, very well dressed and danced away most indefatigably all the time we staid, which was not late as you may believe having no longer any taste for such pleasures. The Marié a very handsome militaire in the Imperial Guard understands fighting better than dancing and soon quitted the ranks while our young sous Préfet distinguished himself by his capers entrechats etc, to the great delight of the pretty Misses who preferred him greatly to the Hero. It is true he is rich et à marier. I hear he is what they call here fou de Mdlle de Gestas, with which I should be delighted as, with her wild, comical Father, and though good very sans esprit Mother, she



stands a bad chance of establishment especially as she is sans argent and not a great beauty. Mdlle Thiery was at the Théâtre français last Sunday very full and the people made the music play several patriotic airs such as la Victoire est à Nous and l'Hymne des Marseillais. . . .


Vauxbuin, Wednesday 19th July <sup>5</sup> 1815.

I am so sure my kind and dear friends will be glad to hear from me that I am no sconer certain the intercourse between our two Countries is restored than I take up my pen though my letter will not depart from Paris till Saturday, perhaps not so soon. . . .

You will be delighted to hear we have not as yet seen an enemy, no not in the shape of honest John Bull, whose good discipline is universally allowed, therefore I do not feel much afeard of him, but the horrid Prussians spread havoc and devastation wherever they pass, insomuch that my good countrymen beat them sometimes most handsomely. Our pretty quiet Valley is almost the only spot which can boast that 'trenching War has not channel'd her fields or bruised her flowerets with the armed hoofs of hostile paces'—the frequent passage of troops which we have been obliged to lodge has been ruinous indeed, but otherwise without the shadow of a complaint, for my part, I am quite sick of revolutions, and hope we shall now go on quietly; everything promises better than last year I think. However I can find cause to rejoice in the restoration of our good King,6 yet I own I am indignant at the fine Ladies who dance all day long at the Tuileries, when the country round Paris presents a scene of misery and desolation; the poor peasants ruined, obliged to leave their miserable cottages to take refuge in Paris, and there to sleep on the bare stones. situation of things was dreadful before the arrival of the allied Sovereigns, but the papers inform you of all that passes and, as Mrs. Slipslop says, 'comparisons are od'rous.' I make none.

Though I boast of our security yet it is with fear and trembling, Laon and Soissons being well fortified and the latter defended by the same young man who made last year such a stout resistance while we were at Paris; the allied troops having other roads open would not lose their time in besieging us, and as I hear the Commandant has submitted to the King and that the

Madame's political opinions would appear to have changed considerably since her letter of April 10.




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Three months had elapsed since Madame de Pougens' last letter. Meanwhile Napoleon had fought and lost Waterloo.

white flag is flying, I trust there is nothing to fear, still M. de Pougens is not easy, and will not hear of undoing the cachettes. We had soon after the Battle a sad alerte, (you must expect me to speak in military phrase I have lived so much with soldiers lately) Annette came breathless one day 'Madame il faut vite tout cacher, les ennemis sont à trois lieues de Laon, on attend des éclaireurs à chaque instant '-all hands therefore to hide, while I was occupied about the few valuables we possess. Mdlle. Annette packed up my clothes with so much care, I have hardly anything in the world, she passes her life in the wash tub and I must take to my bed soon in my own defence. . . . Our neighbour has been very uneasy about her husband who was terribly wounded, but as he is going on well I believe she is comforted to have him quietly here, or rather at Soissons, where he remains to be near his surgeon and for other reasons; he was shot through the groin I believe, however the ball rolled into his boot, he remained two hours after at the head of his Grenadiers, till two of them absolutely forced him from the field, as one of them repeated to our servants. He is in no danger they say but his recovery will be tedious. . . .

I am uneasy about my native Country still very dear to me, do you recollect a passage in Montesquieu in which he says that large standing Armies will be the ruin of Europe? I know not where to look for it now but I remember its striking me much when I read it . . . revenons à nos Moutons . . . our little Curé struts about like a Bantam cock, and poor Mdlle. Thiery will soon not have a nerve left, indeed M. de Pougens and I have had some fears for her head, there is a great deal of fanaticism in her character, the terrors of the revolution made

too I think a lasting impression on her mind.


Lorin laughs and talks, and tells you at the same time 'Oh c'est bien triste,' but now we begin to breathe a little. God grant this devoted Country peace and a free government after all the storms and tempests which have assailed it for so many years past. . . . Alas! Mr. Whitbread, his death, the manner of it affected me much, such a virtuous upright character, what a loss! I am doubly gratified by the handsome manner in which his merit and virtues have been deplored by all parties in the House of Commons as here people spoke of him sometimes with such contempt I felt ready to beat them. You will I know be glad to hear we are all pretty well, though I must own our healths have been a little shaken by constant terror and anxiety, for the allied Armies were hovering round us constantly, my sleep had nearly forsaken me so had M. de Pougens, but now we are regaining our lost ground. . . .



Vauxbuin, Wednesday July 26th, 1815.

No good comes of boasting, so last Sunday evening as I was reading my book very quietly in our pretty hermitage, I was interrupted by Louise out of breath, who entreated me to return to the house, there being 300 Russians or Prussians arrived in a village about 2 miles off. I found M. de Pougens much alarmed. Mdlle. Thiery wringing her hands, in a rage as well as a fright. M. Dansé set off as a scout, and returned giving us the comfort to know they were very quiet, only required food, and on the next evening there arrived here a party of 20 Prussians. clever active friend (who is only Mayor elect) in a moment collected at the different houses in the village the meat, bread, wine, brandy which they required, he established them in the large court of the Château, at present uninhabited, and the officer at our voisine la Baronne's in order to be near his men; she says said officer's conversation was a little persiftant sous des formes polies, but he was rather cruel, his poor man was half dead with a fever, and hardly able to crawl about, his Master beat him so unmercifully, he almost cut off his ear with a whip, much to the horror of our voisine's maids, and right glad were they when the whole party departed. The next day (yesterday) M. Dansé having heard there was a large party at Coeuvres, (a village famous as the family residence of la belle Gabrielle and where he has a Sister) rode over, and found all in great disorder owing to the neglect of the Mayor; he had been informed 6 hours before of their arrival and had made no preparations, so when 400 Russians arrived hungry as wolves, they found nothing, and set about beating the Mayor and all the inhabitants or as many as they could catch. Our good friend, who has an admirable, firm, bold, gay manner with them set them a little to rights. He says, he laughed heartily when he found some of them eating a raw ham, and greasing their boots with the fat . . . so here we are always in fear of their appearance though the Commandant of Soissons has sent them word not to approach the Town nearer than 2 leagues and we are but

Wednesday 2nd August. A whole week has passed and I fully intended sending off my letter by Saturday's post, but alas! our letters and newspapers for several days past have been stopped, the Courier arrives as usual and says the Allied Troops consider Soissons in a state of Siege, and detain alle letters directed thither. It is true parties of Russians are stationed in the villages round the Town, but as the Commandant visits and dines with our Commandant and goes to the Play at



Soissons, we hope all will end amicably; we have a post of about 40 on the Hill near our house, they are in general very quiet thanks to the activity and good sense of M. Dansé. The Mayor of the Village (who is as arrant a Vicar of Bray as ever lived in the days of good Queen Anne), resides at Soissons and leaves us entirely to the care of his deputy the Blacksmith qui perd la tête à chaque menace.

The other day they were impatient for the meat which did not arrive, a soldier said to M. Dansé 'Viande ou caput' (kill). M. Dansé took him by the arm gave him a good shake and he became quiet as a lamb; at the same time he is very attentive to please them especially the officer, helped them to make a sort of Hut for the officer, as they all slept à la belle étoile, and sent fruit; still we must be in care till all is settled with the Town. M. Dansé says they shock him much when they become clamorous for another commodity not possible to furnish them, he has therefore forbid all the women of the Village approaching the post. . . Ah my dear friend in spite of all the pomp and circumstance of War, I detest it more than ever, the poor paysans suffer much, the soldiers carry off not only any fire arms they may find, but even their spades and scythes.

Friday 4th. Having an opportunity of sending to Paris, I will despatch this tardy letter. . . .

Our Russians are very quiet, we feed them as well as we can, that is the village in their different shares. I will write again my dear friends, as soon as I can, for I am sure you will be anxious about us, however, I firmly believe all will end peaceably.

## Vauxbuin,

7th August 1815.

M. Dansé breakfasts with us almost every morning having a passion for tea, he would rival all the washerwomen in the district of London and its environs; he made us laugh heartily, the Russians perplex him so cruelly with certain requisitions, he says he must follow the example of a Mayor in a neighbouring village, who sent off a cart to Soissons for a cargo of Mdlles Cocos. . . . I really know not what we should do without this clever active voisin, our own Mayor living at Soissons and only coming here pour faire le fanfaron, saying 'Oh, j'arrangerai tout cela avec le commandant Russe, j'irai dîner chez lui, etc.' meantime we might be beat black and blue. Friday night at eleven o'clock arrived a heavy requisition of cows, fowls and butter. M. Dansé was up at 3 in the morning to provide all this, he came

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


to breakfast half dead with fatigue; then their men desert and they require us to run after them.


M. Dansé mounted his horse after breakfast and rode to the Russian headquarters to represent that our requisition was almost exhausted, but he found the Russian General in a very bad humour, he had been assured he should take possession of Soissons yesterday, but he had just received a parlementaire from our Commandant to say it must be delayed for two or three days. The truth of the matter is the Commandant is willing to obey the King's orders to surrender the Town, but the Garrison is refractory, and this morning we are a little uneasy. They require the Garrison to depart without their arms which they refuse absolutely, the Commandant slept on the Place with them last night saying 'tuez moi si vous le voulez.' How it will end I know not, but I think it hard to send them out as prisoners (they carried off their arms). Why the Town is at all surrendered to the allied troops I cannot guess, since it has long since submitted to His Majesty. Meantime I must tell you we are all anxious to have the English, honest John Bull, alias 'Jack pay all' (as my poor father used to say) pays for everything in good hard money.

Wednesday 9th. I have no thought of Paris at present, and should be wretched if M. de Pougens was obliged to go there on business. A few days ago the conductor de la diligence said he had seen with his eyes the cannon replaced on the bridges. Here we are in hopes all will end quietly, 'money makes the mare to go' according to the old proverb, so 30,000 frs. given by the Town to the soldiers has disposed them to march out to-day I believe, and the Russians march in to-morrow, but only provisoirement they say, and are to be soon succeeded by the English and Hanoverians, who are to guard our department for the ensuing year. I will not answer for the truth of all this, it was news brought by our old puffing, quaking President of Cosaque memory, who came to dine with us yesterday, and was by no means encouraging. The Master of the Poste (aux chevaux s'entend) assured us yesterday the letters would arrive to-day, but they are not come. M. Dansé is rejoiced he has got rid of his cavalry, who were a very heavy load; we have still the 40 men on the Hill. A poor old woman of the village, a certain Mère Dominique, whom we all love very much, is now a good nurse and has been an excellent cook, undertook the latter office for our libérateurs, they thump her, poor soul, so unmercifully she dares not approach them.

You ask my dearest friend, when I shall visit England. Alas! I dare never promise myself such a satisfaction, or I would again







Alas! my friend when may we hope for quiet Friday 11th. at least, it seems farther off than ever . . . . but no more. We are glad to have our post restored, and our 40 Russians are departed but they have quite ruined us, otherwise very inoffensive, however that is much owing to our good neighbour's admirable management. Lady Pembroke is very good, I delight to hear of her happiness, most certainly we were much obliged to her brother last year, the sauve garde he sent us saved us one day, while the officers staid, it was only after their departure we were so pillaged; we are assured we shall have no Prussians, they are terrible . . . . still we ought to be thankful, I do not believe there is a corner in France which has suffered so little as our Valley. At Cœuvres (a village near) in one house during the term of 3 weeks they drank 79 bottles of brandy! It is true our expense is heavy, but thank God without terror. . . . . Adieu, my excellent friend, M. de Pougens says you are a real treasure and you may be sure I join in feeling you such. . . .

Vauxbuin.

Friday, August 18th 1815.

I trust a letter set out for you dearest friend last Monday, not being yet quite sure of our post I dispatched it to Paris, it was my 3rd since the renewal of the intercourse. . . . . You are too good to love my letters, for party runs so very high just now, I am almost afraid of writing anything more than the old story 'if you are well I am well, etc', however my English independent spirit is not yet damped, and my pen is, so used to give you all I think, that I yield to the temptation and after all what can be more innocent? God knows all I wish for is peace and quiet. . . . .

We have lived lately really as Hermites, seeing nobody but our very near neighbours, Sunday last however arrived the Gestas in great spirits, their son being named Sous Préfet de Rheims, a very desirable station, honourable too on account of the Coronation. M. le Comte though turned of 60 is as great a rattle as our Sir R. Baker when he used to be called Bob Baker in our girlish days, all is sunshine and fair weather with him, Paris the seat of joy and tranquility. I asked if the cannon were still on the bridges, he denied stoutly, but was at last obliged


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
to own qu'il y en avait aux embouchures des ponts. Madame la Comtesse seemed much delighted with her restored title, she is a good soul, loves M. de Pougens dearly, though he scolds her most unmercifully sometimes, to all his reproofs she answers coolly 'Monsieur c'est égal' which is become quite a proverb with us, she is dévote, et n'a pas le sens commun. She told me very gravely Sunday, she could not bear the words patriote, or idées libérales; her husband set out next day for his college electoral.

On Monday I (being no longer like the parson tattered and torn in The house that Jack built) determined to make my first publick appearance at Soissons. Mdlle Thiery shuts herself up in her cell and will not suffer her eyes to dwell on the human face divine in the shape of a Russian, but little Clarice Dansé was delighted to go with me and see the world, our Jean (who has been during 3 months a National guard at Lisle and looks ten degrees fiercer) was my escorte, besides Mdlle Annette, who says 'Messrs. les Russes ont toujours été très polis, pour moi je ne les crains pas du tout.' To be sure I found the streets swarming with them, such a bad smell, which always belongs to them, a parfum à la Russe, they fill the houses with lice, and so like the Bible lice are in all their quarters! I made divers visits and finished with Mdme de Gestas. I found her however quite in despair; when the Russians arrived, she ordered the gates of her Hôtel to be thrown open, a magnificent drapeau was suspended over the door, and her servants ordered to receive all the Russians who should enter, and to give them everything they desired.

They desire to eat and drink all day and all night, she says she is half ruined already; she has three tables, one for the superior officers, another for the inferior and a third for the servants. They all invite their friends and as her cellar is well furnished with Champagne, they carouse finely, and when M. de Gestas returns he will rave and storm as finely. I found her at table with her daughter; soon after entered the cook (a reverend grey-headed old Gemman) I could not hear what he said but his gestures so expressive of despair, his folded arms, eyes uplifted amused me much, at last I heard 'Ils mangent jusqu'aux coquilles des écrevisses.' He told Annette he had not a moment either night or day and yet like his mistress was delighted with their arrival. Several other complaints I heard as they are all quartered chez les bourgeois till the barracks are After listening to all these doleances and fearing we should end by having our share I returned home; the walk was then delightful the landscape by moonlight sweetly pretty, want-

ing only a silver Thames.





Our Prussians departed early next morning having behaved tolerably, only beat a few of the poor paysans, but that (as they say) n'est rien, moins que rien. Our neighbour, though his wound is not quite well, left Soissons to avoid the Russians and arrived here, to be obliged to receive 2 Prussian officers at dinner,

judge his feelings.

Wednesday 23rd. The news from Soissons to-day is that the Russians are soon to depart, by whom succeeded we know not as yet. Mdme de Gestas may rejoice for the old cook told our John this morning they had drank 80 bottles of brandy at least in 9 days! I think they have preserved us however from the

Jan.

Prussians. 10,000 were announced as taking this road to Paris. but the Russian Commander swore ses grand dieux they should not enter Soissons, so they have taken another road. . . . .

> Vauxbuin, Friday August 25th 1815.


A letter was dispatched to Paris to-day for the Courier of to-morrow. I finished I believe very abruptly, M. de Pougens arriving to tell me the consternation and indignation excited in the whole department by the conduct of the Prussians, they besieged Laon as the Russians Soissons, and the Garrison, like ours, only surrendered after having received the royal mandate. The Commandant demanded of the Préfet the trifling sum of 1500,000 fr. he was answered it was impossible, the Commandant immediately sent 25 soldiers to the Préfet, the next day 50, so on to 100, what they call en garnisaire, I know not how it has ended. Compiègne has been treated worse than our Soissons last year, how happy we are to have the Russians, they too, however, exact 'trembling contributions' and at first demanded 600,000 fr. General Sacken arrived and struck off 300,000, but the rest is to be furnished in cloth, shoes for horses An order arrived this morning in our village and men, etc. to furnish 50 horse shoes, the Russians are departing they say, and we shall not have as we hoped honest John Bull, but my Lord Strutt, (as I think Swift calls the Austrians), they say too 50,000 of them are to remain in France, 50,000 Prussians and 50,000 Russians, this devoted Country will be quite ruined.

The Mayor of Soissons is famous for good wines and liqueurs. A Russian officer invited himself to breakfast with him, M. le Maire had to bow and to accept; of course, he expected two or three other guests, they arrived 15, much to the consternation of Mdme la Mairesse, as you may believe. The officer liked his breakfast so well he said he would return to dinner. Of course the Maire invited the rest of the Party—they arrived 40! poor Maire was obliged to send to all the restaurateurs in Soissons and faire main basse on all the volailles, pigeons, fricassees and ragouts. Friday night there was a riot at the playhouse, the Russian officers present, however, soon set things to rights, and have quite gained Mdlle Thiery's good graces, wonderful

Last night I visited my neighbours and found the poor little Baronne very triste, her husband's wound is by no means healed,

and he has decided on joining his regiment, she justly fears the journey. Her pretty sister (whose marriage to an officer in the

same corps I think I described to you in the Spring) is going



Alas! how I wish I could transport myself, my better half and our whole colony indeed, to quieter regions; all who reflect I think must be aware of our very dangerous and critical position, placed on the crater of a volcano which threatens every instant the most terrible explosions. You have no doubt seen a certain alarming paper not printed but in almost everybody's hands, and will not wonder at my fears, however, I endeavour to keep up my spirits and amuse myself and others, as well as I can, so does M. de Pougens, but he trembles every inch of him. Our neighbours set out as I told you, but went no farther than Paris, having heard there of the disbanding of the Army, he (M. Martenot) is returned but his wound so much worse I have not seen him. Soissons has still a Russian Garrison, the inhabitants being alarmed at the report of their leaving the town to the mercy of the Prussians (who are in the neighbourhood) applied to the Russian Commandant who assured them if the Garrison was obliged to depart before it was replaced by a fresh detachment he would leave them 200 men 'alors fermez vos portes et défendez vous, je vous autorise à le faire.'

This continual passage of troops is preparatory to the great review of the Russian Army in Champagne by the Emperor Alexander. 35 Russians had been long stationed at a great farm near us, they have behaved very well but the farmer, tired of the expense, said one day 'Eh bien! Messieurs, quand partirez vous?' Some who could baragouiner a little French answered 'Non partir, reste, reste, bonne France, paysans pas battus; méchante Russic paysans battus'—the Farmeress who repeated this, said our paysans give them good lessons. She overheard them saying to the Russians 'Nous autres nous travaillons pour nous, on dit que chez vous ce n'est pas comme ça, et qu'on vous bat, je voudrons bien voir celui qui me battrons, dame je le lui rendrons, bien' etc., in their patois. The said Russians do not speak very well of their Master, and make comparisons which recommend them well to Mdlle Thiery, the Prussians the same.

Oh! I forgot to tell you an escape we had the other day, we had 60 Prussians to lodge on their way to Paris. We had 4 soldiers here, bons enfants au possible, Westphalians, and speak-

ing French. M. de Pougens though he refuses them brandy yet is so good he gains all their hearts, they call him bon Papa; enfin, we were reconciled to our Prussians. The next morning very early the detachment required carts and horses which the farmer and an alchouseman were stupid enough to refuse. They broke into the houses of both, pillaged them completely, and said they had a right to pillage the whole village, the bon Papa I think would not have escaped, but our Mayor arrived, ordered the carts and horses, sent the alchouseman to prison and they departed, but not till they had caused M. Dansé and M. de Pougens many uneasy moments. I knew nothing of the matter till afterwards.

I went the other day to dine with Mdme de Gestas, and visited our poor old President who has had a paralytic stroke which has deprived him of the use of his left side, but has not affected his speech. These lively people can neither live without society or die without it. I found him in bed in the Salon, a large circle of women knitting, netting and talking one faster than the other, a knot of men in the middle, the Physician (not our philosophe he being too impie) of the party, all gesticulating most furiously and discoursing of Russians, Prussians, etc.-such a sick room you hardly ever beheld. A lady next me amused me with her adventure with a Prussian officer who she was ordered to receive at dinner, he arrived followed by a Jockey neatly dressed. To her great surprise the officer made signs to said Jockey to place himself at the table, she could not help saying 'Monsieur est ce votre usage de manger avec vos domestiques?' 'Oui, Madame.' She then began examining the Jockey and when she perceived very pretty delicate white hands and a pretty face she was very near laughing at the discovery she made.

I found Mdme de Gestas glad to be delivered of her troop of hungry Russians, she now owns when they first arrived they held up the sabre over M. de Gestas, and when her maid refused them brandy one day, they threw her on the table in the eating room and beat her so violently she has not yet recovered; it looks ill and Mdme de Gestas is afraid of some inward bruise; and yet we prefer them to the Prussians. The latter at Compiègne, when they first arrived, entered the house of the receiver of the department, demanded the caisse of his wife, who assured them her husband had paid all the money the day before, they trampled on her, stabbed her, and threw her out of the window. Alas! poor humanity.

Vauxbuin, September 22nd 1815.

At present we are tolerably quiet, the Russians however departing much to our regret, for we have always the fear of the

terrible Prussians before our eyes: the former have conducted themselves very well in Champagne at the great review, having only exhausted the Country which was obliged to feed them, but the Bavarians have pillaged they say in a most terrible manner. M. Dansé is gone to Soissons to assist at the assessment of the War tax, the sum of 100 millions is required of the Nation, our department is to furnish 750,000 frs., meantime nothing is paid.

I am much concerned for our neighbour, he loses 14,000 fr. a year, his retraite will produce only 2000 fr. and they have little besides; his wound continues, an abscess is formed, his poor little wife is the picture of woe, obliged to part with almost all her servants, two little children one of 5 months very ill with the whooping cough; when I consider this and so many more distresses one hears daily. I dare not complain. I cannot boast of much philosophy, but I scrape up all I can against the storm which alas! I fear hangs over our heads, and endeavour to divert my thoughts as much as possible from always presenting horrible pictures of what may happen. It is now Sunday 24th and the Journal has not raised our spirits, already a good deal depressed yesterday when our neighbour Dansé returned from Soissons and told us that the Town was in great alarm, the Prussians font le diable all round; the Mayor of a Village 2 miles from Soissons was obliged to make his escape disguised in a waggoner's frock. and took refuge in Soissons. They seize the public money, stop the couriers and diligences, enfin I know not if it is very safe to write this though as yet they have not appeared on our side of the Town. When the Préfets and Mayors remonstrate they answer 'Nous sommes d'accord avec le Roi.' A Russian General is still at Soissons, but I believe more for les beaux yeux d'une Mdlle Coco en masque, than to guard the Town.

The inhabitants implore a Russian garrison, which they say he promises, but I doubt, as all the Russians near us have decamped, those I mentioned in my last, at a great farm near us. cried most bitterly when they departed, their Master, we hear, listens much to Bergassa (a philosophe of the school of Turgot), I know not if he is a convert. Mdlle Thiery has relapsed into all her horrors and terrors, and we begin to think of playing hide and seek, c'est-à-dire our clothes, for we have nothing for it but to remain here, I would not go to Paris for the world. M. de Pougens received a letter yesterday from an acquaintance of his who lives I believe between Paris and Meaux, I wish I could send you it, his house pillaged from top to bottom (and that very lately), his library spoilt, himself obliged to take refuge in the woods to avoid being assommé; happily an English officer arrived who preserved the garden, and yet he is a very good Royalist, but that is no defence.



M. Dansé could not take his tea with us this morning, being gone to Soissons about the War tax; how I grudge the money, we had begun a purse destined to a much happier purpose but God knows all these expenses have exhausted it quite. Indeed, my dear friends, you are too good to love my letters they are as tiresome as les lamentations de Jérémie, I can give you no other news than what relates to our little circle so that my letters remind me of 'memoirs of P. P. Clerk of this Parish.' You have better intelligence on your side the water than we can have in our secluded Valley, and a Prussian officer said to me 'Madame, ne croyez pas un mot de ce que vous disent vos journaux.'

Monday 25th. Our good neighbour breakfasted with us and set out again for Soissons about this eternal tax, he dined yesterday at the Sous Préfet's and worked from 9 in the morning till 10 at night, he says the Mayor proposed the Bishop should be exempt from the tax, our friend answered warmly 'quoi Monsieur vous faites payer de pauvres pères de famille qui meurent de faim et vous voulez qu'un homme riche et sans enfans soit exempt'—it was decided Monsieur should pay; he disappeared some time ago, nobody knew what was become of him, it turns out he took his flight to England and is returned here all over fine muslin and lace rochets given him by some of your Benedictines.

They say we are to have a French garrison, and that the Prussians have received orders not to pass the River Aisne, but to remain in their present cantonments, I think that very likely, otherwise we should have received their visit by this time, therefore we begin to take courage. . . I must tell you how M. Dansé has laughed about our Michaelmas Goose, which M. de Pougens makes a point of obtaining, but I fancy the Russians have devoured them all, the race seems quite extinct. M. Dansé says he likes our Saints much better than theirs as they seem to be feasting Saints. But my paper really puts a stop to my bavardage. . . .

Vauxbuin, Thursday September 28th 1815.

Since we have heard of the burning of six poor heretics by the Inquisition M. de Pougens says I should date 815. Alas! my dear friend, these are sad times, still as we read Mr. Gibbon, and a certain Histoire des Croisades by Michaud, I am inclined to believe in Mdme. de Stael's perfectionnement and that as Goethe says it advances at least en ligne spirale. A letter for you set out yesterday and here I am already in continuation, I hope it will find you still by the seaside for I never remember more



glorious weather. I am in the garden all day long and yesterday evening as I was, like one of Mrs. Radcliffe's heroines, admiring from the hermitage the tints of the evening fading on the opposite wood, I espied Mdlle Thiery looking for me.

I feared something extraordinary had happened but as she drew near I perceived she did not wear her 'vinegar aspect,' I was reassured, on the contrary she laughed as she said 'Madame voilà de vos compatriotes qui nous arrivent.' I felt quite glad and hastened to meet a band of mighty heroes as I thought, but instead of that I found a troop of poor helpless women and crying children, who could not speak one word of French, escorted by an inferior officer, who when Lorin spoke to him in English (with a very French accent observe) my countryman gravely assured him he did not understand French; he fell to our share to lodge, the women are dispersed about. Mdme Dansé sent to beg I would come and interpret, Clarice Dansé understands a little English, I give her lessons, she translates Telemachus very prettily, but there was little relation between Calypso and Eucharis and my poor countrywomen, or between their wants and Nectar and Ambrosia.

I wish you could have seen their joy when I arrived and proposed some tea to them. I thought they would have embraced me, though one was much occupied giving suck to a little child of 7 weeks old who looked as many months; there were in the whole party 6 women, 4 who had infants of the same age, all ill poor things with the jolting of the waggon. They came from Antwerp and, as one told me after much recollection, were going to St. Dennis; the others were in different houses, I took Lorin for my escort as it was late, and visited them all, but the children cried so bitterly that I could hardly comfort the poor mothers, especially as they were to set out to-day at 5 in the morning. We sent them sugar, etc., and this morning before I was up they came to thank me. The officer supt with us, a decent man very timid though an Irishman (who have a different reputation), he had served 5 years in Spain and said they are going into winter quarters and are to stay 4 years in them, he is perhaps mistaken but certainly they would not have permitted these soldiers' wives to come from Antwerp if they were not to remain some time. They hope to reach St. Dennis to-morrow. I am glad they have fine weather poor souls. They were very decent looking and tidy, the waggoner belongs to Antwerp and was put in requisition to convey them to Paris. The officer was on horseback, his servant could speak a little French. I found as I passed our whole village swarming out to see the peaceable strangers.



Happily as yet we hear nothing of any other strangers, at least on our side of the river. A small village opposite, near Soissons, consisting only of cottages, and a farm or two was visited by Prussians, and a requisition demanded of 900 frs. besieging La Fère in good earnest, it is full of military stores and has long hoisted the White Flag. They make all the paysans work at their travaux de siège, and even others. A nephew of M. Dansé just arrived here, says he was put in

requisition much against his will. . . .

Tuesday, 3rd October. And here we are, my good friends, all of a tremble (as the maids say), the Mayor of Soissons has received orders to prepare for the passage of 20,000 Prussians, 10,000 arrive Friday, and the rest Sunday, 200 are allotted to Vauxbuin, that is 400 in all. Our Mayor and M. Dansé are busy making preparations, meat, bread, wine, etc., they have chosen too a most unlucky moment for their passage—the vintage; here the poor paysans (who have most of them a few vines, the produce of which they sell to the cabarets which helps to pay their rent), sensible they should not have a grape left, have hastened the vintage, so to-day all hands have been employed in the finest October sunshine I ever remember. I have passed the whole day in the vineyard, which rises rapidly on the hillside behind the garden, and this evening I again played romance and delighted myself with the prettiest landscape possible, the village and the old Chateau at my feet 'embosom'd in tufted trees,' enfin I enjoyed it in spite of the Prussians, who will I fear sadly disturb at least the repose I was so much admiring, however we must hope the officers will keep them in tolerable order.

M. Martenot who knows well what stuff soldiers are made of, M. Dansé too, and the Mayor were against gathering the grapes, they say very justly if the soldiers find it made into wine, though so new, they will drink it, and what mischief may not proceed from intoxication. However in the council summoned on the occasion Messrs. les paysans had a vast majority and when the vineyard is not enclosed you must vendanger with the rest. As this Army is to pass through Champagne where the vintage is of much more consequence, I think it strange they did not delay the passage a week or ten days. A brother of Mdme Dansé's has been here for a day or two, he rents a very large farm about 8 leagues from Paris, and has lost 18 cows besides considerable quantities of corn and hay in requisition. Tell the dear traveller the 4 bronze horses on the Arc de Triomphe at the Tuileries have been taken down, and many fine chefs d'œuvre from the Gallery as I hear, but they have not been specified to me.



I will not dispatch my letter till after our rough visitors have left us.

Monday, 9th. I am more than ever confirmed in my rosecoloured system, and endeavouring all I can to convert poor Mdlle Thiery from her dismal tints, for our Prussians are come and gone and except expense we are no sufferers. It was indeed l'élite de l'armée, la garde rouale. A voung officer arrived Wednesday evening with whom we all fell in love, especially Mdlle Thiery, though he grieved us much by saving the Apollo and the Venus were on their way to England, but as another officer on Friday assured us he had seen them the day before his departure I hope our young Baron d'Ilzenplitz was mistaken. He told me we were very happy not to be at Paris and that he was very glad to have left it. I cannot tell you the emotion he gave me when he said he was born in England at Kew, do you remember them? He left Kew at 3 months old and is now 22, had he told me the same thing at Richmond Green I should have felt just nothing at all, but here it sets so many recollections afloat.

The next day we had two officers, five soldiers and 10 horses all very disagreeable (I beg pardon of the horses) the officers wore a kind of cold ironical civility and the soldiers threatened poor Louison to throw her on the fire. Mdlle. Annette who has a very good opinion of her eloquence began to preach to them 'qu'ils étaient dans une maison respectable,' etc., her sermon was cut short by 'Mdlle vous méchante, vous aussi sur le feu.' They happily departed next morning, dear good M. de Pougens got up at 5 o'clock and went downstairs for fear they should beat our poor Louison. M. Martenot received them in his uniform, the Colonel lodging there (as their house is very large, more château-like than ours) the soldiers set about pillaging the garden. M. Martenot went to the Colonel and said in a very firm tone 'M. le Colonel, je désire que vos soldats ayent tout ce qu'il leur faut mais je ne veux pas qu'ils pillent mon jardin, s'ils continuent de la faire, c'est à vous Monsieur que je témoignerai mon mécontentement,' upon which M. le Colonel turned his men out of the garden and shewed M. Martenot all manner of égarde, his conversation would surprise

On Friday we were in some care about those who were to arrive, we had a Colonel, 7 men and 14 horses, the latter caused a great revolution in the basse cour, cow, baudets, rabbits, all obliged to déménager. The officer was a most agreeable young man of very polished manners loving the arts, and having well employed the time he passed at Paris. The commanding officer

(a natural son of the late King of Prussia's, Comte de Brandebourg) was at M. Martenot's. The music of the regiment played after dinner in the garden, I went there and was much pleased with his manners. He expressed the highest consideration for French valour. Our soldiers too were admirable, they refused the brandy offered them saying 'nous prenez vous pour des Russes, pour des Cosaques?' They staid with us all Saturday and a part of yesterday morning, and our officer seemed as well satisfied with us as we were with him, invited us to Berlin, etc. So far so good, by their account I think we are not likely to have any more in our village, one of the officers asked our friend Dansé if their arrière garde était en sûreté? Though so numerous they are not without fear you see.

Vauxbuin, Friday 27th October 1815.

I long to hear the effect sea air and sea bathing have had on your health so precious to the dear family circle in which though absent I love still to include myself. How I envy M. de Thiery, he sets out I believe very soon for dear old England, he will see you, converse with you without restraint which I would fain do but alas! mum is the word more than ever and my letters will be dull as if dipt in the mud of the Dunciad.

We have been sadly tormented lately by our good friends the Prussians. I was in hopes the sad accident which has destroyed so many houses in Soissons, and injured so many others, would have preserved us from such continual passages. Our poor village however had 200 the other day, volunteers I think; such a set, reminding one of Swift's Yahoos. M. de Pougens says and I believe he is very right that it is good policy to dine with them, it gratifies them and keeps them in order at the same time. We had 4, a surgeon and 3 sous officiers, all so dirty and smelling so ill I really could not eat my dinner. One was half drunk beforehand and I thought would have broken my glass continually, by trinqué'ing what the vulgars call Hob Nob, however he was good humoured in his cups for he told us continually 'vous êtes de braves gens, si nous trouvions toujours de ces braves gens là, nous serions plus contents.'

We dined late in order to avoid supper, they required tea and brandy, which latter we gave reluctantly. Mdlle Thiery told me qu'elle avait baptisé l'eau de vie, 'Comment donc baptisé'—'C'est que j'ai mis de l'eau.' 'Ah mon Dieu, ils le decouvriront et ils viendront nous battre.' I was in a fine fright but it passed off very well, the drunken one required John to show him his room, poor John had been obliged to give him his, and as I am sure said John would rather see the D—— en propre personne than these Gemmin, he contented himself with opening the door and was I believe delighted to hear the Yahoo knocking himself against all the tables and chairs, without ever finding the bed, till one of his comrades came to his assistance. I often preach to our John to conceal a little his aversion, he answered me one day 'Eh, Madame, que voulez vous? Ils viennent de ménacer ma pauvre Grand'mere avec leurs sabres, elle en est presque morte de peur.'

The next morning M. de Pougens got up at 4 o'clock to be present at their departure in order to protect the servants, they carried off all the eatables they could find, wine, etc., and alarmed the village terribly, for certain carts they had sent for from another village, a mile off, not arriving they tied the poor deputy Mayor to a tree and were preparing to lash him most severely, threatening to pillage the village, when luckily the carts arrived,

and they departed.

Our military neighbour told us he had a braillard chez lui. ' Mais je ne me suis pas laissé méner par lui, il m'a demandé de la viande, etc., pour emporter, je lui ai repondu fort sèchement, Monsieur vous trouverez tout ce qu'il vous faut à Braisne.' The same corps were very méchant at Soissons, and boasted at Laon they had been so, our friend Mdme Marechal wrote to enquire after us in consequence. She says they are quite ruined at Laon, and had the Prussians remained there longer most of the inhabitants would have left the town, but why or wherefore we cannot tell. The troops are certainly in great haste to depart, marches forcées, horses in requisition, enfin all the marks of anxious precipitation. They say here but I cannot believe it, that the Russians are pillaging the Prussian dominions as they pass, all I am very sure of is that there is a mortal antipathy between the two nations. Our poor Mdlle Thiery is worn to a thread. Lorin calls her Mdme Heraclite and me Mdme Democrite, but indeed I should be ashamed to laugh at the real miseries I hear of.

A soldier travelling to his friends en Bretagne was lodged here the other night, and one of his comrades at M. Dansé's. They both came from Givet, and said the villages they passed through in that neighbourhood were many entirely deserted, the corn left standing on the ground. We were in continual dread of having more to receive, I feel it doubly because it affects poor M. de Pougens so severely, and we were in hopes our old half

demolished Soissons would have been spared these continual passages, since the explosion of the *Poudrière*, . . . mais non . . . il faut se résigner.

Wednesday, 1st November. And here I am writing to you, dearest friend, in the midst of 200 Prussians. Your long wished for and most welcome letter arrived Monday to counterbalance the discomfort which the news of their visit had occasioned me. We were the more alarmed since we heard it was the Landwehr of sad reputation, and that Mdme de Barin, the wife of the new Proprietor du Château expected by her husband on Saturday, had written to say she had just put off her journey, as the Prussians passing through Paris had beat the Parisians on the boulevards with their sabres, and she did not care to travel the same road at the same time. However we have now 7 or 8 soldiers, very young men, smoking and playing at cards in our kitchen, who seem really very inoffensive, they do not understand a word of French so M. de Pougens, who being intended for the diplomatic line was taught German when very young, is every moment put in requisition as interpreter.

We expect an officer but he is not yet arrived. They began rather ill yesterday (the avant garde) they would play at billiards at M. Martenot's, and as they were very dirty he refused, on which one, a young man, went to M. Danse's in a great passion and said 'Je n'aime pas ce Colonel mais j'ai mon sabre', putting his hand fiercely on the hilt, our friend took him gently by the arm 'Tenez Monsieur,' said he smiling, 'vous et votre sabre sont bien jeunes, vous vous calmerez et vous serez content de ce brave Militaire,' and happily he followed our friend's advice. This morning our brave Colonel came in his regimentals (which he always puts on when he receives such guests) and frightened me when he said 'Avec mon bâton en une main et mon pistolet dans l'autre je mènerai vingt de ces gaillards là sur la Montagne.' I could say with Falstaff 'I don't like this gunpowder Percy.' Our Mayor expostulated with him saying Monsieur, vous êtes trop vif avec ces gens là-pour moi s'ils voulaient me battre je leur tendrai le dos.' 'Ma foi, Monsieur, comme vous voudrez' answered our Colonel.

Thursday morning. I am going to Soissons to dine with the Gestas the first time I have visited our poor old Town since the explosion which we felt here severely as we are only two miles from it. Some windows in a farm at the entrance of the village were broken. All our soldiers departed at 4 o'clock, M. de Pougens got up as usual to preside at their departure, they had coffee and carried off some eatables and some wine, but were very quiet, and did not ask for la petite goutte as our soldiers

call a glass of brandy. Yesterday evening they amused themselves with singing hymns, John lent them his fiddle, they played and danced in the eating room but were content with beer, they would drink M. de Pougens' health. The Captain's man (his Master never arrived) could speak a little French. He taught them all to say vive Charles Pougens, till the house rang again. M. Dansé (who is delighted with the honourable mention you make of him) was well satisfied with his soldiers, and after they had drank a little I think Mdlle Thiery had she been there would have embraced them all round! Our good Colonel had an officer with whom he likewise agreed perfectly, enfin all passed off well, they say we have always the élite as there are so many maisons bourgeoises in our village. M. de Pougens would not consent to my going to Soissons to-day till he had enquired of the Mayor of Soissons if any Prussians were expected, he says he has received no orders and I write in expectation of the cabriolet every minute. . . .

Poor Soissons was in great terror the other day, a Frenchman who served as an Interpreter was struck by the Prussian commanding officer upon which he collared the officer and returned the compliment, darting off immediately fearing the consequences. The officer threatened le pillage, le sac de la ville if he was not delivered up. The Mayor and the Préfet were frightened to death and did all they could to find the man but in vain, but I believe have promised to send him after, enfin it is made up they say, but at first it spread a great and general alarm.

Thursday evening. Just returned from Soissons the entrance is melancholy but at the Gestas' we drank all manner of loyal healths in busk Champagne, I said I would drink all but le grand Inquisiteur. . . . Adieu my dear and kind friends, I do not wish for an iron pen like Job but I wish for one of another description, being like you bursting now and then.

Ever, ever yours, F. J. DE POUGENS.

This letter concludes Madame de Pougens' correspondence for 1815. Though the Army of Occupation remained in France for some three years, she was not called upon again to experience the horrors and discomforts of war. But, in 1820, we find her writing from Vauxbuin 'The times are sadly out of joint, and in this country there are at present so many arrestations that I fear "something is rotten in the State of Denmark." As for my native country, it alas! presents a melancholy picture and affects

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me more than I can say.' Madame de Pougens lived to the great age of ninety-three. She died in France, and her remains were conveyed to England, where she was buried in the family vault at Godstone in Kent, by the side of her mother, who was a daughter of Mr. Evelyn of Welbridge, a direct descendant of the well-known Diarist of Wotton.

FLORENCE KINLOCH-COOKE.


## UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE WAR

Not the least of the economic evils of war is its injurious effect on industry. Exports are restricted, manufactures reduced, and the labour market is upset, and these troubled conditions must more or less continue in many, if not in most, branches of industry, until the apparently distant day of peace arrives. An immediate and in some respects the most regrettable phase of this economic disturbance is its effect upon employment. When the present War broke out one of the consequences most promptly prognosticated was a calamitous interference with the wage-earning power of the nation. The pessimists certainly did their best to justify their forebodings. In the first wave of depression merchants, manufacturers, and shopkeepers innumerable adopted the drastic policy of either cutting down wages or putting their employees on short time. One satisfactory result of these scared precautionary measures has undoubtedly been to limit the area of total unemployment, but it is an obvious corollary that the official unemployment figures issued by the Board of Trade do not fully represent the sacrifices which the working-classes, shopmen, warehousemen, clerks, and others have been forced to make through the actual or anticipated depression in trade. Having regard to this qualification, it is, nevertheless, a pleasant duty to admit that the volume of unemployment amongst the workingclasses is neither so big nor so difficult to cope with as might have been expected at the beginning of such a colossal struggle. This fortunate conclusion has been made possible partly by the comparative immunity of our overseas trade and partly by the demand for labour in connexion with military and naval contracts. Many trades have suffered and some staple industries have been very hard hit, but the general effect on national employment has not been either so widespread or so severe as In fact, the conditions have been was at first apprehended. steadily improving month by month, and each official return of general results has been better than the one immediately preceding it.

It is well, at the outset, to bear in mind that trade was already experiencing a serious reaction before any war-cloud had

appeared upon the horizon. In nearly every department a set-back had occurred and work was increasingly scarce. Employment in last July as compared with July in 1913 showed a material falling-off in coal mining, iron mining, the pig-iron industry, iron and steel works, engineering trades, shipbuilding, the cotton, woollen and worsted trades, the jute and linen trades, the hosiery and lace trades (except in the plain net branch), bleaching, printing, dyeing, and finishing, the carpet trade, and the leather and pottery trades. Employment was exceptionally better in the tinplate and steel-sheet trades, the silk trade, the boot and shoe trade, and the brick and cement trades; and the demand for agricultural labour over a considerable area of the country was greater than the supply. Most of the other trades did not show any marked difference compared with a year ago.

It is desirable to throw a little more light, by way of statistics, upon these contrasts. Taking coal mining, for instance, the average number of days worked per week by collieries affecting 710,453 men, during the fortnight ended the 25th of July 1914, was 5.06, as compared with 5.26 a year before. In iron mines and open works, affecting 16,251 men, the weekly average number of working days (for the same fortnight) was 5.53, as compared with 5.65 a year ago. At the end of July 255 pig-iron furnaces were in blast, against 319 in July 1913, and the exports of pig iron (British and Irish) amounted to 74,617 tons against 96,135 tons. The aggregate number of shifts worked in the iron and steel trades for the week ended the 25th of July was 542,598, a decrease of 33,797 (or 5.9 per cent.) on a year ago. In the engineering trades, Trade Unions, with a membership of 233,985, reported 3.4 per cent. of unemployed at the end of July, as compared with 1.9 per cent. in July 1913; but a better view is obtained from the figures with regard to 817,931 workpeople in the same trades insured against unemployment under the National Insurance Act, the percentage of unemployed amongst whom was 3.2, as compared with 2.3. The number of people in the shipbuilding trades insured against unemployment who were unemployed at the end of last July was 4.7 per cent., as compared with 3.4 at the end of July 1913. The cotton trade was to some extent affected by poor trade conditions, and by an agreement made by the Federation of Master Spinners spinning American cotton to curtail production between the 7th of July and the end of September. Returns from cotton-spinning firms employing 110,093 workpeople in the week ended the 25th of July showed a decrease of 1.4 per cent. in the number employed and of 6.7 per cent. in the amount of wages paid. In the woollen and worsted trades, compared with a year ago, there was a decrease of 5.2 per cent. in the number employed and of 7.4 per cent. in



Further light is thrown upon the subject by the statistics of the Board of Trade Labour Exchanges, but the figures already given clearly establish the fact that, generally speaking, trade was in a much less active and prosperous condition just before War was declared than it was at the corresponding period of 1913. Except in the case of trades that were specially benefited by it, the War naturally made things a great deal worse. To put the matter in a nutshell, the general result was to increase the percentage of unemployed in Trade Unions making returns from 2.8 at the end of July to 7.1 at the end of August. But this figure, high though it was, has been frequently exceeded in periods of bad trade, and was much lower than that recorded during the coal strike of 1912, when it rose to 11.3 per cent. It has, however, to be borne in mind that through the adoption of reduced time by many employers the discharge of a portion of their workpeople was avoided. The Trade Unions' statistics, moreover, do not cover the whole of the ground. The Board of Trade's monthly returns contain four different tables headed respectively:

1. 'Trade Union Percentages of Unemployed.'

2. 'Unemployment in 'Insured' Trades.'

3. 'Employers' Returns: Mining and Metal Trades.' And

4. 'Employers' Returns: Textile and other Trades.'

There is, of course, a certain amount of overlapping in these four sets of figures. This is unavoidable owing to the variety of sources of information used in order to get a complete and unbiassed view of the whole industrial situation. The Department publishes all the available figures, but in estimating the position of a particular trade it has regard to the representative character of the several data. Thus, while in table (1) it gives for certain textile trades the Trade Union percentages of persons wholly unemployed, it relies mainly on the figures in table (4), which also cover short time, and are the real index to the state of employment in these trades. Similarly, with coal mining the figures in table (3) are better than those in table (1), as miners are very seldom discharged. These illustrations show that while twenty years ago the Department was largely dependent on Trade Union returns, it has gradually remedied the defects in this source of information by getting returns direct from the employers. A recent notable addition to the Department's information are the records in connexion with unemployment insurance. Here the figures are quite complete for the trades insured, and include all branches of these trades and non-Unionists as well as Unionists. So far as these trades go, the results are. therefore, more comprehensive than anything the Trade Unions can give. They covered a total of 2,341,508 workpeople against the 987,692 in Union membership. At the end of August 145,194 (or 6.2 per cent.) of these were unemployed, whereas a year before the percentage was only 3.1. The great majority of these workpeople are connected with building and construction. engineering and iron founding, shipbuilding and construction of vehicles. Employers' returns in the mining and metal trades and the textile trades deal with the short-time aspect of the case. The 682,587 workpeople engaged in coal mining worked 0.99 fewer days per week than in August 1913; there were 67 fewer furnaces in blast, 170 fewer timplate and steel-sheet mills working, and 11.3 per cent. fewer shifts worked in the iron and steel trades. In the textile and other trades, representing 352,840 workpeople, the returns for the week ended the 22nd of August showed a decrease of 15.5 per cent. in the number employed, and of 30.5 per cent. in the wages paid, as compared with a year before.

During September, October, and November there was an encouraging recovery, illustrations of which will be found in the

table of comparisons on the opposite page.

Although the cotton trade has relatively suffered more than any other and the War has intensified its depression, a heavy decline due to purely trade causes had set in before. centage of unemployment, which was 3.9 for July, jumped up to 17.7 for August; since then it has dropped to 14.5; 9.2, and 6.3 per cent. for September, October, and November respectively. The November returns show a great reduction in the short time reported, especially in the spinning branch. Tinplate works and the textile and furnishing trades were badly hit, but even these have improved since the end of August. For September, 46 more tinplate and steel-sheet mills were in work owing to the cessation of Continental imports, and by November 43 more were employed. In the textile trades there was an increase for September of 9.4 per cent. in the number employed, and of 16.8 per cent. in the wages paid, compared with August. October was better than September, and November was better than October. Comparatively little harm was done to the shipbuilding trade if the percentages can be taken as a criterion. It would seem, though, that increased activity in the naval yards accounts for much of the steadiness of the position, and this may



Trade Unionists Unemployed.

1		
Percentage	8 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	o # m r- m m m r-
Number of Unemployed, Nov. 1914	1503 2184 606 4087 1968 525 5398 446 3692 2280 818 94 171 147	26,771 50,013 17,717 6843 6366 264 755 81,958
Percentage	844966666664646666666666666666666666666	4 5000000 4 4 5000000 50 50 50
Number of Unemployed, Oct. 1914	2425 3585 3585 1050 7305 4373 724 7391 512 3640 4170 2959 962 127 127 15 79	51,897 27,120 10,692 8189 310 1104
Percentage	0 - 1 - 4 - 10 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 6 - 8 - 12 - 8 - 13 - 13 - 13 - 13 - 13 - 13 - 13	
Number of Unemployed, Sept. 1914	4712 3111 962 11,256 4145 1497 12,957 530 5051 4€47 4433 1691 194 169 109	7.1 55,778  * Insured * Trades 6.2 61,118 6.6 40,954 12,093 7.5 11,847 431 1589 3.2 1589
Percentage	4.7.1 6.3 7.7.1 6.3 7.7.1 6.3 7.7.1 6.3 6.3 1.7.4 7.7.1 6.3 8.3 8.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2	7.1 in 'Insur 6.2 6.6 4.9 7.5 4.1 3.2 6.2
Number of Unemployed, Aug. 1914	6182 2170 2839 16,079 4690 3130 15,640 626 3784 4974 5521 3525 268 11 11 198 319	69,956  Unemployed 59,837 53,878 13,132 15,782 498 2067
Percentage	3.0.0.0.0.4.0.0.0.0.4.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.	8. 8. 8. 4. 8. 8. 1. 6. 1. 1. 6. 1. 1. 6. 1. 1. 6. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.
Number of Unemployed, July 1914	2291 792 2078 7908 4896 519 3455 370 1205 1205 1127 221 6 55	28,013 36,599 26,549 12,491 6376 381 1016
Unions	Building	Building and construction Engineering and ironfounding . Shipbuilding Saw-milling Other trades

point to a corresponding sluggishness in shipbuilding for mercantile purposes. Most of the Continent being a closed book so far as exports and imports are concerned, there has been a serious interference with those trades which are dependent upon raw materials from enemy countries, and with others through the cessation of exported manufactures. In the table given above, the column for August affords a fair indication both of the range and the volume of the first shock. It was severe. but it was not any worse than might have been expected: indeed, all things considered, it was not as bad. But even on the most favourable view, it was of sufficiently grave import. A sudden increase of 4.3 per cent. in unemployment in the Trade Union returns alone, at a time, too, when most articles of food were appreciably higher in price, was an ugly enough reminder of the indirect damage caused by war. Fortunately, as will be seen from the other columns, the first shock was the worst. The September returns showed a distinct recovery. Both the short-time figures and those of the workpeople entirely unemployed were smaller. The Trade Union percentage of unemployment, which was 7.1 for August, fell to 5.6, and the percentage in the 'insured' trades, which was 6.2 in August, For October there was a further improvement, though the lower percentages were still considerably higher than the figures for the corresponding month of 1913, except in a few cases of trades which directly benefited from the War. The Trade Unions' percentage of unemployment fell to 4.4 for October, and to 2.9 for November, the latter figure comparing with 2.0 per cent. for November 1913. The percentage in the compulsorily insured trades, which was 5.4 for September, dropped to 4.2 for October and to 3.7 for November which is actually 0.4 per cent. lower than it was for the corresponding month in the previous year. Comparing November with the bad month of August, we find that 272 pig-iron furnaces were in blast, against 255; 442 tinplate works were in operation, against 353; and in the iron and steel trades 543.842 shifts were worked, against 511,875. In the textile, boot, pottery, glass, and other miscellaneous trades 396,519l. was paid in wages for the last week in November, as compared with 276,253l, for the last week in August.

The materials for measuring the effect of the War on trades that are unconnected with insurance schemes are necessarily less trustworthy, but the returns of the Labour Exchanges will be found helpful. If we take the figures for the 11th of September, nearly six weeks after the War began, we find that the total

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The official figures of Trade Union unemployment in Germany for October are 10.9 per cent. They were 22.4 for August.

number of workpeople remaining on the registers was 207,429, as compared with 110,853 on the 12th of June. The number of registrations of unemployed in uninsured trades rose for the four weeks ended the 11th of September from a daily average of 6334 to 7622, and the number of uninsured remaining on the register was 89,383, against 47,345 on the 17th of July. It may be as well to put the figures in tabular form.

	June 12	July 17	Aug. 14	Sept. 11	Oct. 16	Nov. 13
Total number of registrations during month						
ending .	200,363	270,269	309,887	385,145	378,268	272,494
Daily average of registrations .	8711	9009	13,473	16,048	12,609	11,354
Total remaining on registers at .	110,853	112,622	194,580	207,429	157,248	133,215
Uninsured regis- trations for month.	95,566	139,396	145,686	182,927	193,927	144,992
Daily average of ditto	4155	4647	6334	7622	6464	6041

The sharp recovery which these various statistics clearly indicate is due to several causes. In the first place, there is to be considered the abnormal activity in trades affected by Army and Navy contracts. Shipbuilding, ordnance, and small-arms factories, ammunition works, steel-plate mills, Army clothing and equipment manufactures, marine-engine works, food contractors, and other industries stimulated into abnormal activity by the War have been working at high pressure, and have given employment to many more men than they did immediately before the War. The position in November, according to the Board of Trade Labour Gazette, showed such a great improvement that some shortage of male labour was reported. The engineering, shipbuilding, cutlery, woollen, worsted, hosiery, leather, boot and shoe, and the wholesale clothing trade-in fact, every trade manufacturing anything for the Army or Navy-was exceptionally busy, and working overtime. Carpenters and woodworkers, too, were fully employed with the erection of military huts. On the Tyne and the Clyde warships are being built, in Birmingham the rifle and ammunition factories are working night and day, soldiers' uniforms, boots, blankets, and horse cloths are being manufactured at top speed, and it is no exaggeration to say that a number of big contracting firms are congested with orders. The conditions, indeed, are similar to those described by Marcellus in the opening scene of Hamlet-'Such daily cast of brazen cannon and foreign mart for implements of war,' 'such impress of shipwrights whose sore task does not divide the Sunday from the week,' such 'sweaty haste' that makes 'the night joint labourer with the day.'

This increase in employment was encouraged by the wise action of the War Office, which early in the War issued the following suggestions to its contractors:

- 1. Rapid delivery to be attained by employing extra hands, in shifts or otherwise, in preference to overtime, subject always to the paramount necessity of effecting delivery within the times requisite for the needs of the Army.
- 2. Subletting of portions of the work to other suitable manufacturers situated in districts where serious unemployment exists, although contrary to the usual conditions of Army Contracts, is admissible during the present crisis, and it is desired to encourage such subletting.

Another reason for the consistent decrease in the percentage of unemployment during September, October, and November was the effect of the great volume of enlistment for the new Army, and of the number of chauffeurs, artificers, etc., sent This swept up many thousands of working-men both in and out of employment, and diminished the pressure for relief in the industrial centres. The employment figures for October and November were also made better on account of the large number of aliens who have been recently discharged, although the majority of them belonged to classes that do not fall into the above categories-clerks, waiters, hairdressers' assistants, and hotel employees, for example. There is also the most important factor of all to be noted, namely, the tendency of trade to get back into a normal groove, mainly through the ability of the Navy to secure our shipping on the high seas.

But when all these ameliorative influences are taken into account, there still remains a great deal of unemployment in the wage-earning class, with its consequent tax upon benefit and insurance funds, and distress amongst those who have no such aids to fall back upon. Many clerks, shop assistants, and typists have been thrown out of work, and many more have had their meagre stipends reduced, and the strain upon all benevolent organisations is for some time likely to remain heavy. The Government has come to the assistance of voluntary associations, which provide benefit for their unemployed members, by means of special emergency grants. These emergency grants are paid by the Board of Trade as an addition to the refunds of one sixth payable under Section 106 of the National Insurance Act. The payment of the emergency grant is also subject to the following conditions:

- 1. That the Association should be suffering from abnormal unemployment.
  - 2. That the Association should not pay unemployment benefit above a

maximum rate of 17s. per week (including any sum paid by way of State Unemployment Benefit).

3. That the Association should agree while in receipt of the emergency grant to impose levies over and above the ordinary contributions upon those members who remain fully employed.

The amount of the emergency grant (in addition to the refund of one sixth already payable) is either one third or one sixth of the expenditure of the Association on unemployment benefit (exclusive of strike benefit). The rate of the grant is determined by the amount of the levy in accordance with a published scale.

An idea of the scope of the privation resulting from shortage of work and total unemployment is gained from the arrangements made to cope with it. At the end of November the total number of statutory committees for dealing with distress under the Unemployed Workmen Act, whose registers were open, was 82, compared with 40 at the end of August and with 53 for November 1913. The total number of persons who thus received unemployment relief during November was 8000 (against 777 for November 1913), with average earnings of 26s. 3d. against The returns of pauperism show that on one day in November the number of paupers relieved in 35 principal urban districts corresponded to a rate of 190 per 10,000. with August, the total number of paupers relieved increased by 4652, and the rate per 10,000 by 2. The number of indoor paupers increased by 2192, and the number of outdoor paupers by 2460. Manchester, Bolton, Oldham, East London, Leicester, and Hull have been the districts most severely affected at one Compared with November 1913, the rate per time or other. 10,000 increased by 3.

There is a class of unemployed yet to be mentioned that does not figure in any returns, but is nevertheless considerable. Actors, artists, musicians, entertainers, literary folk, et hoc genus omne, have found employment difficult to get. Many of them have been unable to get it at all. Most people hesitate about buying pictures in these days, and there are many who have no surplus money to spend on amusements. The newspaper world has been affected by the higher cost of paper and the timidity (for a time) of advertisers, with the result that the outside contributor, unless a war specialist, has almost disappeared, and the regular staffs have in some cases been put on Although journalists, actors, and singers are reduced pay. hardly thought of when the subject of unemployment is discussed, they help, all the same, to swell the number of those whose cases call for sympathy. It will be fortunate indeed if the area of unobtrusive and often unsuspected poverty does not

become larger before the War is over.

Jan.

For it is obvious that the duration and, to some degree, the extent of excessive unemployment must depend very much upon the duration and fortunes of the War. As long as it lasts the trade in all kinds of luxuries and the activities of the artistic professions are bound to be limited. Many departments of industry must be interfered with, if not crippled, by the loss of Continental markets and the arrested inflow of materials of purely Continental origin. But so long as we keep the command of the seas-and there is no reason to anticipate that we shall ever lose it—it may be hoped that the conditions, instead of getting worse, will continue to improve. What is lost in one direction should be regained in another. Our enemies are much worse off than we are, and their disability is our opportunity. So far as trade and the employment dependent upon it are concerned, although anything like a strong revival is not to be looked for at present, a slow and sure improvement due to the capture of new markets and the relaxation of a bounty-fed competition seems to be well within the bounds of probability. That should result in more hands being required and in full work instead of short time in some of our important manufacturing industries, and although one cannot but deplore the economic waste which has turned the ploughshare into the sword, there is some compensation in the fact that the expenditure on our military and naval forces gives work to thousands of artisans who would otherwise be idle, and circulates big amounts in wages which are most helpful in the emergency. We shall have to pay the bill for all this inevitable outlay, and that will lessen by so much the spending power of the community on useful and productive enterprise hereafter; but in the meantime the keen edge of privation is being blunted by the timely interposition of War contracts and their stimulus to employment.

Meanwhile the old proverb holds good: Prevention is better than Cure. The great thing—so far as it is possible—is to 'keep going.' No one is foolish enough to clamour for 'keeping going' in conditions that would involve employers in a heavy loss. In that case the only effect of the remedy, in the long run, would be to aggravate the disease. Output must of necessity be regulated by demand, and where the demand has fallen off considerably production at the old rate would be disastrous. We cannot expect manufacturers to keep their works on full time when there are no buyers for their goods. But between that impossible policy and the other extreme of over-timidity there is a wide gap. Many trades are being held in restraint by an ultra-conservative estimate of the situation. Others are hindered from improvement by the disposition of a large section of the public to practise an over-zealous economy which, so far

as it is not really necessary, does no good to themselves or to their country. It is a very blind policy to restrict ordinary expenditure when such expenditure may mean all the difference between employment and unemployment for a large number of workpeople. To go without new clothes in order to dispense the money in poor-rates cannot be described as thrift, especially when the purchase of the new clothes, or whatever it may be, will keep a certain number of people in employment. Trade is a chain of many links, and if one of these is broken or made ineffective the continuity of the whole is weakened. If the purchasing power is feeble the industrial power is starved. What we all have to do, then, is to carry on as nearly on normal lines as we can. By so doing we shall ameliorate the effect of those external conditions which have disturbed the balance of employment.

It would be idle to speculate on the ultimate results to the British working-man when things get back once more into the normal groove, but as far as commercial foresight can go there ought—unless the purchasing power of the world is exhausted—to be flourishing times, busy mills and factories, and better wages all round. When those times do come it may be hoped that the dawn of a new prosperity will be welcomed both by masters and men, with a common determination to make the best of the opportunity by working cordially together in a spirit of conciliation and mutual goodwill. The losses and deprivations so patriotically endured in the present must not be forgotten when the 'war drums throb no longer and the battle flags are furled.'

H. J. JENNINGS.

## Jan.

## THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR

So far as the United States is concerned the chief effect of the War is to be looked for in the tremendous shock it has administered not so much to commerce and finance as to American thought. For the first time in their history Americans have ceased to look upon affairs in Europe with a merely spectacular and impersonal interest. They have been compelled to recognise in them a very direct bearing on their own fortunes. They have learned how illusory, after all, was that happy or harmful isolation which appeared to have relieved them for all time from the effects, at once complicating and fortifying, of a constant external

pressure.

For what, before the War and in the eyes of the 'man in the cars,' was the position of the United States? Alone among the Great Powers she was not menaced. Her size and strength and the accident of her geographical situation and surroundings had combined to shield her in an almost unvexed tranquillity. Nothing could be said to endanger her national security. If strife is indeed a law of international life, then in America's case it seemed to be virtually suspended. Of all that follows when two Powers of nearly equal strength and of possibly conflicting interests live within striking distance of one another, she has known next to nothing. A diplomatic dispute with another Power, conducted by either side on the implication of force, has been of all experiences the one most foreign to the normal routine of American existence. The United States of yesterday had no visible enemies to guard against, no definite or even probable crisis of any real magnitude to prepare for, no opposing standard by which to measure her naval and military equipment. It is true that being a high-spirited, volatile, emotional, and on the whole rather bellicose people, the Americans, under the spur of their temperament and in obedience to the combative instinct, have done what they could to fill the vacuum by manufacturing the regulation number of 'scares,' by labelling this Power or that 'the enemy,' and by endeavouring to make international mountains out of molehills. But these diversions were in themselves sufficient proof of their unique national immunity from the serious realities of Weltpolitik. It is hardly, indeed, too much to say that the average, busy, complacent American, living in an atmosphere of extraordinary simplicity and self-absorption, had no vital interest in any external affairs that lay beyond the range of the Monroe Doctrine. Being spared the fierce juxtapositions and imminent contentions that are the lot of the ordinary European, and convinced of the unassailable might of the United States, he was apt to regard the wars and diplomatic disputes of the Old World with an almost frivolous detachment as a sort of drama provided for his distraction. The idea that the United States had one set of interests and the rest of the world another was still up to last August the common American Americans agreed in general with St. Paul that it is only the fool whose eyes are on the end of the earth. International politics had little genuine meaning for them; they were a hermit nation, eminently self-centred, incurious, and unsuspecting, surveying the outer world with a comical pity as an institution whose main office of utility was to serve as a foil to the singular blessedness of American conditions.

It is true that the events of the past decade and a half have transformed the American Republic into an Empire, established her as an Asiatic Power, and brought her at more than one point into somewhat hazardous contact with the nations of the Orient and Occident alike. But there has been very little mental expansion to correspond; the old instinctive attitude of provincialism and disdain, while somewhat weakened, has been very far from destroyed. Up to the very outbreak of the War the average American newspaper continued to treat international politics in a spirit of mingled levity and sensationalism, and the average American citizen was without any adequate understanding of the first elements of Weltpolitik. He felt no need to study them; such education as he absorbed from the Press was meagre and intermittent in amount and extremely unsatisfactory in quality; and it scarcely occurred to him that there could be any vital connexion between American welfare and policies and the issue of some European dispute, thousands of miles from the American continent.

The War, then, came upon the United States with the flashing force of a revelation. In an instant the scales fell from American eyes, the old belief in the sufficiency, and even in the possibility, of isolation was shattered, and a series of shocks brought it unescapably home that the United States was, after all, but part of a whole, and linked to the rest of the world by indissoluble chains of action and reaction. It will, of course, take time before this consciousness becomes powerful enough to affect the play of domestic politics. The November elections, at

which the whole of a new House of Representatives and one third of the Senate were chosen, showed very few signs of being influenced by the War. To all appearances the Americans proceeded to discuss their local affairs as though the outside world were non-existent, and to settle them without the smallest reference to what was happening in Europe. With half the Universe in flames they elected a national Legislature on purely American issues-the tariff, the cost of living, the democratic attitude towards 'big business,' and what not. They even felt justified in administering to the President a severe rebuff by reducing his majority in the popular Chamber from slightly under 150 to just over twenty. The War, so far as one could judge from this side of the Atlantic, hardly occurred to them as a reason for strengthening his hands. This diagnosis, I admit, is not concurred in by all commentators on the spot. One of the shrewdest of them, the Editor of the North American Review. observed in the December issue of his periodical:

It is a common saying that 'The war saved Wilson,' and to this extent the saying is true, namely, that if, in the last month of the campaign, thousands of patriotic citizens who otherwise would not have voted at all had not responded to the appeal to uphold the President before the world, Congress would have been lost to the Democrats.

That, it will be noticed, is not saying much. The War on this showing rallied to President Wilson a portion of that intelligent but exiguous minority of Americans who are interested in foreign affairs but find their domestic politics, from one reason or another, so unattractive that they rarely even take the trouble to vote. But even so, adds the Editor I have quoted, 'it is by no means certain that the general effect of an uncontrollable situation, which not only made war taxes necessary but also intensified the common depression, did not more than offset any political gainfrom higher motives.' In other words, the effect of the War on the voting was practically nil. Nothing could have demonstrated more clearly, first, the confidence of the American people in their ability to remain neutral, and secondly, the gulf that separates their realisation of a broad fact from specific action based upon it and from an understanding of the consequences it entails.

It was, naturally enough, in the sphere of trade and economics that the War first made manifest to Americans the character and the extent of their dependence upon Europe. Following the lead of London, and to stop the withdrawal of gold which began to flow out at the rate of over 10,000,000l. a week, the New York Stock Exchange closed on the 31st of July, not to open again till the second week in December. The insurance on cargoes bound for Europe went up to ten per cent. of their

value; the pound sterling rose from 4.89 dols. to 5 dols., and even—an absolutely unprecedented figure—to 7 dols.; the wheat market, under the combination of a surplus stock of some 250,000,000 bushels, an urgent European demand, and an almost complete lack of transit, was violently convulsed. The huge cotton crop, about two thirds of which is annually sent abroad, lay useless in the warehouses; steel and copper exports fell to almost nothing; the price of sugar doubled; ferro-manganese ore jumped from 6l. to 20l. the ton; the position of the railways, long critical, grew suddenly desperate; vast industries were forced to shut down through the cessation of their accustomed imports of raw material, of potash, silk, chemicals and dyes in particular; and Americans who last year dealt with the belligerent nations to the amount of some 370,000,000l. found the whole of this trade dislocated and jeopardised. Not an interest or section of the country but was instantly made aware that the European conflagration had its direct and immediate effect on American business. The effect was not always unfavourable. The first week of the struggle, it was estimated, added 100,000,000l. to the value of the wheat crop. But in general the reflex influence of the War took the inevitable form of an acute financial and industrial crisis. The United States Government, which for the past decade has spent its best energies in badgering business, was now compelled to come to its rescue. It met the call promptly, and its activities were ably seconded by those of Wall Street. The New York bankers and financiers, and the Committee of the New York Stock Exchange, have, indeed, faced the situation with an unwonted efficiency and largeness of view. Their resolute action stopped a panic that would have thrown all other panics into the shade, and their resort to Clearing House certificates and the prompt establishment of a provisional fund of 20,000,000l. to liquidate foreign indebtedness raised the reputation of American financial statesmanship to a higher point than it had ever reached before. There are some American optimists who believe that when the War is over New York will displace London as the financial centre of the world. More than one American bank, indeed, has recently notified its clients that in future it will issue letters of credit on importations from the Far East and South America in dollars and cents on New York. The supremacy of London is not likely to be easily shaken, but if its sceptre is ever to be wrested from it the events of the past five months have shown that it might readily fall into less competent hands than those of New York.

It is more interesting, however, to note the unexampled responsibilities which were thrown upon the Government. It had first of all to meet the financial necessities of the 100,000

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American citizens whom the War had left stranded in Europe, and who bore the discomforts of their plight with admirable fortitude. It had next to meet a falling-off of revenues reckoned at 2,000,000l. a month. It dealt with this problem both by practising an economy without parallel in modern American history, and by imposing stamp duties and increasing the taxes on beer and wine. It then proceeded to consider the state of the cotton industry, which, in the United States as in Great Britain, is the only industry of the first class that the War has brought to an almost complete standstill. It is an old and a tolerably accurate saying that America pays her debts in cotton, and that anything accordingly which reduces the value of that product reduces also the national debt-paying power. Moreover, as the crop is raised almost wholly on borrowed money, it was imperative that the Southern States should be saved from the financial prostration that must have followed on the loss of exports that for the past five years have averaged over 110,000,000l. annually. After many conferences with the interests concerned, the Secretary of the Treasury announced that he would accept warehouse receipts for cotton and tobacco as a basis for the issue of currency through the national banks. The effect of this has been to tide the planters over the worst of the crisis; but the industry as a whole cannot be restored to anything like normal conditions unless the British and American Governments succeed, as they are now trying to do, in devising a plan that will be equitable to both Lancashire and the South. The main preoccupation, however, of the authorities at Washington during the first few weeks of the War was the shipping question. Americans saw, or thought they saw, an opportunity which it would have been ridiculous not to snatch at, for building up the American mercantile marine. Hitherto no ship has been allowed to fly the American flag unless it was built in the United States. Congress swept away that hampering restriction, the quintessence of Protectionist folly, by admitting foreign-built ships to the American registry. At the same time a war risk insurance bureau was established with a fund of 1,000,000l., and a Bill was introduced authorising the President to spend 6,000,000l. on buying or building naval auxiliaries for use as merchantmen. The purpose of this measure was to enable the United States Government to purchase the German liners, especially those of the Hamburg-Amerika Company, that were lying in the harbours of New York and Boston. Nothing, however, has so far come of the project, though it is worth noting that President Wilson, in his message to Congress on the 8th of December, again, and very strongly, pressed home its urgency. Most Americans, however, still seem to regard it as both a doubtful experiment in Government ownership, and hardly compatible with the obligations of neutrality. Nor did the admission of foreign-built ships to the American registry prove much more productive. Very few owners availed themselves of the privilege, although the Navigation Laws, which add anywhere from twenty-five to forty per cent. to the cost of operating a vessel under the American flag, were suspended for two years. The fact that the British Admiralty was quickly able to announce the security of the Atlantic trade route made most of the American endeavours in this direction both superfluous and inoperative.

Perhaps the chief result of the War on the commercial aspirations of the American people is to have revealed to them the importance of foreign trade and the necessity of capturing as much of it as possible. When peace is restored they will be the only great industrial nation whose wealth has not been squandered, nor whose strength exhausted. An unexampled chance lies open before them, and they are already laying their plans to turn it to the fullest account. They are doing so, let me hasten to add, in an entirely creditable spirit, with no vulgar gloatings over opportunities that have come to them at the expense of others, but with a sharply intensified recognition that the foreign market is fast becoming as indispensable to their manufacturers as it long has been to their farmers, and with a quiet determination to repair abroad the damage which the War has done their trade at home. What especially attracts them is South America, where, in spite of the fact that their imports and exports have risen by nearly one hundred per cent. in the past seven years—from 90,000,000l. to 170,000,000l. the great bulk of the trade, practically, indeed, two thirds of it. still lies with Europe. The total commerce of South America amounts to some 600,000,000l. a year. It is a tempting prize, but one may doubt whether this is quite the time or whether the Americans are quite the people to carry it off. They are not at present by any means well equipped for building up a large foreign trade. They have neither studied nor cultivated the field as carefully as the Germans and ourselves have been obliged to study and cultivate it. Their tendency has rather been to regard foreign trade as a sort of overflow from the home trade. a way to dispose of the surplus. It is a very natural tendency. Their imports and exports combined cannot, I should say, be much more than a tenth of their internal commerce; and of these exports agricultural produce and the products of mines, forests and fisheries represent over seventy per cent., and finished manufactures less than thirty per cent. Speaking broadly, America still owes the place she has taken among the trading nations more to the bounty of Nature than to the skill of man.

Americans have not yet shown that they can establish in a land of foreign speech and ways a trade of anything like the extent and variety that British and German merchants and manufacturers have compassed. Very possibly that is chiefly because they have not yet seriously grappled with the problem. Their capitalists hitherto have not been greatly attracted by what seem to them the rather meagre returns of the ocean carrying trade, of banking, and of industrial investments in South America when compared with the profits of home enterprises or of exports through long-established and convenient channels to the more remunera-They have not been satisfied to give tive markets of Europe. the long credits extended by Europeans, or to manufacture for the special requirements of perhaps a small and uncertain market. or to go to the trouble of packing their goods to suit climatic conditions or local peculiarities of transport. Of course it is merely a question of time before they overcome deficiencies that for the most part are the offspring of sheer indifference and carelessness. But South America has been very hard hit by the War and by its own extravagances; there are few openings for business development in those regions at present; and when peace comes Americans will probably find it much more difficult than they imagine to-day to oust either Great Britain or Germany from the top of the table. We have behind us experience, a sort of habit of financial dominance and a turn for speculative enterprise that will undoubtedly draw new life from the tremendous stir of the present strife; and as for the Germans, I am persuaded there is no royal road to their commercial any more than there is to their military conquest. Neither we nor the Americans can hope to beat them in any neutral market except by adopting and improving upon their methods-by becoming, that is, more exact, more patient, more assiduously scientific, more skilled in foreign tongues, and more attentive to the needs and whims of their customers than they are themselves.

Meanwhile enormous orders have poured in upon the manufacturers of the United States from most of the belligerents and from many neutral lands. The exports of foodstuffs have broken all previous records. Wheat has been shipped to the amount of 10,000,000 bushels a week. Powder, cartridges, shrapnel cases, torpedoes, canteens, wagons, boots, motor trucks, harness and saddles, horses, shirts, blankets, oilcake, barbed wire, tinned meat, cotton duck, knit goods, aeroplanes, railway ties, overcoats—for all these commodities and for many others there has been a demand that already is estimated by the jubilant American Press to exceed 60,000,000l. At one of the water-front terminals in New York in the first week of December nearly 150 car-loads of 'war goods' were awaiting shipment. The naval

situation being what it is, they were destined, of course, for the Allies. But this fact that Germany cannot, while we and our friends can, draw supplies from the United States is one of many facets. It gives point to the contention of the Teutonic apologists in America that the United States is not really neutral, and if there is anything to which President Wilson seems just now to be exceptionally sensitive it is any reflection on the complete dispassionateness of American action. Within the last few weeks Bills have been introduced into both Houses of Congress forbidding the export of arms and ammunition to any warring nation with which the United States itself is at peace; and though the Administration, already under popular suspicion as a hindrance to prosperity, will be very loth to check the trade that is going on in naval and military equipment and accessories—at this moment the only healthy industry there is in the United States-still we must be prepared for a more or less continuous agitation of the subject in Germany's interests. This holds good also for our treatment of neutral trade; every effort will be made to persuade the American people that they have a grievance against us. One may take it for granted that neither the citizens nor the Government of the United States desire to place factitious obstacles in the way of the effective economic exercise of British sea-power, any more than we in the United Kingdom desire to hamper American trade unnecessarily. But within the scope of this general agreement there is room for a good deal of difference of opinion and not a little friction over particular instances, and it is probable that at least 150 cases of seized ships and detained cargoes have been discussed between the two Governments since the War began. We cannot, even to mollify American opinion, afford to relax for a moment our pressure on Germany's industrial windpipe. But it might be possible, if the facts in each case were made more quickly available-communications between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office appear at present to be excessively dilatory—and if a freer use were made of the frank publicity that especially appeals to the American people, to smooth down much of the irritation which is being stirred up in the United States, less by our policy than by our manner of enforcing it. If the unofficial agreement arrived at between London and Washington on the 16th of December proves workable, and an inspection of cargoes before sailing by the British Consular authorities turns out to be as efficacious as searching them on the high seas, it will be a development equally welcome on both sides In any event we should see to it that our of the Atlantic. handling of the whole contraband problem is not such as to justify the suspicion that we are favouring British at the expense of American trade, or depriving Transatlantic merchants and manufacturers of any opening that can be turned to account without harm to our own or our Allies' interests.

But if the commercial imagination of the American people has thus been touched by the vision of boundless possibilities, their political consciousness has leaped with equal boldness towards a new horizon. Never in their history have they been in such close and vital communion of spirit and sympathies with the peoples of Europe. Never, too, have they had better reason to thank their stars that they are immune from the rivalries and detonating hates, the dynastic ambitions, and the curse of armaments that have brought the Old World to its present pass. nothing if not idealist and humanitarian, and the American people have been almost incredibly moved by the mere fact of war on this unparalleled scale of horror and destruction. They feel and are revolted by the sheer brutality of the thing more perhaps than any of the actual belligerents, who amid all the agony and waste keep clear in their hearts and minds the sense of glorious compensations. For Americans the question that presents itself with a deepening insistence is how to end not only this War but all wars. The persuasion spreads that there is reserved for the United States a rôle that will test, as it has never been tested before, the capacity of American statesmanship. Wilson's offer of mediation, made in the first week of the War, was put forward, one may assume, without much hope of its being accepted. It was a proposal formulated for the purpose of having it definitely on the record that the United States was neutral, was benevolent, and when the warring nations were in the mood for peace would gladly do what it could to bring them together. In most Americans' opinion the time will come when a blood-soaked and exhausted Europe will turn to the President's intervention with gratitude and relief. When that hour strikes they believe that the future not only of Old World civilisation but of all mankind may depend, beyond everything else, on the vision that the American mediators bring to their task. American influence, American example, American disinterestedness, backed by a clear purpose and by the conserved strength of 100,000,000 people, will, they think, be the factors that more than any other factors will determine whether this War of the Giants is to be ended merely to be renewed later on, or whether it is to usher in a veritable reign of peace; whether the gospel of force and the armed doctrine of militarism are to continue to oppress the world, or whether civilisation can be started on a new path; whether the nations are to be released from, or are to be thrust back once more in subjection to, the fatuous ambitions and searing burdens, the mad welter of jealousies and attack and counter-attack, that have hitherto been their lot.

This is the object or the mirage that inspires the best American minds to-day. Meanwhile the United States remains not merely neutral but more guardedly so than any nation perhaps has ever been. President Wilson has expanded the obligations of neutrality to include not alone acts but also the expression of opinion. When the Belgian mission laid before him an account of the wrongs and sufferings of their country he replied to them in words of moving and exquisite sympathy, but with a careful avoidance of even the appearance of passing judgment on their case. When the Kaiser protested against the use of dum-dum bullets by the Allies he noted the protest, but declined in all friendliness to express any opinion on the merits of the allegation. When the French and Austrian Governments were sounding the New York bankers as to the possibilities of a loan, he officially intimated that financial assistance to any of the belligerents was 'inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality.' That in itself is a development which, if it can be elevated into a rule of international practice, must go a long way towards discouraging war-Since then he has virtually forbidden American shipbuilders to manufacture submarines for any of the belligerents. But the President went further still in inculcating his conception of what neutrality demands. In an address to the American people he pleaded for an equal impartiality in the speech and conduct of the citizens as individuals. He warned them against 'that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides.' He affirmed

the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels, and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

So far as the neutrality of the American Government is concerned not a voice has been raised anywhere, in the United States or out of it, in criticism of the President's position, except that a good many Americans would have welcomed an official protest in their behalf against Germany's treatment of Belgium and her manifold violations of the Hague Conventions. It was the wise and obvious course, and the emergency is hardly conceivable that would necessitate any deflection from it. Like almost all the rest of the world, the United States has been, and will continue to be, troubled by the knotty problems of international law that are bound to arise when countries with a world-

wide commerce and ships on every ocean go to war. But with a man of the quality of President Wilson at the head of affairs none of these problems, not even the inevitable awkwardnesses that, as I have said, must be expected over the difficult and many-sided questions of contraband, are likely to reach or even to approach the danger line. They will be decided with a fairness, an absence of the controversial and still more conspicuously of the higgling spirit, and a steady recognition of the realities and not merely the appearances of justice—with all the qualities, in short, that have made Mr. Wilson's Presidency an essay, and a very successful one, in the higher ethics of international relations. The United States stirred uneasily, but only for a moment, when the intervention of Japan brought the War in near proximity to her own possessions in the Pacific. But the disquietude passed when it was realised that the scope of the Japanese action was in conformity with and limited by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and that it did not imply the permanent establishment of our Allies either at Kiaochau or in any of the German islands that lie between America and the Philippines. The assurances that were forthcoming on these points had the unwonted merit of really reassuring, and the better-informed Americans were quick to see that, since nothing could have prevented Japan from avenging the affront put upon her by Germany over twenty years ago, it was decidedly to their interests that her operations should be governed by the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese compact. Americans had only to ask themselves whether they would have preferred to see Japan waging an unrestrained war upon Germany or acting, as she is acting, in loval agreement with a Power whose friendliness towards the United States is axiomatic, to perceive that the alliance between Great Britain and Japan, once the object of a certain amount of American suspicion, is in reality a safeguard of American With the Japanese question and the question of contraband out of the way, there is only one contingency-an exceedingly remote one, to which I shall refer later on-that could possibly induce Americans even to debate the expediency of remaining neutral.

With American opinion, however, outside the circles of officialdom the case has been far otherwise. The President's counsel of perfection proved too arduous an ideal for a people preeminently used to forming and expressing their own judgments. It is not an American habit to walk on the eggshells of a dispassionate mentality. They have, beyond most other peoples, the gift of a virile partisanship, and no admonitions from the White House could prevent them from exercising it. We in Great Britain have certainly little reason to complain of the form assumed by their disobedience to the President's injunction. While eagerly and thoroughly exploring all the aspects of the various cases submitted for their verdict, the overwhelming bulk of the American people have found themselves constrained by conscience and conviction to return a whole-hearted judgment in favour of the Allied cause. No one with any knowledge of their instinctive ways of looking at things could have doubted that, given the circumstances, an appeal to the tribunal of American opinion could and would lead to this and no other issue. It has not been a question of 'racial' sympathy or any particular affection for Great Britain. It has been first and foremost a question of morality, of right and wrong, of what is best not only for America but for the welfare of mankind and the progress and security of civilisation. Germany's efforts to win over American goodwill have betrayed the psychological obtuseness which everybody now recognises as one of the least pleasing by-products of militarism. There has been nothing quite like the sedulous courting of the United States by Teutonic emissaries since the elephant in Paradise Lost 'wreathed his lithe proboscis' to plant himself in the good graces of Adam and Eve. The German wooing has been both elephantine and regimental. It has been an official bombardment of cajolery, protestations, denials and lies-the climax to a long and futile campaign of importunate blandishments, princely visits, imperial gifts, falsified history and obtrusive compliments which Americans have long ago rated at their proper value. They see through the game and the exaggerated zeal of those who are playing it. The Kaiser's coquetries move them no more than the blaze of American slang in which Prince Henry traversed their countryor move them only to ridicule and mistrust. There are probably in the United States 3,000,000 Americans of German birth, and some 18,000,000 of German descent. They are enrolled in innumerable societies; the German Ambassador, the former German Colonial Secretary, German-American bankers, professors, journalists and politicians have all taken a hand in influencing American opinion; but the net result of their efforts is to leave the predominant sentiment of the country not merely unconvinced and unreconciled but scornful and hostile.

The truth is that in spite of the admirable qualities of the German immigrant, of the heavy debt which America in particular owes to the example of German educationalists, and of the generous respect which Americans are ever anxious to pay to learning and intellect, there exists between the genius of the two countries a very real conflict of ideas and aspirations. There are two instincts derived from their past which have struck firm roots in the national character and outlook of the American

people. One is their dislike of autocracy; the other is their dislike of bureaucracy and militarism. Germany offends against both instincts. Whereas Americans believe they detect in our form of government the veritable rule of the people, by the people, for the people, operating behind the veil of a constitutional monarchy, in Germany they are persuaded that Parliamentary institutions serve merely as trappings for something little less than an effective and ubiquitous absolutism—an absolutism all the more offensive to their way of thinking in that it rests on a military, aristocratic, and reactionary caste. The whole system which the Kaiser personifies, his whole conception of the State and of the respective parts that the Sovereign, the Army, and the people should play in it, revolt not merely the opinions but the political conscience of the American people, and rasp unceasingly on their sincere and exalted sense of the worth and dignity of the individual and of the moral efficacy of 'free institutions.' This gulf of spiritual antipathy between the two peoples has long been evident; and many events during the past decade and a half have served to widen it, and to fill the American mind with a vague but irrepressible suspicion of the aims of German policy and of the uses to which the Kaiser might one day turn the naval and military power he was swiftly accumulating. A few years ago this suspicion was not less than a national pre-Recently it has died down, but Americans have never quite dismissed from their minds the idea that Germany had designs upon South America and that her ambitions might one day bring her athwart the Monroe Doctrine.

It was only, however, with the advent of the present war that Americans came to see Germany and her rulers in their The spectacle has frankly horrified them. true light. detestable act of treachery committed against Belgium moved them to a universal and spontaneous condemnation, and the atrocious acts by which it has been followed up convinced them that Germany had transformed herself into an enemy of the human race. 'Necessity knows no law' is not a maxim of American statecraft. The violation of treaties and pledges and of the rights of smaller nations is not a proceeding they applaud. They have it firmly fixed in their minds who brought on the war and who went to the uttermost limits to avert it, on which side it is a war of conquest and on which a war in defence of They have appraised the German ideal and found it the negation of everything that Americans most passionately cherish. It is not the ideal of democracy or of peace. They see in it nothing but the doctrine of force, the conception that the ruling factor in human affairs is the sheer mass of organised strength, the belief that soldiers belong to a higher caste of humanity than civilians, the persuasion that 'the people' are unworthy of consideration except as the raw material for the drill-sergeant. In American eyes the Germany that has been revealed by the war is the incarnation of despotism and aggressiveness and the foe of popular freedom, of self-government, and of the appeal to reason. They find themselves without a single shred of sympathy for such a monstrosity, and every fresh depredation it commits adds to the profundity of their repulsion. Moreover, they are beginning to ask themselves how American interests would be affected if Germany were to succeed in dominating Europe and achieving the command of the seas. They know that they can trust us. Our naval power gives them not a moment's anxiety on behalf of a single one of their possessions or policies. They feel no confidence that Germany's maritime supremacy would be equally innocuous. They understand and appreciate our fiscal policy; they are wondering whether, if Germany were to rise to our place, she would be equally liberal. Some of them are beginning to see that, next to the security and well-being of their own country, there is no higher American interest than the preservation of the British Empire on its present footing, and that a Germany bestriding Europe like a jack-booted Colossus would eventually menace the policies and fortunes of the United States in the Pacific and South America. why Americans are at last beginning to examine their own nava! and military organisation and resources with unclouded eyes. That also is why they wish the Allies well. And, finally, that is why American neutrality may be said to be only beyond discussion so long as Germany does not win.

SYDNEY BROOKS

## AN AMERICAN'S VIEW OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

The opinion expressed, in a private letter recently quoted in the Press, by the late Admiral Mahan, of the United States Navy, that 'if Germany wins by a big margin she is likely to be nasty to us' (that is to the United States), must have a profound influence in intensifying the sympathies of his countrymen in the cause of Germany's opponents. Admiral Mahan was not only a great naval strategist, but occupied towards his own country much the same position of acknowledged authority upon all questions of national defence as Lord Roberts held in Great Britain. Of both, too, it may be said that if their advice was not always taken, it rankled in the mind of the most sceptical or indifferent hearer. However reluctant the mind may be to accept an unwelcome truth, if it comes as the judgment of proved capacity joined to unquestioned patriotism the uneasy suspicion will remain that the warning voice may be right and ought not to be denied.

Englishmen are, no doubt, by this time convinced that the great body of opinion in the United States upon the right and wrong of the War coincides with their own, and that America's sympathies as a whole are with the Allies opposed to Germany and Austria. But the attitude of President Wilson's administration is another matter. After making every allowance for the position of strict neutrality which Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan regard as imperative upon the Government, their construction of the Government's duty seems strangely and needlessly remote from the general body of opinion and sentiment throughout that country. Does strict neutrality preclude any protest against the cynical violaters of the Hague Conventions, to which the United States is a party? Does strict neutrality justify the President in enjoining upon his countrymen absolute silence upon the topic of the European War, on the ground that the expression of a private opinion is a violation of that neutrality? He has, for the same reason, we hear, forbidden the West Point Cadets to sing 'It's a long way to Tipperary,' so it may be assumed that for American military bands to play the 'Marseillaise' or 'Die Wacht am Rhein' would be an infringement of neutrality! Perhaps even

'America' is taboo since, the air being the same as 'God Save the King,' its performance might be construed as an expression of sympathy! President Wilson must lack a sense of humour as well as a sense of proportion; but, that apart, his attitude has undoubtedly occasioned no little surprise, and the surprise deepens as we come to perceive more and more clearly how strongly Americans generally regard the justice of Great Britain's cause, and trust in the success of her arms and the arms of her Allies.

'If Germany wins by a big margin,' wrote Admiral Mahan. 'she is likely to be nasty to' the United States. At this stage in the War it is quite safe to say that if Germany wins at all it will be by a big margin. So resolute are the Allies to make an end of her pretensions that they will fight to exhaustion if need be, and Germany cannot win without destroying the armies of Russia, France, and Britain, and the British Fleet. When all that happens she will be absolute mistress in Europe, and then. says Admiral Mahan, 'likely to be nasty' in America; what German 'nastiness' means all the world knows by this time.

If, then, that forecast is sound or if the prophet who uttered it has the prestige of a prophet in his own country, it must quicken, if not the Wilson administration, at least the public pressure that will be brought to bear upon it.

There are two influences at work to direct the current of America's sympathy in favour of Great Britain—pure sentiment and her sense of justice.

Amongst the great mass of Americans, those with Anglo-Saxon blood in their veins, sentiment counts for as much and as little as it does amongst the British-that is to say, like suppressed measles, it works the more virulently from being concealed. I know from personal experience that deep in the heart of the dominant race in the United States exists an almost passionate affection for England. A personal reminiscence may be cited as bearing on that statement. The writer, when a schoolboy surfeited with his country's history, said to his father on one occasion 'Why do you seem so much more fond of England than France? When England fought us France helped us, but everybody seems to forget that.' His answer was terse but sufficient. 'My boy,' said he, 'England is home.' As my English ancestors emigrated to the American Colony of New England in 1632 it cannot be said that my father's 'home' tie was a very personal one, but that tie is rooted deep enough in the Anglo-Saxon-American soul to have survived nearly three centuries of separation and all the normal family bickerings as well. Americans may love to conceal their love as an Englishman cannot help keeping his emotions on ice, but I know that both will shed tears in the dark over an emotional play and be equally ashamed of it.

It is just as positive that if England were in difficulties President Wilson's neutrality fit would be cured by such an explosion of national sentiment that he would have no difficulty in discovering that the honour of the United States was deeply concerned in opposing Germany's Weltpolitik.

And in the same dominant class, which is well represented by Mr. Roosevelt's attitude on most public, social, and economic questions, the sense of justice, or rather of righteousness, to use the more comprehensive term, is inborn and of robust temper. To outsiders it is not so obvious as the extravagant frivolities of the very rich, not so notorious as the tricks of finance or the juggernaut course of competition, not so conspicuous as political chicanery and 'graft,' but it is a real and an invincible force when roused to action. It ended human slavery; it fought the doctrine of State secession to a finish in a civil war of four years' duration, and, though it often moves slowly, it achieves the triumph of the right in the end; and in spite of almost superhuman efforts to win America's sympathies for Germany, her keen sense of justice marches with her sentiment of affection with equal step in support of Britain's cause. To these two factors must be added a growing consciousness of where her self-interest lies, and to this influence Admiral Mahan's dictum comes as a welcome reinforcement.

For if by any chance—by crippling Great Britain's fleet, or eluding it, or by any unexpected serious reverses to the Allies in the land campaigns-the door were opened to an invasion of England, America will realise all the more acutely from Admiral Mahan's warning that Germany's road to the United States lies through Great Britain; and what it means for Germany to traverse any road let Belgium and North-East France supply the answer. Germany had no occasion of enmity-no worthy grudge even against Belgium, for no fair fighter-no one possessing the least claim to be called a sportsman-could feel anything but admiration for little Belgium's plucky defence of her neutrality. And yet has Germany been 'nasty' to Belgium or not? And if she gets to England is she 'likely to be nasty to us' also or not? Those who write for her and speak for her are sufficiently outspoken indeed. That they do not mean to be nice to England They have described the country as they will is quite clear. leave it when they have marched over this road to a worldempire. The details are impressive. No existing monument of our greatness in history, literature or the arts is to be left for a future generation to see. Oxford shall be razed to the earth; Shakespeare's dust shall be scattered to the winds; and there is a vast deal more of it, for the German hate has imagination.

And after England Germany 'is likely to be nasty to us,' wrote

THE

## NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. CCCCLVII-March 1915

## THE FUTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE

THE Allies have struck with energy in the Near East, and before long changes may take place there which will profoundly affect the course of the War.

Foresight is the essence of statesmanship. From the slow progress of the Allies hitherto it would appear that the War will be long-drawn-out, but the unexpected frequently happens, both in war and in foreign politics. For many reasons the aspect of the War may soon change completely. We may hear either that the Austrian Emperor has asked for a separate peace in order to save his country from the worst and final disaster, or that Roumania and Italy have joined in the War and have attacked Austria-Hungary. In the latter case Austria could not resist for long. Within a short space of time Austria-Hungary may be eliminated, and as it would obviously be suicidal for Germany to continue the War single-handed, for Turkey's support has so far proved worthless, her wisest policy would be to give up the hopeless struggle. In these circumstances it seems opportune to consider without delay some of the greatest and most difficult

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
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problems with which a future Peace Congress will have to deal. This is all the more necessary as some of the questions which will have to be settled may cause differences among the Allies, unless the nations and their statesmen have previously arrived at some understanding as to the great lines on which the settlement should take place. Such a preliminary agreement had unfortunately not been effected when, a hundred years ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the entire map of Europe was Owing to the resulting differences and the return of Napoleon from Elba the assembled diplomats hastily concluded a Treaty which left the greatest and most dangerous problems badly solved or not solved at all. Guided by the principle of legitimacy they considered the claims of the rulers, but disregarded those of the nations. At the Congress of Vienna, Germany and Italy were cut up, notwithstanding the protests of the German and Italian people. Thus the work done in haste and under pressure by the diplomats at Vienna led to a series of avoidable wars, and especially to the Wars of Nationality of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71, by which a united Italy and a united Germany were evolved.

The nations and their rulers seem fairly agreed as to the broad principles on which the map of Europe should be reconstructed at a future Congress. In the first place, territorial rearrangements will be made which will strengthen the peaceful nations, which will make unlikely a war of revenge and should secure the maintenance of peace for a very long time. In the second place, the desires of the various nationalities to be united under a Government of their own are to be fulfilled. In the third place, the nations which have fought and suffered are to receive suitable compensation, while those which have merely looked on will presumably derive little or no advantage from the general recasting of frontiers. Apparently there are only three questions which might lead to serious disagreement among the Allies. These are the question of the future of Russia, the question of Poland, and the question of Constantinople. All three questions are closely interwoven.

Russia is a Power which is viewed by many Englishmen with a good deal of distrust. Many people in this country fear that Russia will become too powerful, if Germany and Austria-Hungary should be defeated, if Germany should suffer great territorial losses, and if the Dual Monarchy should no longer form a single State, but should become dissolved into its component parts in accordance with the principle of nationalities. wish for a counterpoise to Russia on the Continent. To many Englishmen who have watched with concern the constant and apparently irresistible progress of Russia in Asia, that country



The problem of Poland, which was very fully considered by the present writer in the January number of this Review, is less dangerous to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies than is that of Constantinople. Russia is clearly the Power most strongly interested in Poland. She occupies towards that country a special position which must be respected. The Polish question is, after all, practically a Russian domestic question. Poland is a kind of Russian Ireland. The question of Constantinople, on the other hand, has for many decades been considered the most dangerous problem in Europe. Constantinople is supposed to be a point of vital interest not only to Russia but to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and this country as well. As the Turks have plunged into the War and have attacked the Allies, the settlement of the problem of Constantinople can no Therefore, it seems best to consider it longer be shelved. frankly, dispassionately, and without prejudice. We have been taught in the past that the possession of Constantinople will decide the fate of the world, that Constantinople dominates the world and that Russia's possession of that position would be fatal to Great Britain's position in India. In these circumstances it seems necessary not only to consider the character of Russia's foreign policy and of the Russian people, but to study the problem of Constantinople in the light of history and with special reference to Russia's future.

Since the time of Napoleon the question of Constantinople has loomed particularly large, and probably unduly large, on the political horizon. Apparently the strategical importance of

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Constantinople is at present generally over-estimated, because the last few generations, instead of studying critically and without prejudice the real importance of that city, have been mesmerised by the pronouncements of the great Corsican warrior, and have repeated his celebrated saying that Constantinople is 'the key of the world,' although it is nothing of the kind.

According to many pópular historians, Russia has 'always' tried to wrest India from England and to make herself mistress of the world by seizing Constantinople. From some of the most serious historical books, and even from dry diplomatic documents, we learn that Russia's policy of seizing with Constantinople the dominion of the world was initiated by her greatest ruler, Peter the Great, who recommended that policy to his successors in his celebrated political testament. History, as Napoleon has told us, is a fable convenue. Napoleon himself has skilfully created a fable convenue around the city of Constantinople, and most of the mistaken views as to Russia's world-conquering aims were engendered by that great genius who has mystified England during a whole century, and has been responsible for a century of misunderstandings between this country and Russia. It seems therefore timely and necessary to consider Russia's actions in the direction of Constantinople and of India by means of the most authoritative documents existing, the vast majority of which are not given in English books. They are new to British readers, and they may help in destroying a century-old legend which has served Napoleon's purpose of sowing enmity between Russia and this country.

The political testament of Peter the Great, which plays so great part in historical and diplomatic literature has, so far as I know, not been translated into English. There are several versions of that document. The following passages, which are taken from the combined versions given by Sokolnicki and Lesur, are those which should be of the greatest interest to English

Austria should be induced to assist in driving the Turks out of Europe.

Under that pretext a standing army should be maintained and shipyards be established on the shores of the Black Sea. Constantly progressing, the forces should advance towards Constantinople.

A strict alliance should be concluded with England. . . . Predominance in the Baltic and in the Black Sea should be aimed at. That is the most important point. On it depends the rapid success of the plan.

My successors should become convinced of the truth that the trade with India is the world trade, and that he who possesses that trade is in truth the master of Europe. Consequently no opportunity for stirring up war with Persia and hastening its decay should be lost. Russia should



penetrate to the Persian Gulf and endeavour to re-establish the ancient trade with the East.

The influence of religion upon the disunited and Greek dissenters dwelling in Hungary, Turkey, and Southern Poland should be made use of. They should be won over. Russia should become their protector and obtain spiritual supremacy over them. . . .

Soon after opportunities will become precious. Everything should be prepared in secret for the great coup. In the deepest secrecy and the greatest circumspection the court of Versailles and then that of Vienna should be approached with the object of sharing with them the domination of the world.

In the following paragraphs the author recommends that Russia should bring about a world-war ostensibly regarding Turkey, that she should set all the other Great Powers by the ears, and while they are engaged in internecine struggles seize Constantinople, make war upon all her opponents, subdue them, and make herself supreme throughout the world.

Peter the Great died in 1725. He greatly enlarged the Russian frontiers, organised, modernised, and Europeanised the country, and fought hard to give it an outlet on the then Swedish Baltic, creating Petrograd. His successors, guided by Catherine the Second, endeavoured with equal energy to give Russia a second outlet to the sea in the South, at Turkey's cost, and apparently they carried out to the letter the recommendations contained in the political testament of Peter the Great. Prophecies are usually correct if they are made after the event. The famous political testament was apparently written not in Peter the Great's lifetime but a century after, when Russia had succeeded in acquiring the shores of the Black Sea and had become the leader of the Slav nations belonging to the Greek Church. Peter the Great's political testament was first published in a book, De la Politique et des Progrès de la Puissance Russe, written by Lesur in 1811, at a time when Napoleon had resolved upon a war with Russia. It was published to influence European, and especially English, opinion against that country. According to Berkholz (Napoléon I., Auteur du Testament de Pierre le Grand), Napoleon himself was the author. The abrupt telegraphic style of the composition indeed greatly resembles that of its putative author. The best informed now generally consider the will of Peter the Great to be a forgery. Bismarck, who was on the most intimate terms with Czar Alexander the Second, described it as 'apocryphal' in the fifth chapter of his Memoirs. The value of Peter the Great's Will as a document revealing the traditional policy and traditions of Russia is nil.

The desire of Peter the Great's successors to conquer the Turkish territory to the south of Russia, and to acquire for the

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country an outlet on the Black Sea, was not unnatural, for at a time when transport by land was almost a physical impossibility in Russia the country could be opened up and developed only by means of her splendid natural waterways and of seaports. As Russia's most fruitful territories are in the south, access to the Black Sea was for her development far more important than an opening on the Baltic. Besides to the deeply religious Russians a war with the Turks has, up to the most recent times, been a Holy War, a kind of crusade. The Empress Catherine succeeded in conquering the shores of the Black Sea, but failed in conquering Constantinople, which she desired to take. With this object in view she proposed the partition of Turkey to Austria in the time of Maria Theresa and of Joseph the Second. According to her historian Castera, she recommended the Minister of France to advise his Government that France should join Russia for the purpose of partitioning the Turkish Empire. As a reward she offered Egypt to France, believing that the conquest of Egypt would be easy.

Catherine's offer of Egypt to France is significant, and should be carefully noted. For centuries France, guided by a sure instinct of territorial values, had been hankering after the possession of Egypt, seeing in that country a door to the lands of the Far East and one of the most important strategical positions in the world. The great historian Sorel wrote in Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797 that the possession of Egypt was 'le rêve qui,

depuis les croissades, hante les imaginations françaises.'

France hungered after Egypt. Her thinkers had planned the construction of the Suez Canal a century before de Lesseps. After the outbreak of the Revolution her historic ambition seemed The French Republic was at war with likely to be fulfilled. England and Russia. England might be attacked in India by way of Egypt, and Egypt might, at the same time, be made a base of operations for an attack upon Russia in the Black Sea in conjunction with Turkey. While England and Russia were thus being attacked a revolution should be engineered in Ireland to complete England's discomfiture. On the 23rd Germinal of the year VI.—that is on the 12th of April 1798—the Directoire appointed the youthful General Bonaparte commander of the Armée d'Orient, and ordered him to take Egypt, to cut the Suez Canal, and to secure to the French Republic the free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea. The aim and object of that expedition, and of the greater plan of operations of which it was to be a part, is clearly and fully disclosed in a lengthy memorandum on the foreign situation, written by Talleyrand, who at the time was the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and placed by him





before the Directoire on the 10th of July 1798. We read in that most valuable and most interesting document:

Si Bonaparte s'établit en Egypte, quand il aura dirigé une part de ses forces contre les Anglais dans l'Inde, qui empêchera que la flotte française, pénétrant dans la mer Noire et s'unissant à celle des Turcs, aille, pour consolider cette puissance de l'occupation de l'Egypte, l'aider à reconquérir la Crimée qui est pour elle d'un bien autre intérêt que cette région livrée depuis des siècles aux révoltes des beys? Il n'y aura pas toujours dans la Méditerranée une nombreuse flotte anglaise. dans l'Inde, menacés sur leurs côtes, frappés au cœur de leur puissance par l'insurrection de l'Irlande, dont les progrès peuvent d'un moment à l'autre désorganiser leur armée navale, ils doivent finir par abandonner la station qu'ils auront établie au fond de la Méditerranée, et dès lors nous pouvons marcher à Constantinople où tout doit être préparé pour que nous soyons bien reçus. La destruction de Cherson et de Sébastopol serait à la fois la plus juste vengeance de l'acharnement insensé des Russes, et le meilleur moyen de négociation avec les Turcs pour en obtenir tout ce qui pourrait consolider notre établissement en Afrique. . . .

L'expédition de Bonaparte, s'il met pied en Egypte, assure la destruction

de la puissance britannique dans l'Inde.

Déjà Malte est en notre pouvoir; ce succès miraculeux serait seul un coup terrible pour le commerce de l'Angleterre, et quand notre armement n'obtiendrait pas un autre fruit, celui-là serait suffisant. Mais des attentes encore plus sensibles sont réservées à cette nation, livrée à tous les déchirements intérieurs qu'elle a si longtemps entretenus chez nous. L'insurrection de l'Irlande, cimentée déjà par le sang de quelques victimes célèbres, paraît faire des progrès remarquables. C'est dans cette contrée que doivent aboutir maintenant tous nos efforts. Des armes, des munitions, des hommes; hâtonsnous de les y porter, rendons à l'Angleterre les maux qu'elle nous a faits. Qu'une République s'élève à côté d'elle pour son instruction ou pour son châtiment. . . .

Si nous sommes bientôt en mesure de faire ce que j'ai indiqué en parlant de la Russie, au moins d'en annoncer l'intention, je ne doute pas que la Porte ne sente le prix de ce service et n'associe ses forces aux nôtres pour repousser la Russie loin des bords de la Mer Noire.

The war programme of the French Directoire against England, which included an attack on Egypt, an expedition against India, the support of Turkey, the raising of Ireland in rebellion, and war upon British commerce, bears a curious resemblance to the

comprehensive war plans of modern Germany.

Napoleon seized the Government of France and he became the heir of the grandiose world-embracing policy of the Republic. He took up the plan which was designed to destroy simultaneously the power of England and Russia and to make France all-powerful throughout the world. Catherine the Second, the great enemy of the French Revolution, had died in 1796 and had been succeeded by the weak, eccentric, violent, and scarcely sane Czar Paul the First. During the first years of his reign he also was hostile to revolutionary France and had made war upon that


country, but in 1800 he quarrelled with England. Napoleon at once utilised the opportunity and persuaded him to attack England in Asia in conjunction with France. In O'Meara's book A Voice from St. Helena we read that Napoleon described to his Irish surgeon the invasion planned in the time of Paul the First as follows:

If Paul had lived you would have lost India before now. An agreement was made between Paul and myself to invade it. I furnished the plan. I was to have sent thirty thousand good troops. He was to send a similar number of the best Russian soldiers and forty thousand Cossacs. I was to subscribe ten millions for the purchase of camels and other requisites for crossing the desert. The King of Prussia was to have been applied to by both of us to grant a passage for my troops through his dominions, which would have been immediately granted. I had at the same time made a demand to the King of Persia for a passage through his country, which would also have been granted, although the negotiations were not entirely concluded, but would have succeeded, as the Persians were desirous of profiting by it themselves. My troops were to have gone to Warsaw, to be joined by the Russians and Cossacs, and to have marched from thence to the Caspian Sea, where they would have either embarked or have proceeded by land, according to circumstances. I was beforehand with you in sending an Ambassador to Persia to make interest there. Since that time your ministers have been imbeciles enough to allow the Russians to get four provinces, which increase their territories beyond the mountains. The first year of war that you will have with the Russians they will take India from you.

It will be noticed that Napoleon did not suggest to Russia an advance upon India by way of Constantinople, but by way of the Caspian Sea, by a route similar to that which she would follow at the present time, when an expedition against India would be carried by the railways running from the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea towards the North-West Frontier of India. That is worth bearing in mind if we wish to inquire whether Russia's occupation of Constantinople would threaten India.

Paul the First was assassinated in 1801 before he could embark upon his fantastic expedition, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Alexander the First. Born in 1777, Alexander came to the throne as a youth of twenty-four. He had been educated by the Swiss philosopher Laharpe in accordance with the principles of Rousseau. The great Polish statesman Prince Adam Czartoryski, an intimate friend of his youth and of his maturer age, drew the following portrait of Alexander in his Memoirs:

Young, candid, inoffensive, thinking only of philanthropy and liberalism, passionately desirous of doing good, but often incapable of distinguishing it from evil, he had seen with equal aversion the wars of Catherine and the despotic follies of Paul, and when he ascended the throne he cast aside all the ideas of avidity, astuteness, and grasping ambition which were the soul of the old Russian policy. Peter's vast projects were ignored for a



Alexander was a good man and a great idealist. His dearest wish was to free the serfs and to make the people happy and prosperous. General Savary, Napoleon's temporary Ambassador in Russia, reported to him on the 4th of November 1807 the following words of the Czar: 'Je veux sortir la nation de cet état de barbarie. Je dis même plus, si la civilisation était assez avancée, j'abolirais cet esclavage, dût-il m'en coûter la tête.' Alexander the First, like the present occupant of the throne Nicholas the Second, was a warm-hearted idealist, a lover of mankind and a friend of peace, anxious to elevate Russia and to introduce the necessary reforms. However, Alexander the First, like Nicholas the Second, was forced into a great war against his will.

In a number of campaigns Napoleon had subdued the Continent, and the French longed for peace. Still Napoleon desired to carry out the great policy of the Directoire, to destroy the power of England and Russia and make France supreme in the world. But as long as the Continent was ready to rise against the French, Napoleon could not safely enter upon a lengthy campaign in far-away Russia. He feared Russia as an opponent as long as Europe was unwilling to bear his yoke. An alliance with Russia would have been invaluable to him. By securing Russia's support he could hope to hold Prussia and Austria in awe and to attack, or at least to threaten, England in India. Russia's support could best be secured by promising to her explicitly, or at least implicitly, the possession of Constantinople and by making her believe that she was not interested in the fate of the other European States, that their enslavement by Napoleon was no concern of hers. In December 1805, while he was at war with Russia, Napoleon significantly said to Prince Dolgoruki, the Czar's aide-de-camp, who had been sent to him, according to the Prince's report of the 23rd of that month published by Tatistcheff:

Que veut-on de moi? Pourquoi l'empereur Alexandre me fait-il la guerre? Que lui faut-il? Il n'a qu'à étendre les frontières de la Russie aux dépens de ses voisins, des Turcs surtout. Sa querelle avec la France tomberait alors d'elle-même. . . . La Russie doit suivre une tout autre politique et ne se préoccuper que de ses propres intérêts.

While, in vague words, Napoleon promised to Alexander the First the possession of Turkey, he endeavoured to raise the Turks

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On the 20th of June 1806 Napoleon against the Russians. dictated, in his characteristic abrupt style, the following instruction for the guidance of General Sebastiani, the French Ambassador in Turkey, which will be found in Driault. La Politique Orientale de Napoléon :

- 1. Inspirer confiance et sécurité à la Porte, la France ne veut que la fortifier.
  - 2. Triple Alliance de Moi, Porte et Perse contre Russie. . . .
- 7. Fermer le Bosphore aux Russes, fermer tous les ports, rendre à la Porte son empire absolu sur la Moldavie et la Valachie.
- 8. Je ne veux point partager l'Empire de Constantinople, voulût-on m'en offrir les trois quarts, je n'en veux point. Je veux raffermir et consolider ce grand empire et m'en servir tel quel comme opposition à la

In 1806 Napoleon made war upon Prussia. In October of that year the Prussians were totally defeated at Jena and Auerstädt. The Russians came to their aid, and Napoleon feared a lengthy campaign far from his base. On the 7th and 8th of February 1807 he defeated the Russians at Evlau. However, the French suffered such fearful losses that Napoleon's position was seriously endangered. Hence he urgently desired to make peace with Russia. Relying upon the youth, the generous enthusiasm, the warm-heartedness, the lack of suspicion, and the inexperience of Alexander the First, Napoleon attempted once more to convert his enemy into a friend and ally and a willing tool. With this object in view he caused articles to be published in the papers advocating a reconciliation of Napoleon and Alexander in the interests of humanity, and recommending joint action by France and Russia against England, the enemy of mankind. Napoleon knew how to convey indirectly to the Czar numerous messages expressing his sorrow at the fearful and needless slaughter, his desire for peace, his goodwill for Russia, and his high esteem for Russia's youthful ruler. Alexander was at once attracted by Napoleon's suggestions, and at last became infatuated by him. He had been fascinated by Napoleon's success. He was keenly aware of the backwardness of Russia. Desiring to advance his country, he wished to learn from his great antagonist the art of government and administration, for it was the organiser in Napoleon that he chiefly admired. On the 14th of June 1807 Napoleon severely defeated the Russians at Friedland, and the Czar, following the advice of his generals, asked Napoleon for peace. A few days later the celebrated meeting of the two monarchs, in a little pavilion erected on a float anchored in the River Niemen, took place. According to Tatistcheff, the Czar's first words to Napoleon were 'Sire, je hais les Anglais autant que vous,' and Napoleon replied 'En ce cas la paix est faite.'

On the Niemen, and at the prolonged meeting of the monarchs at Tilsit which followed, Napoleon unceasingly preached to the Czar the necessity of Franco-Russian co-operation in the interests of peace, and the necessity of breaking the naval tyranny of England. He suggested to Alexander that he should seize Turkey, spoke of the Turks as barbarians, and proposed that the two monarchs, after having destroyed the power of England by an attack upon India, should share between them the dominion of the world. He urged that they should conclude at the same time a treaty of peace and a treaty of alliance which provided for their co-operation throughout the world. Taking advantage of the Czar's easily aroused enthusiasm and of his lack of guile, Napoleon deliberately fooled Alexander the First and tricked him into an alliance with France by which all the advantages fell to Napoleon. How the Czar was treated is described as follows in his Memoirs by Talleyrand, who drafted the Treaty of Tilsit:

In the course of the conferences preceding the Treaty of Tilsit the Emperor Napoleon often spoke to the Czar Alexander of Moldavia and Wallachia as provinces destined some day to become Russian. Affecting to be carried away by some irresistible impulse, and to obey the decrees of Providence, he spoke of the division of European Turkey as inevitable. He then indicated, as if inspired, the general basis of the sharing of that empire, a portion of which was to fall to Austria in order to gratify her pride rather than her ambition. A shrewd mind could easily notice the effect produced upon the mind of Alexander by all those fanciful dreams. Napoleon watched him attentively and, as soon as he noticed that the prospects held out allured the Czar's imagination, he informed Alexander that letters from Paris necessitated his immediate return and gave orders for the treaty to be drafted at once. My instructions on the subject of that treaty were that no allusion to a partition of the Ottoman Empire should appear in it, nor even to the future fate of the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia. These instructions were strictly carried out. Napoleon thus left Tilsit, having made prospective arrangements which could serve him as he pleased for the accomplishment of his other designs. He had not bound himself at all, whereas, by the prospects he held out, he had allured the Czar Alexander and placed him, in relation to Turkey, in a doubtful position which might enable the Cabinet of the Tuileries to bring forth other pretensions untouched in the treaty.

According to the Treaty of Tilsit, which was signed on the 7th of July 1807, Napoleon and Alexander were to support one another on land and sea with the whole of their armed forces. The alliance was defensive and offensive. The two nations were to act in common in making war and in concluding peace. Russia was to act as mediator between England and France, and to request England to give up to France and her Allies all her conquests made since 1805. If England should refuse to submit, Russia was to make war upon England. Thus the duties of the Czar under the Treaty of Alliance were clearly out-

lined. The corresponding advantages, however, were only vaguely hinted at. Only the last article, Article 8, treated of Turkey, and it was worded as follows:

Pareillement, si par une suite des changements qui viennent de se faire à Constantinople, la Porte n'acceptait pas la médiation de la France, ou si, après qu'elle l'aura acceptée, il arrivait que, dans le délai de trois mois après l'ouverture des négociations, elles n'eussent pas conduit à un résultat satisfaisant, la France fera cause commune avec la Russie contre la Porte Ottomane, et les deux hautes parties contractantes s'entendront pour soustraire toutes les provinces de l'Empire ottoman en Europe, la ville de Constantinople et la province de Romélie exceptées, au joug et aux vexations des Turcs.

In return for making war upon England, Alexander the First received merely the promise that in certain eventualities France and Russia would act together against Turkey, and that in the event of such joint action they would come to an understanding with a view to freeing all the European provinces of Turkey from the Turks. However, Constantinople and the Province of Rumelia were to be reserved, and not to be partitioned by the Allies. In return for valuable service, Alexander the First received merely a vague and worthless promise.

As, in numerous conversations, Napoleon had promised to Alexander all he could desire, and as the Czar implicitly believed in his new friend, he probably did not look too closely into the wording of the one-sided treaty, and left Tilsit full of admiration for the Emperor of the French. Meanwhile Napoleon began a most cynical game with Alexander. Although the Treaty of Tilsit did not provide for the partition of Turkey, Napoleon continued using the partition of Turkey as a bait with which to secure Russia's support against England. He went even so far as to offer her, though only verbally, Constantinople itself. On the 7th of November 1807, Count Tolstoi, the Czar's representative in France, reported to Alexander that Napoleon had offered Constantinople to Russia in the following words:

Il (Napoléon) me dit que lui ne voyait aucun avantage pour la France au démembrement de l'empire ottoman, qu'il ne demandait pas mieux que de garantir son intégrité, qu'il le préférait même. . . Cependant, que si nous tenions infiniment à la possession de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, il s'y prêterait volontiers et qu'il nous offrait le thalweg du Danube, mais que ce serait à condition qu'il put s'en dédommager ailleurs.

Il consent même à un plus grand partage de l'empire ottoman s'il pouvait entrer dans les plans de la Russie. Il m'autorise à offrir Constantinople, car il m'assure de n'avoir contracté aucun engagement avec le gouvernement turc, et de n'avoir aucune vue sur cette capitale. . . . Dans la troisième supposition qui annoncerait un entier démembrement de la Turquie européenne, il consent à une extension pour la Russie jusqu'à Constantinople, cette capitale y comprise, contre des acquisitions sur lesquelles il ne s'est point expliqué.

Under unspecified circumstances Napoleon verbally agreed to Russia's occupying Constantinople in return for equally unspeci-

fied compensations for France.

While, on the 7th of November 1807, Napoleon professed to be completely indifferent to Turkey's fate and expressed his willingness to the Russian Ambassador that Russia should have Constantinople, he sent five days later, on the 12th of November, instructions to M. de Caulaincourt, the French Ambassador in Petrograd, in which he frankly stated that he desired the maintenance of Turkey's integrity, and that he had put the project of partitioning Turkey before Alexander solely for the purpose of attaching him to France with the bonds of hope. In these most important instructions to Caulaincourt we read:

Cette chute de l'Empire ottoman peut être désirée par le cabinet de Pétersbourgh; on sait qu'elle est inévitable; mais il n'est point de la politique des deux cours impériales de l'accélérer; elles doivent la reculer jusqu'au moment où le partage de ces vastes débris pourra se faire d'une manière plus avantageuse pour l'une et pour l'autre et où elles n'auront pas à craindre qu'une puissance actuellement leur ennemie s'en approprie, par la possession de l'Egypte et des îles, les plus riches dépouilles. C'est la plus forte objection de l'Empereur contre le partage de l'Empire ottoman.

To these instructions Napoleon added himself the following marginal note, emphasising his desire to preserve the integrity of Turkey:


Ainsi, le véritable désir de l'Empereur dans ce moment est que l'Empire ottoman reste dans son intégrité actuelle, vivant en paix avec la Russie et la France, ayant pour limites le thalweg du Danube, plus les places que la Turquie a sur ce fleuve. . . .

The instructions to M. de Caulaincourt then continued as follows:

Telles sont donc, Monsieur, sur ce point important de politique, les intentions de l'Empereur. Ce qu'il préférerait à tout serait que les Turcs pussent rester en paisible possession de la Valachie et de la Moldavie. . . .

Et enfin, quoique très éloigné du partage de l'Empire turc et regardant cette mesure comme funeste, il ne veut pas qu'en vous expliquant avec l'Empereur Alexandre et son ministre, vous la condamniez d'une manière absolue; mais il vous prescrit de représenter avec force les motifs qui doivent en faire reculer l'époque. Cet antique projet de l'ambition russe est un lien qui peut attacher la Russie à la France et, sous ce point de vue, il faut se garder de décourager entièrement ses espérances.

After informing his Ambassador that the projected partition of Turkey was nothing but a piece of deception whereby to secure Alexander's support, Napoleon told him in the same instructions that the projected Franco-Russian expedition against India was a sham and that he had put it forward only with the



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object of frightening the English into making peace. That most extraordinary and most significant passage runs as follows:

On pourra songer à une expédition dans les Indes; plus elle paraît chimérique, plus la tentative qui en serait faite (et que ne peuvent la France et la Russie?) épouvanterait les Anglais. La terreur semée dans les Indes Anglaises répandrait la confusion à Londres, et certainement quarante mille Français auxquels la Porte aurait accordé passage par Constantinople, se joignant à quarante mille Russes venus par le Caucase, suffiraient pour épouvanter l'Asie et pour en faire la conquête. C'est dans de pareilles vues que l'Empereur a laissé l'ambassadeur qu'il avait nommé pour la Perse se rendre à sa destination.

Napoleon's saying, 'The more fantastic an attempt to attack India would be, the more it will frighten the English,' is very amusing. There is some reason in his observation. England is more easily frightened by bogies than by realities, and one of the bogies which has frightened her most frequently during many decades is the bogey of Constantinople which Napoleon set up a century ago.

Being carried away by his enthusiasm and simple trustfulness, Alexander the First, remembering and often repeating the words which Napoleon had uttered at Tilsit, believed that Constantinople was in his grasp. However, he and his advisers doubted that the joint expedition against India projected by Napoleon was easy to carry out. According to Caulaincourt's report of the 31st of December 1807, Alexander the First and his minister received with some reserve the French proposals relating to that expedition. They obviously estimated more correctly the difficulties which such an undertaking would encounter owing to the vast distances and the inhospitability of the route. They did not share the illusions of Paul the First.


The French Ambassador in Russia was in constant and intimate relations with Alexander the First, and he reported his conversations like an accomplished shorthand-writer. According to a conversation with the Czar, which he communicated to Napoleon on the 21st of January 1808, Napoleon himself had admitted at Tilsit the impossibility of striking at India by a march over land. The Ambassador reported:


Alexandre I: L'Empereur (Napoléon) m'en a parlé à Tilsit. Je suis entré là-dessus en détail avec lui. Il m'a paru convaincu comme moi que c'était impossible.

L'Ambassadeur: Les choses impossibles sont ordinairement celles qui réussissent le mieux, parce que ce sont celles aux quelles on s'attend le moins.

Alexandre I: Mais les distances, les subsistances, les déserts?

L'Ambassadeur: Les troupes de Votre Majesté qui sont venues d'Irkoutsk en Autriche ou en Pologne ont fait plus de chemin qu'il n'y en a des frontières de son empire dans l'Inde. Quant aux subsistances, le biscuit





Alexandre I: Mais par où pensez-vous que nos armées devraient passer? L'Ambassadeur: Il faudrait préalablement des conventions avec la Perse et la Turquie. L'Armée française, par exemple, en ferait une avec la Porte, puisque Constantinople est son chemin naturel. Celle de Votre Majesté passerait par le Caucase, si on n'avait pas les moyens nécessaires pour lui faire traverser la mer Caspienne.

Alexandre I: Mon cher général, c'est un bien grand projet. Mais que de difficultés, pour ne pas dire plus.

While in the time of Paul the First the combined French and Russian armies were to march upon India via Warsaw and the Caspian Sea, Napoleon now proposed that the French Army should march via Constantinople. He evidently sought for a pretext to control that town and the Straits, and with them the Russian Black Sea. Meanwhile he continued playing with On the 2nd of February 1808 he wrote to his Ambassador in Russia that he was on the point of arranging for an expedition to India, combined with the partition of Turkey, that a joint army of twenty to twenty-five thousand Russians, eight to ten thousand Austrians, and thirty to forty thousand Frenchmen, should be set in motion towards India; 'que rien n'est facile comme cette opération; qu'il est certain qu'avant que cette armée soit sur l'Euphrate la terreur sera en Angleterre.' On the 6th of February 1808 Napoleon told the Russian Ambassador, Count Tolstoi, according to the report of the latter, 'Une fois sur l'Euphrate, rien n'empêche d'arriver aux Indes. Ce n'est pas une raison pour échouer dans cette entreprise parce qu'Alexandre et Tamerlan n'y ont pas réussi. Il s'agit de faire mieux qu'eux.'

While Napoleon was amusing Alexander with vain hopes and fantastic proposals, the Czar had begun a very costly war with England in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Tilsit. Feeling at last that the question of Turkey was being treated dilatorily and with the greatest vagueness, he pressed for some more definite arrangement and a series of non-official conferences regarding that country took place between the French Ambassador in Russia and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Acting upon his secret instructions given above, Caulaincourt prevaricated and at first refused to consider the position of Constantinople because that position was strategically too important to be rashly disposed of. Being anxious to dispossess the Turks, largely for reasons of humanity, Alexander then prcposed to make Constantinople a free town. According to Caulaincourt's report of the 1st of March 1808, the Czar said to the French Ambassador 'Constantinople est un point important, trop loin de vous et que vous regardez peut-être comme

March

trop important pour nous. J'ai une idée pour que cela ne fasse pas de difficultés, faisons-en une espèce de ville libre.'

The question arose what equivalent could be given to France if Russia should take Constantinople. At the second conference, which took place on the 2nd of March, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested that France should occupy Egypt, stating 'La France a toujours désiré l'Egypte. Sous le règne de l'impératrice Catherine, elle nous avait fait proposer par l'empereur Joseph II de nous laisser aller à Constantinople si nous lui laissions prendre l'Egypte.' The question of Constantinople itself had to be tackled. On the 4th of March the French Ambassador, speaking, of course, without authority, offered Constantinople to Russia, but claimed at the same time the Dardanelles for France. In other words, he suggested that although Russia might possibly be allowed to occupy Constantinople, France ought to dominate that town by the possession of the Dardanelles. Not unnaturally, the Czar, who was apprised of these demands, refused even to consider that suggestion.

In course of time, the real intentions of Napoleon were revealed to Russia. The Alliance was followed by a breach between the two monarchs, by Napoleon's defeat in 1812, and by his downfall.

The most important documents quoted in these pages show conclusively that the Russian expeditions against India prepared or discussed in the time of Napoleon were inspired not by Paul the First and Alexander the First, but by the great Corsican, that Alexander desired to acquire Constantinople chiefly owing to Napoleon's incitement, that the joint Franco-Russian expedition against India was sheer and deliberate humbug to frighten the English. In the words of the great historian Vandal, the author of the best book on Napoleon and Alexander the First:

The idea of partitioning Turkey was rather a Napoleonic than a Russian idea. Napoleon rather intended to make a demonstration than an attack. He thought that if the French troops crossed the Bosphorus, Asia would be trembling, and England's position be shaken to its very foundations; that in view of the menace she would be willing to make peace with France.

The documents given clearly establish that Napoleon neither intended to give Constantinople to Russia, nor to attack England in India, that on the contrary he wanted Constantinople for France, and that he attached greater value to Egypt than to Constantinople. In his instructions to Caulaincourt, Napoleon confessed that his plans could be carried out only if he ruled the sea, that a premature movement on Constantinople would result in England occupying Egypt, the most valuable part of the Turkish empire. Napoleon might conceivably have given Constantinople to Russia for a time, but he would have done so only with the object

of involving Russia in trouble with England. According to Villemain, he said 'J'ai voulu refouler amicalement la Russie en Asie; je lui ai offert Constantinople.' Commenting on these words, Vandal tells us that, in dangling the bait of Constantinople before Russia, Napoleon merely aimed at involving that country in a life-and-death struggle with England.

Rather by his threats of attacking India in company with Russia overland than by any actual attempt at carrying out that mad adventure, did Napoleon create profound suspicion against Russia among the English, and his machinations have been the cause of a century of Anglo-Russian distrust, friction, and misunderstandings. At the Congress of Vienna, Lord Castlereagh opposed Russia's acquisition of Poland, fearing that that country might become dangerously strong. Replying to the expressions of the British representative's fears, Alexander sent Lord Castlereagh, on the 21st of November 1814, a most remarkable memorandum, in which we read:

Justice established, as an immutable rule for all the transactions between the coalesced States, that the advantages which each of them should be summoned to reap from the triumph of the common cause should be in proportion to the perseverance of their efforts and to the magnitude of the sacrifices.

The necessity for a political balance in its turn prescribed that there should be given to each State a degree of consistency and of political Conventions in the means which each of them should possess in itself to cause them to be respected.

By invariably acting in accordance with the two principles which have been just stated the Emperor resolved to enter upon the war, to support it alone at its commencement, and to carry it on by means of a coalition up to the single point at which the general pacification of Europe might be based on the solid and immovable foundations of the independence of States and of the sacred rights of nations. The barrier of the Oder once overstepped, Russia fought only for her Allies: in order to increase the power of Prussia and of Austria, to deliver Germany, to save France from the frenzy of a despotism of which she alone bore the entire weight after her reverses.

If the Emperor had based his policy upon combinations of a private and exclusive interest when the army of Napoleon, collected together, so to speak, at the expense of Europe, had found its grave in Russia, His Majesty could have made peace with France; and without exposing himself to the chances of a war the issue of which was so much the more uncertain as it depended on the determination of other Cabinets, without imposing fresh sacrifices on his people, might have contented himself, on the one hand, with the security acquired for his Empire; and, on the other hand, have acquiesced in the conditions which Bonaparte, instructed by a sad experience, would have been eager to propose to him. But the Emperor, in the magnanimous enterprise to which he had applied himself, availed himself of the generous enthusiasm of his people to second the desires of all the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The writer gives the Foreign Office version of this memorandum, some passages of which appear to have suffered in the translation.

nations of Europe. He fought with disinterested views for a cause with which the destinies of the human race were connected. Faithful to his principles, His Majesty has constantly laboured to favour the interests of the Powers which had rallied round the common cause, placing his own interests only in the second rank. He has lavished his resources in order to render their united efforts prosperous under the firm conviction that his Allies, far from finding in a conduct so pure grounds for complaint, would be grateful to him for having made all private consideration subordinate to the success of an enterprise which had the general good for its object.

The Czar spoke truly. He had fought in 1813 and 1814 against Napoleon for purely ideal reasons. After Napoleon's disastrous defeat in Russia in 1812 Russia herself was secure against another attack from France. Had she followed a purely selfish policy, she would have left the Western Powers to their fate. While they were weakened in their struggle against Napoleon the powerful Russian Army might have secured the most far-reaching advantages to the country, and might certainly have taken Constantinople. Alexander obviously joined in the war against Napoleon actuated by the wish of giving at last a durable peace to Europe. How strongly the Czar was inspired by ideal and religious motives may be seen from the Holy Alliance Treaty which he drew up in his own handwriting, and which established that henceforth all rulers should be guided in their policy solely by the dictates of the Christian religion. That little-known document was worded as follows:

## In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia having in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon those States which place their confidence and their hope in it alone, acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of settling the steps to be observed by the Powers in their reciprocal relations upon the sublime truths which the Holy Religion of our Saviour teaches:

They solemnly declare that the present Act has no other object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, and guide all their steps as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections. In consequence their Majesties have agreed to the following Articles:—

Article 1. Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the Three Contracting Menarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as fellow countrymen they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance, and,

regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice.

Article 2. In consequence the sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation: the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the one family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom, that is to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.

Article 3. All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.

After the Peace of Vienna an era of reaction began, and the hostility shown by the Governments to the people was attributed not to Prince Metternich, who was chiefly responsible for it, but to the Czar and to the Holy Alliance, which was considered to be an instrument of oppression. However, the fact that the Holy Alliance was a purely ideal compact is attested by Prince Metternich himself in his *Memoirs*. After describing its genesis, Metternich wrote:

Voilà l'histoire de la Sainte Alliance, qui même dans l'esprit prévenu de son auteur, ne devait être qu'une manifestation morale, tandis qu'aux yeux des autres signataires de l'acte elle n'avait pas même cette signification; par conséquent elle ne mérite aucune des interprétations que l'esprit de parti lui a données dans la suite. . Ultérieurement il n'a jamais été question, entre les cabinets, de la 'Sainte Alliance,' et jamais il n'aurait pu en être question. Les partis hostiles aux Souverains ont seuls exploité cet acte, et s'en servis comme d'une arme pour calomnier les intentions les plus pures de leurs adversaires. La 'Sainte Alliance' n'a pas été fondée pour restreindre les droits des peuples ni pour favoriser l'absolutisme et la tyrannie sous n'importe quelle forme. Elle fut uniquement l'expression des sentiments mystiques de l'Empereur Alexandre et l'application des principes du Christianisme à la politique.

Metternich described Alexander's liberal and generous views as 'chimerical, revolutionary and jacobinic' in his letters to the Austrian Emperor, and in his Memoirs and his correspon-

dence he prided himself that he had succeeded in regaining the Czar to reaction. Metternich and other Austrian and German statesmen strove to keep Russia backward and weak by recommending a policy of repression and persecution. Austria and Germany are largely responsible for Russian illiberalism and Russian oppression.

Let us now cast a brief glance at the events which brought

about the Crimean War.

During the first half of the nineteenth century Turkey was almost continually in a state of the gravest disorder, and its downfall seemed to be imminent. Alexander the First had died in 1825, and had been succeeded by Nicholas the First. Believing a catastrophe in Turkey inevitable, he appointed, in 1829, a special committee, consisting of the most eminent statesmen, to consider the problem of Turkey. According to de Martens, Recueil des traités de la Russie, Count Nesselrode, the Vice-Chancellor of the Empire, stated before that Committee that the preservation of Turkey was rather useful than harmful to the true interests of Russia, that it was in the interest of the country to have for neighbour a weak State such as Turkey. After thorough and lengthy discussion, the following resolutions were adopted at a sitting presided over by the Czar himself:

(1) That the advantages of maintaining Turkey in Europe are greater than the disadvantages;


(2) That consequently the downfall of Turkey would be opposed to

Russia's own interests;

(3) That therefore it would be prudent to prevent its fall and to take advantage of the opportunity which might offer for concluding an honourable peace. However, if the last hour of Turkey in Europe should have struck, Russia would be compelled to take the most energetic measures in order to prevent the openings leading to the Black Sea falling into the hands of another Great Power.

During the period preceding the outbreak of the Crimean War Russia's policy was directed by the principles laid down in 1829, and the war itself was obviously due to misunderstandings between England and Russia, and to the prevalence of that distrust of Russia among Englishmen which Napoleon had created in the past. Foreseeing the possibility of Turkey's collapse, the Czar desired to provide for such an event in conjunction with England. With this object in view, he told the British Ambassador, Sir G. H. Seymour, on the 9th of January 1853:

The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces; the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs and that neither should take any decisive step.



Five days later, on the 14th of January, the Czar disclosed his intentions more clearly to the British Ambassador. Fearing that in case of Turkey's downfall England might seize Constantinople, and desiring to prevent that step in accordance with the principles laid down by the Committee of 1829 and given above, he stated:

Maintenant je désire vous parler en ami et en gentleman; si nous arrivons à nous entendre sur cette affaire, l'Angleterre et moi, pour le reste, peu m'importe; il m'est indifférent ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant donc de franchise, je vous dis nettement, que si l'Angleterre songe à s'établir un de ces jours à Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas; je ne vous prête point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement; de mon côté, je suis également disposé de prendre l'engagement de ne pas m'y établir, en propriétaire, il s'entend, car en dépositaire je ne dis pas; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me misent dans le cas d'occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve prévu, si l'on doit tout laisser aller au hasard.

Commenting upon the Czar's confidential statements, the Ambassador reported that he was 'impressed with the belief that . . . his Majesty is sincerely desirous of acting in harmony with her Majesty's Government.' In a further conversation the Czar told the Ambassador on the 21st of February:

The Turkish Empire is a thing to be tolerated, not to be reconstituted. . . . As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia; that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.

The intentions of the Czar, though somewhat vaguely expressed, were perfectly clear. He wished to bring about a peaceful solution of the Turkish problem in case of Turkey's downfall. In accordance with the principles laid down in 1829, he did not desire to see the Dardanelles in the hands of a first-rate Power, and was unwilling to see England established in Constantinople and dominating the Black Sea. He was apparently quite willing that Constantinople and the Straits should be held by some small Power instead of Turkey, or that the position should be internationalised in some form or other in accordance with the ideas expressed by his brother in 1808, so long as he could feel reasonably secure that no foreign Power would seize the openings of the Black Sea and attack Russia in its most vulnerable

quarter. If England should meet him in his desire to regulate the position of Constantinople in a way which would not threaten Russia's security in the Black Sea, he was quite willing that England should occupy Egypt. Possibly the idea that Russia should acquire Constantinople was at the back of his mind, but as Egypt was far more valuable than Constantinople he had offered beforehand the most ample compensation to this country. Unfortunately, the distrust existing against Russia since the time of Napoleon was too deeply rooted. The Czar's proposals were treated almost contemptuously. In replying to the Czar, the British Government, adverting to the sufferings of the Christians living in Turkey upon which Nicholas had dwelt, stated on the 28th of March:

... The treatment of Christians is not harsh, and the toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its subjects might serve as an example to some Governments who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous Power.

Her Majesty's Government believe that Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its Allies, and a determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to the dignity and independence of the Sultan.

The English Government, being filled with suspicions, did not even make a serious attempt to discover the aims and intentions of the Czar. Vaguely dreading Russia, England supported Turkey against that country. Thus Great Britain has been largely responsible not only for the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, but also for the ill-treatment of the Christians and the massacres which have taken place throughout Turkey during many decades.

What has created England's instinctive fear of Russia? If we look at the map, if we consider size to be a criterion of national strength, then Russia is immensely powerful. ever, the Russo-Turkish War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the present War have shown that we need perhaps not have feared Russia's strength so much as her weakness. If Russia had in the past been stronger, if Russia's strength had been in accordance with the views which until lately were generally held here, the present War would not have broken out. German soldiers evidently appraised the military power of Russia far more correctly than did British statesmen. By opposing Russia in the past, England has worked not for her own advantage and for the security of India, but for the benefit of Germany and Austria. England's anti-Russian policy and Russia's anti-British policy were largely inspired first from Paris and then from Berlin and Vienna. That is plain to all who are acquainted with recent diplomatic history.

The century-old antagonism between England and Russia has

been the work of Napoleon, of Bismarck, and of Bismarck's successors. The Russian danger, Russia's aggressiveness, and Russia's constant desire to seize India, are largely figments of the imagination. Russia has little desire to possess India. If she had it she would probably be unable to administer it. The present Czar said to Prince Hohenlohe on the 6th of September 1896: 'Who is to take India from the English? We are not stupid enough to have that plan.' It would be as difficult for Russia to attack India at the present day as it was in the time of the Emperor Paul. It is true Russia has now a couple of railways which run up to the Indian frontier, but India also has railways; these will facilitate the concentration of troops at any point at which that country may be attacked, and with the development of transport by land and sea, and the growing strength of the Empire, the danger of an attack upon India by Russia seems to be decreasing from year to year. In the picturesque language of the late Lord Salisbury, England backed the wrong horse in opposing Russia's policy towards Turkey in the past.

National policy is, as a rule, in accordance with the national character. The Russians are rather dreamers than men of action. rather men of quiet thought than men of ambition. The heroes of Tolstov and of other great Russian authors are not men of the Nietzsche type but men of peace, idealists, desiring the best, animated by a deep sense of religion. The strong idealist strain in the Russian character has found expression not only in the idealist policy followed by Alexander the First and Nicholas the Second, but in that of other Russian Czars as well. Russia has had a Peter the Great, but she has not had a Napoleon, and she is not likely to have one. Those who believe that Russia aims at dominating the world, at conquering all Asia and invading India, are neither acquainted with the Russian character nor with the resources, the capabilities, and the needs of the country. Russia is a very large State. It is extremely powerful for defence, because it is protected by vast distances, a rigorous climate, and very inferior means of communication. The same circumstances which make Russia exceedingly powerful for defence make her very weak for a war of aggression. - That has been seen in all her foreign wars without a single exception. Last, but not least, the Russian people and their rulers have become awakened to the necessity of modernising the country. A new Russia has arisen. Russia has made rapid progress during the last two decades, but her progress has perhaps been slower than that of other nations. Hence Russia is still very poor and backward. She has some railways, but her means of inland transport are totally insufficient. She has scarcely any roads, except a few military ones. France has ten times the mileage of roads possessed by Russia. We hear frequently of the absence of roads in Poland and of the impossibility of moving troops through a sea of mud. Poland is that district of Russia which is best provided with The peasants throughout Russia use still almost exclusively wooden ploughs with which only the surface can be scratched. By changing their wooden ploughs for iron ones they could plough twice as deeply and double their harvests, but they are too poor to provide modern agricultural implements. many Russian villages no iron implements, not even iron nails. may be seen, and the methods of Russia's agriculture are still those of the Dark Ages. The manufacturing industries of the country are in their infancy. The vast majority of the people can neither read nor write, and newspapers exist only in the large towns. If we compare the economic and social conditions of Russia with those existing in other countries it becomes clear that the principal need of Russia is not further expansion but internal development, and in view of the poverty of the country the development of the great Russian estate is possible only in time of peace. For her the restriction of armaments is more necessary than it is for any other Great Power. The principal interest of Russia is peace. That has become clear to every thinking Russian and to the whole Russian nation.

When the great Peace Congress assembles the question of Constantinople will come up for settlement, and from interested quarters we shall be told once more that Constantinople is 'the key of the world.' A glance at the map shows that Constantinople is not the key of the world and is not even the key of the Mediterranean, but that it is merely the key of the Black Sea. Prince Bismarck possessed military ability of the highest kind, and being keenly aware that foreign policy and strategy must go hand in hand, he kept constantly in touch with Germany's lead-He clearly recognised the fallacy of Napoleon's celebrated epigram. Hence, when a member of the Reichstag, referring to the Eastern Question, spoke of the Dardanelles as the key to the dominion of the world, Bismarck smilingly replied 'If the Dardanelles are the key to the dominion of the world it obviously follows that up to now the Sultan has dominated the world.' Constantinople has been possessed by various States. but none of them has so far dominated the world. In Bismarck's words Constantinople has disagreed with all the nations which have possessed it hitherto. Why that has been the case will presently be shown.

So far Constantinople has not given a great accession of strength to the nations which have held it. Far from considering Constantinople in the hands of Russia as a source of strength, Bismarck rather saw in it a source of weakness and of danger.


He wrote in his Memoirs: 'I believe that it would be advantageous for Germany if the Russians in one way or another, physically or diplomatically, were to establish themselves at Constantinople and had to defend that position.' Russia is almost invulnerable as long as she can defend herself with her best weapons: her vast distances, her lack of railways and roads, and her rigorous climate. But the same elements become disadvantageous to Russia's defence if a highly vulnerable point near her frontier can be attacked. In the Crimean War Russia almost bled to death because of the difficulty of sending troops to the Crimea. Her failure in Manchuria arose from the same cause. At present Russia possesses only one point of capital importance on the sea, Petrograd, which can comparatively easily be attacked by an army landed in the neighbourhood. If she occupies Constantinople, she must be ready to defend it, and a very large number of troops will be required to protect the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Straits against an enemy. It is not generally known that the Constantinople position is not circumscribed but very extensive, and that it is not easy to defend it against a mobile and powerful enemy, especially if it is simultaneously attacked by land and sea. The small maps of Turkey are deceptive. It is hardly realised that the distance from the entrance of the Dardanelles to the exit of the Bosphorus is nearly 200 miles. Strategists are agreed that a Power holding Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles must possess territory at least as far inland as the Enos-Midia line—that is, the line from the town of Enos opposite the island of Samothraki to the town of Midia on the Black Sea. A straight line connecting these two towns would be 120 miles long, or exactly as long as the distance which separates London from Cardiff, Paris from Boulogne, or Strasburg from Coblenz. It is clear that a large army and extensive fortifications are needed to defend so broad a front against a determined attack. In addition, Russia would have to defend the shore of the Gulf of Saros and the sea-coast of the peninsula of Galipoli against a landing. This shore-line extends to about 100 miles. Lastly, she would have to defend the opening of the Dardanelles and to prevent an attack upon the Constantinople position across the narrows from the Asiatic mainland. It would be difficult enough to defend this vulnerable and extensive position if it was organically connected with Russia. It will of course be still more difficult to defend it in view of the fact that Roumania and Bulgaria, two powerful States, separate Russia from Constantinople. Russia cannot reach Constantinople by land unless she should succeed in incorporating Roumania and Bulgaria in some way or other, or unless the entire north of Asia Minor, which is now possessed by Turkey, should fall into Russia's hands,

enabling that country to create a land connexion between her Caucasian provinces and the southern shores of the Sea of Marmora and the two Straits. Both events appear so unlikely that they need scarcely be seriously considered. The Constantinople position, if held by Russia, would be detached from that country. The Russian troops garrisoning it would be cut off from the motherland in case of war. Hence they would have to be prepared for a sudden attack and to be always strong enough to defend the peninsula unaided for a very long time. They would have to be provided with gigantic stores of food and of ammunition. It is therefore clear that Russia would require a very large permanent garrison for securing the integrity of Constantinople. In case of war she would undoubtedly require several hundred thousand men for that purpose. Possibly she would need as many as 500,000 men if a determined attack by land and sea was likely; and herein lies the reason for the opinion of the Commission of 1829 that it would be to Russia's advantage if the status quo at Constantinople was not disturbed, if a weak Power was in the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

There are two points of very great strategical importance in the Eastern Mediterranean: the position of Constantinople and Egypt; and Egypt is undoubtedly by far the more important of the two. When in 1797 Napoleon reached the Adriatic he was struck by the incomparable advantages offered by the position of Egypt, and he ear-marked that country for France in case of a partition of Turkey. A year later he headed an expedition to Egypt, not merely in order to strike at England, but largely, if not chiefly, in order to conquer that most important strategical position for France. While the Sea of Marmora and the Straits are merely the connecting links between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, Egypt, especially since the construction of the Suez Canal, is the connecting link of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, of Europe and Asia, of the most populated continents and the busiest seas. Hence the Suez Canal route is, and will remain for centuries, the most valuable strategical and trade route in the world, and it is of course of particular importance to the nation which possesses India. Bismarck said to Busch:

Egypt is as necessary to England as is her daily bread, because of the Suez Canal, which is the shortest connexion between the Eastern and Western halves of the British Empire. The Suez Canal is like the nerve at the back of the neck which connects the spine with the brain.

Those who believe in Napoleonic epigrams will find several remarkable sayings of his relating to Egypt. The great Corsican said to Montholon 'Si j'étais resté en Egypte, je serais à présent



If we wish to compare the relative importance of Constantinople and of the Suez Canal we need only assume that another Power possessed Egypt and Great Britain Constantinople. While Constantinople would be useless to Great Britain the occupation of Egypt by a non-British Power would jeopardise Britain's position in India and her Eastern trade. Napoleon, with his keen eye for strategy, told O'Meara:

Egypt once in possession of the French, farewell India to the English. Turkey must soon fall, and it will be impossible to divide it without allotting some portion to France, which will be Egypt. But if you had kept Alexandria, you would have prevented the French from obtaining it, and of ultimately gaining possession of India, which will certainly follow their possession of Egypt.

In the sailing-ship era the position of Constantinople was far more important to England than it is at present. Then Russia, dominating Constantinople, might conceivably have sent a large fleet into the Mediterranean and have seized Malta, Egypt, and Gibraltar before England could have received any news of the sailing of the Russian armada. With the advent of the electric cable, wireless telegraphy, and steam shipping, that danger has disappeared. From the Russian point of view Constantinople is valuable partly for ideal and partly for strategical reasons. The glamour of Constantinople and its incomparable position on the Golden Horn has fascinated men since the earliest times. stantinople might become the third capital of Russia, and it would, for historical and religious reasons, be a capital worthy of that great Empire. From the strategical point of view Russia desires to possess Constantinople not for aggression but for defence, for protecting the Black Sea shores. Whether, however, she would be wise in accepting Constantinople, even if it were offered to her by all Europe, seems somewhat doubtful. It is true that Constantinople dominates the Black Sea. At the same time Constantinople is dominated by the lands of the Balkan Peninsula. In Talleyrand's words : 'Le centre de gravité du monde n'est ni sur l'Elbe, ni sur l'Adige, il est là-bas aux frontières de l'Europe, sur le Danube.' Similarly Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, one of Napoleon's best generals, said in his Memoirs that

<sup>1</sup> CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

March

Wallachia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria were, in his opinion, the key of the Orient. He thought that the security of Europe was less threatened by Russia possessing Constantinople, supposing the Austrians occupied the countries at the mouth of the Danube. than if Constantinople was held by French and English troops while the Russians were masters of the lower Danube. reasoning of Talleyrand and Marmont seems faultless. It will probably be confirmed by the British strategists, who ought to be consulted by our statesmen on the strategical value of Constantinople. A demonstration of the Balkan States, especially if it were backed by their Central European supporters, against the 120 miles of the Enos-Midia line would obviously convert the Constantinople position from a strategical asset into a very serious strategical liability. It is true that in the event of a Russian attack upon India England could no longer attack Russia in the Black Sea in conjunction with Turkey. However, as Constantinople is a far more valuable point to Russia than the Crimea or Odessa, and as the Balkan States themselves may desire to possess Constantinople, it is obvious that by occupying it Russia would not increase her power but would merely expose herself to greater dangers than heretofore.

Until recently the possibility of the Dardanelles being closed against Russia preoccupied Russian statesmen only. Now it interests the whole people. The Russian nation is determined that never again shall all its foreign trade be stopped by a hostile Power dominating Constantinople. The Duma session has shown that the nation demands freedom for Russia's Black Sea trade by Russia's control of the narrows.

Various proposals have been made for dealing with Constantinople and the Straits after the expulsion of the Turks. Some have advocated that Constantinople should be given to Russia, some that the position should be given to some small Power, such as Bulgaria, or be divided between two or more Powers, one possessing the southern and the other the northern shore; others have recommended that that much coveted position should be neutralised in some form or other. The importance of Constantinople to Russia lies in this, that it is the door to her house, that he who holds Constantinople is able to attack Russia in the Consequently Russia and Russia's principal Sea. opponents would continue to strive for the possession of the narrows, supposing they had been given to some small Power, to several Powers in joint occupation, or had been neutralised. The struggle for Constantinople can obviously end only when the city and the straits are possessed by a first-rate Power. That is the only solution, and the only Power which has a strong claim upon the possession of Constantinople is evidently Russia.

Until recently it seemed possible that Constantinople would become the capital of one of the Balkan States or of a Balkan Confederation. Many years ago Mazzini, addressing the awakening Balkan nations, admonished them: 'Stringetevi in una Confederazione e sia Constantinopoli la vostra città anfizionica, la città dei vostri poteri centrali, aperta a tutti, serva a nessuno.' The internecine war of the Balkan States has destroyed, apparently for ever, the possibility that Constantinople will belong to the Balkan peoples, and perhaps it is better that it is so. Constantinople might have proved as fatal an acquisition to the Balkan peoples as it has been to the Turks, and for all we know it may not prove a blessing to Russia.

Those who fear that Russia might become a danger to Europe in the future, and who would therefore like to see the status quo preserved both in Austria-Hungary and at Constantinople-at first sight Austria-Hungary, as at present constituted, appears to be an efficient counterpoise to Russia—seem very short-sighted. I think I have shown that Russia's acquisition of Constantinople, far from increasing Russia's military strength, would greatly increase her vulnerability. Hence the possession of Constantinople should make Russia more cautious and more peaceful. Similarly, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary into its component parts, an event which at present is contemplated with dread by those who fear Russia's power, would apparently not increase Russia's strength or the strength of Slavism, but would more likely be disadvantageous to both. The weakness of Austria-Hungary arises from its disunion. Owing to its disunion the country is militarily and economically weak. If Austria-Hungary should be replaced by a number of self-governing States these will develop much faster. Some of these States will be Slavonic, but it is not likely that they will become Russia's tools. Liberated nations, as Bismarck has told us, are not grateful but exacting. The Balkan nations which Russia has freed from the Turkish yoke, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Roumania, have promptly asserted their independence from Russia and have developed a strong individuality of their own. The Slavonic nationalities of Austria-Hungary also would probably assert their independence. economic reasons the small and medium-sized nations in the Balkan Peninsula and those within the limits of present-day Austria-Hungary would probably combine, and if they felt threatened by Russia they would naturally form a strong political union. A greater Austria-Hungary, a State on a federal basis, would arise in the place of the present State, and, strengthened by self-government, the power of that confederation would be far greater than that possessed by the Dual Monarchy.

Lastly, the world will as little tolerate a Russian Napoleon as

a French or a German one. Hitherto every nation which has tried to enslave the world by force has been checked by a world combination. The Russians will scarcely be anxious to undertake a policy which has brought about the downfall of Turkey, ancient Spain, Napoleonic France, and modern Germany. Whenever a great danger arises to the liberty of the world the threatened nations combine for mutual protection, and a balance of power, sufficiently strong to restrain it, is automatically established. That has been the lesson of history.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

# THE WAR OF PURIFICATION

A DUTCHMAN'S VIEW

MR. Stephen Graham, the poet and prophet of Anglo-Russia, writes in one of his delectable letters to *The Times* (October 13) on the 'Holy War' of the great Slav nation. 'This War,' he says, 'is holy to everyone, and its motto is: getting rid of the German spirit in life, getting rid of the sheer materialistic point of view, getting rid of brutality, and the lack of understanding of others. . . . Russia, above all things, is fighting that she may go on being herself.' To be oneself, this end, indeed, is worth any amount of national debt accumulated, any number of lives lost, any quantity, aye, and quality, of art destroyed and treasure spoliated through the vultures of 'Kultur.'

Mr. Graham tells us that, whereas 'Britain is fighting for disarmament and universal peace . . . Russia is fighting to preserve her national life and religion.' But, we would ask, is not Britain, too, fighting for the same end? or, at least, will not this holy war produce for Britain a like result? Does not Britain, too, stand in need of a purifying process? Does not Britain, too, need to fight that she may go on being herself? Has not, of late years, the Germanising spell been cast also over Britain? In certain circles, at least, it has become fashionable to borrow the ideas and ideals of Germany for fear of being considered 'unprogressive' and 'insular.'

When Lord Haldane, for instance, wishes to advocate the cult of 'Higher Nationality,' he finds his ideal in German virtue.

In the English language we have no name for it [he declares], and this is unfortunate, for the lack of a distinctive name has occasioned confusion both of thought and of expression. German writers have, however, marked out the system to which I refer and have given it the name of 'Sittlichkeit.' In his book Der Zweck im Recht Rudolph von Jehring, a famous professor at Göttingen, with whose figure I was familiar when I was a student there nearly forty years ago, pointed out, in the part which he devoted to the subject of 'Sittlichkeit,' that it was the merit of the German language to have been the only one to find a really distinctive and scientific expression for it.

When Mr. Lloyd George and other reformers realise the necessity for redress of social deformity, they copy more or less closely the system of Prussian bureaucracy.

And, above all, when the more recent universities in British commercial and industrial centres desire to be up to date, it is the methods of Germany they adapt-if not adopt.

This Germanising trend need not be considered in any partisan spirit. For it is almost general, almost unintentional and unconscious. But this very naturalness and unconsciousness constitute its chief danger.

## IT

As a Dutchman, the writer of this article fears the Germanising trend. For, as a Dutchman, he can fully apprehend the perils of the process. In the Netherlands the trend has finally developed into the fact of Germaniston. There a once original nationalism lies crushed below the deadweight of 'Kultur.' In the first instance it began at the universities. Here, as is the case in Britain, German learning was at first admired and German methods copied, little by little and increasingly, to the gradual exclusion of the learning and methods of other nations and the evaporation of national distinctiveness.

The process of Germanisation is akin to the process of alcoholisation. The longer the patient indulges in it, the weaker his resisting power to it becomes and the stronger doses of the poison he is able and forced to absorb, until finally all proper food comes to be distasteful to him and can no longer be assimilated.

The Dutch universities have practically come to this pass, that unless scholarship in any special branch is of German origin and bears the German hall-mark, it tends to be considered as something very inferior-indeed, barely as scholarship at all.

As Dutch students are good linguists, it rarely pays expense and labour to write special text-books for them or to translate foreign text-books into Dutch. And, of course, the text-books used are almost exclusively German.

In order to bring the result of their investigations before a wider public than that of the Netherlands, Dutch professors often use for their treatises and Dutch students for their theses an international vehicle. And, of course, the language chosen is almost without exception the German language. Fifty years ago French was at least equally favoured.

More phenomenal even than this is the fact that when foreign professors—usually Germans of course—are appointed at Dutch universities, they are wont to lecture at the expense of the Dutch taxpayer, in Dutch lecture-rooms, to Dutch students in-German!

It stands to reason that the Germans have not hesitated to exploit this mental disease. Whenever a Dutch scholar promises to rise to more than average celebrity, some prominent German university is sure to hold out to him an often considerable bribe in order to estrange him from his own country and to gain him for the 'Fatherland.' Van 't Hoff, of Berlin, is but one instance

Another amiable weakness of the 'Kultur'-bringers is to pounce upon any newly hatched Dutch invention or discovery, out of many. to alter it slightly, and then through the prolific technical Press of the 'Fatherland' to valuatit to the world as a new achievement of some incomparable Hor Doktor.'

There was a time when the learning of Leyden and Utrecht and the other Dutch universities held its own, when from all countries of Europe students flocked to the Netherlands to hear the teaching of Arminius and Grotius, of Huygens and Boerhave, of Leeuwenhoek and Musschenbroek. That time is past. Dutch learning has not become less. But it has ceased being distinctive. Leyden is a lesser Leipzig, Utrecht another Göttingen.

Last spring Dr. Schoemaker, a well-known Hague physician, visited the great Medical Congress in the United States. He was much impressed with the high scientific and scholarly standard of a non-German country like America. 'But tell me,' he said to some of the leading professors to whom he was introduced, 'what opinion have you of our Dutch medical science?' 'Well, none at all!' was the reply the astonished doctor received. do not distinguish between Dutch learning and German. identify your achievements with those of Germany.' And they were perfectly right. Intellectually Holland, if not yet altogether, has very nearly been annexed by Germany. Intellectually the Dutch are the bondsmen of the Germans, who gain credit at their expense. And such will be the fate of any other nation, be they Russians, be they Scandinavians, be they Swiss, or be they English, who do not, first and foremost of all things, fight that they may go on being themselves.

The very fountainhead of Dutch intellect, aye, and intelligence, having been infected, the virus has not been slow gradually to pervade the entire system of the nation. As a matter of necessity it has been imbibed by all the higher professional and leading circles. Nor would a self-respecting journalist or primary teacher for anything on earth risk the stigma of unscholarliness.

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
If professors and doctors delight in cramming their libraries with German volumes and in quoting by preference German authority for each most obvious statement, so must they. Indeed, as might be expected, they show at all times a strong tendency to be what the French call plus royaliste que le roi.

And so it seems as though through the deadweight of 'Kultur' every vestige of originality must be squeezed out of the Dutch nation. A ponderous clumsiness begins to pervade Dutch lectures and treatises which by nature is not theirs. It is the German sense of involved and voluminous completeness. When a German wishes to explain how the sun is hot on a July morning he will first discuss the notion of time in general, beginning with a preface on the supposed identity of eternity and of the abstraction of time, which he will call 'Time-in-itself,' or 'Pure Time,' thus formulating: 'Pure Time and Pure Non-Time are identical.' In the course of his discussion he will, amongst many other subjects, argue profoundly on the relation of the name July to Julius Caesar and on the functional descent of the Kaiser from the Emperor Augustus, giving, moreover, a great deal of algebraical information on the known and supposed solar systems. This mentality is beginning to be faithfully reflected in modern Dutch literature. As an instance, the political and theological writings of Dr. Kuyper, the late Premier, are recommended to the

Half a century ago Dutch literature used to be moulded on the French and Latin model, and it is scarcely possible to imagine a sadder decay of speech than from the crystalline limpidity of the French to the murky nebulosities of the German language. A Swiss friend of the writer, who has spent a great part of her life in translating German theological works into French, complained to him the other day of the difficulties of her task. French,' she said, 'everything is clear and precise, and to the point and direct. In German the author contents himself with creating an impression through vague hints and suggestions. Often it is well-nigh impossible to content my French readers with the little the German author offers.' And some years ago a German who was studying philosophy at the Sorbonne assured me that many of his fellow-countrymen are in the habit of reading their 'Kant' in a French translation. Only thus did he become intelligible.

May this holy war preserve the English language for ever from the error of the Dutch, which nevertheless a century ago was as well leavened with Latin as English is at present.

Another even more loathsome symptom of the 'Kultur' disease is the unwonted pedantry which is making itself visible



An Edinburgh professor, who gives himself a great deal of trouble in making University life as agreeable and profitable for foreign students as possible, once experienced a ludicrous instance of this result of 'Kultur.' He had prepared a course for initiating his German students into some of the mysteries of the English language, and had written out a number of expressions and common phrases which he knew from experience to be special stumbling-blocks. Over against these he had given their German equivalents. As, however, he did not feel quite sure of his German, he sent them for correction to an acquaintance of his, a schoolmaster in Germany. The manuscript was returned to him one mass of corrections, not only in the German, but especially in the English column, with falsch! falsch! (wrong! wrong!) all along the line.

At the University of Lausanne there is a German professor who holds a class in English pronunciation. This in itself is remarkable enough, judging from the usual German accent in English. But far more remarkable was it that a British lady who took this class, in order to see what was going on, had her English severely found fault with, as not up to the German's 'scientific' standard!

Scarcely less amusing is the pedantry of the late Professor Franck, of Bonn University. Professor Franck enjoyed considerable reputation as a learned scholar of medieval Dutch. A great number of ancient Dutch epics have been provided by him with weighty and lengthy annotations, some of them very illuminating, others decidedly beside the mark, although to a modern Dutchman of average intelligence the text is perfectly clear. also has published in German the most complete grammar of medieval Dutch in existence. In the second edition of this book he discusses the letter d, and points out that there are two letters d in Dutch, the one linguistically corresponding with the English th, the other with the English d. Moreover, he declares that a modern Dutchman pronounces these two d's with different parts of the mouth. The writer and others have experimented on themselves and on a great number of their fellow-countrymen. but have not yet been fortunate enough to discover a single Dutchman who makes this distinction. The German professor, however, had discovered it from the way in which he pronounced Dutch 'scientifically'! That is 'Kultur.'

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V

A result of Germanisation ever so much more dangerous than clumsiness or pedantry is that of late years the Dutch have begun to look at the world through German spectacles. And yet, strange to say, the bulk of the Dutch people do not like the Germans. They even dislike them strongly, and feel towards them a certain racial animosity. They call them by the pretty name of 'Mof.' There are few words a German hates more than this particular one. To say it to him has the same effect

as driving a pin into his calf.

But all this racial dislike has scarcely stood in the way of Germanisation. Through his educational system a strong admiration, if not veneration, for the thoroughness and grandeur of German 'Kultur' has been so dinned into the modern Dutchman's ears from the cradle upwards that he accepts it as a sort of gospel truth and as a kind of axiom from which he begins his argument. His outlook thus having been Germanised, it is not surprising that he accepts most readily the German way of putting things and the German point of view when it is placed before him in pamphlets and periodicals, and that his Press shows a ready hospitality to 'die deutsche Wahrheit' when it seeks refuge from 'die Weltlügen'-German truth against the lies of the whole world, as we read in the Berliner Tageblatt of the 1st of October. To this must be added the powerful prestige of the victor of 1870, which has not failed to impress his small neighbour, as well as a certain financial interest felt by the Rotterdam and Amsterdam exporters of the produce of German industrial enterprise.

VI

Notwithstanding this, there are signs of recrudescent disharmony between the Dutch and the German elements. one thing, the German lacks the psychological knack of subtle diplomacy. In this respect his 'Kultur' is too clumsily unpleasant. The tone of his Press towards Holland is either brutally imperative or crudely sweet with the sting of saccharin. And, secondly, the German national character, socialistic and thoroughly drilled into subservience, is in its every instinct diametrically opposed to that of the Dutch-i.e. the Frisian nation-which from Caesar's day has been noted for its uncontrolled and uncontrollable individualism, frequently exaggerated to the extreme of anarchy.

The stubborn Frisian, hard-headed and truthful to aggressiveness even under ordinary circumstances, brooks interference as little as an American. Once he becomes aware that he is being meddled with, he will stop short in his course like a mule who kicks his driver and pony cart alike to fragments.

The only danger is that he will not become aware of it soon enough. For the Dutch have a fatal faculty for living in the past instead of in the present. They glory all too readily in their really stupendous achievements during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And they chafe to this day under the yoke of French imperial annexation, forgetting that it was cast off more than a century ago. The French imperialism of the past they still popularly feel as a hideous danger. But to Germany's really threatening imperialism of the present they are, popularly at least, purblind.

Still, there are, as has been said, signs, feeble signs of reaction, bright sparks that in favourable circumstances might be fanned into a roaring conflagration.

Years ago Professor Brugmans, the Amsterdam historian, first opened the writer's eyes to the dangers of Germanisation. This professor objects most strongly to the present one-sided cult of 'Kultur.' To his students he prescribes French text-books (Lavisse) rather than German. And he encourages the perusal of English authors. And lately Professor de Savornin Lohman, the Utrecht social economist, expressed to the writer his very strong and positive preference of British to German authors and methods in his special province. And these two instances could be multiplied. In the Dutch Press also there are signs of reaction. A leading daily paper, like the Amsterdam Telegraaf, and an important weekly, like the Groene Amsterdammer, are at present forbidden fruit in Germany, and not without reason. And likewise anyone who is familiar with Dutch society, in the widest sense of the word, will bear witness to frequent and increasing signs of discontent, diffuse as yet and inarticulate, but which on provocation may unite into a thundering chorus.

### VII

There are Dutchmen who trust that this may be brought about with the assistance of Britain. Needless to say, it is not their desire to be Anglicised any more than it is their desire to be Germanised. What they wish is to balance Germanisation by opposing to it another civilisation. They wish to neutralise 'Kultur.' They want the Netherlands to derive the fullest benefit from their central position amongst the leading Powers of the world. They want to practise a cultural eclecticism, in order, if possible, to create a new symphony of civilisation, a new renascence Dutch in nature, like that Erasmian renascence which was

the foundation-stone for the glorious structure of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe.

If, however, Britain herself were to become entangled and eventually caught in the meshes of 'Kultur,' how would she be able to fulfil in Europe her mission as the protagonist of Occidentalism? How would she be able to stem the overflowing tide of Germanisation? This is why, not only from the Russian point of view, and from the Serbian and the Polish, but from the British and Dutch standpoints as well, and from the Swiss, the Italian and the Scandinavian—indeed, from the general standpoint of Europe—this War must be considered as, and shall be, a holy war of purification. For as long as Britain remains 'fighting that she may go on being herself,' the dead weight of 'Kultur' will not subdue the world.

I. I. BRANTS.



POOR China! She has troubles enough and to spare of her own without being compelled to bear the consequences of other nations' quarrels. It is hard on her people, peacefully disposed both by necessity and inclination, that a war which was none of their seeking, which was no concern of theirs, should make alien soldiers their unwelcome guests, should introduce a new husbandry which planted mines in their fields and made Death stalk side by side with the human reapers of their harvest. As a Chinese newspaper pathetically put it, 'These are losses incurred by the Chinese people. Other peoples' battles are fought on our land, and at our very great expense.'

Those who are not versed in Chinese affairs can hardly realise what this War means to China; how it touches her, how wounds her, at every point of her political life. who know how politics have affected her national existence can understand why this world-war should have made battlefields on Chinese soil, and compelled her people to submit to things justified only in belligerent countries by the exigencies of military operations. The new ethics of war which Germany, once an acknowledged leader in the regions of accurate thought, but now prostituting her intelligence by rigmaroles of argument which would disgrace a fourth-form schoolboy, is endeavouring to foist upon the world, declare neutrality to be an idle principle of which necessity knows nothing, and that convenience is a sufficient substitute for necessity if an attack on an enemy is the objective. Of the application of this new ethic Belgium has been made the unhappy sufferer. The neutrality of China has also been made the sport of circumstance; military necessity has governed everything that has happened to her during the last six months; but it is possible to trace 'the causes of causes and their impulsions one of another' in inevitable sequence, till we get back to the prime cause, and that cause is but another manifestation of Germany's ambition to rule the world by force of arms.

People at home talk so glibly, knowing so little, about China, that the mere mention of the serious consequences of a European war to her is sure to provoke the inevitable query—All neutral




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nations suffer grave inconvenience from wars which do not directly concern them, why should China's position differ from that of, say, Brazil or Siam? That she should have been sorely let and hindered by the Russo-Japanese War was intelligible, for it was waged on her borders; but a European war . . . ! It is well, therefore, at the outset to realise in what China differs normally from other countries. Mainly in this fundamental fact. that she is not mistress of her own household. Though she is a sovereign State she is not free. When the merchants came from the West knocking at the gates of Peking they made it a condition of their entry, which China reluctantly assented to, that they should bring with them their own laws and establish their own Courts, creating an exterritorial status for themselves which withdrew them from the jurisdiction of the country wherein they proposed to trade and take up their residence. peculiar privilege of the foreigner must obviously affect China's neutral position in regard to belligerent nations; but the question is abstruse in the extreme, and in our appreciation of what the War means to China we must eliminate this background of foreign law and foreign Courts, and imagine her simply as a free country in which the alien merchant and financier have found a happy hunting ground. We shall then see why her fortunes have become so inextricably interwoven with those of other countries that the shock of a European war must have far more disastrous consequences than it could have to countries such as Brazil, an absolutely free and independent country, or Siam, where the exterritorial privileges still linger.1

Commerce and finance have long since ceased to be national; now it is 'world-commerce' and 'world-finance'; and 'foreign markets' are one of the great motive powers of foreign policy. The colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore are the British trade outposts in the great commercial struggle in the Far East, the citadel of which is China. But the principle of the open-door to which England has been faithful from time immemorial, a faithfulness which Germany has forgotten, though she has availed herself largely of it, has converted these two colonies, Hong Kong especially, into an international base from which commercial operations in China are conducted. How vast those operations are may be judged by the fact that the port of Victoria is second to none in the world for the tonnage which passes through it under the flag of every country whose ships sail upon the Eastern Seas. All the great firms, shipping, banking, trading, that do business in the East have their branches in Hong Kong. But so vast is the trade with China, outwards as well as inwards,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>There have been changes in the exterritorial position in Siam, but this statement is, I believe, accurate.



There has thus been a give-and-take between China and foreign countries, and this, added to what I have already said, has internationalised the trade of the East. So it has come about that while in other countries the foreign merchant is but a sojourner as all his fathers were, in China he has made his home as he did in India. The Anglo-Indian has his exact counterpart in the 'old China hand,' whose fortunes are wrapped up in those of the country of his adopted residence. The breakup of China would mean the ruin of innumerable foreign enterprises, and would spread havoc in many markets in Europe and America. Conversely, the commercial ruin of Europe would carry disaster into almost every corner of China. 'China' has thus ceased to mean merely the home country of the Chinese;

it is the heart of a vast system in which every nation has its share, in whose welfare every nation is directly interested, by whose troubles every nation is affected. This inter-dependence grows year by year; its roots strike back through more than seventy years; its branches spread in ever-growing strength into the future. This alone would have justified the step which Yuan Shi K'ai took in the early days of the War, to which I shall presently refer, to preserve, if it were possible, 'the sanctity of

non-Europe.' The growth of commerce requires the Nor is this all. material development of the country; railways have helped further in the interlocking of China's relations with other countries; the foreign capitalist and the foreign engineer come upon the scene, and with them an enormous extension of trade in 'plates' and 'fittings,' and the advent of the foreign railwayman to carry things on till the adaptable Chinaman is ready to take his place. Then there is the foreign concession-holder, whose position may somewhat complicate the arrangements which will adjust the future. Again, international troubles in the past brought war loans in their train, and laid the foundation of foreign indebtedness from which, in the days of her seclusion, China had been free. And on these liabilities the Boxer troubles heaped the heavy burden of the 'Indemnities,' which, together with the loans, the Republic manfully assumed and still staggers under. Then came the Revolution, which put prosperity into abeyance; and afterwards further borrowing to meet pressing liabilities, from the Quintuple Group, and a host of minor lenders of short-term loans, all of which forged new links in the international chain. And yet again, the establishment of the Customs, which was the condition attached to the admission of foreign trade, required foreign assistance in the management, and an army of foreign employés; after which came the Post Office, and now the Salt Gabelle, both of which need foreign help.

Is it necessary, therefore, to particularise the consequences to China of a European war? Some of them were so obvious that they flashed into the mind at once. It would dam the sources of her loan supply; a large number of the foreigners in her service would be compelled to answer their national call to arms; and the occasion would be too good to be lost for the rebels of which China has not yet been able to rid herself.<sup>2</sup> As the mind familiarised itself with the idea of war in Europe, other things

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>This article is greatly in excess of the normal length. I have, therefore, been obliged to omit any further reference to the activities of the rebels during the War. It seems, however, that they have given the Government a great deal of trouble. Undue length has also compelled me to omit all reference to the financial struggles which the War imposed on China.

as serious claimed attention; trade in the Treaty Ports would disappear, and the spectre of unemployment for the multitude of coolies in the service of the foreign hongs reared its head. Then, what would become of exchange? Loss on exchange is a terrible business even at the best of times, but with exchange 'gone to nowhere' remittances for payment of interest on foreign loans and for the Indemnities would be ruinously impossible. All the belligerents were And the Indemnities themselves? China's creditors; would they insist on their tael of flesh? Where would the money come from when the pledged Customs revenue was dwindling with vanishing trade? Then there were the railways, profitable alike to China and to the foreign bondholder; many of them were owned by the Powers who were at war; some of them jointly owned. Would they go on working? Ought not China to take over the management and control? Here were puzzles enough in all conscience; and as the mind flitted from point to point, finding in each some pricking danger lurking for China, all the troublesome questions of neutrality surged up tumultuously for consideration; plaguy questions even for a free nation, but for China, tied and bound by the chains of exterritoriality, simply bristling with difficulties, as she had abundant reason to remember from her experiences of the Russo-Japanese War. One of them, indeed, demanded instant attention in connexion with the railways, directly the mobilisation orders were issued; they might, most certainly would, be used by reservists joining the Colours.

From this point onwards her personal troubles merge into those of the world at large, and she becomes directly interested in the War; her integrity becomes, by force of circumstances over which she had no control, a factor which must be recognised, and all questions springing out of it settled, at the end of it. For behind all her many difficulties, only hinted at, there was a trouble looming in the background, which the mind at first refused to allow to take shape, but which became insistent directly it was known that England had entered the lists, overwhelming when at last it took hold of men's brains: represented by one word-'Tsingtao.' Overwhelming, indeed; for to the Chinese it brought to the front questions which affected the national honour. Would it be possible to prevent the waves of war from lapping over into Chinese territory? Could a violation of her soil be avoided? Poor China! The facts were almost too simple; the conclusion plain and palpable. England and Germany were at war; and England and Japan were in alliance for the express purpose of preserving the peace of the Far East; the fulfilment of this purpose might involve the bombardment of the German port, and then Kiaochow would become a battlefield. In

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view of the facts, would it be possible to confine the fighting to the leased territory? or, again with the experience of the Russo-Japanese War behind her, would it be necessary to make the best of a bad bargain and concede to the belligerents a more extended war-zone? And, if China did that, would they keep within it? And then a whole series of problems arose, the like of which for intricacy the Wise Men of the West had never dreamed of when the treaties of lease were entered into. Neutrality by itself was bad enough; but when the belligerents hold leases of neutral China's territory are they permitted to fight out their quarrels there? Would they do so whether or no? And if they did, how would the doctrines of neutrality be applied? Must China fight to protect her neutrality as the textbooks teach, as Belgium, indeed, was already doing? And what was to happen afterwards, when, perhaps, the lessee belligerent was worsted? Surely fantastic problems which it was out of China's power either to stave off or to solve. I shall not pretend to solve them, or even to suggest a solution, for the time for their consideration is not yet.3 China must suffer and wait. Such questions could only be touched with great discretion at present, even if we had all the facts. But I think we may, within the limits of discretion, glance at some of the questions which lie on the surface in consequence of the Allies' attack on Tsingtao, and at some of the problems which arise out of China's neutrality.

I venture now to state a truism. The remaking of history by means of war requires two among many other things: an accurate knowledge of geography, and a mastery of the science of transport. The statesman, whose function it is to be the herald of history, cannot begin to put thoughts into the words which shape action without a map before him. One of the most important elements of the situation which made the great struggle between Russia and Japan inevitable was the fact that Fusan, in Korea, was no more than a short night's journey from Shimonoseki. And the Council of War may have many armies at command, but they are useless unless transport for men and material has been organised; and after they have been landed, transport again, and always transport, for more men and more material.

These are really the axioms of a bellicose statecraft; yet there must be added to the long catalogue of Germany's blunders

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> I have seen it stated that the question of the rights and duties of neutrality of a State that had leased a portion of its territory to a State at war was proposed for discussion at the Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907; it appears, however, that it was not taken up because it was too complicated.

a very singular forgetfulness of them in regard to Tsingtao. Hong Kong is, as I have said, our strategical outpost in the commerce-war of the Far East. France had slowly but surely built up her great dependency of Indo-China. Japan was on the spot, Russia near at hand, and the United States newly arrived in the Philippines. Germany, with her unsatisfied longings for 'places in the sun,' could hardly be expected to sit content; and Tsingtao, with the district of Kiaochow, seemed to meet her requirements. Now, if Germany had treated her new territory as we had treated Hong Kong, as a commercial outpost, I cannot say that all would have been well, but certainly history would have shaped itself in somewhat different fashion. course there must be forts even in commercial outposts, and there must be attendant ships of war; that is the way of the world. But the forts and fleets, being ostensibly the symbols of the motto 'Defence, not Defiance,' are, or ought to be, merely the harbingers of peace; and if Germany could only have learned to play the game, if she could have acquired even an elementary knowledge of simple facts, the fortifications of Tsingtao would have meant exactly what the fortifications of Hong Kong mean -not exactly 'saluting batteries,' but very effective means for resisting attack. The simple facts were, first, the enormous distance of Tsingtao from the base, and an absence of sufficient transport to bring up supports for its garrison-her great merchantmen were predestined for other purposes; secondly, the perfection of the English system of transport, which had been demonstrated not so many years ago. But that feverish haste to rush into the first place and dislodge its present occupant impelled her to spend millions on the forts of Tsingtao; she turned it into a stronghold, a place of arms, and with a curious lack of humour she christened it the 'Gibraltar of the East.' And she did it all behind the veil of the 'Yellow Peril.' That very dreadful composition of the Kaiser, wherein he depicted Germania leading the hosts of Christendom against the Dragon, had a political significance hardly recognised at the time; we merely shrugged our shoulders at the bad art of it; but an acute observer has reminded us that he had assumed to place the trident in her brawny arm. Then the dream of becoming a second Attila came to him, the histrionic 'mailed fist' message its first and most futile expression, a 'passage for the horns' in the opening movement of that wearisome cantata 'Deutschland über Alles.' In outward seeming it was directed against China and her barbaric hordes; but the veil was thin enough for us to have seen through if we had chosen. It is obvious. from what we know now, that it was a strategic move, not in the commerce-war at all, but in the great project of spoliation

of the British Colonies, the plan of which was even then in process of development. But that astonishing blindness to things that are, that belief that events must shape themselves according to the Kaiser's wishes, that disregard of the inevitable, which have guided her policy for many years, drove Germany to her fate. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was, as it was intended to be, the governing factor if ever the supremacy of England in the Far East were put to the touch; strategy and policy were as clearly defined in it as words could set them out. supremacy stood for world-interests, and their preservation was the keynote of all our action and of all dispositions of material force. To challenge them would only bring about further dispositions of stronger forces; and to fortify Tsingtao beyond the immediate needs of a commercial colony was in effect to challenge them. If there were any doubt as to the construction of the Treaty, any question even of the spirit of the Alliance and of its application to a war between England and Germany waged in Europe, the exaggerated fortifications of Tsingtao removed them; and the use of the port as a naval base for raids made the interpretation possible which compelled Japan to come in. There seems to be a question whether the lease permitted this extensive fortification; that is a matter to be discussed by China herself hereafter; but of its supreme folly there can be no ques-At the outside, not more than 10,000 men 4 could be counted on to defend the place, with the reservists in China and Japan added to the garrison. It was certain that Germany could spare no more ships to increase her Far-Eastern squadron, and it would have to face not only the British and French squadrons in those waters, but the whole of the Japanese fleet if she came in. And for the land forces, leaving out of consideration our troops in China and Hong Kong, on the assumption that they would be wanted elsewhere, it was equally certain that once Japan came in, the whole of her armies would, if necessary, be thrown into the scale. It was a foregone conclusion; and it was mere vaingloriousness for the Kaiser to exhort the diminutive garrison not to surrender till the last breath of the last man and the last horse had been expended. From accounts which appear trustworthy, it would seem that there was a certain amount of hard fighting, and that the bravery of the German troops was maintained; but the careful and elaborate dispositions of the Japanese were unnecessary, and the fortress fell without any very strenuous resistance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This figure is given by the *Mainichi Shimbun*. The *Times* 'History of the War,' however, puts the number at 6,000, and the *Peking Gazette* also, 2500 of whom were reservists. According to the 'History,' about 4000 surrendered.

But I am looking at the story from a Chinese point of view. Few things pass unnoticed by the Government, and most things that happen are foreseen, though it has always been China's fate to be unprepared because she has not the means at her disposal to make preparations. It seems probable that with Tsingtao heavily fortified the Government realised that, in the event of hostilities between Germany and any European Power with substantial interests in the Far East, Tsingtao would become a centre of at least naval activity; as a theoretical possibility this could not have been ignored. But that any nation would declare war against England, or that England would declare war against any other nation, was as absent from men's minds in China as it was in the rest of the world, including Germany. Bernhardi's Next War, though it was to be waged against England, is problematical; for Germany was to wait for a fitting moment, and other things had to be accomplished before that moment came; and he puts out of question the possibility of a declaration of war by England. But when the preliminary warnings came through to the East of what was passing in Europe the abstract suddenly became for the Chinese a stern reality. China would be neutral, but it would be neutrality in more than difficult circumstances if Germany and England took to fighting in Chinese waters, or at Tsingtao, or even at Hong Kong. Yuan Shi K'ai's soldier instincts must have told him that the issue was not uncertain unless the high Gods intervened, and that, with Japan true to her alliance, it could not long be delayed. The brood of problems which would then arise for China must have been very clearly before his eyes.

A Chinese writer of ability, Mr. Eugène Ch'en, tackled the question with much acumen in a series of articles in the Peking Gazette. English jealousy of Germany was, he said, a fallacy; German trade thrives best in the British Dominions. He dwelt on the danger which arose from Germany having made a stronghold of Tsingtao; she could not say she was conducting defensive operations only, for she had been pouring in reservists in a sensational manner, and the eyes of the East were focussed on that She was forcing the pace of war; the Emden should cease from harassing British shipping and intern herself; everything should be done to bring about a peaceful solution. One solution he specially urged, that Germany should voluntarily surrender the lease of Kiaochow to China; it would be a proof of her greatness. To the non-belligerent Chinese, his mind attuned to peace, this suggestion appeared to be fraught with peaceful The Japanese had declared their intention of, ousting Germany from her foothold in China; the Germans should realise the hopelessness of their position; they should

meet the enemy in the gate, and while there was yet time avoid the unequal struggle; let them return the leased property to the owner and there would be an end of the matter. Poor Germany! First, she had her own words of 'friendly advice,' addressed to Japan in 1905, cast back in her teeth in the Japanese ultimatum; and then she got further advice from a Chinese writer. The East was verily rising against her, and all the vials of her assumed contempt for the 'yellow races' were found to be cracked and empty of all save words. And for those who chose to read there was that troublesome Bernhardi who had nothing but praise for the Japanese: for their splendid military efficiency, their high political wisdom, for their 'culture'! The singular thing is that Germany had already bethought her of this way through her difficulties; negotiations seem to have been started for the surrender of the lease before the War. The possibility of continuing them after the declaration of war appears to have been cut short by an intimation from 'a certain Power,' as the jargon of the East has it, that negotiations of this nature would amount to a breach of neutrality. Obviously to discuss such a question at such a time would be transgressing that limit of discretion in the spirit of which this article is written.

And Yuan Shi K'ai, through the turmoil of the early days of war, seems to have clung to the hope that 'something like an assent, tacit or explicit, might be secured in favour of the sanctity of non-Europe.' But the President must have realised that his wish to act as mediator, if it were possible, and his proposal that something should be done to prevent the War from spreading to the Far East were doomed to disappointment, and that once the floodgates were opened in Europe no power on earth could prevent the swirl spreading all the world over. He could not disguise from himself the fact, when the news came on the 4th of August, that England's efforts for peace had failed and she had declared war against Germany, that Japan would join; and he , must have been fully prepared for the answers, received on the 14th, from Japan, that her obligations to Great Britain might prevent her from concurring in any such proposal; and from the United States, that she would willingly help, 'but saw no

way of doing so effectively.'

But Germany was intent on getting the sympathy of the Chinese people, and she set about it in the devious way with which we have become too familiar. The Chinese believe in success; therefore Germany must be shown to be victorious. I imagine that of the many problems which will perplex the future historian of the War not the least curious will be the systematic dissemination of false news by Germany throughout the world. It is of course one of the commonplaces of war that

often both sides claim a victory on the same occasion; but to give descriptions of battles that have never occurred, to send frantic cables round the world that you have sunk the greater part of the British Fleet, when as a matter of fact 'the British Fleet you could not see because . . . ' (deletion by the Censor), is sheer childishness, which seems to have as large a share in Teuton composition as a love of 'frightfulness.' The purpose is faintly discernible when British colonies or protectorates are selected for the spreading of fancy news, where there is a large native population. In the Malay Peninsula, for example, there are many Chinese as well as Malays; both are strangely sensitive to defeat, and it is obvious that our prestige would suffer by a heavy reverse early in the War; but it is equally obvious, except apparently to the Germans, that when truth follows hard upon the heels of fiction 5 the rebound in the native mind will be greater than its first depression, and the loss of prestige will be transferred to the other side. It is also just possible that the mercurial spirit of the native might be so played upon that if it were in a state of unrest already that unrest might be fomented into rebellion; if, however, you have to invent both the unrest and the foment, why then, you lapse again into mere childish-But to imagine that any good could come from circulating fanciful news in China was to lack understanding. Yuan Shi K'ai had from the first declared that China was in friendly relations with all the belligerents, which it was his desire to preserve; he had expressed his sympathy with all the fighting Powers through their respective Ministers, and had done his best to inculcate the same spirit into the people, prohibiting the circulation of rumours and the discussion of foreign politics in the tea-houses. The outlook for this form of crusade was therefore not very promising. The mystery of motive must remain unsolved, and I shall very briefly note the 'news' which was cooked up for the temporary consumption of the Chinese.

A 'slight reverse' to our Fleet was almost at once reported, followed on the 10th of August by a disaster in the North Sea 'near Leith,' in which four British battleships had been sunk and several damaged, the Germans losing one cruiser and several torpedo-boats. A week later the scene of the disaster was altered to the Humber. So that old story which the village postman brought us with our afternoon letters about the 'North Sea Fight' and our appalling losses was quickly sent to the East (I heard of it also from Kuala Lumpur), with the circumstantial details that the *Iron Duke* had gone down with Admiral Jellicoe on board. But the chronicle of disaster was not ended. The

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<sup>5</sup> Official reports as to the progress of the War were issued by the British Legation.

China Press (an American paper published in Shanghai, of much resource in collecting news, and reputed accurate) reported that two large men-of-war with four funnels had entered Hong Kong after dark in a wrecked condition with wounded on board; probably the Hampshire and the Yarmouth, afterwards 'reported from Hong Kong' as destroyed by the German squadron. The Gneisenau seems to have got herself sunk about this time, which was the only consolation vouchsafed to us.

The Germans profess to be virtuously indignant when they are charged with organising a campaign of lies; it may be interesting therefore to record some of the 'biggest' that were circulated in China. Our call on the Indian troops greatly disturbed their equanimity, although Treitschke had warned them that it was absurd to imagine that where a nation fought it would not use all its resources of men independent of colour; and Bernhardi always calculated that the French would legitimately use her black troops. The German agents in foreign parts wasted much time and energy in spreading ridiculous reports about the Indian Empire and its troops. The regiment at Hong Kong had mutinied on being warned for active service at Tsingtao, and the Governor of the Colony had been wounded. Bismarck method was brought into full play; thus the German attaché at Stockholm quotes the German Legation at Peking as authority for the statement that the Japanese Government had officially informed China 'that a revolution had broken out in India, that Britain had asked Japan to send troops to help her, and that Japan had agreed in return for a loan of \$200,000,000, "a free hand in China and unrestricted entry of Japanese into the Pacific Colonies."" seed which grew to so wondrous a flower was a statement in a Chinese paper, made at the instance of a German friend; it was then cabled to Shanghai, and so the marvel grew. Another story, that the Indian troops, instead of going to Europe, were planning a mutiny at home, and that the greatest precautions were being taken, was invented in Shanghai and sent to Manila; it was then returned to Shanghai with a 'Manila' headline, and so, to the intense indignation of the Manila Times, circulated through the Far Eastern world. The climax was reached towards the end of October, when the following items of news were issued by the Ostasiatische Lloyd as coming from New York:

England's cry for help to Portugal ensued owing to the untenable and chaotic condition in South Africa. The Indian revolt is further increasing. It is reported from Constantinople that England has sent three active battalions from Malta to India. According to the Harbin Novosti Isni of the 14th of October, the unrest in Calcutta is attributed by England to German machinations.

The Peking Gazette refused to print such 'stuff and non-sense'; but the agent of the company in all gravity protested, and informed the editor that he must take all of his news or none at all. I believe the latter alternative was chosen. The last fragment had quite the Bismarckian touch; by making the report come from Harbin, the major premiss, that there was unrest in Calcutta, would be assumed to be true; the remainder would follow; if there were unrest it would of course have been fomented by Germany. It must be confessed that if an ordinary and not a super-nation had been reduced to such straits in the conduct of a war, its condition would have been considered desperate.

It is no part of my purpose, nor would it now be possible, to give a connected story of the operations in Kiaochow. It was the conduct of these operations on her territory that so affected China, and I must glance briefly at the principal incidents.

It was the height of the summer season at Tsingtao when, in the first days of August, the premonitory news of trouble came Eastwards. One of those inter-port courtesies which are the special feature of life in the East, a polo match, had been arranged between Shanghai and Tsingtao teams, and was to be played in a few days. But social preparations gave immediate place to preparations for war. Everyone understood the significance of the rumours, and how quickly they might materialise into facts. In the East one lives more than anywhere else in the presence of the elements of war; soldiers and sailors are our everyday companions; guns and warships come regularly into the daily perspective of life. Men are accustomed to dining in mess and ward-room, women to dancing under the muzzles of great guns, their primary use forgotten in the fact that they are an uncommon adornment of a ballroom. The barracks and the warships form the base on which is reared the edifice of social life which enlivens the dull routine of work. But when the flags which grace the quarter-deck flutter the ominous signal on the halvard the edifice crumbles at a boatswain's whistle; men's brains are cleared for action, and they see things as they really are; the guns remain grimly masters of the situation. So, in the twinkling of an eye, the old order changed with the publication of the mobilisation orders of Germany and Austria, and the men at the Clubs split up into their several nationalities; reservists hurried from all parts of China to their allotted posts.

And so at once, as I have already hinted, the Chinese Government was faced with the first problem of its neutrality. There were close on 3000 Germans and Austrians in different ports of China, a third of them being in Shanghai, and about the same

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number of French, of which 330 were in Shanghai; at Tientsin there were about 150 of each nationality. A very large proportion of these were naturally reservists. Then there was the relic of the Boxer troubles, a large number of foreign troops, upwards of 9000, in North China, of which 6000 were stationed in Tientsin, and 2000 on special duty as Legation guards in Peking. The general rule is that belligerent troops are not allowed to pass across a neutral country, much less to use its railways. But this gave rise to the question, were the railwavs which the Germans would use to get to Tsingtao really The Tientsin-Pukow railway, which is met at Pukow Chinese? by a ferry to Nanking on the other bank of the Yangtse, is in two sections, the northern or German section, and the southern or British section; the whole line having been financed by loans raised simultaneously in England and Germany. From Nanking a railway built with British capital runs to Shanghai. So far the problem is only complicated by the fact that these railways have been built with foreign capital; but the Shantung railway, which runs from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu, was not only built with German capital, but is a German concession; for all practical purposes, therefore, it is a German railway. In order to make what follows clearer it should now be noted that this railway is 256 miles long, and that it meets the Tientsin-Pukow railway at Tsinanfu on the German section. The railways give rise to two questions: first, in connexion with the neutrality of China, because both these lines were used by the reservists. The second arises out of the operations of the Allies in Kiaochow, and will be dealt with later.

On the 2nd of August, the greater part of the German residents in Tientsin left for Tsingtao by the Tientsin-Pukow railway, to the martial strains of 'Deutschland über Alles.' The reservists from Shanghai came up by boat, so their proceedings do not come into this question, though they used the inland waters of China. The French reservists left Shanghai by tug, going on board in small parties, for the Dupleix, which was lying off Woosung; but they pass out of this narrative, for they joined their regiments in France and took no part in the siege of Tsingtao.

Truly here was a perplexing problem for China, the solution of which it must be confessed was not much assisted by certain provisions of a Neutrality Mandate which the President was advised to issue:

Troops of any of the belligerents, their munitions of war or supplies, are not allowed to cross the territory of China. In the event of a violation the troops shall submit to the Chinese authorities to be disarmed and interned, and the munitions of war and supplies shall be kept in custody until the termination of the war.

And again:

The guards attached to the Legations of the various Powers in Peking and their troops stationed along the route between Peking and Shanhaikuan [on the Peking-Mukden line] shall continue to conduct themselves so as to conform to the Peace Protocol... of 1901 [agreed to after the Boxer troubles]. They are not allowed to interfere with the present war. The foreign troops stationed in other parts of China shall act likewise. Those who do not conform to the foregoing provision may be interned and disarmed by China until the termination of the war.

It is difficult to understand why this Mandate was issued. Yet, like the creation of the Bureau of Neutral Affairs, it may legitimately be said to be evidence of an almost nervous anxiety to prove the sincerity of China's desire to preserve the strictest neutrality. But the provisions I have quoted could have no more effect than Canute's exhortation to the waves, and like the waves of the sea reservists continued to pour into Tsingtao by rail and sea. Truly a perplexing problem, because whichever way China turned there would be a belligerent protest, possibly something worse, facing her. If she refused a permission to use the railways, which had not been asked, it would be treated as a hostile act by Germany, and there would have been accusations of giving material aid to the Allies; if she acquiesced the Allies would protest against a breach of neutrality; they would probably do this whether she acquiesced or not, for undoubtedly the use of the railways afforded most material aid to Germany. I do not think I shall be breaking the restraint I have put upon myself if I say this: whether it is the true solution of the problem is another matter—rules of neutrality have been framed to meet the ordinary circumstances which arise in the life of nations, of which fighting is one; they are hardly applicable to abnormal circumstances without modification. The abnormal circumstance in China's case is the simple fact that not only the reservists but also the foreign troops were lawfully in the country ab origine; and it seems to me that the question is, Would China have the right suddenly to say that they should not take part in the War? There is clearly a paradox involved. But it is really not a question whether she had the right to do this, but whether she had the power to enforce such a condition of neutrality, supposing it to exist? The reservists, and probably the troops, were off to the railway station at Tientsin singing their songs long before the Chinese authorities would know of it, or knowing could move. When they could move were they to send Chinese soldiers by the next train for disarming and interning purposes, with orders to follow the Germans into Kiaochow, right under the forts of Tsingtao? The puzzle thickens as we pursue the elusive principle, which can only be answered by-and-by. But even this cursory view of it brings us at once up against that old idea of neutrality, that it is a quasi-belligerent duty. On this I shall venture to say a few words presently.

But if the coming and going of troops raised conundrums for the Government, quite apart from the annoyance to citizens desiring to travel peacefully according to the time-tables, the fight for Tsingtao developed a further crop which, for complexity, have rarely been equalled. Even the bare possibility of the attack raised a special one, the use of Chinese coolies for defence work in the fortress, promptly protested against by the Allies. Evidently the War was going to upset the foundations of life in China. The European does no spade-work for himself; when he wants land dug, and the soil carted, or rather 'basketed,' away, whether it be for the building of a house or the making of a tennis-court, the spade-coolie and the earth-coolie are waiting for his orders. Why should this convenient custom be upset by ridiculous questions of neutrality? We want trenches dug, and the coolie is obviously the right man to do it. I am disposed to think that the German statement that they were not compelled to work and were properly paid must be accurate, for the guilds would have seen to that; the object for which the work was done would hardly interest them.

Thus from the outset of the War raised curious and serious problems, which increased in number and intensity as the operations proceeded. They were infinitely varied in detail, but they all had this common factor differentiating them from the problems which ordinarily beset a neutral country: China is not as other nations; the belligerent foreigner was an integral part of the community.

I must pause here to deal with some unexpected developments which specially emphasise China's curious position.

It was announced about the middle of August, in the *Peking Gazette*—an English newspaper which had established a reputation for accuracy—that Chinese troops were guarding the *Hatamen* Gate since the withdrawal of the German soldiers, and were also acting as guards to some of the Legations. It was also said that the offer of 'a certain Minister' of his own men for this purpose had been declined by China, 'considering that the acceptance of the offer would be derogatory to its prestige.'

I am not sure that these items of news convey much to those who do not know China; but to those who do, they are pregnant with meaning. If you would understand their full significance, you must go back to the Boxer troubles and imagine the 'Legation Quarter' in Peking as it then was, an island of houses in which the Foreign Ministers lived, set in a seething ocean

of discontented Chinese, practically defenceless, yet so liable to attack that one wonders why, when the signal was at last given, every foreigner in the place was not exterminated. then you must picture to yourself the change that has come over the 'Quarter' in these days; still an island, but each Legation with its military guard, and protected from all possibility of attack by a broad glacis on three sides, swept clear of Chinese houses and the narrow Peking lanes, serving for the guards as parade-ground, football-ground, polo-ground, and securely resting with its fourth side on the Wall. To complete the picture. you must imagine the Wall, a lofty rampart, some sixty feet high and forty feet broad, whereon the world of Peking walks the year round, looking over the great city hiding under the branches of its ten thousand trees, with the vellow-tiled roofs of the Forbidden City gleaming in the sun, or in the cool of a summer night listening to the music of Sir Robert Bredon's band. On this Wall, at intervals, are the great three-storied structures guarding the gates through which the streams of life pass endlessly. men and Chienmen are the limits of that portion of the Wall which forms the base of the 'Quarter,' a mile and a half between them. In the days before the War, the compounds of the German and the United States Legations being next to the Wall, the Germans guarded the eastern half, ending at Hatamen, the United States marines the western half, ending at Chienmen. changes were accomplished by the International Protocol of 1901, which imposed the penalties on the Chinese nation for its great misdeed, and were sulkily acquiesced in by the Government with many professions of penitence. It can hardly be said that either the 'Quarter' itself, in which Chinese troops are not allowed, or the presence of 2000 soldiers of different nationalities in its barracks, is regarded with enthusiasm by the Chinese of to-day. For the Government the arrangement contains no redeeming feature, for it believes that the days of Boxer or other anti-foreign risings are gone for ever. Curiously enough, the first suggestion that the Legation guards should be removed came most unexpectedly from the Russian Government not very long ago; some Governments intimated that they were prepared to follow suit, but others hesitated, and at the outbreak of the War the complete removal of the guards had not become an accomplished fact.

That circumstances should have compelled the old restrictions to be withdrawn, and Chinese to replace foreign soldiers on the guards, shows that the War has disturbed other commonplaces of life in China besides the use of the earth-coolie. And other things seem to have happened showing the same trend of events. It was reported that Chinese soldiers were sent to Mongtze to guard the residents of that port after the French troops were

withdrawn. Not the least interesting report relates to the patrol of the great waterways, for the suppression of the pirates which infest them. On the Yangtse and the West River foreign gunboats help in the work. But here was a possible source of trouble; the Tsingtao and the Moorhen would not be very amiable companions and might come to blows off Wuchow. Trouble had, in fact, been reported from Chungking, some 1500 miles up the Yangtse, between the English, French, and German gunboats; but, apparently at the request of the Chinese authorities, the German had left the port and anchored further down the stream. So far as I can gather, however, the trouble was only potential, for the boats seem to have been dismantled, and the crews sent to their respective fleets. It is interesting to note here, parenthetically, another example of British strength and German weak-The German gunboat on the West River could not get out without passing through Hong Kong waters; she was, therefore, very humbly dismantled, and her equipment moved into the Customs House. There seems to be no doubt that on the rivers China had no difficulty in performing her neutral duties; but here there was a special obligation to all the foreign Powers. treaties are very precise on the subject of her duties and liabilities in respect of piracy, and the rivers must be patrolled. Since the Powers were unable to assist, China must do it by herself, and, a Chinese newspaper pointed out, 'she must do the work well in order to recover the permanent right to patrol.'

Following out the same train of thought, the Chinese Government is said to have expressed a desire to make regulations for protecting the foreign Settlements, for the protection of foreigners is a treaty duty. This probably came to nothing, for it certainly must have been vigorously opposed by the Municipal Bodies.

I have said that the consequences of the War touch China literally at a hundred points; in this group of incidents they touch her heart. They show that her thoughts are inevitably turning to the recovery of some part of her national life. The question is too delicate to deal with at any length; but this may be said without indiscretion: it is doubtful whether the relations of China with the Powers can ever be quite the same again. There are not wanting signs that after the peace there must be a reshaping of European policy in the Far East; and I shall show presently some very substantial reasons why this must be so.

It is necessary, however, to say at once that this does not refer to the abolition of exterritoriality. Turkey has, so she says, 'abolished the Capitulations.' I do not think that China will dream of imitating Turkey. If I appreciate rightly the views of the leaders of Chinese thought, the position they take up is this: it is their dearest wish to free China from her

exterritorial chains, but they desire to achieve this in a legitimate manner; they realise that the conditions indicated in the Mackay Treaty must be fulfilled. Nevertheless the Government of the Republic has before it a problem of statecraft; and I will endeavour to state it as clearly as possible.


Before the War there was China on the one side, and over against her were arrayed the inert forces of 'internationalism,' personified to the world by the collective term 'the Powers.' China could do nothing, achieve nothing, if the subjects or citizens of the Powers were affected, without their assent. This means the assent of all the Powers, because each of the eighteen Powers, great and small, is in China of its own independent treaty right; each claims all the rights and privileges that all the others have. There is no vote of the majority in the deliberations of the Diplomatic Body; all must agree. Lord Cromer, in Modern Egypt, has very graphically described what this system meant there, how it did not work, and how after many years of strenuous labour the inanition of it was at length overborne. A strong-willed Consul-General could and did fight for Egypt against this static force; there is no one to fight for China, though precisely the same anomaly stands in the way of her progress. China is hampered at every turn, she can only struggle on as best she may. What happened in finance is typical. It was not the vastness of her capacity for borrowing that created first the Quadruple, then the Sextuple, and then again the Quintuple Groups. Invoke the paramount interests of Europe in China if you will; the case is as good as its advocates like to make it; but the good case cannot hide the fact that at bottom it was international jealousy that made these Powers cohere in their insistent demand to be in their collective capacity China's only creditor. It was the extraordinary myth of identical aims, identical interests in China's stability, that bound these Powers together, and kindled their indignation when another lender stept over the ring-fence with his money-bags. 'Union is strength'; but this does not presuppose that all who come within the union have a common aim; it is often a union of divergent and hostile aims that makes for strength.

What the effect of the War will be on this financial grouping of the Powers it is difficult to foresee; but at least the myth is dispelled, and its disappearance must have the most important consequences for China if she use the occasion discreetly. The rooting out of German influence in China was the professed aim of the operations against Tsingtao, and since Tsingtao has fallen that process may be supposed to have begun, and will be concluded at the peace; but this has broken for ever the solidarity of the nations which up to now has so hemmed China in. She

desires to preserve the most friendly relations with all the belligerent Powers, but she is entitled to say to them now: 'You have by your professions of united interests forced me into a certain path, imposed on me certain obligations; I assented because I accepted your professions, and recognised how powerful your union made you. But you have fallen out by the way; I am now free to insist on those things which I deem good for my people. I will no longer be hampered by an assumed unity which has ceased to exist.'

What is the alternative? Again Lord Cromer's experience enables us to foresee what the position after the War will be. It is inevitable that there should be divided counsels among the Powers, and with divided counsels the curse of 'internationalism' will become rampant. In all those matters which require the assent of the Diplomatic Body there will be a deadlock, and China's position will become tenfold worse than it was before. Even though Germany's foothold in China has been destroyed she will still remain one of the Powers; she will still have a Minister at Peking, and he, together with his Austrian colleague, will still be members of the Diplomatic Body, and, so far as China is concerned, influential members, for apart from their equal voice in deliberation they are her creditors.

Now let us assume that at the peace Germany purges her great offence and is forgiven; there is still the human factor to be taken into account. Would it be possible for the Minister of Germany to find himself in agreement in debate with his English, French and Russian colleagues? It is expecting a great deal, a great deal which, even in peace time, was rarely found in Egypt; which from all accounts has as rarely been found in Tangier. But if, as seems the more probable, Germany lets her mind rankle on the past; if she should be secretly hoping to retrieve her position in China; if, in short, human nature is still as ever the governing factor in such debates, antagonism in the counsels of the Diplomatic Body in Peking is inevitable, and the result for China less than nothing. A 'strong and united China' remains, as it always was, a matter of supreme interest to the world; but the tables are turned, and now a 'strong and united' Europe is essential to China's future salvation. She is compelled to deal with the Diplomatic Body as a whole, and she has a right to expect that it should have strong and united nations behind it. It must therefore be the business of the Allies to secure this for her, so to save her from the disaster which anything like weakness or disunion in Europe must bring her. this reason it is essential that her future position should be assured at the making of peace, because at that time, as probably at no other for many years to come, there will be agreement



And there is yet another reason why China must participate in the conditions of peace; which brings me once more to the operations round Tsingtao, as they affected China.

All hopes not merely of saving the country from becoming the scene of war, but also of confining the operations within the leased territory of Kiaochow, having been abandoned, the President proposed to set apart a special war-zone within which fighting was to be limited. As Viceroy of Chihli, Yuan Shi K'ai had succeeded during the Russo-Japanese War in excluding hostilities from Chinese territory west of the Liao-ho, and he hoped that the belligerents would accept this precedent as binding on them. But almost the first step which the Japanese took dispelled even this hope, for they landed 2000 soldiers at Lungkow, the commercial port of Shantung, on the other side of the peninsula which forms the southern coast of the Gulf of Pechili. There was nothing left for China but protest. A note was addressed to the Diplomatic Body stating that both belligerents had been moving troops within Chinese dominions,

thus constituting extraordinary circumstances, parallel only to the war waged between Japan and Russia in the Liaotung Peninsula in 1904. Following this precedent the Chinese Government cannot but declare that within the area of Lungkow, Laichow, and the district immediately adjoining Kiaochow Bay [a line practically running straight across the peninsula], which is absolutely the minimum area necessary for the passage and operations of the belligerent troops, it cannot undertake the responsibilities of neutrality. Outside these points China will continue to enforce the Regulations respecting neutrality as previously promulgated. But it is still incumbent upon the belligerent Powers to respect the territorial and administrative rights of China and all persons and properties within the area above defined.

Germany would have none of it, and warned the Government that she held China responsible for any damage that resulted to Tsingtao in consequence of China's acquiescence in the use of her territory for the conduct of hostilities; to which China replied

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> I have not thought it necessary to refer to the 50-kilometre zone round the Bay of Kiaochow within which the free passage of German troops was permitted under the lease. The special war-zone proposed extended beyond this to 20 kilometres east of Weihsien.

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that, forcible resistance being out of the question, her only course was to disclaim responsibility as she had done. But Germany had not been idle; the Shantung railway, stretching over 250 miles into the Shantung Province, served as her line of communications, and she had used it for transport of materials and troops, among whom were some Austrian marines, and this in the opinion of the Allies constituted a breach of China's neutrality. China was indeed between the devil and the deep sea; and the proposition that China was wrong whatever she did, or rather whatever either belligerent chose to do, was neatly put by a Chinese newspaper:


If China were to remain neutral in the way Japan and Great Britain would have it she must be violating neutrality in the eyes of Germany; and if she were to remain neutral in the way Germany would have it she must be equally violating neutrality in the eyes of Germany's enemies.

The same tone was adopted in a Note by China to the Powers; but I think I am right in saying that Germany alone threatened China with the traditional consequences of a violated neutrality. The Notes which came from the Allies were, unless I am mistaken, only justificatory of their own action as being the inevitable

consequence of what Germany had done.

On the 2nd of September neutrals were ordered by the Governor to leave Tsingtao, and estimates of property in the colony were requested, as compensation would be granted out of the indemnity to be obtained from the conquered Allies! Compensation was also promised to the Chinese for the villages which Some days later, however, confidence had been destroyed. seems somewhat to have evaporated; the heavy rains had done great damage to the railway, and there had been a wash-out on the line. The Germans declined to repair: 'Why should we build the line for the Japanese?' They preferred to carry on the work nature had begun by blowing up the bridges between Tsingtao and Kiaochow station, on the boundary of the leased territory.

The relations between China and the belligerents continued to be very strained. There seems to have been some attempt on the part of the Government to assume control of the railway outside the fighting zone, and to prevent the belligerents from using it for the conveyance of war material and supplies; and 1500 Chinese soldiers were sent to guard the line. action which China could take was ineffective to modify the plans of the Japanese by one hand's-breath. On the 25th and 26th of September a large body of troops appeared at Weihsien on the railway, about 120 miles from the boundary of the leased territory. The object was to commence the investment



Chinese protest was forwarded to the British Minister; the reply repeated the alleged breaches of neutrality by Germany, adding that she had refused to carry passengers and had discharged Chinese employés, thus revealing the German status of the railway, and that therefore Japan had no alternative.

In order fully to appreciate the position of the Chinese, caught as it were between two fires, with an invading but unhostile army on the one side, with an army of occupation also unhostile but determined to defend itself against the invader on the other, the proclamations issued by the Japanese at Lungkow are instructive; and I print a few extracts from them.

The first was from the Commander of the Fleet to the Chamber of Commerce at the port:

We are now landing in your country at Lungkow. We do not entertain the least enmity towards the military forces, the farmers, or the merchants and people of your country. Our troops are well disciplined and will not cause the least injury to the autumn crops. I therefore respectfully request that you will cause instructions to be issued to the military forces of your country and to the farmers, merchants, and people, that all should pursue their avocations quietly and not become alarmed and cause disturbances. This is my sincere wish. With compliments.

The second was by the 'Commander of the Imperial Japanese Forces for the Suppression of the Military Forces at Tsingtao':

The fortifications erected by Germany at Tsingtao and the activities of the German fleet in Far Eastern waters both constitute a menace of no inconsiderable importance to the peace of Eastern Asia. The Imperial Japanese Government' could by no means regard the situation with indifference, and has been forced to call out its armies in the cause of right and justice, to inflict severe punishment, in the hope that peace may be rapidly restored in the Far East and that the territorial rights of the Republic of China may be protected. . . . No one need be alarmed, but all should quietly follow their vocations. It is important that you should all supply the wants of our Army to the utmost of your ability, in order that its movements may be furthered. Should anyone dare to interfere with the activities of our troops he will be immediately arrested and severely punished without mercy. This proclamation must be strictly obeyed by all.

Then followed three others issued by the Post Commandant, intimating that 'all boats, carts, cattle, horses, fuel, grain, and meat required must be at once supplied without delay,' and without hesitation, and that payment would be made at first in military notes, which would afterwards be changed into cash. The depôt for exchange was subsequently established at the Temple of the God of War. The last proclamation was more vigorous:

It is expected that citizens of the Republic of China residing within the area of military operation will afford aid to the Japanese troops in all matters to the utmost of their ability. Anyone daring to disobey a

military order or to injure the members of the Japanese Forces will be at once arrested and severely punished without mercy. This is not an empty threat. All must strictly obey this Proclamation.

This is the briefest outline of the military operations which affected China. She took it all very much to heart and very seriously. Mr. Liang Chi Chao, one of the most enlightened of Chinese, and formerly a prominent member of what was called the Government of All the Talents, formed in 1913, challenged the proceedings by an interpellation in the Tsan Cheng Yuan, and reviewed the whole situation in a very bitter speech. I have too great a respect for him not to believe that he felt every word he said; it was manifestly sincere, and it represented the feelings of a very large section of the Chinese people. student, philosopher, patriot, and statesman; yet his eyes were dimmed by trouble; he could not see the great inevitableness that governed the actions of the two nations which took this burden of war upon them; nor yet, as I think I see it, the hand of Destiny leading his own nation through suffering to a brighter day. Let me then, if I can, give unto him 'oil of joy for mourning.'

I will first deal with the situation in a most matter-of-fact manner. China was in a cleft stick; whichever way she turned one of the prongs caught her sharply and reminded her forcibly that 'grin and bear it' was the only policy, even though the Germans charged this against her as a breach of neutrality. The unfortunate possessor of a diseased tooth has to submit to much torture at the hands of the inexorable dentist; it is not sufficient that all offending matter must be removed from the crown; the roots which go deep into the jaw must be subjected to the cleansing operation if dental peace is to be preserved Japan was the far-seeing surgeon; Kiaochow, with its fortified Tsingtao, the diseased crown; the Shantung railway the deepset fang; the naval base the inflammatory trouble. It must all be got rid of before the leased territory could be handed back to China safe and sound. For the temporary seizure of the Tsinanfu workshops I must go further into dental science; the removal of another tooth is often necessary to complete the cure.

Yet another simile from the affairs of everyday life may illustrate the position in which China the unoffending found herself. When a fire is raging it is often necessary and lawful to sacrifice a neighbouring house in order to prevent the conflagration spreading. Thus often do the innocent suffer with the guilty for the common good.

I now come back to the chain of consequences, inevitable, almost automatic in their impulsions one of another, which caught China in its coils and cast her into the furnace of the War.

I find the cause, as I have said throughout, in the turning of

Tsingtao into a place of arms, and the port into a naval base for raids on the shipping of the Allies. On the 23rd of October it was somewhat triumphantly reported that there had been several 'welcome prizes,' among them the Riasan of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, caught after a long chase almost at the gates of Russia, Vladivostock, with bullion on board to the extent of five million roubles; also another Russian steamer with 200 head of cattle and 100 horses, and a British steamer with 'one million yen in gold'! This disturbance of the peace of the Far East made the coming of the Japanese inevitable. many's next step on the road to Avernus was equally inevitable, unless Tsingtao was to go by default; the use of the Shantung railway which was in her hands for the transport of men and material, and also for the collection of supplies along the line. But this made it equally certain that the Japanese would seize the railway, for in no other way could the supplies be stopped. Equally inevitable was it that the investment of Tsingtao should be made from the land side, and the Japanese troops landed at the most convenient place along the coast-Lungkow. Further, the presence of considerable bodies of Japanese troops on Chinese territory made it inevitable that military law in some form should be proclaimed, and that it should be applied to the Chinese in the neighbourhood, for a non-hostile civil population was essential, and hostile acts must be repressed; also that they should be required to billet the troops and furnish supplies. Equally inevitable was it that the Chinese Government should protest against the violation of its soil and the infringement of its rights of sovereignty, otherwise they must have acquiesced, thus furnishing aid to the Allies; and, if by chance they failed, China would have to suffer from German retribution, accentuated by all the refinements of Kultur. it came about that in this sequence of the inevitable, the fact that the territory on which war was waged was China, and the people Chinese, was unavoidably left out of consideration. It is a curious riddle, but I think it is easier to deal with if that antiquated doctrine of neutrality, with the quasi-belligerent sanction attached to the duty of resistance which it preaches, be left out; it was not framed for circumstances undreamed of in the countries where it originated. The doing of what is unavoidable is justified even to an unoffending person if there is no other alternative. If I have traced the chain of events accurately, it is clear that here there was no other alternative. But this leaves the last link in the chain of inevitable consequence to be forged at leisure, when men have more time to think. That last link is clearly indicated. China has suffered in her national dignity, and there must be reparation. What form it should

take cannot as yet be easily stated. But one thing can be stated. Germany has threatened China with reprisals after the war; to allow her to carry out her threat would be to light the torch of war once more in the Far East. Therefore at the peace, when, as I have already pointed out, Germany must for once be in agreement with her enemies, it is in the interests of the whole world that the peace of China should also be ensured, and the pretensions of Germany against her definitely and under the fullest guarantees swept away.

It is impossible to conclude this Article without referring to

some general considerations as to China's neutrality.

This is the second time that the neutrality of China has been seriously in question, and for her powerlessness during the Russo-Japanese war to do the right thing as expounded by the textbooks she has been soundly rated. I remember one learned writer who referred to 'the scandalous way in which China performed her duties of neutrality' during that war. To another it appeared from her action that China had not 'even a rudimentary conception of the somewhat exacting obligations of the modern neutral State.' So she stood condemned by the authorities for her omission to do the things which she ought to have done because other nations chose to go to war. I am not going to plead extenuating circumstances for her sins at that time, were they few or many; but I will venture to say this, that the learned authorities who condemned her were singularly unlearned in the source of her weakness and vacillation then, the chain of exterritoriality with which she has been fettered. It certainly was a surprise to the Chinese Government to find that the Family of Nations, which would not admit China to equal rights in ordinary matters, yet in extraordinary matters expected of her the fulfilment of certain duties said by the learned to be imposed upon her by international law. If I may use a homely simile, it was as if a little boy who had been 'stood in the corner' should She might, be expected to join heartily in family prayers. I should have thought, contend with some show of reason that 'without the pale' in the ordinary affairs of life implies 'without the pale' in the extraordinary. Exterritorial law being the antithesis to international law, the relations which it imposes would seem to negative those duties which are based upon the jus inter gentes, for China is hardly considered as one of the gentes, certainly as having no 'placet' to give in the formation of the

I think I am right in saying that no one has been at pains to re-write the law of neutrality by the light of modern happenings. It was declared to apply in all its crudity to China in 1904; she

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was limitrophe to the theatre of war both by sea and land; that was her misfortune, and everything was assumed against her. But the law of neutrality needs recasting, and some of its doctrines bombed out of existence, for it has at last been seen, what the old writers never seem to have realised, that in this, as in every other principle of law, circumstances alter cases; and the special circumstance in China's case now is that foreign armies have landed and fought upon her soil. The principle of the law of neutrality, which is very present to our minds to-day, is the passage of belligerent troops across neutral territory. This is what a learned writer, Wolsey, still in use in the schools, says of it:

A neutral ought to refuse the transit of belligerent troops even if he were prepared to grant the same to both sides. Neutrals have a right to insist that their territories shall be inviolate and untouched by the operations of war, and their rights of sovereignty uninvaded; and if violations of their rights are committed, they have a right to punish the offender or to demand redress; they are bound to do this, because otherwise neutrality is of no avail, and one of the belligerents enjoys the privilege with impunity.

It is possible that the 'modern neutral State' has still further obligations. But this is clear, that the duties of neutrality are often quasi-belligerent in their nature, for their breach is assumed to lead to war, offensive as well as defensive. And the feebleness of the neutral State, asserted by the learned to have been a good excuse for Portugal in the case of the General Armstrong, was declared by those same learned to be of no avail for China in the case of the Reshitelni sheltering in Chifu Harbour.

The word 'neutrality' conjures up now, and will for evermore, the heroic resistance of Belgium against the German armies before Liège; and the question will be asked in times to come whether that is the standard of duty for every State, however feeble, whose neutrality is placed in jeopardy. were possible to add one leaf to her chaplet of laurels, the words of the 'scrap of paper' would furnish it: 'Belgium shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.' And she did. There is another little State whose neutrality has also been grievously violated, Luxemburg; all that could be done the Grand Duchess did when she set her motor car across the road of the advancing German regiments. And now there is China. For the Allies, as I have shown, the inevitable is their justification. But Germany's retaliatory threat to China may be judged by her own misdeeds. She has justified her violation of the neutrality of Belgium by necessity; therefore, as against her, a far more real and exigent necessity justified the

landing of the Japanese at Lungkow. She has 'chastised' Belgium for obeying the old law of resistance which she now invokes against China; therefore, if China had done what Belgium did, the Allies would have been justified, according to German standards, in so 'chastising' China. To use the expression current among German statesmen, it would have been 'her own fault.' Or, if we take Luxemburg for example, which, according to the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, was 'really neutral,' she 'suffered' German troops to march across her territory; therefore China was 'really neutral' when she also 'suffered' the Japanese troops to march across the peninsula to Tsinanfu, making only an equally ineffectual protest. Solvitur risu.

F. T. PIGGOTT.

# SELF-APPOINTED STATESMEN

It may be true, as Mr. George Bernard Shaw so frequently asserts, that Englishmen as a race are muddle-headed and 'that they have never been forced by political adversity to mistrust their tempers and depend on a carefully stated case, as Irishmen have been.' Looking down upon England 'with something of the detachment of a foreigner and perhaps with a certain slightly malicious taste for taking the conceit out of her,' he has, no doubt, good grounds for believing in our intellectual laziness. Mr. Shaw and certain other irresponsible comedians on the stage of literature who find themselves free, at such a time as this, to sow the seeds of political dissension in our midst and to give the heathen cause for blaspheming, may well attribute their prosperous impunity to a lack of intelligence in the British people; and more especially so when their pernicious activities take the direction of deliberately attempting to injure Great Britain's moral position in the eyes of neutral States. It is undeniably true that in no other country in Europe would an author be permitted to gratify his insatiate passion for notoriety, or a distorted sense of his own importance, by writings of the kind which Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells have seen fit to publish since the War began. In no other country would the makers of farce and the weavers of phantasy be permitted to utter, in the guise of public opinion, critical denunciations of the motives and actions of the Government, coupled with invitations to neutral nations to intervene, when occasion shall offer, for the purpose of determining the terms of peace.

On the face of it, Mr. Shaw's indictment of intellectual laziness would seem to be justified. No doubt the majority of Englishmen would meet the charge by observing that, in the domain of national politics, the lucubrations of Mr. Shaw and other licensed jesters are but as the crackling of thorns under a pot. So far as this country is concerned, this is generally true. But the fact remains that in America, in Scandinavia, and in Germany the opinions on political matters of Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells are very widely accepted at their face value. Their great achievements in literature and

the drama, their international reputation for audacity and brilliancy, have won for them an enormous circulation in the United States. Their iconoclastic theories appeal naturally to that large section of public opinion in the great Democracy which persists in regarding the political institutions of Europe as obsolete and effete; so that, when they turn from their proper business of entertaining fiction (I class Mr. Wells's romantic flights into Socialism as fiction) to pose as lawgivers and selfappointed arbiters of the future destinies of the civilised world, millions of American citizens are only too ready to receive and discuss their opinions as serious contributions to constructive statesmanship. One has but to study the American Press (and more especially that of the Middle-Western States) to realise how widespread and baneful is the influence of Mr. Shaw's destructive criticism and Mr. Wells's fantastic idealism. It is clear that vast numbers of American Yellow-Press readers gladly accept the Shavian gospel of British muddle-headedness and believe, with him, in the hypocrisy and calculated selfishness of British policy in declaring war against Germany. Has he not told them that he and Mr. Wells (who, he says, 'first hoisted the country's flag'!) are the heaven-sent 'mouthpieces of many inarticulate citizens,' and that it is their duty 'to bring the whole continent of war-struck lunatics to reason, if we can '? Demos in America, with his primitive love of personalities, accepts Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells at their own valuation, partly because their opinions are nicely calculated to flatter his own self-esteem, and partly because the restless waywardness of these writers appeals to a class of mind accustomed to find its nourishment in sentimental idealism, tempered with police reports.

As far as their effect on the United Kingdom is concerned, Englishmen are, no doubt, justified in treating the political opinions of Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells with contemptuous indifference; but they are not justified in shutting their eyes to the possible effects of these utterances on public opinion abroad, or leaving them to do their pernicious work unchallenged and unrebuked. It is, indeed, significant of the general lack of proportion which characterises many of our political methods and activities, and suggestive of our inability to appreciate relative values, that, on the one hand, we submit to a rigorous Press Censorship for fear of revealing anything that might serve the purposes of the enemy; while, on the other, we allow writers like Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells to undermine our position in the eves of the world, to vilify the bravest and best members of our Government, and to create in neutral countries a body of opinion calculated to deprive us hereafter of some of the fruits of victory and to prejudice our chances of securing effective terms of peace. As a nation we have acquiesced in the proceedings of a Press Bureau which carries reticence to heights and depths that pass all human understanding; we profess to regard as a grave menace to the State the possible activities of German barbers and waiters in our midst : yet we view with apparent unconcern the spectacle of Englishmen of international reputation publishing broadcast to the world travesties of vitally important issues, and irresponsible opinions calculated to prejudice many of the ends for which we have entered upon this War. The nation, which has declared by the mouth of its King that it is solidly united to fight for a worthy purpose and that 'we shall not lay down our arms until that purpose has been fully achieved,' allows these influential but wholly irrelevant writers to damage that purpose in the eyes of the world. It is no exaggeration to say that Mr. Shaw's Common Sense about the War, and Mr. Wells's hysterical appeals to the American people, are likely to inflict upon the cause for which we are fighting injuries far more permanent and serious than anything that could be accomplished by all the alien enemies in England put together. There is neither sense of proportion nor fitness in a Censorship which mutilates Mr. Hilaire Belloc's retrospective analyses of the military situation, and at the same time permits Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells to sow broadcast the seeds of future trouble. To strain at the military gnat while swallowing the political camel is a policy calculated to cost England dear in the final day of reckoning. The nation at war has spontaneously decided to sink its internal differences and private opinions in whole-hearted support of the Government until victory shall be ours. There is no apparent reason why any licensed jester or earnest visionary in our midst should be exempt from this self-denying ordinance of reticence. spoiled children who amused us in our theatre-going, novelreading days should now be seen and not heard.

Turning for a moment from consideration of the individual activities of Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells, it is pertinent to observe that, with a few notable exceptions, our imaginative writers, weighed in the balance of war's stern realities, have generally been found wanting. Their habits of mind and methods of expression have alike proved unequal to the demands of so great a social and spiritual upheaval. The melodious voices to which we listened gratefully in the far-distant days of peace sound strangely thin and unconvincing to-day. Most of them, deserting their wonted business of creative imagination (because the demand for it has suddenly ceased), have hurled themselves, without preparatory training, into the war of words which seeks to justify or explain this War of the nations. Their artist hands have been suddenly called upon to handle the hard materials




of international politics, their soaring minds brought down to the dull level of treaties, law, and diplomacy. And the net result, in nearly every case, has been to strengthen the opinion of the plain citizen that your man of letters is constitutionally incapable of dealing rationally with the stern realities of life. In the midst of a great catastrophe like this there is neither comfort nor counsel to be found in all their multitudinous voices. From their primrose paths of fiction and phantasy they have suddenly emerged into the stony desert of stern realities, and forthwith they are lost; and, being lost, they shout to each other and gesticulate the more feverishly. Misreading the signs of the times, incapable of applying to the nation's needs the simplest lessons of history, they can only comfort themselves, and those who have leisure to listen to them, with memories of dead words, repeating their familiar incantations at the deserted shrines of absent gods. Being idealists, and frequently sentimental idealists, they look forward to finding, with the restoration of peace, a world clean-swept and ready for the millennium of their dreams, a world from which the Junker shall be banished for ever, in which 'the enthronement of the idea of public right will be the governing idea of European politics.' Underlying all their splendid dreams-universal disarmament, a United States of Europe, the neutralisation of the sea, an International Police Force, and so forth-we find evidence of the same perennial delusion, of the idea that legislation is omnipotent, and that things will get done because laws are passed to do them; evidence of the persistent hope that (as Herbert Spencer has said) 'by some means the collective wisdom can be separated from the collective folly and set over it in such a way as to guide it aright.'

Thus we find certain imaginative writers of the Fabian school taking comfort from their belief that their particular form of Socialism will hereafter be able to put an end to all war, oblivious of the fact that two fifths of the German Army to-day are Thus we find a writer of the literary distinction of Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson bringing to bear upon the European situation the picturesque idealism of his Letters of a Chinese Official, and declaring that peace must henceforth be permanently established 'by the organisation of a league of European States, which are in agreement in desiring the complete prevention of war and powerful enough to make such an agreement effective throughout the world.' Then we find Mr. John Galsworthy proclaiming his faith in Democracy, as the only chance of lasting peace in Europe; almost as pathetic a vision of the Promised Land as that of the Religious Society of Friends, who believe that after this War they will have an opportunity of 'reconstructing European culture upon the only possible permanent foundation-mutual trust and goodwill . . . of laying down far-reaching principles for the future of mankind, such as will ensure us for ever against a repetition of this gigantic folly.' Admire as we may this magnificent faith in the magic power of words, history and sociological science alike warn us that it is an imperishable delusion of humanity to believe that it only needs a sudden re-fashioning of the people to make them good and free. These high hopes are part of man's immortal inheritance of protest against the intrusion of the Serpent into the earthly Paradise, against the sorry scheme of things which ordains that, on this planet, all life shall subsist and survive at the cost of other lives. Throughout all its long history of strife, mankind in the valley of Armageddon has heard and rejoiced at the songs of the poets and the visions of the prophets, foretelling the dawn of the millennium on the distant hillsand has then returned, spiritually refreshed, to the fray.

It is interesting to observe how many of our well-known imaginative writers have now yielded to the spell of this vision of a 'new era,' to be attained (as Mr. Dickinson has it) by invoking 'the new spirit of the world, the spirit of co-operation, of reason, of that divine common sense which is the essence of religion.' But the great majority, being patriotic citizens first and transcendentalists afterwards, have been content to announce their visions of the new-world-to-be without endeavouring to hasten its advent by descending themselves into the arena of politics and polemics. While believing in the impending abolition of all future causes of war, they have proclaimed their belief that 'England could not, without dishonour, have refused to take part in the present War,' and they have refrained from diverting attention from the vital business of defeating Germany by any premature discussion of the ways and means to secure permanent peace.

If I have referred briefly to the published opinions of writers like Mr. Galsworthy and Mr. Dickinson on the issues and causes of the War, I have done so in order to illustrate the truth that the highly imaginative order of mind, affected by a tendency to sentimental idealism, is generally incapable of bringing itself suddenly into direct relation with the elemental and brutal realities of the present devastating struggle. Just as the great majority of our delicately reared poets have shown how seriously their Muse has been embarrassed by the War's sudden trumpetcall to simplicity and fervour, so our novelists and romantic writers, with very few exceptions, have shown themselves unable to realise swiftly the truth that, beneath the surface of our complex civilisation, the instinct of nationalism, patriotism in




This being so, it is all the more to be regretted that the two British authors whose influence is greater than that of any of their contemporaries in America and Germany—Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells—should have rushed into print with such flippant irresponsibility, combining an egregious display of swollen-headed vanity and lack of restraint with contemptuous indifference to the sentiments of the great mass of their countrymen.

Mr. Shaw's pamphlet, Common Sense about the War, his chief contribution to the literature of the subject, was originally published as a Special Supplement to the New Statesman on the 14th of November, and was reproduced in America by the New York Times. Its chief result in England has been to convince the public of Mr. Shaw's callous levity and his unconcealed contempt for the deepest convictions of the nation. Well-meaning visionaries of the Norman Angell school, enrolled in the Union of Democratic Control, and intensely earnest in their plans for the creation of the 'Pacific State,' find Mr. Shaw in sympathy with them against the Junker, and at the same time utterly contemptuous in his ridicule of their 'disarmament delusion.' The very nimbleness of his intellectual acrobatics, the biting malice of his irony, his aloofness and impartial scorn for all concerned, combine to leave him (as no doubt he intended) in splendid isolation, even amongst the 'intellectuals' of the socio-political arena. As for the mass of his countrymen, since the outbreak of war they have had enough serious things to think about and to do, without troubling themselves to digest

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the pasquinades of this literary harlequin. To judge from current opinion, most Englishmen regard these eccentricities and excesses of Mr. Shaw's genius much in the same way as they regard the well-advertised Red Cross activities of certain ladies of the theatrical and fashionable world. Without some such eccentric manifestation of activity, Mr. Shaw might have been shut out completely by the stern realities of the War from the limelight that he loves so well.

But in America, where he commands a far wider circle of readers, and where his avowed intention of 'taking the conceit out of England' appeals to a very considerable minority, there can be no doubt that he has rendered services to Germany sufficient to entitle him to the Iron Cross at the hands of the Kaiser. At a time when our Censorship withholds from the American people much information that might enlighten public opinion and stimulate intelligent sympathy with England and her Allies, Mr. Shaw is allowed to pour out the vials of his scorn upon the British Government in general, and Sir Edward Grey in particular, and to support the statements put forward by Germany as her excuse for violating the neutrality of Belgium and precipitating the catastrophe of war. The conditions under which this mud-slinging is done make it certain that some of it will stick to the prejudice hereafter of our national interests in the day of reckoning. It is not for nothing that the German Press Bureau has given wide circulation to his pamphlet, as propaganda literature calculated to strengthen Germany's position in neutral countries.

In the exuberance of his own performance, however, Mr. Shaw has overdone it. Even the little Broadway shopgirl, digesting him through the columns of the New York Times, in her diligent pursuit of culture, must experience an uneasy feeling that this idol of the American Press is not to be taken seriously. It is not easy, at a time like this, for the master-cynic to pose successfully, in a minority of one against all Europe, as the sole repository of true wisdom. Even a Bowery comedian must revise his conception of unbounded assurance when confronted with the Shaw model, as set forth, for example, in the following extracts from his 'Open Letter to President Wilson':

In your clear western atmosphere and in your peculiarly responsible position as the head centre of western democracy, you, when the European situation became threatening three months ago, must have been acutely aware of the fact to which Europe was so fatally blinded—namely, that the simple solution of the difficulty in which the menace of the Franco-Russo-British Entente placed Germany was for the German Emperor to leave his western frontier under the safeguard of the neighbourliness and good faith of American, British, and French democracy, and then await quite calmly any action that Russia might take against his country on the east. . . .

The Kaiser never dreamed of confiding his frontier to you and to the humanity of his neighbours. And the diplomatists of Europe never thought of that easy and right policy, and could not suggest any substitute for it, with the hideous result which is before you.

Or, from the same document, this bright gem of amateur statesmanship:

If Germany maintains her claim to a right of way through Belgium on a matter which she believed (however erroneously) to be one of life or death to her as a nation, nobody, not even China, now pretends that such rights of way have not their place among those common human rights which are superior to the more artificial rights of nationality. I think, for example, that if Russia made a descent on your continent under circumstances which made it essential to the maintenance of your national freedom that you should move an army through Canada, you would ask our leave to do so and take it by force if we did not grant it. You may reasonably suspect, even if all our statesmen raise a shriek of denial, that we should take a similar liberty under similar circumstances in the teeth of all the scraps of paper in our Foreign Office dustbin.

Thus Germany's contempt for treaties is condoned. But when it comes to a critical analysis of England's position vis à vis Belgium, we are solemnly told that 'no matter how powerful a State is, it is not above feeling the difference between doing something that nobody condemns and something that everybody condemns except the interested parties.'

It may be that just retribution will overtake Mr. Shaw, even in America, for thus abusing the freedom he enjoys in this country. In Chicago, Milwaukee, and other centres of German beer and kultur, his influence and his royalties may possibly remain undiminished, but in the Eastern States there are indications that public opinion deprecates the display of such mountebank levity at a time when all the world is deeply moved to seriousness. One writer in a New York paper thus summarises Common Sense about the War:

Bernard Shaw has written an elaborate thesis to maintain:

1. That Great Britain was abundantly justified in making war with Germany.

2. That the explanation given by the British Government for making war against Germany was stupid, hypocritical, mendacious, and disgraceful.

3 That he alone is capable of interpreting the moral purpose of the British people in undertaking this necessary work of civilisation.

4. That the reason the British Government's justification of the war is so inadequate is because no British Government is ever so clever as Bernard Shaw.

5. That even in the midst of the most horrible calamity known to human

history it pays to advertise.

Various patriots have various ways of serving their country. Some go to the firing line to be shot, and others stay at home to be a source of innocent merriment to the survivors.



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If the future of international relations depends upon the higher education of the masses in the direction of political morality, it is nothing less than deplorable that a man of Mr. Shaw's eminence should permit himself to write contemptuously as he does of Belgium's rights of neutrality, of 'obsolete treaties,' and the circumstances that alter them. If there were any proof that he himself honestly believed this poisonous nonsense, that he was not writing it simply pour épater le bourgeois, with his tongue in his cheek, he might be forgiven. As it is, if the Censor is unable to restrain his pernicious activities, his countrymen should at least discard enough of their 'intellectual laziness' to appreciate Mr. Shaw's form of patriotism and the valuable services which he has rendered to the enemy.

There can be no question as to the sincerity of the frantic appeals which Mr. H. G. Wells has addressed, and continues to address, to Europe and America, to follow him on the road to Utopia. Indeed his deadly earnestness, his childlike faith in his own pet panaceas for the prevention of war, his splendid dreams of world-wide social reconstruction under the guidance of pure 'Liberalism,' are sufficient in themselves to secure for him a large following, and to make his fantastic idealism a force to be reckoned with hereafter, when the sword shall have been sheathed, and diplomacy sets about its work of redrawing the map of Europe. Mr. Wells would save all further trouble in this matter by abolishing diplomacy, after which he, with a few Socialist friends in England and America, would proceed to redraw the map, to abolish the 'individualist capital system,' and establish 'the United States of Europe' upon a Wells régime of enlightened Socialism. 'Let us redraw the map of Europe boldly,' he says, 'as we mean it to be redrawn, and let us replan society as we mean it to be reconstructed'; whereupon he proceeds to outline the foundations of a world made Beautiful and Good on the model originally set forth in Anticipations and The Modern Utopia. Peace hath her swelled heads, no less renowned than war.

To a certain type of mind, by no means uncommon, idealism of this kind carries an almost irresistible appeal. It is a type generally associated with a vague and vicarious morality, which lends itself readily to the support of loose abstractions, and follows gladly anyone who announces a new short cut to Utopia. It scorns precision in matters of detail and the discussion of practical difficulties; it has a firm-rooted faith in the power of 'isms' to overcome human nature and all other obstacles. In America, where public education has been largely in the hands of women, and therefore to some extent subject to sentimental



idealism, the gospel according to Mr. Wells has evoked a response, the strength of which may be estimated in the current opinions of publicists and politicians. Mr. Wells's ideas as to the possibility of a social and political reconstruction of the civilised world, and the confederation and collective disarmament of Europe, coincide at many points with the views of 'intellectuals' and philanthropists in the United States. It is therefore worth while to consider seriously some of the proposals which this gifted romanticist has recently advanced, in all seriousness, as a contribution to constructive statesmanship. I select the following as typical:

From an article on 'The War of the Mind' published in 'The Nation' (August 29) and in the 'New York World' and other American papers.

It rests therefore with us, who outside all formal government represent the national will and intentions, to take this work into our hands. By means of a propaganda of books, newspaper articles, leaflets, tracts in English, French, German, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Italian, Chinese, and Japanese, we have to spread this idea, repeat this idea, and impose upon this war the idea that this war must end war.

(Russia, Austria, Mexico, and Turkey, surely fit subjects for propaganda, appear to have been rather carelessly overlooked.)

From an article in the 'Chicago Tribune' on 'The End of Militarism' (August 19).

It will lie in the power of England, France, Russia, Italy, Japan, and the United States, if Germany and Austria are shattered by this war, to forbid further building of any more ships of war at all; to persuade—if need be, oblige—the minor Powers to sell their navies; to refuse the seas to armed ships not under the control of the Federation; to launch an armed ship can be made an invasion of the common territory of the world.

From 'An Appeal to the American People' (September 5).

For it rests with you to establish and secure, or to refuse to establish and secure, the permanent peace of the world, the final ending of war.

Never were the British people so unanimous. All Ireland is with us. We are not fighting to destroy Germany: it is the firm resolve of England to permit (sic) no fresh 'conquered provinces' to darken the future of Europe.

At the end, we do most firmly believe there will be established a new Europe, a Europe riddened of rankling oppressions, with a free Poland, a free Germany, a free Finland, the Balkans settled, the little nations safe, and peace secured.

Engrossed in the congenial task of deciding the destinies of Europe, Mr. Wells displays the true artist's contempt for consistency. What an expectant world needs is his opinion, red-hot from the Press, no matter how foolish and self-contradictory. This 'firm resolve of England' in the matter of conquered provinces sounded well enough in September, but either he was mis-

informed on the subject or he caused the resolve to be modified. For it no longer forms part of his scheme of world salvation. The following interesting passage occurs in an article, suppressed by the Censor in England, but published in the American Press, under the title of 'Holland's Future' (New York Times, etc., February 7). Mr. Wells is calmly discussing the advantages which Holland would obtain by taking a hand against Germany:

And by coming in, there is something more than the mere termination of a strain and the vindication of international righteousness to consider. There is the possibility, and not only the possibility but the possible need, that Holland should come out of this world war aggrandised. I want to lay stress upon that, because it may prove a decisive factor in this matter.

The Dutch desire aggrandisement for the sake of aggrandisement as little as any nation in Europe. But what if the path of aggrandisement be also the path of safety?

It is clear that both France and Belgium will demand and receive territorial compensation for these last months of horror. It is ridiculous to suppose that the Germans may fling war in its most atrocious and filthy form over Belgium and some of the sweetest parts of France without paying bitterly and abundantly for the freak.

Quite apart from indemnities, France and Belgium must push forward their boundaries so far that if ever Germany tries another rush she will have to rush for some days through her own lost lands. The only tolerable frontier against Germans is a day's march deep in Germany. Of course, Liége will have to be covered in the future by Belgian annexations in the Aix region and stretching toward Cologne, and France will go to the Rhine. I think Belgium as well as France will be forced to go to the Rhine.

It is no good talking now of buffer States, because the German conscience cannot respect them. Buffer States are just anvil States. At any rate, very considerable annexations of German territory by Belgium and France are now inevitable, and Holland must expect a much larger and stronger Belgium to the south of her, allied firmly to France and England.

Here we have the Junker spirit at its best.

Finally, for the purposes of his 'Pacific State,' he proposes:

1. That every citizen shall give a year or so of his or her life to the State. ('Only in that way is it possible to get that sense of obligation and ownership in the State, that unity of feeling which is one of the great advantages possessed by the modern military State over its rural society.')

2. That the State should secure to all willing men the sense of freedom, continuing interesting work and immunity from the degrading experience of involuntary unemployment.

3. That 'that strange, wild, dangerous thing, the Press, and indeed all our knowledge-giving and idea-spreading organisations, should be brought into much clearer relationship with the educational organisation. . . A time will come when the Pacific State will be obliged to control the finances of its Press as closely as it controls its banks, and monopolise the advertisement sheets as its own business. Only so will it escape the invasion of its mind.'

Readers of the Nineteenth Century may wonder what importance can possibly attach to windy stuff of this kind, and be disposed to ignore it as the extravagance of a highly imaginative mind, reduced to a condition of hysteria by contemplation of the horrors of war. His writing undoubtedly reflects a highly nervous condition; nevertheless, these views, in all their crudity, have been published by journals of wide circulation in England and America as representing the tendencies of a considerable section of English Socialists, and even of English Liberalism. His idea of 'a Peace League that is to control (sic) the globe' has its ardent supporters in Great Britain. Its advocates in the United States are many.

It is, unfortunately, true that these irresponsible opinions, uttered ostensibly in the name of English Liberalism by writers whose names are household words on both sides of the Atlantic, have encouraged the belief, already widely prevalent in America, that the United States will eventually be required to act as mediators and arbiters of the terms of peace in Europe. They have certainly created a feeling that (the Monroe Doctrine to the contrary notwithstanding) America has a moral right to be consulted whenever the redrawing of the map of Europe takes But, as Sir Oliver Lodge has pointed out in a recent letter to The Times, the assertion of such an opinion is greatly to be deprecated, for this War will not end in an arbitration nor by any outside intervention, but only by Germany's complete surrender. A considerable body of public opinion is undoubtedly being misled, by the writings of Shaw, Wells, and other English authors, to place a wrong construction (and a construction embarrassing to the Governments of both countries) upon the British people's evident desire to justify its moral position in the eyes of the greatest of the neutral nations. Dr. Butler, President of Columbia University, for instance, believes that the War will end in the organisation of 'The United States of Europe, modelled after and instructed by the United States of America,' because 'conventional diplomacy and conventional statesmanship have very evidently broken down in Europe. They have made a disastrous failure of the work with which they were entrusted. They did not, and could not, prevent the War, because they knew and used only the old formulas. They had no tools for a job like this.'

These, clearly, are the views of the Shaw and Wells school, transplanted and adapted. Similarly, the reiterated appeals of these writers to the United States as a moral force find their answer in Dr. Butler's expressed belief that because 'America is the first moral Power in the world to-day, we have made good our right to be appealed to on questions of national and inter-

national morality.' These views, says a writer in the New York Times, 'must make every American's heart first swell with pride and then thrill with a realisation of responsibility.' Therein lies their mischief and their possible danger.

After all, there may be something to be said for Mr. Wells's

idea of a State-controlled Press.

J. O. P. BLAND.

## NEUTRALITY VERSUS WAR

NEW CONSIDERATIONS IN AN OLD CAUSE

Antagonism between the neutral and the belligerent attitude arises in every war, and personal or national convictions and principles have very little to do with the subject. The same Power which, as a neutral, may have insisted in lofty language on the unrighteousness of interfering with neutrals in the legitimate pursuit of their affairs, on becoming a belligerent, will insist on the unrighteousness of the neutral doing anything which may enable the enemy to prolong the struggle. The arguments are always more or less the same, and Powers do not even consider it necessary to explain away contradictions between views inherent to the nature of the interests involved.

The objections, for instance, of the British Government in the Dacia case to recognising the transfer flagrante bello of a German ship to the American flag were put forward in practically the same terms by the American Government during the Hispano-American War of 1898, when State Secretary Day gave the following instructions to the Diplomatic and Consular officers of the United States:

This Government [he said] is in receipt of information that ships carrying the Spanish flag have been or are about to be furnished with British or other neutral papers upon colorable transfers of ownership, made for the purpose of avoiding belligerent capture. It is desired that any such cases coming to your notice should receive immediate attention, and that steps should be taken to prevent the colorable and void transfers of vessels under the Spanish flag to a neutral flag.

In the Declaration of London the Powers represented—viz. Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, the United States, Japan, and Holland—endeavoured to give what seemed a reasonable view of this particular question of belligerent transfers during the war to a neutral flag, by providing that such transfers effected after the outbreak of hostilities were void unless proved not to have been made in order to evade capture. The burden of proof, it is seen, is imposed on the transferee, as was held by the United States Court in the Benito Estenger case, in which a Spanish ship, a couple of Vol. LXXVII—No. 457

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months after the outbreak of the war of 1898, was transferred to the British flag.

I cite the example of the *Dacia* case on account of its notoriety, but the subject of the present article embraces the interplay of belligerent and neutral rights and duties generally, and the transformation the latter are necessarily undergoing in response to the particular character of the present War.

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
War at all times affects neutrals. Its law and usage are based on the assumption that neutral States agree that the *de facto* situation arising out of war imposes on them certain obligations which it is in their interest, both as actual non-belligerents and as potential belligerents, to observe.

Neutrality is thus the complement of belligerency. War being an effort on the part of the one belligerent to impose its will on the other, any act on the part of a neutral State which conduces to the prolongation of the opposing belligerent's resistance is detrimental to the former. A number of distinctions, however, have grown out of the practice of war which may be summed up as follows <sup>1</sup>:

It is the duty of a neutral State to abstain, in its corporate capacity, from all acts which may help the one belligerent to the disadvantage of the other, and to grant impartially to the one or the other belligerent any rights, advantages, or privileges which cannot be regarded as an intervention in the struggle. On the other hand, it is not bound to prevent the exportation by private persons or companies, for the account of either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, and, in general, of anything which may be useful for an army or a fleet; nor is a loan by a neutral person, company, or bank to one or the other belligerent considered an act committed in favour of one of the belligerents, provided nothing is done officially to prevent the other belligerent from endeavouring to obtain a loan on its side. A neutral State is bound not to permit any violation by either belligerent of its sovereign rights; not even to allow a Prize Court to be constituted by either belligerent on its territory or on a vessel in its waters; and, so far as the means at its disposal permit, not to allow within its jurisdiction the equipment or arming of any vessel which it has any reasonable suspicion may be destined to take part in hostile operations against a Power with which it is at peace.

The consequences of non-observance of neutral obligations are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See more fully thereon Barclay, Law and Usage of War, p. 82, et seq., London 1914.



not identical. Let us take, for instance, the case of 'absolute contraband.' Inasmuch as the belligerents cannot carry on hostilities without artillery, projectiles, and the materials necessary for their manufacture, muskets, Bayonets, swords, etc., called 'munitions of war,' to supply them to either belligerent is an unneutral act. On the part of a neutral State, as such, to afford such supplies would be equivalent to giving direct collective assistance to one of the belligerents against the other, and would, therefore, be a casus belli; while, on the part of its individual citizens, such assistance only exposes those who give it to the penalty of capture and confiscation of the things in question by the opposing belligerent. Out of the universal acquiescence in this latter method of leaving the belligerent himself to deal with forbidden private assistance to the enemy has grown up the law of contraband—that is to say the procedure which the belligerents, in return for being allowed to take the law into their own hands, are bound to observe for the protection of innocent neutral property.

A belligerent right which follows from what I have called the complementary character of neutrality is that entitling the belligerent to close access, even by neutral ships, to any of the enemy's ports, for the purpose of more effectually preventing him from receiving supplies which may enable him to prolong his resistance. In this case, it is seen, even non-contraband property and goods are included in the prohibition, known in the usage of war as 'blockade.' Of blockade, Grotius remarks, war authorises many things which would not otherwise be allowable. Thus, if an enemy cannot be brought to terms without closing access to him of things which can help him to hold out, necessity gives the adversary the right to claim an indemnity for violation of the blockade from him who violates it.<sup>2</sup>

This right to an indemnity has been worked out in practice

2 Grotius justifies his contention in the following quaint passage: 'If the supply sent hinder the execution of my designs and the sender might have known as much, as if I have besieged a town, and blocked up its ports, and thereupon quickly expect a surrender or a Peace, that Sender is obliged to make me satisfaction for the Damage that I suffer upon his Accounts as much as he that shall take a Prisoner out of Custody, that was committed for a just debt, or helps him to make his escape in order to cheat me; and proportionably to my Loss, I may seize on his goods, and take them as my own, till I am fully satisfied. If he did not actually do me any Damage, but only designed it, then have I a right by detaining those supplies, to oblige him to give me security for the future by Pledges, hostages, or the like. But, further, if the wrongs done to me by the enemy be openly unjust, and he by those supplies encourages him in his unjust War, then shall he not only be obliged to repair my Loss, but also be treated as a malefactor, as one that rescues a notorious convict out of the hands of Justice; and in this case, it shall be lawful for me to deal with him agreeable to his Offence, according to those Rules which we have set down for Punishments; and for a just Restitution, we may pillage him too.'

as a right of capture and confiscation by the blockading belligerent of vessels endeavouring, in spite of notice, to enter the blockaded place.

Originally a blockade by sea was probably nothing more than the adaptation to maritime warfare of blockades upon land which are de facto blockades, the army investing the blockaded spot and being in actual physical possession of the zone through which it prevents ingress and egress. An attempt to violate such a blockade would be an act of hostility against the investing army. A maritime blockade would also originally be a close blockade undertaken in conjunction with operations on the land side and restricted to the entrance of a port or bay or river. From the first, however, there would be the necessary difference between intercourse by sea and by land, that the cordon round the port on the side of the sea cannot be as effectively enforced, or even as effectively made visible as on the land side. With the growth of recognition of neutral rights, the fact that a ship on its way to the blockaded port was not aware of the blockade would be taken into account, and notification of blockade to neutral States would come into use for the purpose of avoiding complications in such Notification having become an international practice, it is easy to understand how at a time when communications were slow, uncertain, and difficult it would sometimes be given, as a possible measure of belligerent tactics, before the blockade could be carried out or, perhaps, had even been finally decided upon. Treaties between different States then grew up to regulate, as between them, the enforcement of blockades and the protection of the property of either as a neutral where the other might be a belligerent. Every text-book of International Law tells of the abuse to which, later on, the notification of 'paper blockades' lent itself, of the combination of neutrals in self-defence, and how eventually in 1856 the maritime Powers of Europe, returning, as it were, to the starting point of the institution, decreed that for the future, to be binding on neutrals, blockades must be effective.

Writers, following Grotius and seeking for a legal justification of the right of capture and confiscation, have laid it down that blockade is a substitution of the dominion of the blockading State for that of the blockaded one, as it no doubt was originally, and that the blockading State has the same rights of exclusion of aliens and alien vessels as all States possess on their own terri-This view, however, would only account for the right of blockade within the territorial waters of the blockaded State, and would not justify the exercise by a belligerent of rights upon the high sea not recognised in time of peace. Whatever the justifying basis of the right may be, in the course of time it has



become, like the rules of contraband, a substantive right of war owing its existence to a state of belligerency and entailing corresponding duties on neutrality.

A contingent belligerent right arising out of the law of both contraband and blockade is that of visit and search, without which the relative positions of belligerent and neutral, and the responsibilities and privileges of the latter, could not be ascertained. This belligerent right is known as that of 'Right of Search.' Here again a procedure has grown up for the protection of innocent neutral traffic, including the immunity confirmed by the Declaration of Paris that, except contraband, enemy goods on board a neutral ship, as well as neutral goods on board an enemy ship, are free from capture.

All these rights and duties on the part of belligerents and neutrals have grown up under a system of warfare which, since the changes produced by the introduction of gunpowder, has remained till the present day essentially the same. Submarine and aerial war, machine and the new siege guns seem to have produced a change equally profound, the effect of which is only beginning to make itself felt. One of their consequences has been to draw into the orbit of war materials and industries never before regarded as serving its purposes. The present feeling on both sides is one of resentment at new methods which are growing up in response to the change, but change there is, and we must examine its consequences with the detachment befitting a new de facto situation.

#### TT

I referred above in connexion with the law of contraband to things which are indispensable to warfare. In contradistinction to these are things which are of no use whatsoever in warfare. These are articles which, says Grotius, only serve for pleasure and cannot at any time be classed as contraband. He instanced such things as pictures, embroideries, curiosities, etc. Between absolute contraband and absolute non-contraband, so to speak, are all the other products of man's industry which, according to their destination, are contraband or not as the case may be. In the Declaration of London three lists are given corresponding to these divisions. In the case of absolute and conditional contraband any alteration has to be notified to neutral Powers, but in the case of the free list it was forbidden to place any of the articles enumerated on either of the other two lists.

The English term of 'Visit and Search' is, I may mention, a misnomer. 'Visite' is the French term for 'search.' How it found its way into our diplomatic terminology is easily surmised. I use the term 'Right of search' as the correct equivalent of 'Droit de visite.'

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The Declaration is only six years old. The lists were drawn up in accordance with the then current views on the subject. Yet they are already out of date.

With the increasing complication of warfare, as I have said, a large number of other things besides those enumerated in the Declaration as absolute contraband have become as essential to its conduct as powder and shot.

Thus, among the 'conditional' list of the Declaration of London were aircraft and their component parts, barbed wire, motor vehicles, tyres, and mineral oils. Under the British Order in Council (December 23, 1914) they have been transferred to the 'absolute' list. Under the same Order several of the Free List articles, such as the 'raw materials of the textile industries,' rubber, and hides, have been struck out of this free list as utilisable in warfare, and are now entered in the 'conditional' list. Alterations in the methods of warfare, in fact, necessarily entail corresponding alterations in respect of neutrals. The present War has shown that sandbags and barbed wire are more effective for defence than the strongest masonry. Barbed wire has acquired such importance that, in spite of its civilian uses, it cannot but be classed among articles indispensable in warfare. The same may be said of machinery and implements for the digging of trenches, now as indispensable for defence as artillery for offence; and, as regards petroleum, now classed, as we have seen, as 'absolute' contraband, it is not only the motive power of military waggons, and indispensable for traction in general, but without it aircraft cannot fly. The inclusion in 'absolute contraband' of these articles, however, implies a new definition of the term. It would obviously be wrong to declare any of them to be useless for any other purpose than We must, therefore, define 'absolute contraband' as now applying to articles which are in such overwhelming demand in war that the presumption of their destination is 'absolute.'

But the changes to which the new conditions of war are exposing the character of contraband are not confined to the classification of the articles themselves. Articles of conditional contraband consigned to a belligerent country are distinguished according to their destination. Thus the Declaration of London provides that conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or is consigned to the authorities of the enemy State or a contractor established in the enemy country 'who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of the kind to the enemy,' or to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or 'other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy.' It is obviously becoming more and more difficult, when all a nation's life is

occupied in the prosecution of a war, to select a place of discharge which would enable a Prize Court to decide that the destination was evidence that the goods, though utilisable for war purposes, would not be so employed. Especially is this so in the densely populated countries of Western Europe, where highly developed networks of railway place the whole country in easy if not direct connexion with military and naval bases.

The adaptation to altered conditions of warfare, of contraband lists, radical as it is, however, is a small matter compared with the difficulty of adapting the law of blockade to the conditions of the present War. The reader must bear in mind that a blockade is not a mere measure for the purpose of worrying the enemy, but is a deliberate and organised method of starving the enemy and forcing him, so far as it operates, to sue for peace.

The seizure and confiscation of contraband on board neutral ships, and the capture of enemy ships, have the same purpose in view, but the neutral trade with the enemy in other respects is entitled to go on, so far as possible, as in time of peace. Blockade is a method of stopping even this innocent trade. As blockade is an exception to the general principle that innocent neutral trade is entitled to immunity from the penalties of war, the exercise of it is surrounded by a number of formalities and obligations which the belligerent is bound to observe. I have quoted above the requirement of the Declaration of Paris (1856). The Declaration of London (1909) has now formulated the conditions generally as a statement of international law which may be regarded as the present usage in reference to the subject. The following is an abridgement of the rules in so far as they relate to the matter under discussion:

A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy (Art. 1).

In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast-line (Art. 2).

Neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of blockade except within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade effective (Art. 17).

The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts (Art. 18).

Whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade if, at the moment, she is on her way to a non-blockaded port (Art. 19).

A vessel which has broken blockade outwards, or which has attempted to break blockade inwards, is liable to capture so long as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force. If the pursuit is abandoned, or if the blockade is raised, her capture can no longer be effected (Art. 20).

A vessel found guilty of breach of blockade is liable to condemnation.


The cargo is also condemned, unless it is proved that at the time of the shipment of the goods the shippers neither knew nor could have known of the intention to break the blockade (Art. 21).

It is seen, as in fact is obvious, that a blockade cannot extend beyond the seaboard of the enemy, and where neutral territory or a neutral port breaks the continuity of the line of blockade, neutral ships under the existing law can carry on their trade without the belligerent having any right of interference except that of search for and the seizure of contraband destined for the enemy. This right the belligerent possesses in virtue of what is known as the 'doctrine of continuous voyage.' According to this doctrine, if the ultimate destination of contraband goods, though first shipped to a neutral port, is enemy territory, they may be treated, though on board a neutral ship, as if they had been shipped to the enemy territory direct.

The same principle, if applied to blockade, would entitle the belligerent, in cases where a blockade, through the presence of a neutral port within its line, could be evaded, to treat neutral ships bound for this neutral port, if the ultimate destination of their non-contraband cargoes were enemy territory, as if such cargoes had been shipped to the enemy territory direct. example, if Holland were a part of Germany or joined the enemy, a blockade might be declared of the whole coast from the limit of the German occupation in Belgium to the Danish frontier, and then all goods, whatever the description, contraband and non-contraband, could be excluded from entry into Germany. So long as Holland remains neutral, this cannot be done. Any blockade would be ineffective which did not include Dutch ports, or which, by extension to it of the doctrine of 'continuous voyage,' did not apply to all cargoes shipped to them. In practice, some such qualified extension seems to be already transforming the existing procedure, though the decision to regard Bills of Lading to order as a presumption of enemy destination, sufficient in many cases to deter the consignment of goods to the enemy, obviously cannot prevent a re-sale.

The term 'blockade' has recently been used in quite a different sense from that employed in international usage. While England is endeavouring by expansion of the scope of contraband and by her 'search' for it to prevent Germany from renewing the supplies necessary to her for further prosecution of the War, Germany, on her side, following the example of the blockades of the Napoleonic era, has declared a blockade of the British Islands, which in the present state of her naval impotency seems as much like an act of desperation as was its predecessor in 1806.

On the other hand, as regards the action of England against which it professes to retaliate, war being an effort by the one



#### III

There are many other changes in existing practice which may arise out of the present War and affect neutrals as much as belligerents. Thus the arming of merchant vessels for defence against a belligerent which, disregarding the principle and applying the exception, destroys enemy vessels without distinction between neutral and enemy cargoes, or between combatants and non-combatants, or between neutral and enemy persons, and in fact practically carries on war against mankind in general, may entail methods of hindering pursuit on the high seas. This would add not only new risks for neutral ships, but might force them to carry munitions of war for defence against what is virtual piracy, and instead of neutral trade obtaining, with the progress of international usage, greater freedom from molestation, the existing freedom would be seriously curtailed by these new methods of defence.

Thus, again, as regards the bombardment of undefended towns, forbidden in both land and naval warfare, there is the undecided question of the meaning of the word 'undefended.' A town is not 'undefended' in naval warfare if it is protected by floating mines. This is the sense of the reservation made by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan to the section of the Hague Convention No. IX. forbidding belligerents to bombard an undefended port on the sole ground that submarine contact mines are moored in front of it. A port whose entrance is defended by floating mines is unquestionably 'defended.' Yet floating mines are not visible objects, and how is the commander of a hostile vessel to ascertain if it is defended by mines or not?

The subject of bombardments, it is seen, is a complicated one, and the present state of international practice is neither a sufficient protection for the innocent civilian nor a sufficient indication of the scope of his powers to the hostile commander.

In this chaotic condition of the practice generally, what is the position as regards the dropping of bombs from aircraft? I have dealt with this subject in an independent article, but since its

<sup>&#</sup>x27; See my article in the Nineteenth Century and After of November 1914.

publication the pretension has been put forward that even a rifle shot fired at a hostile air-vessel is justification for exercising reprisals by the dropping of bombs on the offending population. This pretension is a reductio ad absurdum of the whole case of dropping bombs on towns, defended or undefended, from isolated aircraft, which are not and can never be in a position to enforce submission.


Crossing neutral territory at a high altitude seems at first sight a matter which can do little harm, but aviation is still only in its infancy as a method of offence. To allow belligerent aircraft to cross neutral territory is to allow those of the adverse belligerent to pursue them into neutral territory. The consequences are too obvious to need amplification, and neutrals will do well to insist on its illegality in the most emphatic terms.

Experience of the present War, in fact, only shows how much wiser were the delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 than their principals who have not ratified the Convention forbidding this inhuman method of inflicting indiscriminate and useless injury altogether.

To return to the changes in the relations of belligerent and neutral, which the present War seems to be occasioning, the greatest change of all will be entailed by the difficulty, owing to the new methods of warfare, of bringing the War solely by force of arms to a conclusion. If pitched battles are no longer possible and neither belligerent has a chance of defeating the other in the field, the final result can only be determined by exhaustion of the opposing forces. This implies not only the incessant and protracted destruction of life, but also the exhaustion of the supply of every kind of article which is necessary for the manufacture of munitions of war, or which can sustain life, or which can feed the national industries with raw material.

The present War is on too large a scale to endure like past intermittent wars which could last seven, thirty, even a hundred years. In previous articles I have shown the spirit in which the German General Staff conceived it; to be successful, it had to be overwhelming and ruthless. The action of the Allies need be neither, if their more humane methods prevail; but they can only prevail if neutral States, instead of consulting any possible interest they may have in the continuance of the War, abstain from doing anything which can prolong it.

In the work of thus helping to bring the War to an end neutral Powers may take a determining share not the less effective because it is passive. They are the weaker States in the present struggle of gigantic armies, and their future safety depends on the existing balance of European States being maintained and the



ambition of more powerful Governments being made unattainable by recourse to mere brute force.

It is obvious that Germany cannot be ultimately successful against practically the whole of Europe. She has exhausted the advantages she possessed at the outset of the War, and henceforward the disproportion between her available resources and those of the Allies can only become more accentuated. To bring this futile struggle to an honourable conclusion as speedily as possible can but be the wish of even Germany's well-wishers.

Besides, it may well be doubted whether it is desirable that such essential changes of usage as I have endeavoured to fore-shadow should find acceptance in the course of a war so exceptional in many respects as the present one. The neutral Powers have an interest in the preservation of usages which have grown up under their fostering influence. A united effort on their part might save the European world not only from further bloodshed but from what is almost as bad: the chaotic defiance of law and order with which we are threatened.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

# THE PASSING OF THE CHILD

THERE is no need to emphasise the importance of maintaining the population of these islands so long as weight of numbers is the most potent factor in determining the issue of war. growing size of the Allies' armies affords good reason for believing that the present struggle will end in a manner satisfactory to the British people, but immediate success alone would be a far from adequate recompense for the terrible cost incurred. posterity will fall the task of seeing that what is now gained is kept. Optimists say that this War will end war, and though the future may show that to be the case, it would be too dangerous to act on the belief, and not to take all reasonable precautions against the possibility of having at some future time again to meet our present or other foes. International animosities persist for long periods, and nations have displayed astonishing powers of recuperation after defeat. The hatred of England which has arisen in Germany may, if she is beaten, leave a bitter and sullen people filled with a desire some day to wipe out their Against this hostility neither battleships nor fortresses are likely to suffice, if there should be marked disparity in numbers. The purpose of this article is to show that changes have occurred, and are still taking place, in our population which point to the conclusion that the population of Germany, already much the greater, will in ensuing decades tend more and more to outstrip ours at an increasingly rapid rate. Unless the most vigorous steps are taken to counteract these changes, the next generation may be confronted with a situation more serious than that we have had to face, and much of our present effort may have been in vain.

The process of forecasting changes in population is not easy, for, before reliable inferences can be drawn from the census returns and annual reports on births and deaths, allowances have to be made and corrections introduced into the figures, the significance and effect of which may not be readily appreciated by those unversed in statistical methods. Before the War we witnessed year by year a steady decline in the birth-rate, but anxiety was allayed by the fact that the death-rate was seen to

be falling simultaneously at an equal or even, in some years, at a greater pace. Thus the comfortable margin between the two rates provided for a substantial yearly increment of population, even after allowance was made for the effect of emigration, and it was apparently assumed that this balance would be maintained indefinitely. But the problem involves much more than a simple subtraction of death-rate from birth-rate. The effect of making corrections in these rates to allow for variations in the proportion of people of different ages and different sexes in the population is much greater than is generally realised. The very ominous figures in the recently published volumes analysing the statistics of the last census have certainly not yet received the public attention they deserve. Read in conjunction with the later Reports of the Registrar-General, they point with a high degree of probability to a further fall in the birth-rate altogether independent of any increase in the practice which is the main cause of the fall, as well as to an automatic rise in the deathrate at no very distant time. It will be shown that the fall in the death-rate has not always been entirely due to improvements in sanitation and other conditions, and that the other causes which have helped to keep it down must operate less and less as time passes.

In order to deal with a complex subject in as simple a manner as possible, I propose first to examine the causes which influence a birth-rate, and to show how the birth-rate in this country, as usually measured, understates the real decline in fertility during recent decades; then to examine the death-rate and the interdependence of death-rates and birth-rates on each other, with a view to indicating how almost inevitable is a rise in the deathrate sooner or later; and finally to compare the corresponding statistics in Germany and certain other countries with those of

this country.

### THE DECLINE IN FERTILITY

The 'crude' birth-rate of a country is the number of living children born annually in a thousand of the population. It is a useful figure for arriving at the annual natural rate of increment of population, which may be done by subtracting from it the crude death-rate or number of persons in a thousand who die in a year. But when the object is to study the causes which have led to an upward or downward movement in the birth-rate, the extent to which those causes have operated in the past, and the manner in which they are likely to influence the rate in the future, it is necessary to seek other forms of expression in order to allow for variations from year to year, or from country to country, in the proportions of persons of different ages and different sexes.

It is clear, for example, that a population which contains a low proportion of women will, other conditions being the same, have a lower birth-rate than one in which the proportion is high. Similarly a population which contains an excess of persons below the age of 15, or of persons above the age of 45, or both, will tend to have a lower birth-rate than one in which the opposite condition prevails. In order to avoid these difficulties, the Registrar-General for England and Wales has adopted two other methods of measuring fertility—viz. by indicating the birth-rate per thousand of the female population between the ages of 15 and 45, and the legitimate birth-rate per thousand married women between the same ages. The statistics calculated by all three methods are stated in Table 1.

Table 1.—Birth-rates and Fertility—England and Wales, 1876-1913.

Year	Birth-rate Calculated on Total Population at all ages		Fertility Calculated on the Female Population aged 15–45 years		Legitimate Fertility Calculated on the Married Female Population aged 15–45 years	
	Rate per 1000	Compared with rate in 1876-80 taken as 100	Rate per 1000	Compared with rate in 1876-80 taken as 100	Rate per 1000	Compared with rate in 1876-80 taken as 100
1876	36.3	102-8	157.5	102.7	304.1	102-6
1878	35.6	100-8	154.5	100.8	298.8	100.8
1880	34.2	96.9	148.3	96.7	287.0	96.9
1882	33.8	95.8	145.8	95.1	283-9	95.8
1884	33.6	95.2	144.2	94.1	283.7	95.7
1886	32-8	92.9	140.2	91.5	278.0	93.8
1888	31.2	88.4	132.3	86.3	265.0	89.4
1890	30.2	85-6	127.6	83.2	258-2	87.1
1892	30.4	86-1	127.3	83.0	259-3	87.5
1894	29.6	83.9	122-4	79.8	249.4	84.2
1896	29.6	83.9	121.5	79.3	247.8	83.6
1898	29.3	83.0	118.9	77.6	243.0	82.0
1900	28.7	81.3	115.6	75.4	236-8	79.9
1902	28.5	80.7	114-4	74.6	234.1	79.0
1904	28.0	79.3	112.3	73.3	228.8	74.8
1906	27.2	77.1	109.2	71.2	221.6	73.2
1908	26.7	75.6	107.3	70.0	217.0	70.5
1909	25.8	73.1	103.6	67.6	208.8	68.3
1910	25.1	71.1	100.6	65.6	202.5	66.2
1911	24.4	69.1	97.8	63.8	196.2	64.7
1912	23.8	67.4	95.6	62.4	191.8	04.1
1913	23.9	-	-			

The figures show that since 1877 there has been a heavy and almost uninterrupted fall in the birth-rate by whatever method it is expressed, and that the rate of fall has been accelerated during recent years. Moreover, comparison of the columns

The slight rise in 1913 may have been due to the influence of the Insurance Act leading to the registration of some births which might previously have been regarded as still-births. If so, it is of no significance.

shows that, owing to the increase in the proportion of women aged 15 to 45 in the population, the crude birth-rate appreciably understates the decline in fertility measured in relation to these. Commenting on these rates, Dr. Stevenson says in the Registrar-General's Annual Report for 1912 'If the fertility of married women in proportion to their numbers had been as high in 1912 as in 1876-80, the legitimate births would have numbered 1,290,480 instead of the 835,209 actually recorded, giving a legitimate birth-rate of 35.2.' A loss of more than 400,000 infant lives every year from one disease alone would lead to the most stupendous national efforts being made to check it. To compensate for this loss, the effects of infant clinics and schools for mothers are like saving a boatload from a sinking liner.

The chief cause of the decline in the birth-rate is well known: it is prevention of conception by artificial means.2 But two other less generally recognised factors-viz. the decrease in the proportion of married persons in the population, and the postponement of marriage—are also operating to a subsidiary extent. Between 1871 and 1911 the proportion of persons married annually to a thousand marriageable persons-i.e. unmarried and widowed persons over 15 years of age—has fallen from 56.9 to 46.2. The postponement of marriage is shown by the fact that, since 1871, the percentage of married women aged 15 to 45, who are between the ages of 15 and 25, has dropped from 15.2 to 9.9, while the percentage who are between the ages of 25 and 45 has increased from 84.8 to 90.1. Since fertility diminishes with advancing age, this change must have had an

appreciable effect in lowering the birth-rate.

In order to estimate the chances of arresting the fall in the birth-rate, in so far as it is due to prevention of conception, it is necessary to examine the extent to which the practice appears to have spread among the population. Although there are no very full figures relating to the point, it is generally believed that the custom of limiting the size of the family was, until recent years, practically restricted to the wealthier classes. But the completion of the census tabulation of occupations has now for the first time made it possible to express birth-rates in relation to the numbers of the parents engaged in various occupations. Table 2, taken from the Registrar-General's Annual Report for 1912, shows the rates for nine large social classes, though, as these classes overlap to some extent, the figures can only be regarded as approximately correct.

<sup>2</sup> An interesting article by Dr. Whitley in Public Health for February 1915 points also to an increase in the practice of procuring abortion.

Table 2 .- Legitimate Birth-rates in Social Classes-England and Wales, 1911.


Social Class		Per 1000 Males aged 10 Years and over (including Retired)	Per 1000 Married Males aged under 55 Years (including Retired)	
Upper and middle class		47	119	
	excluding	40	100	
Donostono, .		46	132	
Skilled workmen .		73	153	
Intermediate class .		70	158	
Unskilled workmen .		90	213	
Textile workers .		50	125	
		107	230	
		49	161	

The most striking feature in this table is the low birthrate among textile workers, which is very little above that of the upper and middle classes. Since the infant mortality in this group is twice as great as that of the middle classes, its effective fertility is actually the lowest of any in the list. This low rate, as the Registrar-General points out, is very strongly suggestive of purposeful avoidance of conception, since the custom of employing married female labour in the mills provides special economic inducements to this class to restrict its birth-rate. It is difficult to account otherwise for the difference between miners and mill hands, for the two classes are very similarly situated except as regards the employment of their womenfolk. relative lowness of the rate among workmen of the skilled and intermediate class, as compared with unskilled workmen and miners, may be due to the same cause. The low rate among agricultural labourers is partially due to the low marriage-rate in that class, which may be associated with poorness of wages and inadequacy of housing accommodation. The revelation of the fact that the custom of restricting births has now reached the working-classes is one of the greatest significance. extension of the practice among the huge groups which appear still to be unaffected would cause a further heavy fall in the general birth-rate.

A full discussion of the motives which have led to the custom of restricting births, or of the moral aspects of the question, would occupy too much space, but it seems probable that the causes are too deep-seated to justify hope that changes in social or economic conditions will alter them. Denunciations of 'selfishness' or the 'pursuit of pleasure' are, in my opinion, futile, and to a large extent unjustified. Selfishness may prevent some men from marrying, but in the vast majority of cases it is not selfishness which leads parents to limit their families. It is rather an added, if mistaken, sense of responsibility, a







strengthening of the 'family instinct' arising from the know-

So far we have only examined the causes of the fall in the birth-rate which have been directly due to individual action, such as restriction of the family, or abstention from or postponement of marriage. But, in addition, the birth-rate is indirectly affected in a complex manner by changes in the age constitution, or proportions of persons of different ages in the population, which changes are in their turn associated with changes in the birth-rate, the death-rate, and the emigration rate. The effect these influences have had on the British population in the past, and are likely to have still more in the future, will perhaps be more readily understood if their consideration is deferred until the factors which influence a death-rate have been examined.

## THE PROBABLE RISE IN THE DEATH-RATE

Apart from any real decline in mortality following improvement in conditions, or from a rise due to exceptional prevalence of disease, the three main factors which influence a death-rate are: (1) the proportion in the population of infants and young children; (2) the proportion of persons past middle life; and (3) the proportion of females. The way in which these factors operate may be best demonstrated by taking the actual death-rates in England and Wales according to sex and age in the year 1912 (Table 3).

These rates have been standardised to the year 1901, but for the purposes of the argument this does not affect their value.

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Table 3 .- Death-rates at Twelve Groups of Ages-England and Wales, 1912.

Ages	Males	Females	Persons	
0- 5	35.4	29.4	32.4	
5-10	3.1	3.0	3.1	
10-15	1.8	2.0	1.9	
15-20	2.8	2.7	2.8	
20-25	3.5	3.1	3.3	
25-35	4.7	3.9	4.3	
35-45	8.0	6.4	7.2	
45-55	14.7	11.2	12.9	
55-65	29.9	22.7	26.1	
65-75	63.9	51.7	57.1	
75-85	138-1	118.9	126.7	
85 and upwards	266.0	245.6	252.9	
All ages	13.8	12.1	12-9	

The infant-mortality rate, that is the deaths of infants per thousand births, was, in 1912, for males 106, for females 84, and for the two together 95.

(1) It will be noticed that the death-rate during the first five years of life is high, and is not exceeded in the following agegroups until the age 65-75 is reached. Moreover, if the figures for the first quinquennium were further analysed, it would be found that the highest death-rate is in the first year. It is clear, therefore, that an excess of infants and very young children in the population tends to increase the death-rate for the whole community.

(2) After the first quinquennium the death-rate remains low until the age 35-45 is reached, when an appreciable rise occurs, and thereafter it increases rapidly at each age-group. Accordingly, the greater the proportion of elderly persons in the population, the higher the death-rate.

(3) Except at the age 10-15, when the rate for females is slightly the less favourable, the mortality of males is appreciably higher at all age-groups than that of females. An excess

of males, therefore, tends to raise the death-rate.

In consequence of these influences, before reliable inferences can be drawn from comparison of the crude death-rates in two years or two countries, it is necessary to 'standardise' them, that is to calculate what the death-rate in one year or one country would have been if the sex and age distribution of the population had been the same as in the other year or other country.

An interesting example of the way in which a crude deathrate may be misleading if not read in conjunction with the age constitution of a population is afforded by Ireland. The deathrate in that country, in 1912, was 16.5 per thousand, which is 3.2 per thousand above the English rate for the same period. At first sight this might suggest that Ireland is not so healthy a country as England, though the opposite is probably the case. It is unfortunate that, although the Registrar-General for England quotes in his annual report the crude death-rate for Ireland, and the Registrar-General for Ireland quotes the crude rate for England, neither standardises his figures in terms of the other, since this would enable a comparison to be made between the two rates, in which differences arising from differences in the constitution of the populations had been eliminated. The rates would then be largely a test of conditions, and it is quite possible that the Irish rate would be the lower. There are, however, indirect ways of gauging the healthiness of a country which, when applied to Ireland, justify the belief that it is more favourable to human life than England, in spite of its higher deathrate. In the first place, the Irish infant-mortality rate is the lowest in Europe, with the exception of those in Norway and Sweden, and it compares remarkably well with the rate in either England or Scotland. Since 1881 it has only twice reached 110 per thousand births, and since 1904 it has been below 100. In 1912 it was 86. These rates may be contrasted with the figures for England and Wales given in Table 4. It will be seen that the latter have often been above 130 or more, and in 1912 the rate was 95. The low rate of infant mortality in Ireland must be attributed chiefly to the fact that the rural population bears a much larger proportion to the total population than is the case in England and Wales. Another rough index of conditions is afforded by the frequency and extent of infectious diseases, particularly enteric fever, and in these respects the Irish returns are, on the whole, as satisfactory as the English.

The chief reason why the death-rate is higher in Ireland than in England is the fact that for many years emigration has been draining away the younger members of the community, and, in consequence, the proportion of persons beyond middle life is considerably higher in Ireland than in England. same reason accounts for the low birth-rate, 23.0 in 1912, owing to the comparatively low proportion of married women in the population; for the steadiness of the rate, which has scarcely changed at all during the last thirty years, gives good ground for believing that the practice of preventing conception has not reached Ireland. In backward countries, and in large towns, where masses of people are living under unsatisfactory conditions, it is generally the case that a high birth-rate and a high deathrate go together; but Ireland affords an instance of a country where a low birth-rate is associated with a relatively high deathrate, the explanation of which is to be found in the higher average age of the population. In this country we have, in

March


addition to emigration, another powerful influence, the falling birth-rate, reducing the proportion of young people, and these will ultimately have the same effect, with the added disadvantage that the natural mortality here is probably higher than in Ireland.

It is now necessary to examine the death-rate in England and Wales in the light of what has been said regarding influence of age. Table 4 sets out the crude and standardised death-rates and infant mortality rate since 1877.

Table 4.—Death-rates and Infant Mortality—England and Wales, 1877-1913.

Year	Crude Rates per 1000 living	Rates Stan- dardised to year 1901	Deaths of Infants under One Year per 1000 Births	Year	Crude Rates per 1000 Living	Rates Stan- dardised to Year 1901	Deaths of Infants under One Year per 1000 Births
1877	20.3	19-4	136	1896	17-1	16.9	148
1878	21.6	20.5	152	1897	17.4	17.3	156
1879	20.7	19.9	135	1898	17.5	17.4	160
1880	20.5	19.5	153	1899	18.2	18.2	163
1881	18.9	18.2	130	1900	18.2	18.2	154
1882	19.6	18.8	141	1901	16.9	16.9	151
1883	19.6	19.0	137	1902	16.3	16.2	133
1884	19.7	19.0	147	1903	15.5	15.4	132
1885	19.2	18.7	138	1904	16.3	16.2	145
1886	19.5	19.0	149	1905	15.3	15.2	128
1887	19.1	18-6	145	1906	15.5	15.3	132
1888	18-1	17.7	136	1907	15.1	14.9	118
1889	18.2	17.9	144	1908	14.8	14.5	120
1890	19.5	19.3	151	1909	14.6	14.3	109
1891	20.2	20.0	149	1910	13.5	13.2	105
1892	19.0	18.8	148	1911	14.6	14.3	130
1893	19.2	18.9	159	1912	13.3	12.9	95
1894	16.6	16.4	137	1913	13.7	13.4	109
1895	18.7	18.5	161				


These figures show that there has been a considerable fall in the death-rate and, particularly in recent years, in the infant mortality rate, the great bulk of which must be attributed to progress in sanitation and improved conditions. But while the fall provides gratifying evidence of the value of the efforts that have been made, it also shows that the time when this influence must reach its natural limit has been brought perceptibly nearer. There have been, however, since 1877 substantial changes in the age constitution of the population, owing to the fall in the birth-rate, the decline in infant mortality, the decline in the general death-rate, and the effect of emigration. In order to appreciate the influences these changes have had on the deathrate in the past, and to estimate the effect they are likely to have in the future, it is necessary to see clearly what these changes have been. Table 5 shows the proportion of persons in five-yearly groups of ages in a million of the population at each census since 1851.



Ages	1851	1861	1871	1881	1891	1901	1911
Under 5 yrs.	130,977	134,594	135,225	135,551	122,523	114,262	106,857
5-10	116,712	116,816	119,166	121,173	117,065	107,209	102,488
10-15	106,727	104,912	106,737	107,811	111,148	102,735	97,023
15-20	98,016	96,313	96,002	98,067	101,745	99,796	92,502
20-25	92,963	91,173	88,268	89,635	91,248	95,946	88,042
25-30	82,024	78,198	78,398	78,847	81,036	86,833	85,362
30-35	71,182	69,110	68,685	67,199	69,907	74,746	79,765
35-40	60,720	61,026	59,058	59,343	61,435	65,956	72,449
40-45	54,029	56,519	54,147	53,874	53,341	56,893	61,896
45-50	44,568	46,389	46,364	44,327	46,094	48,365	53,384
50-55	39,537	40,195	41,594	39,349	39,998	40,857	44,432
55-60	29,356	30,599	31,620	31,049	30,484	32,359	35,443
60-65	26,847	27,720	27,416	28,013	26,649	27,382	28,276
65-70	18,269	18,766	19,428	19,345	19,720	19,358	22,368
70-75	13,954	14.021	14,264	13,473	14,410	13,722	15,347
75-80	8,149	8,005	8,013	7,790	8,045	8,131	8,593
80-85	4,119	3,970	3,955	3,686	3,644	3,959	3,997
85 & up-				The Task			
wards	1,851	1,674	1,660	1,468	1,508	1,491	1,776

The startling feature in this table is the decrease in the proportion of infants and young children since 1881. Up to that year the number in a million of the population showed a slight tendency to increase, but the fall in the birth-rate has now lowered the number below five years of age from 135,551 to Falls of only slightly less magnitude have 106,857 in 1911. occurred in the succeeding quinquennia, while for every age-group above 20-25 there has been an increase. The effect of the fall was naturally at first most felt at early ages, and the reduction in the proportion of infants and young children, among whom as was shown mortality is high, was so great as to bring down the general death-rate for the whole community. As Dr. Stevenson has pointed out, this effect continued up to about the year 1901, but since that year the favourable influence upon the general death-rate of reduction in the proportion of infants has been outweighed by the adverse effect of reduction in the proportion of children and youths and increase in that of elderly persons. It must constantly be borne in mind that although the numbers of persons in the higher age-groups are relatively small, the much higher death-rate in them compensates for this deficiency in its effect on the general death-rate. The rise in the death-rate, however, which would have occurred in consequence of the increase in the number of elderly persons, has been masked by the real decline in mortality resulting from improved conditions, an effect which must become progressively less.

It should be noticed (and the importance of this will be seen when we come to consider Germany) that since a generation has




not yet passed, the full effect of the reduction in children has yet to be felt. The survivors of those who were in the first age-group in 1881 are only in the seventh group in 1911. It is not until they have reached the last group that the full effect of the decline in 1881-86 will be exhausted. But since 1881 there have been further declines in each year, the effect of which is more and more postponed. Thus the drop in the first quinquennium in recent years is still actually exerting a favourable influence on the general death-rate owing to the high rate of infant and child mortality, and its adverse effect will not be felt for another twenty years or more.

The way in which the immediate effect is postponed may perhaps be rendered clearer by another observation. If the columns for 1881 and 1891 be compared, it will be seen that the decrease is limited to the first two quinquennia. That means that all the sixteen succeeding age-groups are available in which to make good the deficiency in the million. But comparing 1891 and 1901, a drop occurs in the first four quinquennia, and increase is now limited to the fourteen higher age-groups. Between 1901 and 1911, the decline extends to six quinquennia, and still greater compensation must occur in the remaining twelve age-groups. Even if the practice responsible for the fall in the birth-rate were at once arrested we cannot escape having yet to pay the full penalty for the restriction of earlier years.

There is, of course, room for a considerable fall in the infant mortality rate, which is still appallingly high in many of our large cities. The figures for 1913, however, are not so encouraging as might be wished, and tremendous efforts will be necessary in order to secure a substantial decline. But it must be remembered that as the proportion of the population upon which this favourable influence acts becomes steadily less, the reduction it effects in the general death-rate will become progressively less marked. In any case the outlook is not bright. If conditions of life are substantially improved, acceleration of the preventive movement is likely to occur; if they are left as they are, or become worse, there is little hope for reduction of infant mortality.

The question of increase or decrease of population is further complicated by the effects of emigration and immigration. It is not possible to estimate the extent of these movements in the future from the experience of the past, since the numbers who leave our shores for permanent residence abroad fluctuate considerably from year to year, in accordance with the demand for labour in the colonies and foreign countries, the conditions of trade at home, and other factors. But, on the whole, emigration has very considerably increased in recent years, and in 1913 the




The ultimate effect of these processes, if they continue unchecked, must be to bring about a rise in the death-rate. It may be useful to show that this conclusion can be reached by

another line of reasoning.

We have been dealing with changes in population which extend over considerable periods of years, and may require as much as a generation before their full effect is reached. To measure these changes and estimate their complete effects, an annual death-rate is a fallacious guide. Just as a weekly deathrate which varies with climatic changes, or seasonal fluctuations in population, or epidemics, is no criterion of the deathrate for the year, so an annual death-rate may have little relation to the death-rate extending over decades or generations, and that is what we are concerned with here. An illustration may make this clear. Let us imagine a population of a thousand school children who throughout life are kept together. During the early years the death-rate may be zero. As they grow up, the annual death-rate gradually and continually rises from one per thousand when the first child dies, until, perhaps, the last two or three members of the community die in extreme old age in the same year, when the annual death-rate would be a thousand per thousand. Now, the average annual death-rate is a figure intermediate between these two. This is equally true if we imagine the thousand children scattered through the general

<sup>4</sup> The births in England and Wales in 1913 were 872,737, and the deaths 486,939.



population. In other words, an exceptionally low death-rate in a population which is not being continually recruited by young members (save such part as can be directly attributed to permanent improvement in conditions) must be compensated for. either by an exceptionally high death-rate in the same area at a later period, or by a higher death-rate in another area or areas contemporaneously. It is only necessary to look at some local annual death-rates in order to see that this must be true. The crude death-rates in Eastbourne, Southend-on-Sea, St. Albans, Woking, Watford, and Cromer were all below 10 per thousand living in 1912. Now, if it be realised that a deathrate of 10 per thousand, if continuous in the same population, would mean everybody born living to a hundred years, it becomes evident that in these localities some factors, such as an excess of women or young persons, or a low proportion of infants, must be operating to keep the death-rates down. Yet these influences may produce a similar and prolonged effect in a population so large that it can scarcely be described as 'local.' In Australia the death-rate since 1900 has not exceeded 12.5 per thousand, and for many years before that date it was only a point or two higher. This means an average life of eighty years for everyone Such a rate can only be maintained indefinitely by a continual addition of young people to the population, either in consequence of a high birth-rate or by immigration, and that this has occurred in Australia is shown by the great increase in the annual number of marriages. The following figures are most instructive:

Table 6.—Vital Statistics in Australia, 1893-1912.

	Estimated		Proportion I	Deaths under One Year of Age		
Year	ToIndian in	Persons Married	Persons Married	Births	Deaths	per 1000 Births
1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910	3,333,825 3,394,328 3,459,192 3,522,362 3,585,442 3,641,251 3,690,353 3,740,665 3,790,710 3,847,998 3,893,329 3,942,730 4,001,117 4,060,324 4,123,729 4,194,410 4,274,617 4,370,185 4,490,366 4,644,852	41,262 41,250 43,128 46,136 47,878 48,944 51,916 54,202 55,506 55,852 51,954 55,364 58,008 60,820 64,940 65,102 67,550 73,184 78,964 84,294	12·4 12·2 12·5 13·1 13·4 13·4 14·1 14·5 14·6 14·5 13·3 14·0 14·5 15·0 15·7 15·5 16·8 16·7 17·6 18·1	32·8 30·8 30·4 28·4 28·2 27·2 27·3 27·3 27·2 26·7 25·3 26·4 26·6 26·8 26·6 26·7 27·2 28·7	13·7 12·7 12·5 12·8 12·1 14·1 12·9 11·8 12·2 12·5 12·2 11·1 10·9 11·0 11·1 10·3 10·4 10·7 11·2	115 103 101 113 105 127 117 100 104 107 111 82 82 83 81 78 72 75 68 72

It should be noticed that while, during a period of twenty years, the population has increased by rather more than a quarter, the number of persons married in the year has more than doubled.

In England and Wales, in 1912 (the latest year for which detailed figures are available), the death-rate was 13.3, which, if continuous in a stationary population, would mean an average life of seventy-five years for everyone born. But, while in Australia the death-rate has been kept low by the continual influx of young people into the population, in this country precisely the opposite influence is working. We are continually lessening our proportion of young people, both by limitation of the family and by emigration, and there is, in addition, the temporary effect of the War. Despite further reduction of mortality from improvements in conditions, it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that sooner or later the death-rate will rise. In the evolutionary process Australia affords an example of a country at one end of the scale, and France and Ireland examples at the other end. If we wish to guess at what the death-rate in this country will ultimately be, we must turn to the death-rates in those countries, which were 17.5 and 16.5 respectively in The practical point is how soon will the rise begin, and in this connexion the figures for the last few years are significant. If reference be made to Table 4, it will be seen that, although infant mortality has been low, in two out of the three years succeeding 1910 the death-rate was higher than in 1910, and that there was only a difference of .2 in 1912, the year in which it was lower. It would almost appear as though we had already reached the bottom of the wave.

The returns for other countries of the Empire are equally ominous. In Scotland, in 1912, the excess of births over deaths amounted to 48,404, but the loss by migration was 58,459. Hence, for the first time since 1855, when the present system of registration began, the population of Scotland showed a decrease, which amounted to 10,055. It is significant of the rate at which rural depopulation continues in that country, that the loss was almost entirely confined to the country districts and smaller towns, for the larger burghs, in the aggregate, actually

showed an increase. In Ireland, the population in 1851, the first census year after the great famine, was 6,574,278. Since that year it has fallen almost without intermission to 4,384,710 in 1912, chiefly owing Recent years, however, to emigration to the United States. afford ground for hoping that the process has now been checked, for there was a slight rise in 1910, and again in 1912.

In Australia the births in 1893 numbered 109,322; in 1912

they had only increased to 133,088, although by that year the annual number of persons married had more than doubled. As shown in Table 6, the marriage-rate increased by nearly fifty per cent., but the birth-rate fell from 32.8 to 28.7. In New Zealand, the marriage-rate increased from 12.4 in 1893, to 17.6 in 1912, but during the same period the birth-rate fell from 27.5 to 26.5. In Ontario, the marriage-rate has risen from 13.4 in 1893, to 22.2 in 1912; the birth-rate, 19.7 in 1893, increased up to 1908, when it was 25.6, but since that year it has fallen continuously to 22.4, in 1912. As previously shown, in the absence of knowledge regarding sex and age constitution, the crude birth-rate is not a satisfactory measure of fertility. But the figures for all these Colonies strongly suggest that restriction of births is practised in them.

To sum up, then, we are confronted with the following exceed-

ingly probable developments:

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(1) A further continuous fall in the birth-rate, owing to the spread of the practice of preventing conception, and possibly also to the further diminution in the proportion of married persons, and to the increased postponement of marriage. In addition, the fall will be increased by the rise in the average age of the population, brought about by the heavy fall which has already occurred, but has not yet produced its full effect, the ultimate effect of the further fall which may be anticipated, and the

probable continuance of emigration of young persons.

(2) A diminution in the rate of fall of the death-rate, followed by a period during which the rate will remain more or less constant and which may already have been reached, and then a steady rise. These changes will be produced by the rise in the average age of the population again, as in (1), due to the decline of the birth-rate in the past, and the further decline which may be expected in the future. They may be masked for a time by a real decline in mortality owing to improved conditions, but the effect of this will become less and less as its natural limit is approached. On the other hand, they may be accelerated by increased emigration.

The margin between the birth-rate and the death-rate is now 10.2. It may be highly rash to predict when this will disappear, but if the figures should approximate at an average rate of .5 per annum (and this is only about what the average fall in the birth-rate alone has been during recent years), twenty years will see a

stationary population in this country.

## THE COMPARISON WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Birth- and death-rates in European countries show considerable range of variation. Roughly they are an index of social

conditions, and for this purpose perhaps the infant mortality rate is the most useful. Owing, however, to incompleteness of information as to age and sex constitutions, detailed comparisons are limited. Table 7 shows the movements of population in some of the chief European countries, and the birth- and death-rates since 1893.

Table 7.—Vital Statistics in European Countries, 1893, 1903 and 1912.

Country	Year	Population, estimated to Middle of each Year	Births per 1000 of the Population	Deaths per 1000 of the Population	Deaths of Infants under One Year to 1000 Births*
(	1893	24.152,635	38.2	27.3	232
Austria	1903	26,780,035	35.3	23.8	215
Austra	1912	28,879,295	31.3	20.5	180
· ·	1893	6,262,272	29.5	20.3	165
Belgium	1903	6,985,219	27.5	17.0	155
Deigium	1912	7,571,387	22.9 7	16-4 7	167 7
	1893	38,380,000	22.8	22.5	173
France	1903	39,124,000	21.1	19.2	137
France	1912	39,660,000	19.0	17.5	78
	1893	17,779,476	42.6	31.2	239
Trunmanı	1903	19,669,177	36.9	26.2	212
Hungary .	1912	21.134,862	36.3	23.3	186
	1893	30,875,678	36.5	25-2	180
Ttales	1903	32,839.509	31.7	22.4	168
Italy · ·	1912	35.026.486	32.4	18.2	153 7
	1893	4,701,243	33.8	19.2	164
The Netherlands	1903	5.389,066	31.6	15.6	135
The Metheriands	1912	6,068,389	28.1	12.3	87
	1893	2,021,400	30.6	16.3	89
N	1903	2,265,900	28.8	14.7	79
Norway	1912	2,393,300	25.4	13.4	65 7
	1893	5,485,739	40.5	30.8	217
Roumania .	1903	6,292,032	40.1	24.8	201
Roumania .	1912	7,230,418	43-4	22-9	186
	1893	93,292,955 °	47.0	33.1	252
Russia	1903	103,423,601	48.1	30-0	256
Russia	1912	122,550,700	44.0 10	28.9 10	248 10
	1893	17,996,000	35.6	29.7	-
Chain	1903	18,853,000	36-3	25.0	162
Spain	1912	19,562,568	32.6	21.8	17 10
	1893	4,815.508	27-4	16-8	101
Sweden	1903	5,210,022	25.7	15.1	93
Sweden	1912	5,582,996	23.7	14.2	72 7

The highest birth-rate in any European country is in Russia. A tendency to fall began in 1902, when the highest rate, 49.1, was reached; but it is likely to be many years before the decline approaches that manifested in more progressive Western Europe. Russia's enormous population is advancing at a greater

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Exclusive of Germany and the United Kingdom, which are dealt with in Tables 8 and 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>o</sup> Exclusive of still-births. <sup>r</sup> 1911. <sup>s</sup> European (fifty Governments, excluding Finland and Provinces of the Vistula and of the Caucasus). <sup>2</sup> 1894. <sup>10</sup> 1909.

rate than that of any other European country, and if she should succeed in reducing her death-rate, which already shows a perceptible decline, her numbers must more and more outstrip those of other nations. Very similar figures are shown by Roumania, Servia, and Bulgaria. Peering into the distant future, we may eventually see the Slav races increased relatively in such enormous proportion that they may come to dominate all Europe, but this is a flight of fancy which has little practical importance at present.

Between the conditions in Russia and in France no contrast could be greater. It was in the latter country that restriction of births originated, and its tragic effects are now abundantly clear. During the ten years 1902 to 1912, while Russia added nearly twenty-one millions to her population—one fifth of the total in 1902—France increased hers by little more than half a million. Though in 1912 France succeeded in reducing her infant mortality rate to 78—a remarkable achievement—her general death-rate still remained at 17.5. This is a measure of what ours may eventually be.

Among the smaller countries the rapid decline in the birth-

rate in Belgium may be noted.

It is, however, the comparison between Germany and the United Kingdom which is of the greatest interest at present, and for this purpose it is desirable to set out the statistics more fully than they have been given for other countries.

Table 8.—United Kingdom.

Year	Population, estimated to middle of each Year	Births per 1000 of the Population	Deaths per 1000 of the Population	Deaths of Infant under One Year per 1000 Births
1000	35,449,721	32.0	19.6	131
1883	38,490,333	29.8	19.0	151
1893		28.8	16.8	131
1894	38,859,067	29.4	18.7	152
1895	39,221,109	29.0	16.9	139
1896	39,599,072	28.9	17.6	150
1897	39,987,294	28.7	17.7	153
1898	40,380,792		18.2	154
1899	40,774,296	28.5	18.4	147
1900	41,154,646	28.2	The second secon	144
1901	41,538,211	28.0	17.1	128
1902	41,892,680	28.0	16.5	127
1903	42,246,591	28.0	15.8	139
1904	42,611,375	27.7	16.6	124
1905	42,980,788	27.1	15.6	The state of the s
1906	43,361,077	27.0	15.7	127
1907	43,737,834	26.3	15.5	114
1908	44,123,819	26.5	15.3	118
1909	44,519,454	25.7	15.0	107
1910	44,915,934	25.0	14.0	105
1911	45,298,573	24.4	14.8	125
1912	45,662,646	23.9	13.8	-

Table 9 .- German Empire.

Year	Population estimated to middle of each Year	Births per 1000 of the Population	Deaths per 1000 of the Population	Deaths of Infants under One Year per 1000 Births
1883	46,013,927	36-6	25.9	-
1893	50,756,521	36.8	24.6	_
1894	51,339,492	35.9	22.3	-
1895	52,001,060	36-1	22.1	-
1896	52,753,455	36-3	20.8	
1897	53,569,271	36.0	21.3	-
1898	54,406,277	36.1	20.5	-
1899	55,248,225	35.8	21.5	-
1900	56,045,886	35.6	22-1	_
1901	56,861,612	35.7	20.7	207
1902	57,709,213	35.1	19.5	183
1903	58,575,463	33.9	20.0	204
1904	59,430,283	34.1	19.6	196
1904	60,285,103	33.0	19.8	205
1906	61,139,923	33.1	18.2	185
	61,994,743	32.3	18.0	176
1907	62,849,563	32.1	18-1	178
1908	63,695,875	31.1	17.2	170
1909	64,568,951	29.8	16.2	162
1910 1911	65,425,851	28.6	17.3	192

In 1911 the population of Germany exceeded that of the United Kingdom by more than twenty millions. For many years its rate of increase has been the greater. Between 1901 and 1911, while the United Kingdom added 3,760,362 to its population, an increase of 9 per cent., Germany added 8,564,239, an increase of 15 per cent. The birth-rate in Germany in 1911 was 4.2 per thousand higher than that in the United Kingdom. It has fallen from the fairly constant neighbourhood of 36 during the later years of the last century, but it is of the greatest importance to notice that the fall in Germany did not begin until about 1902, and has only become considerable during quite recent years. As already explained, the full effect of the fall on the population is not felt for a considerable time. In this country the decline began about 1877. It is quite possible that Germany may eventually reach the static condition which has almost been reached in France, and which this country appears to be approaching, but now, in 1915, Germany is only where we were in 1890. As regards the immediate future Germany starts with an advantage over us of twenty-five years.

The death-rate in Germany in 1911 was 2.5 higher than that in the United Kingdom, and the infant mortality rate was 192 as compared with 125. There is therefore much more scope for reduction of the death-rate in Germany, and especially of the infant mortality rate, than in the United Kingdom.

Taking all the factors into consideration, therefore, there seems to be good reason for believing that if Germany does not

lose an appreciable part of her population as a result of the War, her numbers relatively to ours will increase very largely during the next twenty or thirty years. We cannot tell yet what internal effects the War will have in that country. It may be that a period of terrible depression must be gone through which will send up the death-rate, check efforts at social reform, and encourage emigration. There is also the actual loss of life in the field to be remembered, but the effect of this will not be so great as a diminution of population which included women. On the other hand, the intense national consciousness of the Germans may, if they are beaten, engender a desire for revenge in the future which might be more effective in arresting the decline of the birth-rate than anything we can hope to do in this country.

We may justly entertain the belief that the friendship established between the Allies will be lasting, but we cannot always expect to receive Russia's active assistance. If that country should gain, as a result of the War, an entry into the Mediterranean, an ice-free port in the Baltic, and a strip of new territory, she is not likely to want more for many a long year. That she should go to war from purely altruistic motives is to say the least doubtful. Nor would it be in accordance with British traditions to rely continually upon another Power. France in the matter of population is even in a worse position than we are.

The importance of giving the profoundest consideration to the future growth of populations, when the terms of peace are discussed, becomes obvious, if it be realised that the populations of East Prussia and Alsace-Lorraine, the territories which general opinion seems to agree a defeated Germany should lose, are together less than four millions. Even if the province of West Prussia be included the addition is less than two millions.

The artificial restriction of the family is a new feature in the history of mankind which has not so far received the attention from the detached, biological point of view that it deserves. Yet it may have effects ultimately more stupendous and far-reaching than any of those great movements of the past—migrations, conquests, epidemics, religious changes—which, beginning in prehistoric times, have so profoundly influenced human development. In this country, with one exception, the process began earlier and has gone further than among any other people. Unless we can—and quickly too—reduce our infant mortality to an extent hitherto unhoped for, can improve conditions of life so that our young people no longer seek for happiness or opportunity abroad, and can awaken the national conscience on the question of births, the future of our nation is grave.

WILLIAM A. BREND.

## THE PROFESSIONAL CLASSES, THE WAR, AND THE BIRTH-RATE

It is perhaps early days to discuss what is to happen after the War, but to those who love their England the question is already paramount, as to what they can do for their country when she emerges torn and bleeding, but, as we hope and believe, victorious from that terrible conflict.

Some will, no doubt, say that we have given our own life-blood and that of our nearest and dearest, also in a great measure of our wealth and labour voluntarily, and that the Government will see to it that we pay for the War by increased taxation. All this is true, and doubly true, but I think what the Spirit of Britain, if she could speak, would say, at least to the younger married members of the community, is 'Give me sons and daughters—sons to take the place of the gallant dead, daughters to bear and train the coming generations for their country's good.'

If, as we are told, War is a great purifier and simplifier of life, then it seems to me that one of the chief signs of England's decadence, the serious decline in her birth-rate, ought after the War to be one of the first things to right itself, and we should once more become a virile, prolific nation, ready to people our own land and our Colonies with healthy sons and daughters. Now this demand can be met easily, with perhaps some selfsacrifice and a little inconvenience, by the upper and moneyed classes -also by the working-man with his insurances, his free education, free hospitals, etc., etc. It is met too freely already by the improvident poor, who cast their offspring heedlessly on an indulgent and 'grandmotherly' State: but what of the middle classes—the 'backbone of England,' especially the upper middle and professional classes (of whom alone I speak with real inside knowledge)? An increased birth-rate is, and will be, to them a counsel of perfection, unless and until the burden of living is lifted in some measure from their shoulders, as for the last fifty years it has in ever-increasing measure been lifted from the shoulders of the lower classes.

I here put out of count altogether the eugenist plea for quality instead of quantity, as it has been abundantly proved that many of the world's greatest men have been younger members of large families; and, of the few large families still met with, the younger members are by no means the least gifted, either mentally or physically.

That these large families are few and far between, especially in the upper and upper middle classes, is shown by the number of only sons among the officers' names in the present casualty lists. That I myself can claim to be the mother of (for these days) an unusually large family is proved by the fact that when I went to consult a well-known lady's doctor in London and replied 'nine' to his question of how many children I had had, he seemed utterly amazed, and said that in all his experience he had never had a patient with more than five children, and that number even was most uncommon.

I must certainly confess that the stamina of the present generation of women does not seem to allow of the yearly baby spoken of so calmly in old Dr. Chavasse's Advice to a Wife, in which he says 'Some ladies breed every twelve months.' I found this out to my cost, as four children in as many years led to the loss of two of them in early infancy through malnutrition. Now, with a personal experience of the mental and physical strain, toil and suffering entailed on both parents by the production and rearing of such a large family on a small income, I should be the last to blame my own relations, friends, and equals for deliberately limiting the number of their family.

This is not as it should be, or as it was in the time of our grandparents, and one longs for the day when a great statesman may arise who will have the welfare of the *middle* classes at heart, and make it possible for them to increase their family every two or three years to the total of at least five or six, in

health, comfort, and security for their future.

Of course everything 'middle' tends to be dull and uninteresting—middle age, mid-Victorian, Middle Ages (synonym for ignorance and sloth), and in legislating for the staid, respectable, uncomplaining, easily reckoned-up middle classes, there is nothing of the glamour of the fight for the Lords, with their long line of historic and hereditary rule, or of the swaying of the new democracy, with its elusive, unexpected, 'what will you give me to put you in power?' popular vote.

And so the 'backbone of England' is left to decay—the 'learned' class, which has for centuries supplied the bulk of the great men of England—statesmen, lawyers, soldiers, ecclesiastics, scholars, scientists, artists (that is, interpreters of all the

Arts).

Now, to go back to the beginning of the question, the birthrate itself, I most emphatically deny that this is low in the professional class from any motives of self-indulgence, love of pleasure, or shrinking from pain or trouble to themselves. Of all classes of the community, they are perhaps the one which shows the most devotion, love, and care for their children, and it is these very characteristics that make them shrink from bringing into the world young lives, to whom for lack of means they cannot afford to give the best that life has to offer.

To them, remember, in these modern days, comfortable conditions of living, a good education, a circle of congenial friends, Art, travel, up-to-date amusements, are not luxuries, but as much necessaries of life as the working-man's 'meat' dinner, gossip at the street corners, public-house, and football match; and to have to deny these to their children is as bitter as it is to the working-man to see his children ill-clad and ill-fed. (I am, of

course, here comparing the best of both classes.)

Now, let us take a typical case of an ordinary professional man—say a doctor or solicitor in a country town or growing provincial town, with an income of from 500l. to 1000l. a year, never likely to increase much, and earned by constant toil and

diligence, with but little time for rest or recreation.

I am not here considering the case of the clergy, with their often pitifully small incomes, for which reason (and others) one sometimes longs for a celibate Anglican priesthood, despite the fact that many great men have been reared in English vicarages. Still, they have some alleviations in reduction of fees for education and other purposes, and in generous gifts and benefactions.

With the advent of the first baby expenses begin—doctor's and nurse's fees (larger than formerly), increase in household

staff, increased cost of living.

With 'number three' baby comes the difficulty with modern servants, who 'really could not come to such a large family,' must have wages increased to stay, could not dream of taking a baby at night! (Poor brain-weary father, and anxious, tired mother!) It perhaps also entails a move into a larger house, where upkeep, rates, rent and taxes are all increased. Meanwhile, the subscription list is almost daily lengthening, and the visiting list must be kept up and added to for the children's sake, both entailing increased expenditure.

The minor childish ailments safely over, including probably one or two small operations such as for adenoids, which did not appear to trouble our forebears, also the stopping of first teeth only recently proved necessary, the question of education begins. N.B.: All these things are now supplied free to the workingman, and by maternity benefit his children are even born free,

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while ours are 'bought' from the very beginning. I once remarked half-jokingly to a dentist that he ought to 'make a reduction on taking a quantity,' in reference to the bills for my large family, but he replied that, on the contrary, he ought to charge double, as children were so much more trouble than adults.

As to education, a moderately good governess or a small day school may suffice for a beginning for the boys, but what after that? Many people will say 'Why not be content with the local Grammar or High School, or even Secondary School, all designed for the "sons of gentlemen"? Yes; but unfortunately they are not entirely filled by the 'sons of gentlemen,' and the parents dread the lack of refinement in speech, manners, and companionship, and even the loss of caste from which their boys will suffer there. Call them 'snobs' if you will—but that will only be, O Censorious One! if you have enough money to educate your own son well, or do not desire 'The Best' for him!

Probably the father himself, and the mother's relations, have been at Public Schools, and shall they do less well for their own sons? For, criticise the Public School system as they may and do, the English upper classes are still convinced that it is the only possible education for a gentleman. So with much saving and economy, sacrifice of precious capital, or even alas! in some cases debts or loans to be refunded later on—the boys are sent—first in all probability to an expensive Preparatory School—and then to their father's beloved old Public School—there to spend, no doubt, the four happiest years of all their lives. For some there is, of course, the great relief of Scholarships, but these benefit the minority of brilliant or fortunate boys, not the majority of ordinary ones.

As illustrating the practical utility of a boy's Public School education, in answer to the detractors' plea of useless expenditure for the professional classes, I will quote one concrete

example.

A boy whom I know left his Public School at eighteen, and almost immediately got a commission in his local Territorial regiment. A few months later a senior officer remarked to the boy's sister 'Your brother has a wonderful way with the men, they will do anything for him.' Now, I ask, would this have been the case if that boy had been educated at the local Grammar School among these men themselves, or their relatives and intimates, who had attained to it by exhibitions or County Council Scholarships? No, I think not! Now, the bulk of our Territorial officers and a large number of those in the Regular Forces are drawn from the professional classes, and this War has already abundantly proved that the prestige of our officers, their unique combination of friendliness with unquestioned authority over their

men, is a great factor in the success of our arms, and hence a national asset. Nowhere is this faculty of leading men acquired so naturally as at our great Public Schools, and this, in fact, has been already acknowledged by other nations.

In this War, where all are so gallant, it seems invidious to apportion special praise to certain regiments, but I certainly think the Territorial units at the Front deserve all they have been given. The nation must remember that, whereas the Regular Forces have adopted the Services as their career, the Territorials and New Army are in many cases sacrificing their career as civilians entirely to the cause. The financial loss to the wives and children of professional men will certainly be great, especially as taxation always falls heaviest on the middle classes, and the Income Tax heaviest of all on those who earn their living, literally, by the 'sweat of their brow' in strenuous brain-work. The Death Duties also form a great burden to the middle classes, and I know of cases where a much 'looked-forward-to' bequest from a distant relative or friend has diminished, through recent taxation, by at least one third of its original value.

But now to return to our professional man's family.

With regard to the girls—even with a good governess the lack of advantages in a small town, as to outside tuition in special subjects, also the difficulty of their forming suitable friendships, is such as to discountenance an entirely 'Home' education; while the mother dare not face the moral and physical dangers of a daily train journey to and from school in a neighbouring large town.

There is, therefore, no alternative except a good boarding school with all its expenses, for at least the last three years of the

girls' school life.

The children having been educated, they then have to be put out into the world, girls as well as boys, as there is rarely enough capital to provide more than a mere pittance, in case of need, for the widow. If the sons decide to take up their father's or any other ordinary profession, the training will probably cost close upon 1000l., take possibly five years to complete, and even then they will be barely self-supporting, and it will be at least another five years before they can afford to marry and rear a family of their own. Here we touch another cause of the decreased birth-rate being more noticeable in the middle class than any other, owing to the parents being older before they are able to marry than was formerly the case in England. The girls, too, have to undergo an expensive training, and if out working in the world are undoubtedly less likely to marry well or early, than their equals in comfortable homes, with every social and financial advantage.

As to illness, too, if the professional man, or his wife, or any of his family, have, during the years of stress and strain, a serious illness, involving a lengthy treatment or an operation, the expense is almost overwhelming.

Those who have had dealings with trained nurses, Nursing Homes, and specialists' fees will bear me out in this—in spite of the many generous doctors and nurses who reduce their charges for special cases. Why is it that in London and the large towns there are still no places (or so few as to be a negligible quantity), between the ruinously expensive Nursing Homes and the ordinary free hospitals, where gentle-people can be inexpensively treated and cured in comfort and peace—with no stigma of poverty or meanness? The carking care and anxiety of the years during which their family is growing up ages the parents long before their time and renders them an easy prey to disease or nervous trouble. Happy are they who survive to see their children grown-up and in a secure financial position before they have to leave them.

Many will say this is a morbid picture, but I maintain that it is quite a typical one, and, this being so, can anyone blame the professional classes for limiting their families to the two or three children to whom alone they feel they can do full justice?

No, England will have to devise some means of financial relief, if she wishes her middle classes to continue to exist as a leavening mass between the rising Democracy and the Aristocracy of both wealth and birth.

I hope that nothing I have said will be taken as meaning to decry the working or poorer classes, among whom I have many friends, and to whom I in no way grudge the increased facilities of living. That even they sometimes realise the burdens carried by the middle classes is obvious from the remark made to me by a quite poor working woman: 'The 'likes' of us are better off than you are, as you have so much to do with your money.'

In conclusion, as the daughter, wife, mother, sister, sister-inlaw, and cousin of professional men, I think I may describe myself as 'One who knows.'

A. M. RICHARDSON.

## 'WHEN IGNORANCE WAS BLISS'

JULY AND AUGUST IN NORTH CENTRAL SIBERIA

During the last ten years there has been a growing interest in Russia, its art, literature, and people. Exhibitions of Russian pictorial art and handicrafts are frequently open; few concerts are held where one or more of the compositions of Tschaikowsky are not included in the programme; the works of Stravinsky, Glinka the founder of modern Russian music, Borodin, Moussorgsky the composer of 'Boris Godounov' and 'Khovanstchina,' and Rimsky-Korsakov are widely appreciated, and Russian choreographic art has become the fashion. The annual number of translations of the great Slavonic authors and dramatists is double that of ten or fifteen years ago, and owing to the excellent studies of Russian life and character by Maurice Baring, Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace and others too numerous to mention, the qualities of the Slavonic people are more widely understood and appreciated. And lastly, there is the factor of the national interest in our great Ally, created by the present European War. This interest, appealing to that large section of the English nation who, hitherto being unconcerned with art in any form, have looked upon the Russians with distrust and thinly veiled antipathy, has led to a sincere desire to overcome an insular and unreasonable prejudice.

I do not venture to embark on an exposition of Russian character, but to set down some personal observations of Siberia, thinking that an account of the conditions of life in a portion of that Empire may not be inappropriate at this time, or to those who watch the Slavonic development, for the destiny of Russia is irrevocably linked with that of her great eastern territory.

Before I begin the narrative of my Siberian experiences perhaps a brief summary of the prevailing geographical and economic conditions of the country is admissible. The vast district of Siberia, covering some 150,000,000 square miles, or one and a half times as large as Europe, can be roughly divided into three regions. In the south are the scorched and arid deserts traversed by the nomadic tribes and the camel. Included

in the second region are the undulating plains covered with harsh grass, called 'steppes,' inhabited by the Cossacks, and the famous black soil of great agricultural value. The third region contains the 'taiga' or virgin forest, which, extending for more than 3700 miles, from the Ural Mountains in the west to the Pacific in the east, with a breadth of 1200 miles from north to south, stretches north of the steppes; and lastly, in the extreme north, is the 'tundra,' an immense frozen marsh extending from Russian Lapland in the west to the Behring Straits and the Sea of Okhotsk in the east, its northerly coast bordered by the Arctic Ocean.

Comprised in this area are agricultural and mineral riches of incalculable value. It is necessary to refer to but a small portion of these varied sources of wealth, so far but little exploited, in order to arrive at a rough estimate of the importance Siberia will eventually command as one of the greatest granaries and mineral treasuries of the world. The Ural Mountains are renowned not only for precious stones, but for their gold and silver mines; in addition to these are the gold-producing regions of the Irkutsk, of the Trans-Baikalia, and Amur and Ussuri districts. The precious metal has also been found in profusion on the Anadyr River in Kamchatka. Iron, copper, and lead are abundant in many parts, and there is a sufficiency of coalfields on the island of Sakhalin, lying east of Nikolayevsk (only the northern portion of the island belongs to Russia, the southern being restored to Japan in 1905 by the Treaty of Portsmouth), to supply the entire Pacific navigation. This same island also possesses rich oil-wells. These form but one section of the inexhaustible resources of Siberia, and not the least of them is the land, of which it has been truly said, 'the gold of Siberia lies in its black soil.' In spite of inefficient farming, the fecundity of the earth is such that the moujik need only score the surface with his primitive plough and scatter a few seeds for the crops to spring up as if by magic. That Siberia will become one of the great butter-producers of the world is a foregone conclusion. We need only compare the statistics of 1898, when 149,000 poods of butter were manufactured, with the increase of 8,600,000 poods (or 140,870 tons) of the year 1909,2 the bulk of the output going on the English markets. In addition to these is the important fur trade, the wealth of timber contained in the tracts of forest, and the valuable fisheries. Much of this is potential wealth, and so far there is lacking the perfected organisation which will open up industrial centres, combine and systematise the widespread interests and isolated activities into one homogeneous force. The distances to be covered are great, and the difficul-

<sup>2</sup> Nansen, Through Siberia, p. 293.

<sup>1</sup> One pood is equivalent to about forty English pounds.

ties of communication (except by the rivers and railways, which are still inadequate for the growing needs of the country) are problems that can only be solved by the greatest ability and patient perseverance.

The rivers of Siberia, until recent years, have only been used for inland commerce, and their value as an outlet for her products has been neglected,3 but in 1913 the Siberian Trading and Steamship Company successfully carried out their project of opening up a regular trading route between Europe and Central Siberia, by the Kara Sea and the waterways of the Obi and the Yenisei. Again, in 1914 two cargo boats of 2400 tons, bringing four small steamers bought by the Russian Government for the Siberian river traffic, accomplished the voyage. Of this latter expedition I can speak from experience, and will return to later, as I was privileged to be on board one of the steamers for the return voyage. Owing to the ice in the Kara Sea, however, this route is only open during the months of August and September. These are the small beginnings from which evolve great commercial enterprises, such as the Hudson Bay Company, and in the future the Kara Sea route will prove an important outlet for the unrivalled resources of Siberia.

The peoples of Siberia are as varied as her products, for her population of 13,000,000 souls includes Russians, Cossacks, Tartars, Mongols, Kirghis, Voguls, and those aboriginal tribes who inhabit the northern wastes, the Samoyeds, Ostiaks of the Obi (a distinct race from those of the Yenisei), the Tungus, Yuraks, and the Dolgans of north-western and north-central Siberia, and the Chukchis, Koryaks, and Yakuts of north-eastern Siberia.

This is, as I have said, but a rough estimate of the potentialities of Siberia, and that many of them so far lack exploitation will be remedied in the future. The undeniable fact remains that, with these inexhaustible and varied possibilities, Siberia, if her population prove themselves not only capable of utilising them, but of an imperial spirit, will be a great world-force. 'It is in Asia once again that will be decided the destinies of the world.' 4

My previous experience of Siberia had been limited to the fleeting glimpses seen through the windows of the International

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> To the enterprise of Captain Joseph Wiggins is owing the credit of being the first to open up the trade route between Europe and the mouths of the Obi and Yenisei, and of bringing the first Russian Government river steamer to the latter river. He accomplished his first voyage in 1874, and subsequently crossed the Kara Sea nine times in all. Baron Nordenskiöld also followed the same route in the years 1875-76. But these individual enterprises lapsed on the death of their originators, and since the last voyage of Captain Wiggins, in 1895, the route was unused till 1911.

<sup>&#</sup>x27; Lord Ronaldshay.

Express on a journey to China in 1910. In the spring of 1914, however, I accompanied Miss M. A. Czaplicka, a Polish anthropologist, and leader of an expedition sent from Oxford for the purpose of studying some of the aboriginal tribes of north-central Siberia.

Our destination was Golchicka, a small settlement on the estuary of the Yenisei River, lying about latitude 72 degrees, half way between longitudes 80 degrees and 90 degrees, and five hundred miles within the Arctic Circle.

On the outward journey we travelled by the ordinary express to Moscow, and from thence by the Trans-Siberian Railway to Krasnoiarsk, the junction of the River Yenisei and the railroad, arriving there on the 6th of June. We were met by Mr. Gunnar Christensen, the manager for the Siberian Trading and Steamship Company in Krasnoiarsk, with whom Miss Czaplicka had been in communication. This gentleman had purchased stores for the expedition, booked our passages on board the first steamer to leave for the north after the river-ice had broken up, and showed us every kindness and consideration. We embarked on the steamer next day at noon for the second stage of our journey. The steamer, once the Glenmore, but now rechristened the Oriol (Eagle), is a small paddle-boat, and was built in Newcastleon-Tyne. She had come through the Kara Sea in 1905, carrying rails for the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Oriol towed a roofed-in barge, like a Noah's Ark, of twice her size and tonnage for the accommodation of the fishing people, and attached to this in succession were two other barges, the first containing empty barrels, and a horse and half a dozen cows, used for barter in exchange for furs, etc., occupied the third barge.

The Yenisei, the Obi, and the Lena are the chief means of communication between the northern and southern parts of The Yenisei is the fifth largest river in the world, with a length of 3000 miles, and is navigable with its tributaries for a distance of 5000 miles. It begins to freeze towards the end of September, and from thence onwards the river is unavailable as a means of transit, and the towns and settlements along its banks are practically isolated, for the traffic carried on by means of sledging on the old post roads is unimportant when compared with the facilities offered by the river. May the thaw sets in, and the huge blocks of ice go tumbling down stream to be emptied into the Kara Sea, but its waters are not navigable till the beginning of June, when the riversteamers begin to ply up and down. Not only are the Yenisei and its sister-rivers used as waterways, but they give employment to a large section of the population. These people embark on the steamers and travel northwards, landing in parties at different points. Their equipment is simple, and consists of boats and fishing-nets, empty barrels and bags of salt, for containing and preserving their catch, and a few household necessities tied up in bundles, a bag or two of flour, an axe, spade, and a saw for the purpose of building a hut, as many of them land in deserted spots devoid of any protection. Here they remain during the six or seven weeks of the summer, the men employed in catching the fish and the women and children in cleaning, salting, and placing it in barrels; but when autumn comes they pack up their goods and travel homewards by the steamers returning south, and during the winter months their harvest is sold to the townsfolk.

The fisheries constitute one of the important factors of Siberian life, for the rivers are teeming with fish which migrate from the Arctic Ocean to spawn in the river beds. The varieties most commonly met with, and principally used for salting, are the omel, yielding an excellent red caviare, the maxun, a variety of herring, and the nyelma or white salmon. The latter often attains a considerable size; one caught at Golchicka measured four feet ten inches in length. But the fish most highly prized, both for its caviare and flesh, is the ostrena, or sturgeon. The nyelma and ostrena begin their journey up the river at the end of May and beginning of June, the omel and maxun soon follow, and by the middle of the latter month the fishing is in full swing. In a good season great quantities of fish are caught, and it only seems necessary to drop the nets into the water to obtain a good haul. We were told by Madame Nieratova, a trader who employs two Dolgan families, that each person during the season catches on an average 600 lbs. of fish, and at Nosonovsky a party of fisherfolk secured 700 poods of fish in six weeks, one net alone accounting for 100 poods in one day.

It is to be regretted that so far the fisheries are totally lacking in organisation, and an industry which would considerably add to the prosperity of Siberia is carried on independently and with great waste by the fishermen. Fish refuse, for instance, is an invaluable manure, but it is thrown into the river. Salting is the only preservative method used, and all pickled and conserved fish is imported into Siberia from Russia, whereas the prolific Siberian fisheries could not only supply the western part of the Empire with this produce, but place the overflow on the European markets.

The river voyage from Krasnoiarsk to Golchicka, a distance of 1404 miles, takes from twenty to twenty-five days, according to the weather encountered, for the river is liable to sudden and

violent gales—in a few minutes the calm surface of the water is goaded into waves of a considerable size—and at these times,

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as the Oriol was encumbered with three heavy barges, progress was not only dangerous, but impossible, and she was forced to drop anchor in the shelter of an island till the storm had blown over. As wood is mostly burnt for fuel, frequent stoppages are made at the forest depots en route, and this, combined with the disembarkation of the parties of fishermen, makes progress slow; but the river life is of great interest, and, as a halt will sometimes extend for several hours, we were able to observe the Russian settlements or wander in some primeval forest.

At this time of the year, the Siberian early spring, the winter snows still linger in drifts as deep as the shoulders of a man. but in contrast to this white severity is the forest undergrowth, where little birds, whose twitters and shrill cries fill the air, are busy nesting. The crisp crimson buds of wild rhubarb press their way through the moss, and threading an intricate course between the hummocks are tiny rivulets running from the melting snow. The austere trunks of pine and cedar taper upwards like the pillars of a cathedral, and, as you penetrate still deeper into the forest, the bird-calls die away, for they only seem to congregate in the more open spaces near the river, and you are hemmed in by a deep silence. There is something oppressive in this hushed immensity and endless multiplication of tree upon tree, clothing the middle Asiatic zone from the Urals to the Pacific with a uniform profound forest, only broken by the waters of vast sluggish rivers. At other times a smoky haze, the charred stumps of trees, and the acrid smell of burning wood testified to the passage of one of the great forest fires which rage sometimes for weeks on end.

The works of man are in contradiction to the natural beauties of Siberia, for the settlements are a dreary miscellany of dun-coloured huts built of rough logs, dovetailed at the corners, with moss stuffed into the interstices. Glass is a luxury, and, partly for this reason and because of the extreme severity of the winter months, windows are small, far between, and in-There are no roads, and sanitary observvariably sealed up. ances are non-existent, for the street of the village is the communal dustbin, and serves as a hunting-ground for the dogs, pigs, and fowls who roost amongst the heaps of garbage. In the summer months the track is ankle-deep in fine dust, but a shower of rain converts it into an expanse of liquid mud, where walking becomes an impossibility, except in the larger towns, where a few rough planks are placed on the sidewalks. It is astonishing that, living under these conditions, outbreaks of fever are not more prevalent. The Russian, being an habitual tea-drinker, which necessitates the boiling of water, is probably saved from epidemics of this nature.

The country on either side of the Yenisei varies but little for several days, the forest stretches mile after mile along the river banks, but as the steamer proceeds further north a difference is perceptible, both in the dwindling vegetation and in the climatic conditions, which are reversed, the warmth of early spring returning to the bleakness of an English February day. luxurious forest declines into a spare coppice, till at Dudinka, a settlement lying some 1153 miles north of Krasnojarsk, hardly a vestige of woodland remains, and though the month was June great ice-floes lined the river banks and drifted tumultuously down stream. The nights begin to pale, till only a ghostly twilight prevails during the midnight hours. The sky, the river banks, and vast stretches of placid water are illuminated by an unearthly blue radiance, a colour so subtle and magical that it seems like an unreal region, or the landscape of a dream. in a week or so comes the transition, when the sun no longer sinks below the horizon, and midnight is no darker than a summer's afternoon.


We first came into direct contact with the political exile at Dudinka. On our way down, when the Oriol stopped at a settlement where any of these unfortunates were stationed, we noticed the gangway was guarded by gendarmes in order to prevent any attempt at escape. We landed from the steamer and walked to the village where we had some purchases to make, a distance of three versts.5 Outside the little shop, the only one Dudinka possesses, a young man was standing, and, hearing us make inquiries about some natives who were reported to be in the neighbourhood, he came forward and spoke to us, accompanied us through the settlement, and later on asked us to his lodgingtwo bare rooms in the house of a merchant who does not live in the settlement. He told us he came from White Russia-a portion of the Empire north-east of Poland, that his name was A. M. Avramenok, and that he was a political exile. His parents. he said, were of the peasant class, but had given him a good education, and this he had used to further the revolutionary cause. A man of these qualities, who understands the peasant, for by birth he is of their class and the conditions of their life are known to him, is the type of revolutionary leader most to be feared His status of birth creates a basis of by the Government. sympathy between him and those whose forces he directs, and his higher mental qualities enable him to sway those forces at his discretion; whereas the peasant distrusts the aristocrat with advanced theories. The traditions and training of the nobility are such that a mutual understanding between two such divergent types is so rare as to be virtually non-existent. Moreover, the

5 Three versts are equal to two miles.

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gulf fixed between the moujik and the aristocrat in Russia is not bridged, or bridged only to an unimportant extent, by a middle class. Therefore a revolutionary leader with the qualities of Avramenok is at once the most efficient and powerful. His offence, that of spreading revolutionary ideas amongst the soldiery, is regarded as one of the gravest political crimes, and the delinquent, if caught in the act, suffers the severest penalty of the law, that of death. He was judged by a courtmartial, the procedure followed for all military offences, but the sentence was commuted to banishment for life, as he was only engaged in printing the propaganda when arrested, with twentyone of his comrades, two of them being women. But though all were similarly punished, each exile was deported to a different station.

Politicals sentenced by this court are not entitled to any Government allowance; those arrested for less grave offences and tried by an administrative court receive fifteen roubles a month (11. 11s. 8d.), but if the exile, by any means whatsoever, adds to this sum by his own activities, even by the earning of half a rouble, the grant is withdrawn. In any case, to earn a living without experience in these wilds is a difficult matter. All politicals are forbidden the possession of firearms, and the trading in furs to be obtained by shooting wild animals is denied them. Trapping foxes, etc., could be resorted to, but to what purpose if not for sale? Agriculture is impossible where three feet below the surface the ground is perpetually frozen. The exile in these regions lacks all means of distraction. The life-sentence exile, even though having no Government allowance, is yet not allowed to earn money, and has no choice but to depend on the donations of friends and relations, or if these fail him, or are too poor to contribute to his support, he is forced to rely upon the charity of the settlers. The system is pernicious. It is an encouragement to indolence and pauperism, for it denies what is of vital necessity and the inalienable right of the individual-namely, that of being able to exercise the mental and physical powers; for these, if allowed to fall into disuse, inevitably end not only in sloth of body, but in mental deterioration. This is, I believe, one of the chief complaints of the political exile nowadays. Incidentally it is an unfair tax upon the settlers, who must support the life-sentenced politicals or see them starve. The case of the political subject to less severe restrictions, who wishes to pursue some activity, is beset with difficulties, and much depends on the character and goodwill of the administrator of the province where he is stationed. He may apply for permission to use a camera, or to make anthropological investigations among the native tribes. His petition is sent in, and one administration



In spite of all these obstructions, the bulk of all museum work, scientific and medical investigation, in Siberia is done by political exiles, and all credit is due to those who carry out this valuable work in the face of opposition and discouragement. The case of Avramenok is an exception, for he had been appointed by the Government of Education to the Meteorological Station lately set up at Dudinka, where the climatic conditions are of great interest. In the winter the thermometer can fall to 57° below zero Centigrade, and the velocity of the wind has been registered at eighty-nine and ninety miles an hour. Though condemned by one section of the Government to forfeit all civil rights and allowance, he is appointed by another department to a responsible scientific post, and receives 30 roubles a month for his services—a paradoxical situation! Politicals have only been sent to this part of Siberia, the province of Yeniseisk, since the revolution of 1905; previously to that date they were deported to the penal settlements further east.

The first Slavonic people to penetrate into Siberia were the Cossacks, in 1581, under the leadership of Yermak, an adventurer and freebooter. Following in his footsteps came the explorers and traders, until the Sea of Okhotsk was reached in the year 1646, and owing to the fortitude of these people 5,000,000 square miles were added to the kingdom of the Czar. In the seventeenth century Russia first used Siberia as a means of disposing of her convicted criminals, and at the same time of working the Siberian mines at the lowest expense. Later on the Government awoke to the growing importance of Asiatic Russia, and a number of 'ukáses' were issued substituting the sentence of life-long banishment to Siberia for the death penalty. Between 1823 and 1898 an army of 700,000 exiles of all classes, accompanied by 216,000 of those who voluntarily chose to share their banishment. were sent to Siberia, and in 1913 the existing number of political and criminal exiles in Siberia was about 40,000.6 In addition to the hosts of compulsory exiles, there also came large numbers of Poles, Jews, and those who dissented from the Orthodox Faith. or who found the restrictions of Russian life unbearable. later years the Government, in its anxiety to colonise Siberia, has offered every inducement to the peasants to come and settle on the new land. At the present day the moujik is transported free of charge from his own home to a distributing centre, from whence he is taken under charge of officials to his allotted portion of land. Each male is given forty-one and a half acres, sufficient

. Wright and Digby, Siberia, p. 101.

wood to build his house and farm buildings, and a grant for the farming expenses of one year. If he is without means agricultural implements are provided on the instalment system. We were told by a young Siberian named Yosiphe Gerasimivitch Prokopchuk that the provinces of Trukhansk and the districts of the Lena and the Ob are exempt from military service in order to encourage colonisation and ensure the land from being depopulated. Great pressure has been used to induce the Trans-Baikal Cossacks to settle in the Amur and Ussuri districts of Eastern Siberia, with the double motive of opening up the new country and affording a garrison and line of defence.

These are the means Russia has employed to colonise Siberia, and it will be seen that the imported population is composed of the descendants of pioneer Cossacks, political and criminal exiles, and religious malcontents, supplemented by the ever-increasing

flood of immigrant peasants.

Golchicka was reached on the 27th of June, and we seemed to have reverted to the conditions of winter. Ice-floes encumbered the river, and extended in rough heaps along the shore. few huts of the settlement lay in a dreary waste of melting snow, and the only variation to the level sky-line in the north were the pyramidal stacks of drift wood. The country round Golchicka is typical Siberian tundra, an undulating marshy waste. tree can grow in these latitudes, as from Dudinka northwards the ground below the surface is eternally frostbound, and the stunted willows, covered with grey-green catkins, are no taller than the grass they grow between. When the snow melts patches of bronze-green moss appear, interwoven with the many varieties of fleshy lichen on which the reindeer feed, and as the season advances the purple and pale green shoots of small flowering plants come struggling upwards to the sun; but in the declivities of the low hills the snow remains until far into August. Behind these uplands lie frozen lakes, where the Asiatic golden plover courts his mate, and countless wading birds, called by the Russians 'Peytushuk' (little cocks), congregate before they migrate southwards. For a few short weeks the tundra wakes up to a new life, and is transformed by a galaxy of flowers. It is a most wonderful sight, this short Arctic summer, when as if clothed in a garment of many colours the tundra lies bathed in the golden light of the midnight sun. The swamps are fringed round with forget-me-nots and marsh marigolds, saxifrages, campanulas, mingled with lemon-coloured Iceland poppies and many varieties of rattle and purple vetch are studded over the prairie; but this pageant is short-lived, in a little time the flowers are withered by a frost, and the tundra is once again a soft and sombre brown. As the season advances with rapid strides in these northern latitudes, very soon a dry and powdery snow begins to fall, and when that falls winter is at hand—a nine months' winter, sunless and dark for three of these months, a winter of scourging storms and snow, and yet more snow, until the land is shrouded in a uniform white mantle.

We arrived a week before the fishing season begins. Two traders only live here for the whole year round, and the population is supplemented in the summer by a family or two of Russian fishing folk and the natives who come here for the fishing season. We took up our quarters in a 'balagan,' or wooden hut, originally built for a bath-house, and made this our base for excursions up and down the river and into the tundra. Golchicka is beyond all postal and telegraphic communication, for Trukhansk, the most northerly post station, lies 532 miles south of Golchicka. A service of monthly post boats, sometimes drawn by dogs, takes letters and parcels beyond Trukhansk, but even these do not penetrate as far north as Golchicka, so our life in that northerly region, without a means of communication with the outer world, was one of complete isolation.

About seven days after our arrival the natives began to come in from the tundra, travelling by reindeer sledges, and pitched their 'chooms' or tents on the banks of the river. The tribes who inhabit the central Siberian tundra, and with whom we principally came into connexion, were the Samoyeds, Yuraks, and the Dolgans.

Before the investigations of the Finnish philologist, Alexander Castrén, who came to the Yenisei district in 1842 and 1843. little was known of the origin of the Siberian aborigines. In later years researches have been carried on by Professor Kai Donner and other renowned philologists, and as certain of these tribes are numerically decreasing it is imperative that records should be made before they become extinct. Alexander Castrén was the first to come to the conclusion that, from a philological point of view, the Samoyedic peoples are akin to the Finnish race. The dialects of the former tribe, though they have undergone a great modification, owing to their contact with other languages, still have much in common with the language of the Finns. For example, the words Oja, Yoga, Kolba, names of waters in the Yenisei basin, in Finnish and Lapp are interpreted as brook, water, and fishing water, and the rivers Kemi and Kymi in the Finn districts have a corresponding Kem in Siberia, the name of the upper source of the Yenisei. There are also other indications of relationship too numerous to mention in an article which makes no claim to a scientific point of view.

Oscar Peschel, The Races of Man and their Geographical Distribution, p. 387.

The present distribution of the Samoyeds covers a vast tract of land from the White Sea in European Russia to Khatanga Bay on the east side of the Taimyr Peninsula. These people are the least civilised of all Polar races; next in order come the Chukchis of north-east Siberia. In direct contrast to these primitives are the reindeer Lapps of Russia and Scandinavia, who possess a high order of Arctic culture.

In appearance the Samoveds are typical degenerates. eves are small, the cheek bones abnormally prominent, and the whole face expresses a low order of development. Their stature is below the average, especially amongst the women, many of whom are dwarfish, and a man of five feet towers above his fellows. All natives, but particularly the Samoveds, have feet so small that they appear quite inadequate for the support of the body, but they possess a very rare beauty in their hands, which are as near the perfection of form as the hands of a highclass Chinese lady. One must say that they are personally unclean, and, owing to their debilitated condition, are less capable of resisting the attacks of disease or of holding their own against the Russian trader than the more efficient and cleaner tribes. There is another tribe, the Ostiaks of the Yenisei, who are even more retrogressive than the Samoyedic people, but we only came into contact with them in the middle course of the Yenisei River, for their boundaries extend no further north than the region near Trukhansk.

The Samoyed dress is most interesting, for the materials used are entirely composed of natural products, and strictly limited by their environment. Both women and men wear trousers and boots made in one, of reindeer hide. The shape of this garment is curious, as there is no difference in the width from the tip of the foot upwards to the waist. Perhaps the best way to describe it would be by saying that it is as shapeless as the leg of a mammoth, from which, as we were told by an old Samoved (though this statement must be taken with some reservation), the form first originated. Over this is worn a tunic of deerskin reaching half-way to the knees, with the lower edge cut into narrow shreds to form a fringe. Covering the tunic is a jacket, also of deerskin, decorated with strips of coloured cloth following the edge of the jacket, and on the hem, and about four inches higher up, are borders of dog fur. A hood edged with fox or dog fur, according to the means of the native, is worn on the head. Some of the women hang rows of brass crescent-shaped ornaments over the breast. These are suspended one above the other by means of leather thongs, and. are engraved with a pattern of half moons and fine lines. The men have a similar dress, with modifications. The outer garment, or 'sakuy,' with the fur on the outside, is closed from neck to hem like a smock, and attached to this is a hood, which rises in a peak on the top. Many of the Samoyeds still use flint and steel, and for this purpose a steel implement is suspended from the waist by a chain of brass and steel links. The tinder used is dried lichen. The other more sophisticated tribes use Russian matches.

The Yuraks are a branch of the Samoyedic race, though they speak another dialect and inhabit a region not extending so far east and north as the Taimyr Peninsula, and running parallel with the southern borders of the Samoyed area; but as there is much intermarriage between these peoples, the boundaries and characteristics of the Yuraks are less definitely marked than those of the other tribes. The Yurak costume differs in many respects from that of the Samoyeds, and much of the materials for its composition are of Russian manufacture. The woman's dress consists of a brightly coloured felt robe reaching to the ankles. Appliquéd on this are bands of cloth in a contrasting colour to the dress, which terminates with a border of white fur round the neck. The men also wear cloth tunics edged with fur.

The Dolgans are very distinctive from the two former peoples, being typically Mongolian, with yellowish brown skins, stiff black hair and oblique eyes. They are supposed to have migrated from the district near the River Lena in the east, and now occupy an area extending from the Yenisei in the west to the south-eastern shores of Khatanga Bay. The long jacket of the Dolgan woman is elaborately embroidered with beadwork and bands of bright-coloured cloth, and the men, owing to their predilection for rows of brass buttons on their blue coats, have a semi-military appearance. Both sexes of these tribes wear the Samoved trousers, or 'pimmies,' with the difference that the Dolgans and Yuraks shape them to follow the line of the foot and leg, and in the case of the Dolgans the 'pimmies' are decorated with their characteristic beadwork. All these tribes are nomadic, cultivate the reindeer, and live by hunting and fishing.

Though many of the natives are nominally Christians, are baptised, and receive Russian names, at heart they still adhere to their ancient nature-worship, when alone use their native patronymics one to the other, and practise shamanism in secret. This cult includes the curing of disease, predicting the future, spiritualism, and magic practices. The shaman, or priest, of the north Asiatic races has much in common with the medicine man of the North American Indian. The former uses a magic drum, and the latter a rattle, and both wear decorated cloaks when

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officiating at a ceremony. Indeed, much of their ritual bears so close a resemblance that many people attribute the birthplace of the ancient races of the North American Continent to the regions of northern Asia.8 I made drawings of several Samoyeds who were identical in type with a North American 'brave.' The Siberian native still sacrifices to his gods.9 In the summer of this year I heard from far off the beating of the magic drum, and saw the head of a sacrificial reindeer impaled on a stake after a ceremony held over a sick boy. But the natives scattered on our approach, and refused to admit they had been shamanising. The Orthodox Greek Faith has not taken root amongst these people, and the ikons they carry about and place in their 'chooms' (tents) are regarded as of little account. We asked a Yurak man if he had an ikon in his 'choom,' and he answered 'Yes, we have a Russian "shaitan" (god), but we do not give him anything.' An old Samoyed told us that some years ago, after an outbreak of smallpox and measles among the natives, a medical expedition was sent to Golchicka to inquire into the reasons of the epidemic. (Incidentally the expedition was recalled, as the doctors and nurses, instead of attending to the suffering natives, spent their time in carousing with the traders.) While they were at Golchicka, however, the eldest son of this Samoyed fell ill, and the father hurried to the doctor for aid. He found the latter drunk, and, though the old man called several times afterwards, the physician for one reason or other failed to come. Thereupon the native put his ikon outside his 'choom' and called in a shaman.

The possessions of the departed are placed around his tomb for the use of the shade in the spiritual world. Beside the bones of the sacrificial reindeer lies the sledge, the goad, the fishing net, and wooden drinking bowl. A woman's tomb, or 'lead,' can be recognised by the bread trough, pothook, and kettle lying near by. The natives have a pretty custom of hanging bells upon the uprights of a child's grave.

The reasons given for the numerical decrease of the native tribes are many. The root of the evil lies in those scourges which civilisation invariably brings to the primitive people with whom it comes into contact. The chief and most pernicious is syphilis, which eats like a cancer throughout the entire population of Siberia, affecting both Russians and aborigines alike.<sup>10</sup>

Socar Peschel, op. cit. p. 263.

<sup>10</sup> Wright and Digby, Siberia, p. 171. 'The leading physician at Omsk stated that 80 per cent. of the people of that city were syphilitic, and that in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Captain Frederic Jackson in *The Great Frozen Land* (p. 89) remarks in his book that only a few years previous to 1895 a young girl was immolated by a Samoyed of Nova Zemlya, but though it is possible the natives offered up human sacrifices to propitiate their gods, the practice has not been followed for many years.

Its chief victims are to be found among the Tartar races of Central Siberia, where the number of affected persons in many villages is as much as one hundred per cent. The other most prevalent diseases among the natives are tubercular ailments, and black smallpox. The latter, a very malignant type of the disease, has been known to destroy whole tribes. Lastly, one of the primal causes of their degeneration is the curse transmitted by the Russians, running in their veins like a fatal taint, the almost insane craving for vodka.

The sale of yodka has been prohibited throughout the empire since the beginning of the War, so the following instances only extend to the time of my departure from Siberia on the 19th of September 1914. Before this time, to my knowledge, its prohibition was confined to certain localities. The areas I knew of were the northern parts of the provinces of the Lena and Yeniseisk, while in the southern portions the sale of the spirit was allowed. In the northern regions Government officials were empowered to enter and search every dwelling or steamboat for any form of the spirit, and frequent confiscations were the result of these investigations. In August of this year 240 bottles of pure spirit, from which vodka is made, were found on the premises of a trader living in Yenisei settlement. The situation is not without complexity. All natives, with hardly an exception, refuse to trade unless a glass or two of vodka is the precursor of a transaction. If the trader, from conscientious scruples, refuses to observe this custom, he finds his business declines, and that he is hopelessly outclassed by his trade rivals who have no compunction in gratifying the weakness of the native. The less scrupulous type of trader is also in a quandary, for keeping vodka on his premises lays him open to its confiscation and the resulting financial loss, so if he wishes to maintain his custom he must run this risk and re-buy more spirit if the law is enforced and his stock seized. This led to a paradoxical situation, for the Government, who held the spirit monopoly and prohibited its sale, by these means indirectly gained a double profit. The price of vodka naturally rose, and at Dudinka, within the prohibited area, where the inhabitants numbered two officials, two priests, fifteen merchants, nine exiles, and a few women and children, the average consumption of vodka for one year was 100 barrels, and a bottle of the spirit, usually costing 50 kopeks, could only be bought for the sum of 15 roubles. These advanced prices acted as an incentive to smuggling, and

consequence the insane asylums were overcrowded with unfortunates. Physicians in Irkutsk gave a rate for that city of not much lower percentage. In the Gymnasium for girls at Blagowestchensk there were 700 pupils enrolled in 1911. Of these over fifteen years of age 35 per cent. were suffering from the same disease.'

this was principally carried on by the river steamers. A Yeniseisk trader, and owner of a steamer, who went by the title of the 'Alcohol King,' was universally known to have grown rich on the enormous profits he obtained by smuggling the contraband. Some little time ago the steamer of this trader was stopped near Vorogovo, on the Yenisei, and the contraband. consisting of 1500 barrels of pure spirit, distributed amongst the crew as part of their baggage, was confiscated. But the zealous officials had been a little too previous. The trader brought an action against the Government, and could prove that he was some ten versts outside the prohibited area. He won his case, and the Government was not only forced to pay a fine but to return the confiscated spirit. The scenes in a settlement after the departure of one of these steamers baffles description. Round about their 'chooms' the natives would be lying prone upon the ground in a state of hopeless intoxication, like dead flies near a saucer of poison, or drifting down stream in their boats, incapable of either rowing or directing their course. But the Russian in liquor becomes quarrelsome, and fights, not infrequently ending in murder, were the result of these periodical orgies.

Reindeer are a factor of great importance in native life, for not only are these animals the sole means of transit in the tundra life, 11 but the chief food of the native is reindeer meat. The native clothing and the cover of the 'choom' is made of deer-hide sewn with thread made from sinews of the leg, and the antlers are used for such purposes as snuff boxes,

powder horns, portions of the harness, and so on.

We were enabled during July to make an excursion by reindeer sledges and to stay for several days in the 'choom' of a family of Dolgans, who lived some forty-five versts away in the tundra. The native possesses only three tools—a borer, an axe, and a knife—but he constructs with these a sledge of marvellous utility and endurance.

Our cortège consisted of the four members of the expedition, our hosts, two native youths who drove, twenty-seven reindeer, and six sledges, one sledge for each person. The first team of reindeer were harnessed five abreast, and drew a sledge where sat the driver. Tied on to this, and drawing a second sledge,

<sup>11</sup> Teams of dogs (nine dogs to a team) are harnessed to sledges and used by some Russian settlers, but only in the winter time. We were told by Mihiu Petrovitch Antonoff, one of the Golchicka traders, that his dog team can cover a distance of fifty miles in three hours. The reindeer, however, have greater endurance, and can be used both for summer sledging on the grassy tundra and for travelling on the snow in winter. Frederic Jackson, the Arctic explorer, drove a team of three deer for a distance of 120 versts, and accomplished the journey within twelve hours. In spite of the fact that they were not fed during this time they arrived quite game at the end.

carrying a member of our party, were four deer, and the same procedure was followed for the third sledge. The remaining three sledges were attached and driven in a similar way. Only one rein is used for driving, which passes along the near side to the deer who is the leader. A strong pull on the rein turns the whole team to the near side; if, however, a turn to the off side is necessary, the rein is jerked lightly and sharply. A long wooden goad, tipped with a circular piece of horn or ivory, is employed for prodding the hind quarters of the recalcitrant deer. The third and last sledge is perhaps the most interesting point of view, for you are so encompassed by a forest of tossing antlers that you can only catch occasional glimpses of your companions in front.

We filed off over the tundra in a long procession, bumping from one hillock to another, where the sledge acted like a vicious horse who means to throw his rider, diving into streams and

from one hillock to another, where the sledge acted like a vicious horse who means to throw his rider, diving into streams and out again and gliding over tracks of snow, the reindeer scooping up large mouthfuls of this as they ran, 'speeding on towards the top of the world.' So we continued, with intervals for rest, till after about seven hours' travelling we came to the banks of a shallow river, not very broad or imposing, but with a swift current. Here we descended from the sledges and were paddled across the river one by one in a small canoe, the reindeer swimming in our wake, still harnessed to the sledges. Dolgan 'choom' lay at the head of a valley some five versts beyond the river. A 'choom' resembles a North American wigwam, and is constructed of stakes fifteen feet in length, meeting together at the top. The bases of the stakes are planted on the ground in a circle, from ten to fifteen feet across. The choom covering, with an aperture left at the top for the smoke to escape, varies according to the season and its owner's environment. With some tribes, the Ostiaks of the Yenisei, for instance, birch bark sewn together in strips is employed, but reindeer hide is the material in use among the Samoyeds, Yuraks, and Dolgans who inhabit the treeless tundra. The interior is bare but for a few essentials. Suspended on a parallel bar and supported by the construction stakes are a pot for cooking and a kettle for boiling water. There are no chairs, as the natives sit crosslegged on the ground, but a small table is sometimes included, about one foot in height, on which the meal is served. If you add to this sleeping bags and rugs of reindeer skin for each person, and a box for holding teacups, food, and a miscellany of odds and ends, the catalogue of accessories is complete. Fire is made in the middle of the floor, but as all wood, other than the scrub growing in the neighbourhood, has to be brought from Golchicka, where there is a limitless supply of driftwood, this was only lit for cooking purposes. Many Samoyeds still eat their fish and meat in the raw state, but the Dolgans with whom we shared food and lodging lived on black bread, bought from the Russian trader—who cuts it into small pieces and dries it in the oven as a precaution against mould—fish, and reindeer meat, supplemented by a few wild geese; but as the season is very short for these birds they form an inappreciable asset to the native food supply. Tea, bought from the Russians in hard cakes, is drunk without milk, and the sugar is eaten instead of

being put into the cups.

Our hosts, the Dolgan family, consisted of three young men and their widowed mother. This race are considered to be the cleanest and most industrious of native tribes, and their custom is to undress completely and retire to sleep in bags of reindeer and wolf skin, made with the fur on the inside. Their ablutions are curious. In the morning the mother rose first, as she was also the last to go to bed, and fetched water from the river side. scooped this up from the pail with a dipper, and proffered it to each young man in turn, who sucked it up into his mouth, held it there till the chill had gone, and then ejected it on to the closed palms of his hands, and, before the water had time to trickle through, rapidly rubbed his face with the water so Much to our amusement, however, on the second morning after our arrival, we found one of the Dolgans, a youth named Nikolai, indulging in the sincerest form of flattery, and having an 'angleski' ablution in the cold waters of the river.

We found the 'choom' life exceedingly agreeable, with the exception that when it rained a certain quantity of water found an entrance through the hole in the top, and not only made the centre of the floor very wet, but ran down the stake supports and dripped upon the sleepers who lay underneath. But the free and open life, and the gay spirits of our hosts, who did not scruple to call out 'Enotuy tuyok' ('You sleep,' or 'Go to sleep') when our conversation disturbed their slumbers, far outweighed the disadvantages. After spending some days with the Dolgans, during which time we accompanied them on several hunting

excursions after wild geese, we returned to Golchicka.

About the end of August the fishing season waned, and the restless nomadic natives began their winter migration. They returned to the tundra so quickly and so quietly that it was only by the daily decrease in the row of 'chooms' along the river bank that you would notice they had gone. The silent waste absorbed them one by one, and the sole indications of their passing were the tracks of the sledges crossing over the yielding moss. Under the sullen sky V-shaped flocks of wild geese flew southwards. Day by day these flocks increased in number, and,

though many of them were so high up in the zenith as to be invisible, their raucous cackle could be plainly heard. There was still a little colour to be found. Here and there we came across patches of the red and yellow leaves of a creeping shrub called 'talnik,' and the soft white balls of cotton grass were dotted over the marsh lands; but otherwise the tundra was the exemplification of that dreary mid-season when winter is overstepping the autumn boundary. We also began to make preparations for leaving, and packed our trunks in readiness for embarking once more on the *Oriol*. She was due to arrive at Golchicka about the 24th of August. This would be her last journey before the ice began to form on the river, when navigation is suspended for nine months.

My intention from the first had been to return to England, if possible, by the Kara Sea. But the project was always a doubtful one. The 'Angleski parahods' (English steamers), as they are called in Golchicka, are cargo-boats not built for passenger accommodation, so a berth can only be secured by favour.

On the 26th of August Mr. Christensen arrived at Golchicka on board the Yeniseisk. This boat, together with the steamer Ob and nine lighters laden with Siberian cargo for the English steamers, had been hired by the Siberian Trading and Steamship Company from the Russian Government, for the purpose of bringing gendarmes, 12 fishery experts, and the Custom House officials who were to supervise the cargo of the English steamers. The latter were due to arrive at Golchicka, via the Kara Sea, on or about the 26th or the 28th of August, but as the anchorage here is unsatisfactory they have to proceed some eighty versts further south, to Nosonovsky, and at this place the Ob and the lighters were already waiting.

When we were leaving Krasnoiarsk, Mr. Christensen had told us of his projected journey to Golchicka, and offered to bring all our letters with him. These, for want of a postal address, were to be directed to Krasnoiarsk (Golchicka, as I have previously explained, lies outside the postal area). We were naturally anxious to hear from friends and relations, as, since leaving England, we had been living in an isolation as complete as that of the Polar regions, and had received no news at all.

When the Yeniseisk dropped anchor, we immediately set out in our small rowing boat for the steamer, but Mr. Christensen forestalled us and came to shore in the Yeniseisk's dinghy. That meeting I shall never forget. Almost the first words he said were 'All Europe is at war; Russia, France, England, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The gendarmes are to prevent the escape of any exiles. I believe some years ago several politicals managed to evade the police and escaped to Europe by the steamers.

Belgium are fighting the German and Austrian armies.' The further details that he gave us we afterwards grasped were from tainted German sources, but at the time we were not in a position to sift truth from falsehood, and had no option but to believe these pessimistic reports. The situation seemed not only monstrous but incredible, for there had been no preliminary warnings of this holocaust previous to our departure from England. We were also told that the Trans-Siberian Railway was seriously congested, owing to the rapid Russian mobilisation, and the necessity for returning by the Kara Sea became increasingly urgent, as the ordinary route through Germany was now closed.


For the next week we kept an anxious watch for the English That week of inactive waiting was a week of windstorms as unquiet as were our spirits. Many times during those days we climbed on to the roof of our little balagan and searched the vast horizon of the Yenisei, but the straight line between the river and the dome of the sky stretched always in an unbroken

uniformity.

On the 3rd of September the Oriol arrived, and we went on board to book our passages for Nosonovsky. Towards the evening of the same day, against a blood-red sunset, we sighted the masts and smoke-stacks of the English steamers, now some days overdue, and they passed us early next morning, hulls low down over the horizon, steaming south for Nosonovsky, but the Oriol did not reach there for some days, owing to the prevalent gales.

At Nosonovsky the river is twenty-three nautical miles wide, but lying close to the western shore, and divided from one another by narrow channels, are many flat and deserted islands, con-Behind these islands the west bank of the stituting a delta. river is invisible. Normally this reach of the Yenisei is a dreary prospect, but on the 6th of September, when the Oriol steamed up, the waterway was full of life and colour. At anchor in midstream were two large steamers of 2400 tons each, the Ragna and the Sküle, and lying near, like a brood of chickens round a mother hen, were the nine lighters, and three smaller cargo steamers, brought out from Hamburg only twenty-four hours before the German declaration of war, but now the property of the Russian Government; and lying a little further up the stream were the Yeniseisk and the Ob. All the boats, even to the lighters, were decked out with fluttering pennants, and after the secluded life we had been leading this display seemed as gay and imposing as a naval review.

Mr. Jonas Lied, the managing director of the Company, was on board the Ragna, and, when we had explained the obstacles to our returning home by the railroad, kindly allowed us to come on board. But I fear the problem of finding us a cabin caused



Dickson Island, situated at the extreme mouth of the Yenisei, was hemmed in by a belt of ice, and great ice-floes were drifting slowly southwards from the Kara Sea towards the river mouth. We watched the Siberian coast receding until it was like a bank of mist, almost transparent against the light of the sky, a mere shadow or emanation; then in a breathing-space it had gone, and round about us spread the cold and gloomy waters of the Kara Sea, littered with fantastically shaped ice-floes.

With our experiences of the ice in the Kara Sea, our journey to Tromsö, from Tromsö to Bergen, and thence to England by the North Sea, there is no room to deal, neither would it be

relevant to an article concerning Siberia alone.

Siberia is a country of violent contrasts—climatic, economic, and social. Here you find embraced in one vast tract an equatorial heat and an extreme cold, as great as, if not greater than, that of the Polar regions; the wealth of the mining and agricultural districts, in contrast to the unproductive, sterile tundra. Her population is one of the most heterogeneous that the world has ever seen: the convicted thief, murderer, and aboriginal mingled with the advanced thinker and student. The reactionary and primitive forces lie cheek by jowl with the highest development of social life; and the many religions of these peoples are as conflicting as their classes and social characteristics. Siberia, even at this date, is a name of illomen, for associated with it are tales of oppression and of brutal

This cargo consisted of 400 poods of butter, Siberian cedar, hides and tow, the whole consignment being worth about 130,000l.

injustices which cry aloud for redress. This side of the shield has been sedulously held before the public to the exclusion of the more important side; but I feel that the destinies of countries are of greater urgency than their former lapses, as the future of the individual must take precedence, and in no way be hampered by past errors of judgment.

For the conquest of this continent—for continent it is—great courage and heroism was exacted; but to govern it wisely, to conquer it in spirit as well as in deed, to abolish religious and political despotism, to institute better educational methods, and to organise the resources of the country, will require greater courage. It will require the greatest form of courage—the courage not to take, but to give.

The War has already proved that the Russian Government and people are capable of great sacrifices. This spirit of self-abnegation has indeed been shown not only by the Slavonic races, but in a marked degree by the peoples of each country now locked in this terrific death struggle. It is the one justification of war.

That the next great world force will not be French, German, or English, but Slavonic, is beyond all doubt. The real ordeal of Russia, when she will prove her force to be for good and a humanitarian principle, or for evil and a continuation of corrupt and reactionary methods, will follow the cessation of hostilities. In her inward reorganisation, in the concessions she will grant to Poland and Finland, in her religious and political reforms, will come her trial by fire and the veritable testing of her heroism.

DORA CURTIS.

### POETRY PROPHECY AND THE WAR

Voices crying in the wilderness were theirs who announced the War that surprised its prophets when it came. More correct, perhaps, would it be to say that both prophets and unbelievers were only half surprised when the grave alarum at length rang out. I have not space now to attempt a fascinated groping amid the general mind-precarious groping amid vital intangibilities; but it would not be impossibly difficult to show how subtly, in the mind of people of diverse classes and thoughts, spite of disavowal and protestation, there persisted a conviction of the inevitability of the great War, a conviction of which the secret growing strength was only admitted when all hope of its error was gone. The prophets were right, but unhappily they were not persuasive. least of all when they proceeded from admonition to advice. It is not because of an aversion from truth that truth cries so often unregarded: it is rather that the heralds appear ungracious, are shrill, passionate, arrogant, when it were better that they should be cool, patient, and reasonable.

With one magnificent exception they have confined their warnings to prose. The poet thus distinguished is Mr. Charles Doughty, sole modern master of epic narrative, poet of England in her cradle and prophet of her present strife. In two quasidramatic poems, The Cliffs and The Clouds, he has anticipated the German attack, and divined the militant workings of the German psychology, with singularly clear sight. For those to whom his writings are unfamiliar let it be said for introduction that his first was also his single prose work, Wanderings in Arabia, a book which has slowly come to be known as the greatest travel book in our language-greatest, that is, in its record of adventurousness, in its extension of a powerful personality, in its understanding of a wild, alien people, and simply unique in its mastery of prose. Years after, Mr. Doughty began to issue the six volumes of The Dawn in Britain, an epic narrative of the interlinked history of Rome and Britain during the five hundred years that had ended with the death of Caractacus and the taking The singular affectionateness of his of Rome by the Gauls.

regard for the Britain of that brave period, for her people, chiefs, cities, religion, her flowers, birds, and very soil—this promises and secures the greater intensity of his passion for the England of our own day as he knows it and imagines it. That passion is confined rather than amply contained in *The Cliffs*, published in 1909, and *The Clouds*, published in 1912.

The Cliffs opens with John Hobbe, coastguard and Crimea veteran, watching an East Anglian heath-cliff. Recalling his own violent youth spent in England's fight, he murmurs as he

looks for the moon to shine out again:

I would these clouds were brushed
Once from her bayonet-bright, high-burnished face.
I'm wont to perilous ways and doubtful nights:
There's many I've in them trenches wrought and watched.
Ah Lord of Glory! Thou that all beholdest
From starry heavens' yonder mighty steep,
Beseech Thee, I yet some soldier's deed might work.

Shadow and sound approach of an airship, and in the darkness Hobbe, puzzled and suspicious, crouches watching, listening. 'Two foreign militaires' and their mechanic alight and make fast their craft. Theirs is a reconnoitring journey, and for an hour or two they sit waiting for the first light. Talking serenely, one of them, an ingenious German Baron, expatiates to his lieutenant on the German view of England, of English slothfulness, ease, incompetence, speaking in pretty close harmony with those vigorous misconceptions with which the last few months have amazed and amused us all. Petticoat Island is his designation of England, with a people slow of heart, merely island-bred, evil-counselled. Parliament is a pack of loose-brained demagogues, and the rulers of the State pennywise, foolhardy mandarins. And what can be expected, since the English tongue is 'a native fog of misbegotten language-a speech wherein none can think clearly.' Elsewhere Englishmen's words are 'disloyal, sordid, forged, pernicious argot.' He will not have it that there has been but a late and hasty degeneration; he blows away whatever glory hangs over English history, recalls the Dutch ships in the Thames and explains Waterloo by Napoleon's stomach-ache and Blücher. 'Thus holds our General Staff.' To some of these airy nothings the lieutenant demurs; his mother was an Englishwoman. What cause has Germany against the English? The candid answer is that England has too much, Germany not enough, and force is God's law of nations. Anticipating with remarkable accuracy the harangue of the German Imperial Chancellor and his 'scrap of paper,' the Baron declares that if but their power be great they need not spare for any 'dusty treaties'; and thus Germany's shall be the prize of our vast possessions,



now held only by her long-sufferance. England herself shall sink into an island province of Germany, for 'it plainly appertains to our Imperial Crown by antique right.' The plan is by craft to sink the British Fleet, since it rides the sea so carelessly at night without protection ''gainst sudden offence of enemy submarines'; ports are to be sealed by mines, until the abject multitude clamour for bread and England bleed to death. Her own arms are vain, for what has since become so famous as our 'contemptible little army' is deemed by the Baron to be a diseased Liliputian force scattered round the globe. With an eye to India, Turkey is to be beguiled:

It costs no more to us Than promises; and that's only paper breath.

One inevitably recalls the 'strong bid' made by the German Chancellor for British neutrality by agreement between the two nations. From another view the lieutenant replies:

How with men-rocks, Harder than granite, souls that fear no death, Should we contend; whose only dread in death Is to be found less than their fathers' spirits In warlike worth!...

What is there, can be matched with their true worth!
Where were swash-buckler brags, big bully-strut,
Mustachios at full cock, tall beer-steeped flesh,
Brave clink of sabres, spurs, in Linden street,
Or warlike fripperies; whereat the World laughs?

The Baron laughs at him, 'Herr Balaam'; but the lieutenant has a fear (which time even yet may prove to be true) lest

The natural piety should revolt Of our peace-loving homely honest folk.

His fear is indeed more solemn, and as yet unechoed in our ears to-day:

If there's an Eye in heaven, if there's an Ear, I dread must fall one day a Nemesis For all this on us.

All which touches the Baron not at all. The preachers shall preach:

Nay, if any lack persuasion they'll protest,
And hammer out an hundred godly texts,
And loudly asseverate, all those make up for us!
Methinks, their white be-banded vulpine throats
I see above their tubs; and heavenward lifted,
Their feminine hands bless our war-enterprises!

And already we have seen theologians, professors, artists, and publicists hastily marshalling their texts and crying out their

asseverations for the benefit of neutrals; and twenty-two German universities have sent to foreign universities a pained protest against the accusation of the German soldiery, the most docile in the world. The answer to these evasive protests, it will be remembered, has been merely to print the German proclamations ordering the soldiers to do what they are accused of having done; and the preachers preach in vain.

Typically cynical, the Baron speaks of the 'new school of thought' which holds that even religion is in abeyance, when

A man's in doing of a thing To his advancement. When that's done and past And may not be undone, he can repent, And fall to whining contrite penitence.

'For all the wrong which we are thus doing,' said the German Chancellor, in defending the invasion of Belgium, 'we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained'—that is 'when that's done and may not be undone.' Christian precepts and all superstitious fears they will despise. Ah, remonstrates the lieutenant, there is a piety of our common flesh amongst all of human voice and understanding: humanity that cannot cease; but this the Baron waves aside. When all has been achieved they will get some 'upstart professor' to justify their ways to man:

And with his new tin trumpet din the World!

Returning to his favourite theme, this cynical spy does not hesitate to reproach our puritan hearts with 'a creeping vein of impotent cynicism.' Our theatre is emasculate and meretricious (yes, spite of Reinhardt and the Berlin zest for Mr. Shaw), our literature putrid and withering—voice of hunchback spirits. Phrase after phrase, it will be observed, can be matched to-day. More happily correct has proved the testimony of the lieutenant, who has travelled in India, and does not believe that the branches will fall from the tree at the first violent gust:

Her rajahs would, I am persuaded, Whet loyal sabres, and lead forth proud armies, To maintain Britain's cause!

Even as to the English themselves he seeks to mitigate the Baron's contempt—' they are as the sea-waves, all one beneath.'

So they talk, crouched on the wild cliff, meditating treason against mankind's happiness, Crimea Hobbe listening and half-understanding, the silent heavens bristling with unregarded stars, as the air of years and years had tingled with unregarded warnings. Their errand is to reconnoitre; the great fleet comes between two banks of mines; it is time to fly back and guide

the rest of the aircraft. They rise to release theirs, and Hobbe stoutly interposing is slain by the Baron, who (prefiguring Zabern) deplores that his sword is smutched with clown's blood.

For a book written before 1909 and published in that year, the importance to be attached to aircraft in connexion with a raid on England is acutely foreseen, more especially when it is remembered how, both then and much later, the inadequacy of our own strength in this direction was unrecognised. More striking, however, than any such anticipation is the general previsionary apprehension of that which is and has been (as we now admit) the real peril-I mean the peculiar misconception under which Germany has been striding forward so many years, both as regards her own powers, needs and aspirations, and the rights of all the non-Teutonic world. The first part of The Cliffs revealed for the mere lover of poetry what the last few months have proclaimed bitterly to the whole world. Then comes a curious change. Mr. Doughty, who has read thus surely the minds of the German mandarins (to use his own word again), aims strangely awry in his forecast of the English Government. He sees supineness, ministers scattered hither and thither for long week-ends, the public offices 'shut like tombs,' so that Coastguard Commander Pakenham, confronted with intelligence of the enemy's vast designs, cannot even get an answer to telegraph messages but after excruciating delay. Our fleet, hastily recalled from distant manœuvres, may reach the Channel in three days; but the German fleet, with scores of transports, has already been sighted. Dull and nerveless has been the head, and so the whole body is slack and wanting in warlike skill.

> Ha, Sir! had Englishmen been bred to arms They'd not now care whether by land it were, Or sea, they met with Britain's enemies.

Unready, unready is his sombre indictment of a 'parricide Parliament,' for he has the purely aristocratic, intellectual contempt for 'democratic government,' and would possibly scorn even the phrase as meaningless. Pleasant is it to read, nevertheless, of the prompt and sweet courage of the country people, ready to do anything and everything; of the 'boy-defenders of the Isle,' with radiant looks; more pleasant still to us at the moment the tribute to the 'London Scottish,' and a swart-eyed band to whom:

Jews, born Englishmen,
Shouted commandment in strange Hebrew tongue,
Men faithful to the State wherein they dwell;
Those in whose hearts antique war-fury burns
Marched to do battle at the foster-shore.

March ment's

Nothing in the imagined blackness of a democratic Government's neglect can make Mr. Doughty forget his native pride in Britain; and this pride is expressed in his invention of a great national organisation, apparently unofficial, called The Sacred Band; men enrolled father with son, even grandfather with grandson, and keeping green their hearts through trivial tasks for 'the day':

Day when shall they contend to the last man, A living bulwark, warding Britain's Coast, Over all whose corses must her Enemies pass.

Nor only in England does he find—what we have now so fortunately found—prompt loyalty of devotion among the people; in daughter-lands and far-off isles is

> Felt mighty pulse of Britain's Mother-heart, Man's message under weight of infinite flood. . . . Went up great cry: the haunts of merchandise Were shut. With burning hearts in haste assembled Then citizen-throngs, in hundred market-places, To hear the words of whose best could speak.

Proudly does he write of the response from the oversea provinces. He sees their ships running forth, packed with stern, eager hearts, setting out with much the same vivid and various effect of pageantry as he has portrayed in *The Dawn in Britain*, when the longships came to our shores.

As I write, the newspapers teem with talk of Germany's avowed imperial piracy, her threat to destroy indiscriminately whatever shipping wanders foolishly into European waters. There is mingled surprise and contempt, but Mr. Doughty at least is not among the surprised; for in *The Cliffs* he writes of four great submarines that lay beyond the Needles (be it remembered that no declaration of war had preceded this act) and

Waylaid our ships; where not in sight from land. They took their crews and passengers out, 'mongst whom Some women were and children; and them set On pontoon rafts, borne on the English ships, Adrift. He thought they'd tow them out an hour, To sea, leaving one boat, that few in her Might row, towards Catherine's light, for help to save Their cast-away, spoiled, naked, weary lives; Drifting in jeopardy, on the dim night-waves.

Were the German strategists conceivably lacking in unholy devices, it might be thought that they had read Mr. Doughty's poetry with enthusiasm.

What of the end of this raid? The deep-laid plans miscarry. The German fleet in their manœuvrings stumble on their own mines; two capital ships and three transports are lost; a land-

ing in Yorkshire is repelled; and an air fleet wrecked in a storm. Mr. Doughty had as little fear of Zeppelins in 1909 as we have to-day in considering their fitness for fight; there is something oddly humorous in his picture:

Cast were many away in squall and tempest
At sea; which could not stem the windy gusts.
Some other fought, that topt the English Cliffs,
With windmills, lightning rods, and weathercocks'
Sharp beaks; and most-whiles had the worst. Some bounced
On trees; and fell down loads of enemies, like as
At bed-time, cockchafers do. Some hanged themselves
On telegraph wires.

The aeroplanes, however, 'that went like rocketing pheasants,' escape by rising against the wind. 'An arrow of the Almighty,' says Mr. Doughty, has 'attained' the Royal plotter, and England is spared the Island struggle by much the same super-mundane intervention as sent that other Armada broken and empty away.

In one thing has Mr. Doughty been hopelessly and magnificently wrong—in his conception of the indifference, the profound somnolence of the Government of the day. Upon this it would be idle to enlarge. In another, who among our people would not say he has spoken magnificently aright?

> All Europe's Chancelleries know full well, Were this our mighty Ship of Britain's State To founder under us; should rise such waves, Redound, reverberate, through all the World, Beat back, from shore to shore, an hundred years: And still breed wars, and those beget new wars: That to forecast the event, must far surpass The exercise of any mortal wit.

#### II

The Clouds carries the German plans a stage further, though the development of the poem is obscure, and gives place (as, indeed, does The Cliffs) to idyllic interludes in the Elizabethan manner, if a manner which is so purely and so potently an author's own can be called by another's name. In The Clouds Mr. Doughty has become, indeed, more wholly Mr. Doughty, in his manner, his music, his union of strength and sweetness, his half-sad, half-confident but wholly filial regard for England. The 'Proeme' breathes melancholy and pride; England is still a land of slumbering, trembling, sighing, a land undone; and in 'The Muse's Garden' a 'Vates' sits, to whom the Muse in vision unfolds the future.

The first scene so unfolded is 'Easthampton Burned,' and is placed beyond what was once Easthampton. A workman's

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family crouches over the hedge-fire, the children for lack of food huggled to their mother's bosom. Carpenter, the sometime lodger, a land agent, joins them as they talk of children burned in hospital beds, of the sorrows before them, and of the uncomprehended attack that has ruined them all. They talk on, not uncheerfully, though the heavy boom of guns is still heard. From the interrogation of the Mayor by an Intelligence Officer, the reader learns how, on a night of hazy moon, pontoon boats suddenly landed German pioneers at Easthampton Strand, who at once cut the telephone wires, surrounded the few cottages, and threatened death to all. Throughout the calm night foot and horse soldiers and 'muffle-wheeled field guns' disembarked and moved inland. They must needs pass a camp of English recruits; challenged, the invaders fire, and the few dazed recruits that are not soon killed are secured. Easthampton reached, the undreaming town is waked by a gunshot and summoned to surrender, provide horses, carriage, and victual, and pay 30,000l.

The Germans take possession of the town, and then their

commandant rides in with a strong guard:

In old crooked narrow street,
Where hardly wain might pass, stood many thronging
The foot pavement to look on. Risen in his stirrups
He gave the word. Ride down the Englanders!
Sudden over men's heads rang out a shot
From chamber window of an antique house.

Killed by the ramrod of a mere blunderbuss, 'that arrogant' falls from his horse. The shot had been fired by an old widow, 'moaning her dead son's only son' killed that morning by the Germans. The unhappy woman is seized, tried by court-martial, tied to a lamp post, and shot, men rushing to save her being bayoneted. Her yet living body is flung back into the house, which is fired. A tempest of live shells is rained upon the burning town, for example's sake; and in a few hours a place of twelve thousand families becomes a funereal waste of smoke and flame.

Strange! yet not so strange. For Easthampton read Aerschot, Louvain, Visé, Malines, these in Belgium; or the all but innumerable places in France which the French Commission on the Violations of International Law have named in their Report. Near Louvain, at Sempst, says the Belgian Commission:

were found the bodies of two men, partially carbonised. One of them had his legs cut off at the knees; the other had the arms and legs cut off. A workman, whose burnt body has been seen by several witnesses, had been struck several times with bayonets, and then, while still alive, the Germans had poured petroleum over him, and thrown him into a house to which they set fire. A woman who came out of her house was killed in the same way.

At Senlis, declares the French Commission:

The Germans entered Senlis, where they were greeted by rifle fire from African troops. Alleging that they had been fired on by civilians, they set fire to two quarters of the town. One hundred and five houses were burned in the following manner: The Germans marched along the streets in a column; at a whistle from an officer some of them fell out and proceeded to break in the doors of the houses and the shop fronts; then others came along and lit the fire with grenades and rockets; patrols who followed them fired incendiary bullets with their rifles into those houses in which the fire was not taking hold fast enough.

To multiply instances would be at once easy and tedious. For us the point of the English poet's words is that the fulfilment of his prophecy is found not in England but in Belgium and France. The difference is merely accidental—if the escape from such blind havoc can ever be conceived by the human imagination as merely accidental.

Carpenter, witness of all this, journeys northwards by road and footpath to his mother. Reaching Ely, he joins the crowd that press for safety into the Cathedral, his ears still holding echoes of the heavy distant guns. In the great nave is made public distribution of bread, and at night the floor is parcelled out among the fugitive men and women. He leaves Ely with many more, since a third of all strangers must remove for lack of bread; and the fear is uttered that the next day may require the departure of another third. On the way to Stamford Carpenter meets young men 'from college halls':

Untaught, unexercised to patriot arms . . . Nor of that shame ashamed.

From Stamford to Dove Valley he journeys on, learning by gossip (since letters and newspapers are scarce) of the sealing of the Medway and Thames, the occupation of the Isle of Wight, and the investment of Portsmouth. In the Valley of the Dove he meets a placid fisherman who carries always with him, and most affectionately now, The Compleat Angler, and talks lyrically with that sweet savour of life which Walton himself communicated. Strange and welcome this distraction of talk between Carpenter and Piscator, with the pious ghost of old Izaak hovering near. Piscator:


Still studying to conform my spirit to his;
Which was conformed to Christ and His first saints.
With him, I joy to hear chant of all birds;
And this small teeming wavering infinite hum,
In the sheen air, and thymy web of grass,
Of silver-winged flies, and derne creeping things:
All children of Life's Breath, on my Dove's brinks.

And all the while around their childlike spirits creep nearing echoes of war and death. Yet not in indifference do they talk, for Piscator's house has been burned by the Germans, and his home now is with many homeless ones in a cave-camp, refuge of Britons, Saxons, and Angles from their earlier foes, now the shelter of men newly forlorn. This delicious interlude is surely as right in its vision of character as the view of the Government's invariable weakness is wrong; for even to-day do not men go about their business, peasants dig and sow under screaming shells, committees sit and scholars lecture upon the discovery of early sitesand all as if the world were peaceful still? Piscator, fishing and talking, becomes a type of that quiet brightness of spirit which we in England witness everywhere moving with a natural and Other such interludes occur in the poem, curihappy ease. ously gentle and beautiful, but of these I do not speak now. Carpenter continues his journey homewards, and it is this journey by high road and footpath, mostly avoiding towns, but coming here and there upon offenceless, idle groups-men awakened, but ignorant to despair of all that is happening-it is this that gives Mr. Doughty his great opportunity of an imaginative outline of the effect of these ills upon the people of England. One tells Carpenter:

Where the Eastlanders occupy any manor-house,
They put therein to the most abject uses
What thing they find, without regard of aught.
He had known them, mongst the armour and stags' heads
To stall their horses, in historic halls.
He had known them, priceless heirlooms to break up
To kindle fires, under their cooking pots.
He had known, where Eastlander officer's evening pastime
Was, with revolvers, to shoot out the eyes
Of a great Northern lord's ancestral pictures!

Does it not remind us of the lessons in Kultur which have been so diligently taught by German trooper and general alike? Witness (one for many) the Château of Baye or of Beaumont, referred to in the French Commissioners' Report. Piece by piece the story is gathered up, from here a fragment, from there a hint, until the whole 'doing' and 'being' are comprehensively seen. The German plan was to effect five simultaneous landings, of which four were successful, the British Fleet having been lured afar by feints. But one of these attempts is foiled, three German warships foundering; the rest are chased and taken. Captured, too, are most of the transports:

Some tempting, midst the fight, their cables slipped, To make an offing; holed by English shot Sunk within sight of land. Others, which dragged, Wind-driven, their anchors, fell on a lee shore.



The story of these almost superhumane rescues has been matched many times already by British generosity in the present War! And are not these things for boasting, if ever boast be justified?

The German fleets convoy five army corps, supplemented by air raids everywhere. London and the South Coast, the Midlands, and Lancashire are in the same moment attacked; Portsmouth is bombarded and the Victory driven off between two cruisers; communications are cut, and wireless messages corrupted by counter-contrivance; and the armies of our Allies are prevented from assisting us by strong fleets containing their fleets. From a wounded naval officer (whose destroyer has been struck by one of the mines laid, before war had been declared, by disguised German ships) Carpenter hears how in a single sudden attack by night, when all the world but one nation slept at peace, Britain's naval predominance is lost; and amid such tales of disaster one thing only is reported for encouragement-that the English airmen easily excel all airy foes, losing their own lives freely to cast away their enemies by using against the fleet a new explosive.

Who is there, would not for his Nation's Life Hazard himself, yield willingly his own life, For England? Never have intrepid spirits Been here found wanting: Britain's soil breeds such. For every hardy, adventurous, desperate enterprise A thousand volunteers.

This of the misfortunes of war. More minutely has Mr. Doughty pictured the state of England in this bewilderment. The seizure by the invaders of all food, wanted or unwanted by themselves; the deliberate effort to strangle by hunger and terrorise by violence, so that the unwarlike crowds shall themselves compel peace; bands of native marauders, grown fierce with hunger, making all roads unsafe; sudden commercial collapse, with expectation of a general moratorium; children taught in caveschools, as in Rheims are children taught to-day in cellars; and everywhere men, lovers of their motherland, looking darkly forward to massacre, expatriation, or slavery, and blaming bitterly the rulers of their choice—these things and more, broadly or in careful detail, are set before you, lightened only with fortunate glimpses of the brave good-will of man to man. Reading of them now, you reflect how all these might be but the description (the horror softened) of the sufferings of France or Belgium.

With a lovely tenderness of affection, Carpenter (upon whom

all these rays of intelligence are focussed) looks sharply for every least sign of alteration as he approaches his mother's house.

Dark is my path, 'twixt holly hedges. Here
Should be our elder tree. It is! (I it know
By the heavy smell.) This then smooth laurel bough
I feel: the ruffling hazel-leaves, that hang over
Our gate hear now. Thank God! my journey is ended.

He finds his mother fled, Germans occupying the house, and himself apprehended. Questioned, he tells what he knows of the erasure of Easthampton from its site, and hears the significant comment:

> 'My major, you remember its bombarding,' Another quoth, 'hath served for precedent In this campaign.'

For a contemptuous look and phrase his old acquaintance the blacksmith had been shot at his own door; but Carpenter himself is not ill-treated, and is permitted to journey on to his mother in Wales. The last two books of this strange poem tell us no more of Carpenter, but in a touch here and a word there is revealed the abyss into which England's richness is cast. The German 'watchword' is 'Tame England by Famine'; and Famine tames her so quickly that the invaders are 'compelled by the world's voice' to establish doles of food; all that the British Parliament can do is to destroy the finger-posts on all roads, so that the task of feeding the multitude shall not be increased by their dispersion. Follows riot, 'carnival of unreason,' dismay of civil strife, until London is tardily avenged by our 'aeroplane destroyers' casting 'hadesite' bombs-fitly so called, since each bomb is the death of a thousand Germans. The last book has the title 'Help from Overseas,' and though Mr. Doughty is vexingly inexplicit, he assists you to believe that England will yet be England again and a better England, purged of all that has unmanned her:

> Mother of Nations, hearken and take heart! Know, that those great communities of thy sons, (Defenders of the rock of the five Britains) Be, as the living chords, of one great harp; Sounding in unison, in vast accord, O'er main-sea deeps, from all Britannic shores.

Possibly we shall never know how near England has been to the experience thus minutely imagined and so cruelly realised in Belgium and France. Poets, says Shelley, are the unacknowledged legislators of the world, and Mr. Doughty's clearness of vision—so far, at any rate, as German ideas and intentions are concerned—suggests the value of poets as acknowledged legislators. Some things he could not foresee, for a man's prescience is perforce confined within the limits of his character. He foresaw in England much of the agony which has wrung the vitals of Belgium and France, even as he forecast the very cynicism, the intrepid mendacity, the corruption of national ideas, with which German apologists have familiarised us. But there are things which he has not hinted at because it was not within his character, as it is not within the English character itself, to imagine them. The German principle of deliberate terrorisation he did indeed divine, but the particularities were unimaginable. He could not conceive of the destruction of an unimportant town like Termonde,1 the drenching of the hospital with petroleum and then the burning, with a poor epileptic within. He could not foresee that in places like Termonde and its neighbours 2 scores of inhabitants would be shot or bayoneted, their eyes put out, and at last their corpses mutilated, and all because of the resistance of a belligerent force; or that a German army, advancing upon a fortress, such as Liège, would protect itself by a line of hostages driven in front, with a larger number in reserve; or that some of these hostages would be stationed (with frightened nuns) all night upon a bridge, to prevent bombardment; or that when men and women should be thus seized for hostages a proportion of the men would invariably be set aside for immediate shooting; or that at this or that small village the male inhabitants, fathers and sons together, would be shot in a body before the streaming eyes of wives and children. Nor did he foresee how often the tragic 'case of Madame X.' or 'case of Mdlle X.' would recur in the methodical reports of Commissions following upon the track of these late exponents of German Romance; nor how in English villages to-day young refugee girls should hide, shrinking from their burden, waiting despairingly for the passage of the monthshe did not foresee what no Englishman could foresee. But what he did apprehend was the German mind in which these things all lay unborn, the envious, arrogant temper which has swept so vehemently over the mental territory of the German people, turning its strength and wisdom to an acrid flame. He divined this when to many of us it was but a mere uneasy suspicion, when we would not believe what we were unwillingly beginning Was there not something naïve in the deliberate cheerfulness with which occasional warnings were received? For beneath that cheerfulness there was always a sombre anxiety that could not be starved or silenced. Mr. Doughty only saw more

<sup>2</sup> Read, for the real names given in the Belgian Commissioners' Report, Snettisham, Wells, or a thousand small places anywhere in England.

Dendermonde, in the history of that stainlessly gallant gentleman, Captain Shandy, and Corporal Trim.

clearly and candidly what most saw obscurely and unadmittingly. These strange, grave poems, the largest body of purely 'patriotic' literature which we have, gain greatly in significance when they are viewed in the growing light poured by the War upon our national psychology, as well as on that of the German people.

#### TTT

More briefly must the poetry of Mr. Thomas Hardy be considered now, especially since its interest is mainly retrospective so far as England and her fortunes are concerned. It is his great, curious 'drama of the Napoleonic wars, in three parts, nineteen acts, and one hundred and thirty scenes'—The Dynasts—which is chiefly significant at this moment. Published more than ten years ago, when Mr. Hardy had already secured his position in English prose literature, this singular work confirmed the opinion of those who were beginning to think that his achievement as a poet would outweigh his achievement as a novelist: an opinion which subsequent poems were continually to strengthen. And now this enormous and continental work has been boldly cabined within the two hours' traffic of the stage, brightening many a winter afternoon and evening at the Kingsway Theatre—a success no less delightful than unlikely.

Mr. Hardy says that his drama is concerned with the great historical clash of peoples artificially brought about some hundred years ago; but his own view is rather that the Napoleonic upheaval was far from artificial—was indeed the result of blind forces, sinister inscrutabilities, antipathies, 'the Immanent Will with its inexplicable artistries,' just such dark, vital abstractions as have released rather than artificially brought about the present conflict of peoples. Mr. Hardy's poem does not depend upon a single interest for its great power and splendour. It has the interest of historical interpretation, the no less profound interest of its author's philosophical view of human life and destiny, and the intense, quickening interest of noble poetry. The choice of the subject was due, he tells us, mainly to accidents of locality -but who knows how human choice is determined? At any rate, these felicitous 'accidents' resulted in the creation of a poem, of the subject of which Mr. Hardy was of all living writers the most sensitive to feel the influences.

The historical interest has, of course, two aspects, the one purely insular, the other European, more varied and hardly less vivid. The author of the Wessex tales has enriched English literature with many a simple, intimate country scene, possessing beyond their historical value (highly as that may be reckoned) a social and psychological value, since these novels reveal not only

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the peasant's ways and condition, but also his mind, his native attitude in face of questions of life and death. But nothing to be found in the stories shows this double value more clearly than passages from *The Dynasts*, passages such as:

#### First Spectator.

And you've come to see the sight, like the King and myself? Well, one fool makes many. What a mampus o' folk it is here to-day. And what a time we do live in, between wars and wassailings, the ghost o' Boney and King George in flesh and blood! . . . Everybody was fairly gallied this week when the King went out yachting, meaning to be back for the theatre; and the time passed, and it got dark, and the play couldn't begin, and eight or nine o'clock came, and never a sign of him. I don't know when 'a did land, but 'twas said by all that it was a foolhardy pleasure to take.

#### Fourth Spectator.

He's a very obstinate and comical old gentleman, and by all account 'a wouldn't make port when asked to.

#### Second Spectator.

Lard, Lard, if 'a were nabbed, it wouldn't make a deal of difference! We should have nobody to zing to, and play single-stick to, and grin at through horse-collars, that's true. And nobody to sign our few documents. But we should rub along some way, goodnow.

Always has Mr. Hardy been fascinated by a red coat. His country folk are people who have served on land or sea, or whose sons or husbands have served; his very imagery is of martial matters. He has written songs that are indeed noble English airs:

In the wild October night-time when the wind raved round the land, And the Back-sea met the Front-sea, and our doors were blocked with sand, And we heard the drub of Dead-man's Bay, where bones of thousands are, We knew not what the day had done for us at Trafalgar.

Had done, Had done, For us at Trafalgar!

Merely to turn the familiar pages again, for the first time since the present War began, is to find passages that greet you with a new, ironic significance:

Five hundred thousand active men in arms Shall strike, supported by Britannic aid In vessels, men and money subsidies, To free North Germany and Hanover From trampling foes; deliver Switzerland, Unbind the galled republic of the Dutch, Rethrone in Piedmont the Sardinian King, Make Naples sword-proof.

March

Or note this of Berlin, when Napoleon is approaching and a lady of the Court cries through her tears:

The kingdom late of Prussia, can it be That thus it disappears?—a patriot-cry, A battle, bravery, ruin; and no more?

And now, too, when the figure of the Kaiser is so continually thrust before us, and the soberest sees it as at best but tragicomic, it is with fresher interest that we turn back a moment to Napoleon in The Dynasts. In all that astonishing rise and fall Mr. Hardy sees nothing trivial or comic, but only the errancy of genius uncontrolled; and there is a pure tragic note in the last scene when Napoleon, entering listlessly the Wood of Bossu, is 'stung by spectral questionings,' knowing he has lived too long for his own greatness:

> I came too late in time To assume the prophet or the demi-god, A part past playing now.

The present time illuminates the phrase afresh. 'The Spirit of the Years,' accosting Napoleon as he broods, reminds him that his glory was that of the Dresden days, when well-nigh every monarch bent before him:

> Saving always England's -Rightly dost say 'well-nigh.' Not England's,-she Whose tough, enisled, self-centered, kindless craft Has tracked me, springed me, thumbed me by the throat, And made herself the means of mangling me!

Luminous again the words of Wellington at Waterloo:

Manœuvring does not seem to animate Napoleon's methods here. Forward he comes, And pounds away on us in the ancient style, Till he is driven back in the ancient style, And so the see-saw sways!

The large, proud moments of our history are splendidly preserved in The Dynasts-Trafalgar, Nelson's death, the brilliant figure of the great Admiral clear as a star in Mr. Hardy's sharp and weighty verse. . . . Pathetic beyond almost anything in the novels is that other scene of the poor King of delinquent wits, lying at Windsor and told of Albuera. 'You have achieved a victory.'

He says I have won a battle? But I thought I was a poor afflicted captive here, In darkness lingering out my lonely days, Beset with terror of these myrmidons That suck my blood like vampires! Ay, ay, ay!



No aims left to me but to quicken death To quicklier please my son! And yet he says That I have won a battle!

The Dynasts is a rare if it be not a unique instance of a great creative work conceived in or touched by an ironic spirit. Unseen 'ironies' form some of the 'phantasmal intelligences' sitting in judgment upon the procession of events in this long drama; for Mr. Hardy, far from content with simply chronicling, must perforce strive to interpret. He cannot believe that there is no meaning and no end in all this strife but the aggrandisement of a soldier or the founding of a dynasty; and hence the purely philosophical interest of the poem is as acute as the purely national interest. Here, however, it must be left aside, with this sole note for the consolation of those who, in the present more than Napoleonic struggle, are compelled to questions which are more often and more easily asked than answered:

> Yet is it but Napoleon who has failed. The pale pathetic peoples still plod on Through hoodwinkings to light.

Is that hard to believe? Looking abroad to-day one is conscious of eclipse, and in the obscurity it is difficult to discover aught but one huge interlocking of furious armies and peoples. It needs no impossible faith, however, to believe that one forest of hoodwinkings may soon be passed through, and that even a few years (a short time in the life of nations) will see the European peoples on the fringe of clear and simple light. When that light is grown it may be time for the chronicler of the War to begin his musings; sooner it cannot profitably be. The Napoleonic wars have waited a hundred years for a man of genius to understand as well as judge, to interpret as well as record, to revive and recall as well as celebrate. In The Dynasts, and in a score of poems from other volumes, Mr. Hardy has applied the superb powers of a great imagination to a subject which only a great imagination could enkindle again; and the result is a contribution not only to history, but also to that spirit which is born in the blood and bred in the bones of the British people, and nursed upon traditions that are native, unwritten history—the spirit by which the end of the present War has long been pre-determined. The very greatness of England's victory a hundred years ago is a guarantee that by the same national spirit will the same issue be attained in this vaster conflict of peoples.

## OUR NEW ARMIES:

A STUDY AND A FORECAST

It is a study which may be made almost anywhere in Great Scarcely a country town but its pavements are thronged with figures in peaked cap and khaki tunic. It is, moreover, an unique study, the like of which has never hitherto been afforded us. The Volunteer movement of Napoleonic times, although with points of resemblance, is totally dissimilar in this, that here you have the sudden blazing forth of the martial spirit among a people so ostentatiously devoted to the maintenance of peace, that their supposed unwillingness to fight was undoubtedly a contributory cause of the outbreak of War; a people, moreover, who for a hundred years had regarded war as a matter of distant frontiers, not a menace to the heart of their Empire-a matter, therefore, to be left to the professional fighter, backed up by the national resources, not a call to the citizen, as such, to take up arms. Of course to large numbers of people it has not yet appeared in this light, but our success in raising our new armies is a fair test of the extent to which it has done so. A new phenomenon, such as this, must have about it features worth studying, both in themselves, and as indicating lines of future development in national character and international relationships. Unsuspected elements of thought and feeling have come to the surface. They will not subside and leave uninfluenced the character in which they have betrayed their presence, nor the relationship in which that character will henceforth stand to the larger humanity of which it is a part.

At the commencement of the struggle this was not the case. The nation was stirred to its core by indignation, which it believed to be righteous; it was also profoundly solemnised by the thought of conflict with an enemy of so terrific a military reputation. But the citizen, as such, did not immediately feel himself touched by the call to arms. The first recruits to the new army were largely of the ordinary type, that with which we were familiar during the Boer War, men out of employment, seeking a livelihood, or adventurous spirits on the outlook for

exciting experiences. As the evidence of what we regarded as German perfidy and cruelty accumulated; as we became conscious of the passion of hatred aroused against us; as the certainty that the War would be costly both in lives and treasure, and the probability that it would be long was realised, a change crept over the spirit of the nation, which was reflected in the character of the recruits. Not since the days of the Crusades, perhaps, has so strong a conviction that we are engaged in a Holy War permeated the nation, with its corollary that to bear arms is not merely a useful occupation for those who like soldiering, but a duty incumbent even upon those who do not. This introduces into the new armies a touch of the 'Ironside' spirit.

Of course, among the officers there are many who belong to what may soon be regarded as the 'old school,' the name now often applied to a hard-swearing, hard-drinking set of vanished days. The men to whom I refer are indeed superior to these. Sport-loving, clean-living, duty-doing, in many cases they only just fall short of the highest possibilities open to a soldier. The spiritual is the touch lacking. Given that, they would be indeed Gabriels, 'God's heroes.' If 'playing the game' demands death, they will die. Still, it will be only 'playing the game.' They are very hard to convince that their adversaries are not doing the same. 'The Germans are very keen to win, and perhaps not always as scrupulous as they might be about the means they use ' is the severest judgment you are likely to get from them. With the memory of the slanders poured out on themselves during the Boer War, this mildness is not altogether to be wondered at. But the man who goes to war in that spirit is inferior as a striking force to him whose heart is afire with the possession of God's commission to right the wrong. And he is apt to discourage in others the spirit of religious devotion to the work in hand, to the meaning and value of which he is a stranger. No one has such power to create an 'atmosphere' as the commanding officer of a company or troop. The writer had good evidence of this when forming a Confirmation class among the soldiers quartered in his parish. Out of twenty members, ten came from two companies, the commanding officers of which were keen Churchmen. The motives of those who offered themselves varied from the feeling that an effort must be made to satisfy the wishes of loved ones at such a time, to the personal desire to be spiritually, as well as physically, fit to meet the contingencies awaiting them across the sea. In all, as far as could be judged, there was a distinct expectation of spiritual blessing, and an utter absence of mechanical compliance with custom, which one has often too much reason to suspect, and in consequence it was a most stimulating class to conduct.

The moral issues involved in this conflict appear to have affected all parts of the army, but the ranks more than the others. To innumerable country towns it has been a novel and exciting experience to be transformed from sleepy agricultural marketing places into smart military centres. The strange thing has been, not that the evils incident to garrison towns have cropped up and scandalised quiet folk unaccustomed to such doings, but that they have not reached anything like the dimensions which in ordinary times would be prophesied. No doubt they vary in various localities, and the first army was more on the level which might have been expected than subsequent ones. In this parish the amount of drunkenness is not much above normal. On the other hand, the khaki-worship of young girls, mostly fifteen or sixteen years old, has been tremendously pronounced, nor can the praiseworthy efforts made to confine it within the limits safe for them be said to be very successful as yet. If our soldier lads do not emerge from their training with very 'swelled heads,' it will not be the fault of the civilian population. Soldiers are admitted at half price to the picture shows, there are special 'military' nights at the theatre, when they are allowed to behave very much as they please; and it says a good deal for them that nothing more objectionable than noise has resulted.

The impulse urging our people to give a good time while they can to the men who are going forth, perhaps to die for them, is That the unwisdom of some of the natural, and creditable. means employed is not more productive of harm is because such an unusual proportion of recruits have joined the ranks from the very highest motives, and, in consequence, the percentage of those of superior social and educational status who have enlisted is much larger than usual. Our Universities, and even our Theological Colleges, where the vocation of the students might be regarded as fixed, are more than half depleted. This means the entry into the soldier's calling of men whose whole outlook on life is from the religious point of view. A month or two ago the writer asked a Bishop whether his list of ordination candidates was not dangerously reduced. 'Greatly, but not dangerously,' was his reply; 'we shall get them all back again with interest.' It seems, indeed, reasonable to expect that many of those who have felt the thrill of response to the call of a high service, and in obedience to it have given up careers chosen from selfish motives. when the War is over will respond to another high call—that of the Church in need of men to minister at her altars, especially in the poor and crowded centres of population. possibly those who have added to the usual preparation for Holy Orders the training of the camp and battlefield, will find that it will give them just the sort of power which is needed in days when all Christian bodies in the country are lamenting the absence of men from their services. Within the writer's knowledge one young theological student, the son of a country clergyman, is already finding his Christian manhood put to a severe test in a reserve battalion of Territorials, where the tone is perhaps not quite up to the average. Under such circumstances some will fall, doubtless, but some will come out as 'gold tried in the fire.'

The War is bound to stir, more deeply as it goes on, the religious feelings and convictions of the nation; will it bring our men back to loyalty to some form of organised Christianity? Never before has the need of thorough organisation, if success is to be won, been demonstrated on such a stupendous scale. Those who have given themselves to form part of the great fighting machine, because they hoped thereby to aid a cause which appealed to every fibre of their being, are not likely to be content with the franc-tireur method, or rather want of method, in any other great cause to which they may give themselves in the future. They will be much more likely to attach themselves to what they believe to be the best organisation for carrying it out; they will study the rules, and try to do their part in making the wheels go round. And there is no doubt that, to many such, religion will be the cause making the great appeal. I have in my desk a letter from the Front, from an officer in high command, in which he states how in the dark and glorious days of the retreat from Mons the power of prayer and the reality of answers to prayer were brought home to him as never before. Given a larger proportion of men than usual joining the Army from high and chivalrous motives; given a large number of sensitive consciences, who, lovers of peace though they were, could not in honour shirk the questions of the recent house-to-house inquiry, and you have the material ready to hand from which a great religious revival might be expected to arise, a revival moreover on the lines of organised Christianity.

A consideration urged by the Headmaster of Eton in the last number of the *Hibbert Journal* tells in the same direction. He points out that, while in Prussia the State is organised down to the smallest detail, Christianity has rested, ever since the Reformation, on an individualistic basis. No witness for morals is forthcoming from the Church in that country in the face of the omnipotent State. Had the Church, as an organisation, been stronger, the moral downfall of the German people could not have been compassed by the militarist faction dominant in the State. If this view be correct, it is certain that men who have organised for the settlement of great international moral

issues, and in doing so have attained to a spiritual enthusiasm to which they have hitherto been strangers, will, on coming home, seek earnestly for that organisation which will best effect moral and spiritual advance at home, and will not consent, as hitherto, to be merely nominal adherents of whatever organisation their parents happened to belong to. We may therefore expect a revival, not only of religious feeling, but of organised Christianity, as a result of the experiences through which we are

passing.

Against this, the extraordinary mixture of religious faiths in the allied ranks might be supposed to tend towards the obliteration, not merely of distinctions between Church and Church, but even between Faith and Faith. My Anglican friend, resting for a few days behind the trenches in a little French village, finds the village church at his service for prayer and meditation; the hearts of all English Christians go out to Cardinal Mercier, the patriot Archbishop of Malines; the French soldiers, we are glad to learn, have been impressed by the religious tone they have observed among our English troops, and they are likely to be still more impressed as the new armies come to the Front; Belgians, French, and English look with sympathy and admiration on the stubborn fight waged against the common foe by Russian Churchmen on the eastern front, and incidentally learn attractive things about Russian Christianity of which the Western world hitherto was in ignorance; nay, more: Hindoos and Mahommedans are having the Victoria Cross pinned to their breast, which by its very form suggests a recognition of Christian courage, while the Japanese convey to King Albert of the Belgians their appreciation of his Christian heroism in the gift of a jewelled sword. Does not all this go to support an attitude of indifference to the points of distinction between creeds?

> For Modes of Faith let graceless zealots fight, His can't be wrong whose life is in the right.

On the other hand, we may be sure that as we get to know our foes better, more examples of Christian chivalry, such as that of the captain of the Emden, will come to light even among the Germans, and we shall learn that it is possible for a man's private life to be in the right, while through the system to which he is attached--in this case political, though it might equally be ecclesiastical-he is involved in the grossest wrong. Thus one hopes that we shall learn that, although the best of men may be found in almost every organisation, and even outside of every organisation, the most effective work for the good of all can only be done through that organisation which is best adapted for the application of the highest truth to human life.

We Christians believe that in the Church of Christ such an organisation exists. Surely the circumstances of mutual brother-hood into which the War has thrown members of various branches of the Church must tend toward the breaking down of the walls of partition between them, and towards the establishment of some bond of outward union which will preserve 'In necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in omnibus caritas.' What would not such an outward and visible witness to moral and spiritual truth do for the settlement of the problems which Europe will present to a distracted diplomacy, when the great 'Cease fire!' is sounded?

C. E. SCOTT MONCRIEFF.

# THE ALIEN ENEMY WITHIN OUR GATES

APHORISMS made in Germany are not as a rule approved by us at the present juncture, but von Hindenburg's saying, or reputed saying, concerning the supreme value of strong nerves to a nation at war is not displeasing to English ears.

If there is one thing we are confident about, it is that our nerves will stand any strain that the country will have to endure, and that we bear suspense, reverses, and disaster, both as individuals and as a nation with strong heart and a stiff upper lip. Strength of nerve is a quality which has been bred in the bone for centuries past in this nation of ours, nor has this War disproved the claim. In the trenches or the North Sea, in the homes grown suddenly dark and still when the dreaded War Office letter came, in the seaside town where little children have been crushed by shell or bomb, the steadfastness of character which, in spite of all our faults, has made us what we are —a nation holding the greatest Empire on the earth in trust—has not failed us, and we know it never will.

Then there is our love of fair play. 'Fair play is a jewel,' we say. We claim to be pre-eminently a nation of good sportsmen

who play the game.

As a rule we have done so; but in this crisis there has been one unfortunate exception—the attitude of a section of Englishmen towards those Germans and Austrians who are domiciled in this country.

This attitude has been unworthy of a strong-nerved people,

and conspicuously lacking in fair play.

This in itself would not be of very great importance, for allowance must always be made for some nerves to go to pieces in such a time as the present, had not the Government shown signs on one occasion of yielding to the clamour, while the majority of the nation and the Press have made little effort to set forth the facts and appeal to fair play and common sense.

This official weakness and national indifference have already resulted in grave injustice, the widespread suffering of innocent persons, and the creation of intense bitterness and sense of undeserved injury on the part of thousands of well-intentioned, perfectly harmless German and Austrian residents here. If it is repeated, and the agitation against men of German blood simply because they are Germans gains force and impetus, it will end in a condition of affairs which can only be described as a moral disaster to the British race.

The position has been stated bluntly, but this is no time for mincing words. The enemy outside our gates is desperate, and at any moment the 'frightfulness' of his methods of waging war may be brought home to the people in these islands more severely than it has been yet. If this happens, and the present spirit manifested by many responsible Englishmen towards Germans living here is maintained, the treatment to which these folk who are wholly in our power may be subjected is not pleasant to contemplate.

Let the issue be quite clear. No complaint is advanced against the criticisms of the authorities which have appeared when some person has been found to have abused the freedom of the subject which we give to citizens of this country, even though they have been of German nationality. Still less should we carp at any warning to the Government, however emphatic, or to the people of this country, to be firm and circumspect in dealings with alien enemies here, no matter how innocent they may appear, nor how long they may have made England their home. We are at war with an enemy whose long-felt hatred for us under a cloak of friendship has been disclosed so plainly that it would be positively blameworthy not to be strict and watchful, and to fail to treat with stern justice and short shrift any person suggesting lax methods of dealing with espionage or the dangers of incendiarism.

But when measures are urged which must deprive thousands of persons with whom their bitterest enemy could find no fault, and the large majority of whom have English-born wives and children, of their whole livelihood, reducing them to hopeless penury and misery—then it is time to call a halt, and consider whether the interests of any nation, least of all our own free land, are to be advanced by a policy which, cloak it as we may, has become one of harrying and persecuting people simply because

they belong to the nation which we hate.

This policy began when the Government were urged to take up every German and Austrian subject, of whatever age and rank, and thrust him into prison. No one was to be spared. No exception was to be made. Because there was evidence that information had reached Germany of the disposition of our Fleet, and other matters, and that somewhere in our midst were a number of spies, the safety of the realm demanded that tens of thousands of persons whose interests lay wholly

in the opposite direction, and who, as the police in whose books they were registered knew full well, were innocent of evil intent, should be torn from their families and their employment, and incarcerated in camps until the War was over.

Nothing more senseless or more cruel could be imagined, and the Government knew it. But they yielded to a certain extent, and for a little while internment took place wholesale of all sorts and conditions of Germans and Austrians between the ages of sixteen and forty-five. It did not last long. The extreme difficulty of finding accommodation for such prisoners, and perhaps quiet pressure from officials who had not lost their heads, soon began to tell, and very shortly the numbers began to fall off, and, apart from suspects and the cases of destitute single men, and any person who was found wandering about without a home, arrests ceased, and matters fell into their former groove.

But great harm had been done. In the first place, the agitators had gained a victory over officialdom. In the second place, a great number of families were rendered destitute, and the heads of those families, from being quiet and for the most part neutral-minded people, were rendered bitterly antagonistic


to British sentiment and British rule.

In the meantime through enlistment of able-bodied men, and the great need for industrial workers to supply the requirements of the Army, opportunities of employment soon began to open for Germans and Austrians who had been discharged when the War began, or who had been taken into camps. As a natural consequence, employers, who knew the quality of the men they had been forced to relinquish in deference to popular prejudice, began to take back old hands; while prisoners in camp asked for their discharge, so that they might once more maintain their families, who were either subsisting upon savings, or the selling of such little property or goods as they possessed, or being supported by the charity of wealthier countrymen or members of the British public still capable of compassion for one of an enemy's race.

With the view of eliminating those who might safely be at liberty, a large number of inquiries were, under the direction of the military authorities, made by the police, and those who were satisfactorily vouched for by British subjects and could

properly maintain themselves were released.

At once the storm arose again. The police were accused of acting as agents to procure work for 'enemies' to the detriment of honest British Labour, and bitter questions were put in Parliament. This time, however, the Government stood firm, and so far the latest attempt to harry the German has had no effect, though it remains to be seen whether employers of Germans will be persecuted in their turn, and fresh efforts made, especially in



Now, what is at the back of all this persecution? I believe it is wholly, and solely, ignorance and fear. I do not believe that the most violent advocate for universal internment of alien enemies is conscious of the wrong that he is doing to innocent persons and to his country's honour. He is simply possessed with the conviction that, unless he does harry and persecute and lay by the heels every German who can be laid hands upon, England is in danger. He has lost confidence, if he ever had any, in the power of the police to cope with the situation if any Germans are loose. He considers the Home Office to be a feeble satellite of the War Office, without courage, without knowledge, and without strength-a poor, anaemic, palsied department, with expediency written all over it, and principle-nowhere.

What are the facts?

The present writer, who has no more official connexion with the Home Secretary and his officials than the most stalwart of their critics, has taken some trouble to ascertain these facts, and, moreover, has, in a purely voluntary way, been closely associated with work undertaken for many years past for foreigners in distress in London of all nationalities. He ventures to submit the result for the consideration of the readers of this Review, in the hope that, whether or not fiction may still appeal to those who have been nourishing themselves upon it to such purpose, yet in the end the truth will reach the ears of those who are still able to give it a hearing, and through them, and the sense of justice and of right which all Englishmen cherish at the bottom of their hearts, ultimately prevail.

The facts are as follows: No sooner was war declared than the Home Office and War Office authorities met, and thrashed out in all its bearings the problem of how to detect and crush as far as possible espionage by Germans and Austrians and others on these shores; how to guard against incendiarism, and to prevent with a heavy hand the least danger of a rising of the

enemy within our gates in the event of an invasion.

The first problem was the toughest proposition of all-indeed, the only one worth mentioning, as things have turned out, for inquiries entered into at the time, and pursued carefully ever since, have shown that no organisation exists which could produce incendiarism. As for a rising upon invasion, those who know most tell us that the worst inclined of our alien enemies here-even the ubiquitous German waiter himself-when he is not a hungry and harmless servant of the eating public, which he generally is—is possessed with only one determination—namely that if his throat is not cut within an hour or so after the

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Germans have reached, we will say, Parliament Hill or Bromley in Kent—and he is pretty certain it will be—he will on the instant betake himself to the nearest and darkest cellar he can find, and there remain surrounded by solitude and coal-dust until der Tag is over for good and all.

But the spy—he was a different person altogether, and all the energy, knowledge, and force at the disposal of the Criminal Investigation Department at Scotland Yard, working in closest co-operation with the whole of the service throughout the country, were concentrated upon that gentleman and all his wiles

and possible activities.

It would not be desirable for obvious reasons to describe, or even indicate in the most general terms, the measures taken, first to discover and test the power of the espionage agencies at work among us, and then to circumvent them. Some day the story may be published. It will make good reading. All that can be said now is that the necessary measures were being taken many months before the outbreak of war, and that emergency legislation since the outbreak has greatly strengthened the hands of the Executive in dealing with the danger. This does not mean that all espionage was stopped, or that it does not go on still; indeed, it will presumably continue to do so to a certain extent while the War lasts. But it does mean that the supply of information reaching the enemy from registered Germans and Austrians is now practically negligible. It never was very great, and the eager spy-hunters in their hue and cry after the alien enemy have been following the wrong hare.

The real danger, there is reason to believe, lies in certain naturalised Germans, whose English citizenship preserves them from police control. And it is suggested that if it were possible to pass a law for such naturalised persons to be denaturalised during the period of the War, the police could grasp by the neck such espionage as still goes on and break its back. This must not be construed into a general accusation against naturalised Germans as a class. They are as a rule as loyal citizens as we have in this country. But there are a few who should be deprived of their citizenship at all costs, if espionage is to be stopped, and brought under the direct control and supervision of the police.

As to incendiarism, it has, I think, been stated by the Home Secretary in Parliament that no case has occurred of an alien enemy being found with a bomb or other weapon of like character in his possession. Nevertheless, as we all know, thanks largely to Sir Edward Ward and his Special Constables, public buildings, bridges, railway stations, centres of electrical supply, gasworks, reservoirs, etc., are guarded day and night, while the

utmost care is exercised to keep watch upon the movements of alien enemies, or naturalised ones for that matter, who for any cause show a disposition to congregate together.

The consideration of our police for the alien enemy, however, has not been limited to the detection of espionage and the prevention of incendiarism. In London the congregation of such persons is so enormous that to have examined every individual through the organisation of the police alone would have been practically impossible—at least within any reasonable time. Yet it had to be done, not only to protect the public but for the protection of the majority of the alien enemies themselves.

The difficulty was surmounted by an expedient at once effective and humane. It was known that large numbers of these 'alien enemies'—though technically German and Austrian subjects—were in feeling as antagonistic to German rule as the Allies themselves. Among them were Serbs, Alsatians, Greeks, Poles, Polish Jews, Czechs, Armenians, and Italians. The Commissioner of Police appointed for each of these races a responsible person or committee of compatriots, who, acting for him, conducted all necessary investigations. This system has proved successful. Every suspicious case was tracked out and dealt with, and the rest insured immunity from police interference subject to continuance of good behaviour.

The security of the country having been provided for as far as possible against espionage and incendiarism from ill-disposed alien enemies, the Government turned its attention to the other side of the problem—a side which the public in general, and our 'eave 'arf a brick at 'im' gentlemen in particular, do not appear

to have considered at all.

This was to arrange for relieving the distress and ameliorating as far as possible the sufferings of the innocent alien enemy brought to ruin by the War—and who, if he were driven to desperation by the sight of his starving family, would obviously become a menace and danger far greater than the professional spy to the community which had callously visited the sins of his brethren upon his unfortunate head.

The condition of these people has been truly pitiable, and it would only be necessary for those writers in the Press who exhaust so much good ink and English in diatribes against the Government and the police for their 'criminal leniency to German rats,' to make personal investigation among the homes of the 'rats,'—for such writers are naturally as kind-hearted and fair-minded Englishmen as ever lived—to feel a compassion for these victims of the War, and when they take up their pens again to tell quite another story.

I repeat, and must do so ad nauseam, that the root of all the misunderstanding which has grown up over this matter is

ignorance-plain, naked ignorance of facts.

But the Government knew the facts and so did those who had been dealing with distressed foreigners for years before the War; and while, through popular prejudice and the Press campaign which followed it, great and undeserved injury has been done to thousands of well-behaved and well-intentioned German and Austrian residents in England, no alien enemy has been reduced to starvation or beggary. This has been prevented by the exertions of private philanthropic agencies, though working under difficulties which are strange indeed in this land of charity, and the German and Austrian Governments acting through the American Embassy, and, when private resources began to fail, by the British Government itself.

The Government, however, though it took no action to provide directly for relief of the distressed families of German subjects until November, formed soon after war was declared what was called 'The Destitute Aliens Committee.' This Committee was appointed by the Home Secretary for the following purposes:

(i) To arrange for the repatriation of destitute aliens, especially alien enemies, not being persons fit for military service, or suspects.

(ii) To co-operate with charitable societies relieving destitute aliens

and to guide and control their operations.

(iii) To organise (in co-operation with the authorities concerned) any special arrangements which may be necessary for the accommodation and maintenance of destitute aliens.

(iv) Generally to deal with questions arising from time to time as to the relief and assistance of destitute aliens, which may be referred to them by the Home Office, War Office, or Local Government Board.

The members of the Committee are the following:

Sir William Byrne, K.C.V.O., C.B. (Chairman).

John Pedder, Esq., C.B., Assistant Secretary, Home Office.

A. B. Lowry, Esq., Chief Inspector, Local Government Board.

The Hon, F. T. Bigham, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police. Major Horwood, War Office.

Edgar Seligman, Esq.

R. S. Meiklejohn, Esq., C.B., The Treasury.

John Lamb, Esq., Assistant Under Secretary, Scottish Office.

E. Sebag-Montefiore, Esq.

The formation of a body so powerfully representative, and presided over by so distinguished a public servant as Sir William Byrne, to 'deal with questions arising from time to time as to the relief and assistance of destitute aliens' showed that our Government and the Minister responsible for home affairs fully grasped the need for a humane and consistent policy on the part of the nation to be pursued in regard to all aliens, regardless of nationality, suffering through the War. No report of the work that has been accomplished by the Committee has yet been published, but all who have been directly concerned with the relief of distress among foreigners since August have had free access to its officials, and received wise counsel and unswerving sympathy.

The functions of the Committee are primarily of an advisory character; but as a means of direct communication between unofficial agencies and the executive authorities, a centre of information and consultation, and a powerful lever in bringing about co-ordination and united effort among the legion of separate forces at work on behalf of the infinite variety and confusion of aliens in our midst, it has a part to play second to none in importance in assuring peace, order—and safety also—within the shores of this country, which, it must not be forgotten, has been an asylum for generations of the poorer class of alien races.

We have now to review that side of our subject to which we would draw the particular attention of the band of patriots who helped to force the hand of the authorities, and succeeded in cutting off the livelihood of a great number of alien enemies furthest removed from anything resembling a spy or an

incendiary.

It must be a very brief review for reasons of space, and no attempt can be made to do justice to the service and self-sacrifice which, without sympathy or support from the public Press, and even under comments which are the reverse of encouraging or complimentary, is being given untiringly not only by English men and women, side by side with Germans and Austrians eager to help their distressed compatriots, but by French and Russians, Italians and Scandinavians, united together and with the full knowledge and countenance of the Government, the military, and the police, succouring aliens in distress without distinction of race, creed, or nationality.

The work began in August. On the 21st of that month, while the armies of the Allies were coming to grips with Germany and Austria, a number of people, each representative in a distinctive way of one of the belligerent nations, and of nearly all the neutrals in Europe, met at the invitation of the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress at the Society's office, 68 Finsbury Pavement, E.C. This conference entered into a solemn covenant to form a 'Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies,' to procure and administer funds upon a plan approved by the Home Office 'by which aliens of every nationality, class, and creed will be dealt with impartially and according

to their need by those who know them best, and under the superintendence of a joint representative Committee to be responsible for the expenditure.'


The joint representative Committee elected as Chairman an Englishman, Sir Frederick Robertson, and another Englishman as Vice-Chairman, and appointed the staff of the Society of Friends of Foreigners—all English men and women—to be responsible under the Committee for the administration of the funds. The Committee itself is representative of all the nations involved in the War.

An appeal to the public on behalf of the Council received instant response, and up to this date the sum of 16,000l. has been expended. The responsibility of the Council was national to commence with, as no other organised movement had been set on foot; but, through relief given by the American Embassy on behalf of the German Government, and action by our own Government in relief of English wives and families of interned Germans, it is now chiefly metropolitan. The applications at the office from alien enemies averaged at first some 200 a day, and the staff, though rapidly augmented by a large number of capable volunteers, worked literally day and night to register, sift, and investigate the claims. The needs of the French, Russian, Italian, and other nationalities were not overlooked. There were National Societies established to help distressed foreigners of these nations, each of which received substantial grants from the fund to aid their work.

But the distress of Germans and Austrians has been, and still remains, the chief concern of the Council, and from German firms, and wealthy German families, comes the bulk of the money needed for the work. What this work involves may be realised when it is stated that the average weekly relief bill for some months past has been 700l. to 1000l., and that fifty-seven voluntary visitors and workers, in addition to an efficient paid staff, are engaged in dealing with the 1500 families who are now receiving weekly subsistence.

The point which needs emphasis here, if the full significance of this movement is to be realised by the public in this and in other countries, is that the administration, as already stated, is in British hands, and that the Committee and Council responsible for the whole undertaking are cosmopolitan in the widest sense. Among the directors who actively assist the Chairman and Vice-Chairman in examination of 'cases' and the details of management, are the representatives of the Russian, the French, and the Italian Societies.

There is nothing new under the sun. This War, and every-



This fact is brought home to all who are taking part in relieving the distress of alien enemies to-day. The Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress, which instituted this 'Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies,' and has given all its strength to make this great union of forces a success, came into existence in 1806; and, supported by Royalty, and the greatest in the land, its first President a Prince of the Blood, its second the Duke of Wellington, had become before Waterloo was won a fully established British institution.

will.

The tale contains a moral. The records of the S.F.F.D. were kept from the beginning with great care, and it is clear that all through those early years, when the country was exhausted by a great war, and the strain was at its height, and bitterness against the French unspeakable, the British public of that day, led by King George the Third, contributed freely to funds which, as the Minutes show, afterwards signed by the Duke himself, were most frequently used in relieving the necessities of French merchants who had lost their all at the hands of English privateers.

A French mariner 'of excellent character' was saved from starvation, and set up in business. Mark that! Three French Catholic priests were pensioned. Where was our patriotic Press? And how sadly wanting in discrimination were those potentates of Europe: the Emperor of Russia, who gave the Society 1000l.; the King of Prussia, who gave 500l.; not to mention persons of note, such as Talleyrand and Marshal Blücher, whose names are to be seen inscribed in the Society's Autograph Book in 1814.

The Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies can claim no such patronage, and its cases are less romantic than merchants and mariners robbed by sea pirates, but the same spirit is there, and it may not be amiss to quote one or two of the cases helped to-day:

(A) A widow, German, sixty-two years old, forty-two years in England; four sons serving in the British Army. Her work all lost through the war.

(B) A cabman. German by nationality, but came to England at twelve months old forty-five years ago. Wife and five children in the greatest destitution.

Note.—The man could not even speak German, yet his licence had been withdrawn and no one would employ him.

Incidentally, also, the Council has been of service in quite another fashion. C. was a person who represented himself to be one of the innocent and unfortunate. Investigation proved him to have been in receipt of monthly remittances from Germany, to have a great fondness for our naval dockyards, and a character which was the reverse of satisfactory. He is now in camp.

The Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies is not the only Society engaged in work among alien enemies. But space has been given to its operations, as it is the largest, and the doings of the lesser bodies are much of the same character.

These include 'the Emergency Committee for the Assistance of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians in Distress' (convened by the Religious Society of Friends) and the National Societies, French, Russian, Italian, Scandinavian, German, and Austrian, represented upon the Central Council and working with

it in close co-operation.

The Council has also representatives from the Jewish Board of Guardians, the German Farm Colony, the International Women's Relief Committee—from which Society a large number of its visitors and voluntary workers are drawn—the Young Women's Christian Association, and the Charity Organisation Society. The Central Bureau of Foreign Benevolent Societies (a central agency for inquiry and registration of aliens in distress), which was initiated in 1903 by the Social Welfare Association for London (then the City Council for Organisation of Charity) also has a place on the Council. The King Edward the Seventh British German Foundation, besides being represented, gives generous assistance by making itself responsible for aiding Germans of superior class who have fallen into indigence owing to the War.

Thus through this Council, apart from all Government action, a united movement is in being, where no 'alien enemies' are known, but only persons who are of foreign birth or nationality and needing aid, and where all who have money or time to serve join together—English and German, French and Austrian, side by side, and hand to hand, to see that all is done aright

and in good order.

It remains only to mention the work of the American Embassy, and our own relief authorities. The former has received funds from both the German and Austrian Governments, with which, acting through the German Society of Benevolence on the one hand, and the Austro-Hungarian Emergency Committee on the other, it relieves (a) the wives and families in England of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians fighting for their country; (b) the German or Austrian wives and families of men interned in British concentration camps. The Central Council of United Alien Relief Societies has by arrangement

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made itself responsible for the relief of destitute or distressed Germans who are not interned, and their wives and families.

The British Government has, since November, instructed the Boards of Guardians to relieve, on a special scale and quite separately from ordinary cases of destitute English persons, all necessitous British-born wives and children of interned Germans and Austrians.

The volume of assistance available for alien enemies reduced to distress or rendered destitute by the War is now considerable, and while, as has been already stated, the greater part of the money has been contributed by wealthy Germans and Austrians here, or those who are naturalised British subjects only, yet since the personal service is mostly English, and the responsibility of administration wholly theirs, this country may claim that in action, if not always in speech, it has done some justice to the distressed enemy within its gates. What is needed to secure full justice, and to enable our country to show all neutral nations and posterity that in the end it will do its duty towards enemies within its shores, in spite of unprecedented provocation and strain from without, is that the unworthy agitation against employment of Germans and Austrians where they may work without harm to others shall cease; and that in war, as in peace time, all men on British ground who live soberly, honestly, and inoffensively, shall pursue their avocations unmolested, no matter what their nationality may be, assured of the fair treatment which has never before been withheld from any man living under the protection of the British flag.

ARTHUR PATERSON.

## GERMANY IN PEACE AND IN WAR:

## A GLIMPSE FROM WITHIN

The best-hated man in Germany to-day is not Mr. Asquith or Sir Edward Grey. It is our late wise and patriotic sovereign, King Edward. One notices the animosity of tone with which even temperate and broad-minded persons speak of 'der Eduard.' The advent of the present war is attributed to his policy. A personal antipathy on his part towards the Kaiser is generally believed to have existed. As a natural consequence of the imperfect conception of constitutionalism which exists in Germany there is generally a tendency amongst Germans somewhat to exaggerate the power of the Sovereign in other countries.

All who have followed even slightly the course of German politics in recent years will have noticed occasions on which marked protest has been made in the Reichstag against instances of autocratic action by the Kaiser. Such protests have generally not prevented a large section of Germans from heartily approving and supporting the Kaiser's conduct. Amongst that large class in Germany whose sympathies are conservative there are a very great number who really prefer personal government by the Emperor to any strict regard to constitutionalism.

Such a disposition seems to the inhabitants of many modern States reactionary. But for a large part of the German nation it is merely a survival of the conception of the 'Fürsten,' or heads of the smaller German States, which existed in such great numbers and varying sizes down to almost microscopic diminutiveness till many years after the beginning of last century. is a kind of feeling which we cannot understand in England, and the repeated display of it by Germans can scarcely fail to excite in many of us more democratic Britons a sense of irritation. There are still so many States, each with its little idol, including even Schaumburg-Lippe, which is not quite half the size of Huntingdonshire. That the present Emperor himself, as King of Prussia, has a conception of the office of Constitutional Sovereign very different from that which has long prevailed here . is shown if only by many of his numerous speeches, which teem with the words 'I' and 'my grandfather.' To the personal

virtue of these personalities or their forebears are attributed all the benefits which have been attained, and if statesmen had any part in their attainment they had it, as all perfect statesmen must realise, not by any authorship of their own, but as the instruments of their Sovereign.

The German has two separate forms of allegiance, that to his State and that to the Empire. Evidently the feeling for the State used, not very many years ago, to be even greater than it is, because Bismarck emphatically expressed a conviction that, with the individual German, State allegiance was a much stronger personal feeling than the common German allegiance. Probably many would hesitate to assert this now. One may have often puzzled one's self over the question as to which feeling is stronger, and have put it to Germans, only to receive the tantalising answer 'We have both feelings.' Anyhow, the feeling towards the Prince of the State is still strong, and great part of what it may have lost since the establishment of the Empire is carried over into much the same kind of personal feeling towards the Emperor.

Striking, too, is the manner in which the essential idea of an empire has revived in Germany amongst the Princes themselves and all the scions of the princely families with greater vigour and cohesion than it possessed in the centuries of its historic period as 'the Empire.' This War has shown amongst them a complete loyalty to the Imperial leadership, a feeling which the present Emperor is not prevented by any confusion of modesty from constantly emphasising. A young scion of the reigning family of Saxe-Meiningen was killed at the battle of Maubeuge, upon whom were found written words of appreciation of the fact of dying for 'his Emperor.' The example of the reigning houses, which are so influential in their own dominions, excites the feelings of their subjects in the same direction.

Since Germany made war the Emperor appears to enjoy a measure of universal popularity such as he had never enjoyed before. This seems to be so not only in all the States but also amongst all the political parties throughout the Empire. In the early days of the war the Emperor followed up his words to the Reichstag, that 'He knew no longer any parties but only Germans,' by an appeal to representatives of each party to display their loyal support by coming forward and putting their hands in his.

The Social Democrats seem to have abstained from this particular display of loyalty. A statement that they had taken part in it, which was made as a charge against them at an International Socialist Congress held in Italy in September, was strenuously denied by a Social Democratic deputy. The latter

had appeared before the Congress in order to defend the conduct of his party, but their action in supporting a war which was, amidst other condemnations of it, denounced as the 'torturing'

of Belgium, was unanimously censured.

The solidarity of all parties, including the Social Democrats, in support of the War caused general satisfaction throughout Germany, just as the solidarity of parties here caused dissatisfaction and disappointment there. Inasmuch as there was no crisis in Germany at the time the instantaneous display of union here was so much the more admirable than that displayed there, just as it was also the frustration of certain calculations made by the Emperor and his Government in originating the War.

One finds occasionally here expressions of an opinion that, when the German nation comes to understand aright the causation of the War, there will be a reversion of national feeling gravely prejudicial to the German arms. The answer seems to be that as long as the War lasts, and probably for, at least, a long time afterwards, the nation will not come to perceive aright the causation of the War. The belief that they have been forced into war by wicked aggressors and conspirators has been so cleverly instilled into the minds of the nation by the Government, the Press, and the multiform war party, and, their patriotism being thus challenged, national feeling has sunk so deep, that no attempt at their enlightenment by impartial statement or disclosure of suppressed documents carries with it the remotest prospect of success. The Emperor is regarded as the champion of German national existence and the spokesman of present national feeling, and the nation never seemed in less danger of a revolution.

One can never foretell what may be the effect of some calamitous defeat upon any nation at war. But to the opinion sometimes expressed here that the realisation of defeat, when it can no longer be prevented, will probably bring about a revolution in Germany, the answer seems to be the same as that to the first opinion. As the German people have been convinced that they are fighting a great defensive war in preservation of their national existence, no knowledge of defeat is likely to lead them to anticipate their own destruction by the suicidal act of revolution. Only subjugation itself, strenuous as the task must be, can achieve the end which Germany herself has rendered essential to her adversaries if they are to live securely, and if Europe is to have some chance of a long spell of peace. To stop short of such a conclusion would seem a pitiable waste of heroic effort, suffering, and death.

In order to attain this conclusion it would not seem to be necessary that united Germany should be undone. To divide

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again and to keep divided a populous nation so intent on union would be an impossible task even if it were desirable. But it might well be desirable, if it should be found to be enforceable, that the leadership of united Germany should be removed from the kingdom of Prussia. Such a measure would be sure to meet with fierce opposition not only in Prussia herself but also in other parts of Germany. There is no other German State at all comparable with Prussia in position, power, or territory. But, on the other hand, there is none so imbued with ambition and with an aggressive spirit of superiority, prompting to general domination. Prussia is the fountain-head of all in Germany that is offensive and menacing to other nationalities, and it is an unfortunate thing that the arrogant spirit of the Prussian people fits in so closely with the overweening arrogance of their reigning house.

Prussia would have to be shorn first not only of Posen but of other provinces, including, most probably, Westphalia and the Rhine Province, where certain proportions of the population, especially after the exhaustion of a long war, would probably show little opposition to a separation from Prussia.

One may venture to anticipate a like condition amongst certain proportions in Hanover. Though the bulk of the present population there would probably be opposed to separation from Prussia, there is still a Guelph party which has some few adherents and returns a handful of deputies to the Reichstag. The Duke of Cumberland, the son of the late King of Hanover, who was dispossessed on account of having sided with Austria in the war of 1866 between that country and Prussia, when Pressia also annexed the kingdom, has not renounced his rights. His sole surviving son married the Emperor's only daughter in 1913, and later in the same year the Duchy of Brunswick, the right of succession to which had in 1884 fallen to his father, who was prevented by his claim to Hanover from assuming possession, was handed over to him. Meanwhile, the Chauvinistic German Crown Prince had entered a protest on the ground that his brother-in-law had not renounced his claim of succession to the Kingdom of Hanover. The latter has never formally renounced that claim. But having, on the occasion of his reconciliation with Prussia, exchanged from the Bavarian into the Prussian Army, he wrote a letter, subsequently made public, to the German Chancellor, in which he referred to that fact as also to the fact that he had in like time taken the oath of Before his official entry into Brunswick he signed a patent agreeing to observe the constitution of the Duchy and to 'stand in unshakeable loyalty to the Empire and its august head.' Thus he seems to be considered to have impliedly re-

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nounced his rights in respect of Hanover, and the Crown Prince desisted from his objection.

Save, perhaps, for the last-mentioned circumstance, assuming that the Imperial Crown were to be transferred from Prussia to some other German State, possibly the most suitable candidate for it would be a restored King of Hanover. By the fact of his position of protest towards Prussia having remained quite outside the German Empire and its affairs, residing in Austria, the Duke of Cumberland personally would not be open to the invidiousness which might attach to the acceptance of the Imperial Crown by the Sovereign of any German State which had in 1871 subscribed to the constitution of the German Empire under a Hohenzollern King of Prussia as Emperor. His position, too, as a son and successor of a German King who had reigned in Hanover would be a better qualification than that of a Sovereign whose position was below that of King. Moreover, he and his family are Protestant, and Hanover also is preponderatingly Protestant. As about two thirds of the population of the Empire are Protestant, the Imperial Crown could scarcely be conferred on a Catholic Sovereign. Of the three actual Kings within the Empire other than the King of Prussia, two-the King of Bavaria and the King of Saxony-are Catholics; while, on the death of the third, the King of Würtemberg, who is already an old man, his Kingdom passes to a Catholic heir belonging to a Catholic line.

But these last observations belong to the category of highly Anticipating, as we must, the most speculative reflexions. abundant measure of victory for the Allies, vet the re-casting of Germany from outside would be to-day a far more prodigious task than it was even in the days of Napoleon.

Of all the States in the Empire, distinctly the most individual is Bavaria. Though its population is only about one sixth of that of Prussia, it is the next largest after the latter in both population and territory. It is the only one which has kept its own post-office, and even in the military sphere it has preserved a larger measure of apartness. It is the only State where both the reigning house and the majority of the inhabitants are Roman Catholic. Both entertain feelings of kindly fellowship towards Austria. But, notwithstanding their lack of sympathy with the North German character, the Bavarians are whole-hearted constituents of the Empire.

Amongst the majority of the Bavarian peasantry the sense of dynastic loyalty is entirely to their own reigning house, and very strong it is too. The Wittelsbachs have a firm hold on the affections of their subjects, and their influence is great. old Regent Luitpold, who died a couple of years ago, was wonderfully esteemed and beloved. His son, the present old King Louis, is also very popular. He is a convinced upholder of religion, whereas his son, Crown Prince Rupert, is believed on this point to be contrarily disposed.

Both father and son, however, agree in loyalty to the German Empire. At the outbreak of the War the King of Bavaria was foremost amongst German rulers in expressions of imperial patriotism, and he was said to have cheerfully greeted the news of our declaration of War with the words 'One enemy more.' The son's temper is already well known, and the fact that he is regarded by some Legitimists in this country as de jure heir to the throne of Great Britain and Ireland 'seems to have availed nothing to stem his fury against this country in the War.

In this common German sense as regards the War the Bavarian people seem to be in agreement with their rulers. Stray statements to the contrary which have appeared in the Press here seem to have no foundation. With all their Southern easiness the Bavarians show no lack of discipline, and the Bavarian official is little, if at all, less exact than the Prussian. Like as it is in many other respects to German-speaking Austria, Bavaria has nothing of that slovenliness which is such a provoking feature of Austria: that slovenliness which the latter country shows, for instance, to such an uncomfortable degree in its railway administration.

Germany presents a strange blending of two conditions which, at first sight, are generally thought to be conflicting. We have considered the deferential regard shown to the reigning Princes and the peculiarly exalted position held by the Emperor. Side by side there is, especially in Prussia, a large measure of what may be called Socialism. Between the two there is a far scantier conception of individual freedom than that which has come to be almost part of our nature here. A distinguished Frenchman of last century remarked that Prussia was one huge garrison. In great part it is so. The other part consists of officialdom. What is not absorbed by the Army is absorbed by the State.

But these facts must not lead us to the sadly wrong conclusion that the German character is wanting in vigour or in initiative. The reverse is the case. Their commercial enterprise is well known to us. Even in national matters much voluntary energy is shown. There is the Boy Scout movement, and for years we have been hearing of the Navy League for the enlargement of the Navy, of which Prince Salm was the leading spirit.

The fact seems to be that their existing form of government

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Crown Prince's mother, the present Queen of Bavaria, is an Archduchess of Austria, and belongs to the line Este-Modena. She is a descendant of Henrietta, Duchess of Orleans, daughter of Charles the First.

suits on the whole the spirit of the nation, at least in its present stage, and that it fits in with its abilities and its strivings. On one occasion a few years ago, crossing the Belgian frontier from Germany, a young Westphalian, who had been living for over a year in Belgium, spoke of the number of German blackguards and wastrels who took refuge across the border. Upon my asking him whether he preferred living under the Prussian system of supervision to living under the more easy-going Belgian régime, he answered emphatically that he preferred the former.

Where this highly organised system suits the character of a nation the whole presents to the world outside a very effective contrivance of power. We are becoming accustomed in this country to the statement that, because the German Army is a conscript one, a good deal of its moral fighting worth must be discounted. But to most people who know Germany such statements sound rather surprising, and one cannot help a surmise that the authors of them are inferring rather from premises the general truth of which we all admit, than from personal knowledge of the German nation or German soldiers. For my own part, having been, as a youth, at a German University, and at the same time in a garrison town, and having been frequently in Germany since then; having often discussed national matters, characteristics and politics with intelligent, wellinformed friends; and having for nearly two months last year seen the nation in time of war, and talked with many out of hundreds of wounded soldiers in the district where I was detained, I can detect little foundation for these statements.

These wounded soldiers, the majority of whom had been only slightly wounded, represented practically all parts of Germany except Bavaria. They represented the mechanics, peasant proprietors, agricultural and general labourers, artisans, factory hands, innkeepers, and small storekeepers, etc., of Germany. Just because their nation is at war with us it is better to state and to realise that they were, on the whole, well set up, that they were remarkably cheerful, had plenty of spirits, and, as far as one could judge, had the personal spring of the normal, healthy man; and that they in no way resembled 'slaves.' Neither their appearance nor their demeanour presented the slightest trace of coercion. While in that locality they seemed well behaved, and one saw no drunkenness. As far as one could judge, the young women of the place did not seem to make any set upon them. Perhaps one of the advantages of conscription is that, as soldiering is part of the general duty of the inhabitants, it does not cause any strange commotion in their lives. One inferred that the local population was a moral one, because one saw no indications to the contrary, and it certainly appeared to be a religious one, a special earnestness in this latter sphere being seemingly developed by the fact of the War.

Of course, women from outside would not have been allowed to forgather in the locality, attracted thereto by the presence of the soldiers. With their usual thoroughness, the German authorities take stringent measures to obviate loss or deterioration through this particular channel. In Berlin in the early part of September, in view of an intended large transport of troops through the city, almost alarmingly large precautionary powers were given to the police. Any woman in the streets, restaurants, or any public place, whose appearance or demeanour was suggestive of courtesanship, was liable to instant arrest.

Amongst the fairly long list of regulations prescribed for these soldiers there were provisions against entering public-houses or the dwellings of any of the townspeople other than those in which the soldiers entering were actually quartered, and all were re-

quired to be in their quarters by 9 P.M. each evening.

Conversation with them generally bore out the impression which their appearance made. Many of them showed eagerness to get back to the Front. Conversation with one in particular, a young man belonging to the middle class, who had served, as all those belonging to that or the upper class who have attained a certain standard of education are merely bound to do, only one year, gave an interesting insight into many points. One statement, if accurate, would certainly go to show that there was no lack of initiative amongst the troops. He said that for every emergent assault a spontaneously constituted leader was invariably found: if it were not an officer, there would be a noncommissioned officer, or even one of the men, ready at the spur of the moment to call upon the others to follow him.

Before dismissing the soldiers I should like to say a word of comparison of them with volunteers casually seen in the streets of London. The latter are a considerably superior type in bearing and general demeanour. Certain things must be borne in mind. First, the general level, in the various grades of the classes above that of the labourer, of what one may, for want of a better word, call 'decency' in bearing, manners and ordinary social behaviour, is immeasurably higher in England than it is in Germany. Secondly, the splendid volunteering which we have witnessed has been proportionately larger from those classes than from the labourers, or even artisans. Thirdly, in England we have no peasant class, whereas in Germany the peasantry is almost the backbone of the country; and, fourthly, the Germans are not physically and athletically developed as are the English. They have not played games and are not as agile.

No one denies that in everything in life voluntary effort, if

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
abundant, is preferable. Doubtless there are many arguments which one may urge against compulsory service. But do not let us base any argument on any false belief or assumption that the German army is less efficient because it is conscript, thereby overlooking the fact that it is a citizen army consisting of sons, husbands, and fathers who feel that they are fighting for their homes and common country, and regard it as unpatriotic in the manhood of any country not to be trained and ready to fight for its defence. Much as we may dislike militarism, we cannot aspire to crush it by mere civilianism; we cannot hope to keep it in check without the support of fighting men.

As long as a nation is in accord with a system of militarism and officialdom, as the bulk of the Germans are, the more deadly foe it is to other nations. We find German firms and individuals pursuing some set course like a planet, and this even away from their own country and its government. One occasionally hears people in England say that the Germans have more patriotism than the English. For my part I do not admit that for a moment, and I am strongly disposed to think that in many ways they have less. There is amongst the English a greater love of the soil of their native land, its social life, and its ways than one finds for the like objects amongst the Germans, who are often eager to adopt the social life and ways of this country or America. But there is this amongst a large proportion of Germans—a quality very different from patriotism—a joint spirit of aggrandisement, a common quest of benefit at the expense of others. Therefore when we consider the militarism and officialdom in Germany, do not let us underrate their value by failing to gauge them in their relationship to what exists there. There exists between Emperor, Government, and the prevailing elements in the nation a conspiracy of domination and aggrandisement.

This has probably struck many persons who for years past have had occasion to hear educated Prussians talk. Some sixteen years ago I chanced to see a letter in a German newspaper, from nobody in particular, headed 'Deutschland über Alles,' which expounded these words by foretelling the eventual conquest of England by Germany and the complete supremacy of the German To instance an unknown writer to a newspaper may seem worthless, but the point is rather that no letter conceived in such a spirit could ever have found publication in a British journal, except possibly in the Lancet, as an interesting illustration of a

peculiar form of lunacy.

How the Germans have for years envisaged this country is perhaps now better realised. The Government have, as shown by their publication dated October 9, been quite alive for years to the fact that the German Secret Intelligence Department was



There is really no analogy between English residency in Germany and German residency in England. English people have never come to play the same part in German life that Germans have played in ours. We have never taken possession of Germany to the same extent that Germans have taken possession of England. The system in their country of control of the movements of the population and of obligatory police notification of all new arrivals in any locality has been unknown here. The naturalisation of Germans in England has been greater than that of English in Germany. Moreover, that, to any extent worth speaking of, English spying has been carried on in Germany is not even alleged there. And we know what a detestably large part it plays in German methods.

A book published in 1913 by Germans in England, in their own language, entitled *The German Colony in England*, gives us some illustration of the remarkable fulness of German life in this country.

An introduction by way of a 'History of the Germans in England' says:

The different articles (i.e. contained in the book) will show that the national consciousness amongst the Germans of London and of England is again striking deeper currents. Since the foundation of the Empire profound developments have completed themselves in the relations of the Germans abroad to the Empire, and not the least cause of this is the energy of the ruler (i.e. the present Emperor) who represents the nation of which we are the sons and daughters.

One of the most interesting of the articles which illustrate the movement referred to is that which describes 'The German Navy League of London.' We are told that the League was founded on the anniversary of the Emperor's birthday, January 27, 1900, on the suggestion of the then Consul-General in London, by Dr. E. Crüsemann, and that it belongs to the Central Association of German Navy Leagues in foreign parts, which stands independently by the side of that formed within the Empire. The article tells us that:

Unfortunately the London Navy League is a good deal kept back within the circles of the German Colony—a fact due merely to ignorance of its life and aims. It is imagined that it is a league whose aims are directed against England. But really nothing could be further from the truth.

A national league of men for whom their German nationality stands above everything—that is what the German Navy League is, and it stands for our Emperor's words: 'Germany's future lies upon the water.'

We have, moreover, mention of the 'Glasgow Navy League,' founded in 1899, and counting from 130 to 140 members.

The book records the foundation, made in 1913, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Emperor's accession, of 'The Imperial Jubilee Fund of Germans in England.' It sets out the appeal made for the purpose, which states that it is

a foundation for charitable and mutually beneficial purposes. The Committee, whose names are signed below, has therefore resolved to make a collection from Germans resident in the United Kingdom, as also from all those who, by reason of birth, descent, upbringing, or other bonds, are united to the German home country. . . . The German Colony in Great Britain and Ireland has as yet never missed an opportunity of making known its love for the Fatherland and its respectful attachment to the exalted personage who stands at its head. It will also show itself worthy of the present memorable occasion.

There follow the names of the Committee: Patron, Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador. Chairman, Baron Bruno von Schröder, and Vice-Presidents, whose names include those of the 'Right Honourable Sir Edgar Speyer, Bart.' and 'Sir Carl

Meyer, Bart.'

We reverence even in a war of life or death the charter of the liberty of everyone who has the status of a British citizen, and we cling jealously to the principles of constitutional rights, the precious adjuncts of existence within the British Empire, justly only less to be cherished than that existence itself. There are special present provisions dealing with a class, such that all persons who come within it are subjected to certain restrictions, even though some amongst them are less likely to be harmfully disposed than others who are outside the class. For instance, though the English widow of a German comes under the restrictions, the German widow of an Englishman comes under none. It may be answered that there must be general laws. But that answer does not seem to be appropriate to an exceptional time like that of war, when the only object is the temporary safeguarding from danger from any quarter. Consequently, if the restrictions afford any real safeguard, one might expect to see them applied also wherever else circumstances are known to exist which are at least equally likely to cause a predisposition in favour of the enemy.

We have before us the example of Belgium, where for years Germans in their many thousands, notably the rich and influential, have resided with baneful result to the existence of the kingdom. That one can seriously regard naturalisation as making such a difference as to constitute a sufficient safeguard seems like the arrogation to it of the nature of a sacrament which by some invisible operation transforms the soul. It is argued by some that the fact of having settled here and having been in a friendly manner admitted to a share in the life of the country must necessarily predispose the persons upon whom such treatment has been bestowed to benevolence or, at least, absence of hostility towards this country. This argument seems to ignore the feelings which must necessarily be excited in such persons by a present environment of hard truths and indignation and well-founded animosity towards their country. Feelings being subjective matters, the present has immeasurably greater influence than any past no matter how long or how friendly. Nothing is more stimulating to patriotism than finding yourself in a country with which your own is at war.

It would be hard to transmit the impression received by the person coming from Germany to England since the beginning of the War. The difference was startling, so that one could scarcely escape the thought that great part of the population here did not realise the difficulties, seriousness, or hugeness of the war in which they were engaged, nor the quality nor temper of their foe. That on their side the German population did realise the gravity of the War had been abundantly evident. Their perception of it produced no panic, but on the contrary a keener vitality and determination, which expressed themselves in many ways. Where I happened to be detained, the bulk of the manhood of the place having been called up, each morning for a period during the holidays the children were summoned to the school and told off to help throughout the day, in field or housework, those families who needed help.

One heard many there say that it was a war in which their existence was at stake. The population here might have said the same if they had realised the strength of the enemy and the intensity of the struggle, and the realisation might have resulted in still further expressions of activity throughout the country.

As regards official control, in one instance only did one see here a close likeness to Germany at war, namely, in the, perhaps, not sufficiently valued secrecy—a quality to which the German headquarters' staff in the West, in an official despatch, attributed much of their early success. This spirit of reticence guided not only the publication of news to the public but also the tidings of individuals in the field.

Otherwise it was very different from Germany, where every detail was strenuously directed to the deadly combat in which the nation was engaged. Within a couple of hours of our declaration of war becoming known in the locality, my room and all things in

it were searched by the police in the presence of the magistrate, one of whose officials, though, perhaps, without his knowledge, kept me away while the search was being made. A like search was made in the case of a born German, domiciled and naturalised in Austria, very shortly after his arrival in the place. Urgent personal instructions which I had written in English on a postcard were required to be re-written and despatched in German. No language but German was allowed to be spoken on the telephone. Yet both magistrate and postmaster uniformly showed great civility; and if one happened to make any comment the answer was 'But this is war time.' Coblenz was cleared at twenty-four hours' notice of every non-German, and if any such had been found in the place after that time he would have run a risk of the extreme penalty. A German correspondent to a German newspaper told how he had ventured to visit the naval station at Cuxhaven, and how he had been advised by a kindly inhabitant to leave without delay lest he might be shot, and had duly followed the advice.

When one had breathed the last of the captive air of Prussia and had shaken oneself free of the braggart frontier officer, who affected to speak in pitying tones of a few British regiments opposed to a 'trained' army, and declared that his country's navy would soon come out of her corner, being assured in reply that the coming out of his navy would be cordially fêted by ours, one began to speculate feverishly on a momentous question as England grew nearer. Anybody can guess what it was: Would conscription have been introduced?

R. S. NOLAN.

## IS LOGIC EFFETE? A CRITICISM

In the February issue of the Nineteenth Century Dr. Mercier has given its readers an amusing paper on 'Logic and Science.' How far he is poking fun at his readers, or how far the nonsense he writes is due to ignorance and confusion of thought is difficult to decide. His article begins by an assault on an article which has appeared, it seems, in the Quarterly Review, entitled 'The Logic of Thought and the Logic of Science.' As the writer is a logician, this fact gives Dr. Mercier the occasion to deny to logicians the power of accurately expressing their meaning. With the scope and conclusions of that article we have nothing to do; the writer of it will no doubt be amply able to defend himself so far as he is involved in the present discussion. Professor Karl Pearson will also doubtless be quite capable of rebutting the accusation that he believes science to be merely statistics.

The fun Dr. Mercier pours on the common ideas of what science is and does, is very excellent fooling. Yet perhaps he will pardon the humble individual at present writing, for suggesting that there is in Dr. Mercier's mind a certain confusion as to the province of Science properly so called. His illustration of chess-men in a chaotic heap being ranged in order by a player is excellent if applied only to the classification of facts. This, however, is a very subordinate function of Science. Science becomes really scientific only when it uses these facts as premises to deduce from them the laws of their succession or co-ordination. Facts-the relation of the stars on each successive nightrevealed to the observation of those who studied the stars in Babylon, that certain stars did not twinkle, and that these stood each successive night in a different relation to the other stars. These Assyrian stargazers collated the facts which they had observed, and from them found the paths of the planets in the Several millennia after these early astronomers had been gathered to their fathers Kepler used the facts so observed, and from them deduced his 'Laws.' From these, in turn, Newton deduced the wider law of gravitation. It would have been an analogue of this higher function of Science if Dr. Mercier had

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supposed someone ignorant of chess deducing the rules of the

game from watching several successive games played.

Our present object, however, is not to point out the limited ideas Dr. Mercier has of the functions of Science, but rather his misconceptions as to the defects he alleges in the logic of our schools and in the methods of logicians. He makes the astounding statement 'In two thousand years logicians have not succeeded in defining logic!' It certainly has not been for lack of trying. To take a few examples: Sir William Hamilton devotes one whole lecture and part of another to that very question; Ueberweg begins his treatise on the subject with a definition of logic; Jevons also begins his little book, with which most students are familiar, with a definition. So Mill, too, opens his more ponderous treatise with a discussion of the possibility of an adequate definition of logic before it has been examined. Dr. Mercier tells us 'there is no difficulty about it'-i.e. about giving a definition of logic, and proceeds at once to give the correct definition for which logicians had been fumbling in vain for twenty centuries. 'Logic is the science and art of reasoning.' When I read these words I could scarcely believe my eyes. I felt sure I had seen something not unlike them elsewhere; on opening Whately's Elements of Logic I find that the first sentence amounts to Dr. Mercier's definition: 'Logic may be considered as the Science, and also as the Art of Reasoning.' Further from the misty memories of my youth I recalled the venerable figure of Robert Buchanan, Professor of Logic in Glasgow from 1824 to 1864, and seemed to hear him enunciating, in almost Dr. Mercier's words, the definition of logic. Mercier is much too young a man, or I should have been endeavouring to ransack my memory to recall, if possible, one of his name as sitting beside me in the junior division of the Logic Class in the penultimate year of Buchanan's incumbency. When Dr. Mercier proceeds to develop his thesis we find his method resembling that of Aristotle, the father of the 'old logic' which he so despises. Dr. Mercier would begin by 'assertion and denial'; Aristotle combines the two in his doctrine of the 'Proposition'; he tells us 'A proposition is a sentence which affirms or denies something of something.' · As he goes on, Dr. Mercier's resemblance doctrinally to the ancient Glasgow Professor increases; 'generalisation, classification, definition,' are what Dr. Buchanan taught.

Notwithstanding the superior position Dr. Mercier assumes to those poor misguided logicians, he sometimes, if we may dare to hint it, manifests a confusion of thought as bad as the worst of which he accuses them. He animadverts very severely on the action of the British Medical Association in proposing to

discuss 'Unconscious Mind.' This in his light-hearted way he identifies with 'Unconscious Consciousness.' If the mind is the faculty of thought, and if there are thoughts which do not themselves come into consciousness but the effects of them do, then his equation is incorrect. Not to have recognised these effects of unconscious thought, we fear, convicts Dr. Mercier of being wanting in the primary quality of a man of sciencecareful observation. If he has examined the phenomena of mind with any degree of thoroughness, he must be aware that many mental processes go on, so to say, beneath the surface of the mind, apart from consciousness. An act of will is a mental act; but, in walking, every several step must be accompanied by an act of will and be caused by it; yet I am sure that, when he walks, only in rare instances is Dr. Mercier aware of the separate volitions by which each step is accomplished. To take another case: the process of speech. I am sure that when Dr. Mercier, as he tells us, urged on the Medico-Psychological Association 'the justifiability, in certain cases, of punishing lunatics,' he would choose eminently suitable words, and arrange them in a clear, lucid argument; vet much of this choice of words was made unconsciously. Dr. Mercier knew clearly what he wanted to say, and the words in which to say it came of themselves. Yet what a complex of mental operations is involved in the very simplest speech! The same thing occurs in writing. When Dr. Mercier wrote the article with which he has entertained his readers, he had to choose out the words that would adequately express his meaning-had to remember how they were spelt, and had to think out while his mind was guiding his pen what he was next to put Yet all these mental acts would but rarely force themselves into consciousness.

Further, these unconscious processes are subject to laws. I presume Dr. Mercier is far too accurate a man ever to be guilty of an incorrect spelling, however great the hurry in which he is writing. I confess I do not enjoy this happy immunity from blunders. When I am guilty of a mis-spelling it is the rule that I spell correctly a word of the same or similar sound, but other than that I wish to use. I have found myself writing 'know,' the verb, for 'no,' the negative adjective, or again I have written 'few' for 'view.' This has all the look of dictation to a somewhat inattentive amanuensis. It is as if an intelligence, not my conscious self, had heard the sound, but from not attending to the connexion put down a word which represented the sound as a word other than the one needed by the line of thought. In other words, there seems to be a mind, of the workings of which I am not conscious, which guides my pen generally correctly but which sometimes fails. We may observe that the 682

amusing phenomena of 'Spoonerisms' are due to something of a similar kind. Such things as those above mentioned are worthy of study, whether Dr. Mercier considers the name of the paper which treated of it logical or not.

While it is perfectly true that we are liable to give a name to our ignorance and think that by so doing it has become knowledge, yet the instance he gives, which by connexion he seems to regard as to the point, scarcely is so. It is from his own experience. As a boy he brought a pebble to his teacher to learn what it was; he got from the master the answer that it was a common jasper. Dr. Mercier says that in giving this answer the master was 'something of a humorist.' It may be that I am ignorant of what humour is, but I fail to see where the humour of the situation comes in. This, however, is by the way. It is to be presumed that his teacher gave him a true answer; if so, the boy got his information, that the stone was one belonging to a class called 'jasper' and to the sub-class 'common.' Classification is one of the things which Dr. Mercier recognises as to be taught under the head of logic. He also knows that a class can only be retained in thought by being named. Of course, the teacher might have proceeded and explained to the boy the peculiar qualities which made that pebble a jasper, the various phenomena that were connoted by that name; but some of the qualities were observable by the naked eye, and could be recognised by the boy and retained in his mind for application to future pebbles. If the teacher gave young Mercier a correct answer, the lad was helped on in the systematisation of his knowledge.

Presumably as a contrast to the false knowledge which Dr. Mercier thinks is all that is given by appending a name to an object, he describes how a child learns that things are breakable. His bottle falls to the floor and breaks with a loud noise; he bangs a toy on the side of his crib: it also breaks with a noise. He learns in that way that things break. The child has thus in his mind, though not yet present in consciousness, the law of cause and effect, that when a change takes place that change has been caused by something. If the infant supposed had further proceeded to throw down his indiarubber doll in the expectation that it also would break with a noise, his disappointment would enable him to reach another step in generalisation. 'Soft things do not make a noise when they fall, and do not break.' That this is a systematising of knowledge is true, but in this is no contradiction of ordinary logic. Even Aristotle argues in this way when on somewhat inconclusive evidence he decides that the want of a gall bladder is conducive to longevity.

There are many statements in Dr. Mercier's article which are difficult to understand. He declares that 'a knowledge of a com-

petent logic would have taught' Dr. McDougall that the relation between Mind and Body is an insoluble problem. It may be that Dr. Mercier is correct, and that we never shall be able to understand the relation between these two elements of human nature, but logic can only reveal this after prolonged reasoning. Dr. Mercier speaks rather as if a competent logic would have prevented Dr. McDougall from at all undertaking the inquiry. This, it seems to us, is a somewhat large demand to make of any logic whatever, even of that 'competent logic' which dwells, as yet unrevealed, in the brain of Dr. Mercier.

Another hard saying is the assertion in the paragraph which follows the one about Dr. McDougall, that 'Logicians enumerate nine or ten 'quantities' in propositions, and declare there are only two.' What Dr. Mercier means by saying that 'Logicians enumerate nine or ten quantities in propositions' I cannot tell. De Morgan introduced a distinction between definite and indefinite particulars; Sir William Hamilton quantified the predicate; but both admitted only 'universal' and 'particular.' Kant, who was a logician as well as a metaphysician, made the logical quantities three, 'universal,' 'particular,' and 'individual'; but that is a long way off 'nine or ten.' Who are the logicians who so enumerate the quantities of propositions? The other sins which Dr. Mercier lays to the charge of these poor logicians are equally inscrutable, but it would be loss of time to discuss them seriously.

At the same time we have an interest in Dr. Mercier as a psychological phenomenon. What moved him to write the article before us at all? He does not seem to be a specialist in logical What he appears to consider novelties are already commonplaces. In fact, he occupies the attitude of the urchin who would persist in instructing his grandmother how to suck eggs. As Dr. Mercier is a man with a reputation to maintain he cannot be so ignorant as he would appear to be. What, then, is the inwardness of this proceeding on the part of Dr. Mercier? What is the motive behind his article? It is possible, we think, to find an answer to this question by careful study of the article itself. Dr. Mercier appears to have a bone to pick with Professor Karl Pearson for holding that science is statistics, and for hoping that in the happy by and bye the law of cause and effect will be thrown aside wholly. At the same time Dr. Mercier appears to sympathise with the Professor's assaults on the Mendelians. For our part Mendelism has always seemed an attempt, fairly successful, to make the biological law of Heredity somewhat The nomenclature, and the deductions from the theory, may be capable of amendment.

The point which, it appears to us, Dr. Mercier feels most

keenly, and which seems most to have moved him to write, is one in regard to which we are in entirest sympathy with himviz. the treatment which his thesis on 'the justifiability in certain cases of punishing lunatics' received from the Medico-Psychological Association, before which it was delivered. It is impossible for anyone, whatever the logical doctrines he has been taught, not to see the fallacy involved in the equivocal reply to Dr. Mercier's argument from the practice in lunatic asylums of depriving obstreperous patients of certain freedoms which otherwise they enjoyed, saying that these were not punishments but were simply the withdrawal of privileges. On a similar argument the reimprisonment of a ticket-of-leave man would not be a punishment, it would simply be the withdrawal of privilege granted. In the case of certain lunatics the power of control, though weakened, is not totally lost, and it can be elicited by this system of rewards and 'withdrawals of privilege,' and, by being exercised, This applies to some extent to punishments strengthened. inflicted by the magistrate; the certainty that crime will be punished may assist the will, though somewhat weakened, in restraining the maniacal impulse. Indeed, there have been cases of murder in which the capital sentence has been commuted to lifelong detention of the accused as a criminal lunatic, where the opinion of Lord Braxfield in regard to a criminal before him 'that he wad be nane the waur o' a hangin' might have been carried into effect with advantage.

While thus we sympathise so far with Dr. Mercier we cannot go his length. Of course, it is absurd of Professor Karl Pearson to give such undue weight to statistics, and to dismiss the law of causation, and doubly absurd of the Medico-Psychological Association to fail to recognise punishment in the deprival of privilege; yet surely it is carrying matters too far because of these to contemn as valueless all the logic taught in schools and colleges. It is as bad as the Chinese, who, according to Charles Lamb, burned a house down in order to enjoy roast pig.

J. E. H. THOMSON.

## OUR IMPERIAL SYSTEM

Some few weeks ago the conversation at a certain mess-table of British officers in France—at which I had the honour to be a guest—turned after dinner to the subject of military discipline in the German and the British Armies. My host, a colonel with some twenty years' experience of the North-West Frontier, said to me:

It is character that tells with the men, and I don't know where you will find anything to beat the Englishman in that respect. Take a young subaltern, or, if you like, an Indian civilian fresh from home—a young cub who has hardly cut his teeth, so to speak—and plant him down alone with an outpost on the frontier or in the middle of a big administrative district, and in a few weeks, by sheer force of character and nothing else, he will acquire an ascendency over his men which it would take a man from any other European country years to acquire—if he ever acquired it at all.

It was no unworthy boast. Many an untold tale of quiet heroism and uncovenanted devotion lies behind it.

Glad hearts without reproach or blot That do their work and know it not.

Upon such a rock is our Empire built. It has been reserved for the greatest of Empires since the Empire of Rome to apply and to develop this principle of voluntary service, until to-day, in this, her hour of supreme trial, she finds herself with her quiver full, ready and eager to meet her enemies in the gate.

It is, as we know, the sole prerogative of the Crown to raise troops. The private citizen who attempts to raise troops and drill them on his own account would commit a statutory offence. English law recognises the right of every man to carry arms (Blackstone elevates this right to the dignity of natural law) but not the claim to use them in concert. You may arm but you must not drill. It matters not whether the troops be raised here or in the Dominions overseas. It is in the King's name that Colonial troops are still enlisted. I may quote a recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a case in which a soldier in a New South Wales contingent, which had

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served in South Africa, was suing the Colonial Government for arrears of pay:

The Plaintiff was in the service of the Crown and his payment was to be made by the Crown. Whether the money by which he was to be paid was to be found by the colony or the mother country was not a matter which could in any way affect his relations to his employer the Crown. . . .

The Government in relation to this contract is the King himself. The soldier is his soldier and the supplies granted to H.M. for the purpose of paying his soldiers, whether they be granted by the Imperial or the Colonial Legislature, are money granted to the King.

Under these circumstances the money paid was money paid for services rendered to the King.

We must remember, however, to what constitutional limitations that prerogative is subject. After a long and bitter struggle between King and Parliament in the seventeenth century it was established in the Bill of Rights, and the principle is now consecrated in the preamble to the Army Annual Act, that 'the raising or keeping of a standing army within the United Kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law.'

Observe that the Act says the United Kingdom; it says nothing about the Dominions overseas. Of that more anon. Observe also that it says in time of peace. Does it by denying the unrestricted exercise of the Prerogative in time of peace admit it in time of war? That is a question to which more than one answer is possible. Certainly if the Germans invaded this realm to-morrow the King could by the sole exercise of his prerogative call upon each and all of us to take up arms in defence of the realm. Whether he could do that in the case of a war such as the present, falling short of actual invasion, is another question which I am attempting to answer elsewhere. observe also that the preamble speaks of a Standing Army; it says nothing of a permanent Navy. The reader may not be aware that not only is it not illegal for the King to maintain a permanent Navy in time of peace without the consent of Parliament, but also that it would be perfectly legal for the King to force men to serve in it—in other words, to revive the press-gang. The townsman need not be alarmed—the King's right of impressment is limited by Common Law to those that go down to the sea in ships and do business in great waters—the landsman is safe. But the Common Law, in limiting the right, has recognised it. The reader will find a case—the case of Alexander Broadfoot-in Foster's Crown Cases, a book that was and still is a book of great authority. But more of this when I come to speak of our Colonial Navies.

Does, then, the doctrine of the Army Act restricting the prerogative apply to the Dominions, despite the absence in the preamble of any express words relating to them? Undoubtedly it does. It is an old-established doctrine that the English settlers in distant lands carry the Common Law with them, and not only the Common Law, but also so much of the Statute Law as is applicable to their condition, and, in particular, all statutes prior to the date of settlement that are declaratory of the Common Therefore, the sacramental words of the Bill of Rights and the Mutiny Act which are embodied in the Army Act apply to the Dominions. The King's Prerogative to raise troops in the Dominions is subject to the same limitations there as here. He cannot raise and maintain soldiers there without the consent of the local legislature. Our colonial troops are just as much statutory forces-Parliamentary armies, if we like to call them such—as are our home troops. The numbers, the pay, the discipline are all regulated by colonial statutes. Respect for this constitutional doctrine had much to do with the difficulties which precipitated the revolt of our American colonies in the eighteenth When the British Government was engaged in its century. great struggle with France for the hegemony of North America it always recognised, hard-pressed though it was, that it had no right to compel its American subjects to raise troops—especially for service in the hinterland beyond the colonial frontier. It had to fall back on voluntary enlistment, and upon requisitions on the colonial Governments to supply quotas-requisitions which, as we may read in Pitt's correspondence with the colonial Governors, the colonies were none too ready to supply. failure of these and local requisitions compelled the British Parliament to maintain a garrison in America, and the attempt to tax the colonies for their support led to results with which The maintenance of colonial garrisons everyone is familiar. was, however, in no sense illegal, and the Crown continued this policy in her remaining colonies right down to the year 1870, and in some places still continues it. But she could not compel the colonies to contribute to their support. Nor would the colonies volunteer such support unless it was accompanied by control.

It was the recognition of this difficulty—the impossibility of combining imperial control of local forces with local expenditure upon the maintenance of those forces—that caused the gradual withdrawal of colonial garrisons some fifty years ago. The military establishments—barracks, fortifications, and so on—were handed over to the colonial Governments as a free gift. The result was that until some ten years ago, or less, our colonies

As regards the conquered colonies the same limitation of the prerogative would undoubtedly be implied in the grant of responsible government.

-with the exception of South Africa, where a garrison was left after the termination of the Boer war-were practically defenceless on land. They have since found it necessary to put their Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New house in order. Zealand have within the last seven years each of them passed local Defence Acts, all of which, with some variations, adopt the principle of compulsory service. In Australia and South Africa the compulsion extends to training in peace; in Canada, which has a militia, the compulsion is limited to service in war. The scope of this compulsion to serve in war is in point of age decidedly large—every citizen from seventeen to eighteen years of age is liable to serve right up to his sixtieth year. exemption in South Africa is significant—persons not of European descent cannot be members of the force. In each case these Defence Forces, as they are called, are divided into a Permanent Force and a Citizen Force, corresponding roughly to our Regular and Territorial Forces respectively, but with this important difference: that service in the Citizen Forces is not

as here, voluntary, but compulsory.

What is the place of these forces in imperial strategy? That is a question which I will consider more closely when I come to examine the naval forces of the Dominions. But I may here remark that the creation of these land forces in the colonies has coincided in point of time with the concentration of the Imperial Fleet in home waters, and there can be little doubt that the two departures are causally related. In the case of Australia and Canada no doubt the emergence of a new planet, a great Asiatic Power, in the firmament of nations had also something to do with the military activity of the Dominions. Be that as it may, the question remains how far can these forces be considered as being truly Imperial forces-forces which our Army Council and the Committee of Imperial Defence can take into account in the strategy of a European campaign? Now, legally speaking, the Defence Acts of the Dominions do not directly contemplate the use of these forces outside their territories at all. Like our old Militia the basis of service in these forces is domestic. find ancient Acts of Parliament asserting that by law no man is compellable to go out of his county to serve as a soldier except in case of sudden coming of strange enemies into the kingdom. Militia duty was not distinguishable from police duty-both were based on the principle of the posse comitatus, and the sheriff can at law call out every man of us to assist in the execution of a writ or the keeping of the peace. Militia duty was the reverse side of this police duty. And although under the exigencies of ... war Englishmen might have been compelled to serve out of their county, they could never be compelled to serve out of the realm.

This is the principle governing the terms of service in the colonial forces. The Australian Acts provide that no member of the force is bound to serve out of the Commonwealth without his own consent. The South African Act extends the liability to service beyond the boundaries of the Union, but limits it to South Africa. But that does not mean that co-operation with the Imperial forces is necessarily confined to the territory of each Dominion. What it does mean is that the co-operation which is now being so splendidly given is voluntary—it is the expression of spontaneous loyalty, unbought and unforced.

The Governor-Such Imperial contingencies are provided for. General is empowered in time of war to place the defence forces or any part thereof under the orders of the commander of any portion of the King's regular forces. This express provision was necessary, because in the absence of it the King's commission issued to officers in England gives them no legal authority over Dominion forces. In virtue of it the colonial troops can now be brigaded with our own men without impairing the unity of command. What is hardly less important than unity of com-Here there was a legal mand is uniformity of discipline. difficulty. A colonial legislature could enact a code of discipline for enforcement within its own territory, but, in accordance with a well-known rule of law, it could not make that code enforceable outside it. Unlike the Imperial Legislature, colonial parliaments cannot legislate ex-territorially. To what code of military law, then, are Canadian and Australian troops serving in Europe subject? Section 177 of our own Army Act has solved the difficulty. The colonial code is to apply in virtue of the Imperial legislation; failing such a code, our own code, as enacted in the Army Act, is to be extended to the colonial troops serving by our side. As a matter of fact, Australia has adopted our own Army Act, the provisions of which are 'common form' in the Defence Acts of the Dominions.

Thus is uniformity of discipline secured.

Something, too, has been done to create an Imperial school of strategy and tactics. Thanks to Lord Haldane, we have had since 1909 an Imperial General Staff. The principle of that Staff is, without interfering with the autonomy of each Dominion, to secure the possibility of combining all the forces of the Empire in one homogeneous army. Reciprocity is provided for by attaching an officer from each Dominion to the War Office and an officer from the War Office to each General Staff in the Dominions.

This far-sighted conception of an Imperial school of strategy we owe to Lord Haldane, of whom it may truly be said that he saw the problem of defence steadily, and saw it whole. We have not the space to enter at the present moment into the question of War Office administration during recent years.2 Our immediate object is merely to outline the legal and political foundations upon which the system of Imperial Defence is built. Enough if we say here that it is to Lord Haldane that we owe in a very large degree the success which has attended the prosecution of the present War-the creation of a Territorial Force for alternative use for home defence or foreign service, the redistribution of business among the Army Council (which he first put on a statutory basis) on a system which combined specialisation of function with collective deliberation and supreme Ministerial control, the idea of an expansive Expeditionary Force; and, above all, those plans for the mobilisation and transport of the Expeditionary Force, which were worked out to the last detail in the secret War Book, and the success of which is a matter of common knowledge. Political memories are notoriously short, but these are services which will not be forgotten.

What of India? Here, indeed, we enter the country of romance. The Indian Army is the mirror of the Indian peoples: almost every caste and every tribe has taken service under the British raj. The conditions of that service are a striking commentary on the character of British rule. The reader will remember that in the armies of the Roman Empire none but citizens could serve in the legions, and that service in the auxiliaries was only ultimately rewarded by the bestowal of the coveted status. The policy of the Emperors was to denationalise the subject peoples as insidiously as possible. Under Vespasian provincial auxiliaries were studiously posted in other provinces than their own. Britons were sent to Dacia, Syrians to the Danube. Well might Tacitus say 'It is by the blood of the provinces that the provinces are conquered.' Even the legions, when recruited, as they came to be, from provincial citizens, were carefully composed of mixed nationalities. Gaul and Spaniard served under the same eagles. Divide et Impera was the motto of the Roman recruiting system. The armies of Rome became a military constitution; they were neither Italian nor provincial, and in the hands of despotic emperors they became the instrument of Italy's own subjection until the mother country herself became but a province of the Empire.

How different is our Indian Empire! There are, indeed, many similitudes between the Roman and Indian Empires, and Lord Bryce has already emphasised them in a brilliant chapter of his Studies in History and Jurisprudence. But there are also many differences and none more remarkable than this: that the Indian regiments accentuate the native character instead of

The writer has gone more fully into this subject in War, its Conduct and its Legal Results, John Murray, 1915.

attenuating it. Sikh serves with Sikh, Ghurka with Ghurka. Nor does the auxiliary change his political character on enlistment. Military service confers no civic rights, for the simple reason that the auxiliary, whether soldier or civilian, already possesses them. The distinction between citizen and subject, so rooted in the Roman system, is unknown to our law; so, indeed, we might almost say is the distinction between soldier and civilian. India is a country of personal law—I admit it—and distinctions are indeed drawn in the Code of Criminal Procedure between persons of European descent and Asiatics; but, without going deeper into a complex subject, I may at least say this: there is nothing in the constitution of the Indian Army resembling those features of the Roman Army which were to prove so fatal to the cause of political freedom.

We may, if we like, call the English troops in India Imperial legionaries and the native troops auxiliaries, but the distinction must not be pressed too far. There is, however, this difference between the two: the English troops in India and the English officers of the native troops are, like their comrades at home, subject to the disciplinary code of the Army Act. The native troops are governed by a different law—the Indian Articles of War, and those Articles contrive to govern the discipline of the Indian

troops now serving in Europe. There is one aspect of the Indian Army which is of great constitutional importance. If the reader will look at our Army Annual Act, by which Parliament annually fixes the number of His Majesty's troops and thereby restricts the Crown to raise no more men than are therein granted, he will find the words 'exclusive of the numbers actually serving within His Majesty's Indian possessions.' In other words, the numbers of the Indian Army are unlimited by statute. Here it would seem is an instrument of despotism: the Crown might intimidate its English subjects by the presence of an Indian Army whose pay and numbers are subject to no Parliamentary control. Troops sent to India are placed on the Indian establishment; they cease to come under the annual Army Estimates. But the draughtsman of the Government of India Act was careful to guard against such an attempt to outflank the constitutional securities of the Bill of Rights. The Act provides that

Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of H.M.'s Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of India are not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, applicable to defraying the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of those possessions by H.M.'s Forces charged upon those revenues.

We may remember Mr. Disraeli's liberal interpretation of that constitutional safeguard and how he anticipated the consent of Parliament when he moved the Indian troops to Malta, thereby provoking a great constitutional controversy in the House of Commons. I will not enter into the merits of that controversy here. Sufficient if I say that the clause does ensure that sooner or later in any such operation Parliament is enabled to act, at one and the same time, as the guardian of the liberties of the

Indian people and our own.

I have failed in my purpose if I have not succeeded in showing how firmly based is this system of Imperial Defence upon the principles of constitutional freedom. The separation between civil and military authority which Diocletian introduced into the Roman Empire, and by which the whole civil polity was suffocated in a shirt of steel, is unknown to ours. Under Diocletian the army was an imperium in imperio, and the policy by which Pompey superseded the senatorial governors by his military legates was carried to its logical conclusion. Diocletian's policy may have saved the provinces for the Empire (it checked seditious governors), but it ruined such autonomy as they had. No such necessity confronts ourselves, because we have made autonomy the very corner-stone of our rule. We do not fear our colonies because we have learnt to trust them. The result is that everywhere the military power is the servant of the civil authority and not its master, and even an English commission will of itself carry with it no authority over a colonial trooper. Voluntary co-operation, not Imperial subjection, has been and is That being so, the soldier, British, Indian, or Colonial, does not stand for a privileged caste. A British soldier, we have been told in classical language, is only a civilian armed in a particular manner. He does not by putting on the whole armour of His Majesty thereby put off the obligations of a civilian. If he undergoes any change of status at all it is in the direction of losing rights rather than acquiring privileges. Enlistment often operates as disfranchisement-not by law but by force of It is difficult—as revising barristers have shown—to facts. establish that exclusive control which is the test of the occupation franchise if you happen to sleep in cubicles in barracks. It is still more difficult to establish continuous residence when you are called away to camp or on active service. Parliament has only recently had to pass an Emergency Act expressly protecting members of the Territorial Force from the disfranchisement which would otherwise have followed upon their embodiment. No! our Army is, as Lord Haldane once declared it should be, 'a popular institution, not a menace to civil liberty.'

An extremely important departure in the direction of the co-ordination of the problems of Imperial Defence was taken a few years ago by the creation of a Committee to deal with such problems. The constitution of this Committee is an informal

one, almost as informal as that of the Cabinet itself, and it has never been defined either by prerogative or statute. It normally consists of the Ministers responsible for the Army and Navy respectively, together with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the Secretary for India. It is, however, a very elastic body, and whenever matters affecting their departments are under consideration other Ministers may be summoned, and not only they but the permanent officials. The presence of officials thus discriminates this body from the Cabinet, from which it also differs in having a permanent secretariat with a permanent record of its deliberations for the use of successive administrations. In that respect it has done much to neutralise problems of defence so far as political parties are concerned, and to secure continuity of policy. Indeed, a member of the Opposition, Mr. Balfour, is summoned to its deliberations. Not only so but representatives of the colonies may and, when present in London, do attend. The Prime Ministers of the Dominions present at the periodical Colonial Conference invariably take advantage of their presence in this country to attend the meetings of the Committee. And lately the Imperial Government have invited the Dominions to participate regularly in its deliberations by providing for the permanent presence in London of one of their Ministers, though nothing has, we believe, yet been done to carry this proposal into effect. There are, of course, limits set to the power of a body of this kind, owing to the necessity of preserving the supremacy of the Cabinet and its complete responsibility to Parliament. Hence the Committee has no independent initiative and no executive authority. It is a purely consultative body. But its importance in providing for a common policy of defence throughout the Empire cannot be overestimated, and in it probably lies the germ of all future developments in the direction of the closer unity of the Empire.

We have already referred to the Imperial General Staff. The object of creating it was not merely to provide for the common study of strategical problems—that is largely the work of the Committee—but to enable the War Office and the War Staffs of the Dominions to work out a harmonious plan of rapid mobilisation in the event of war, and to provide for a common system of drill, training, and equipment. Thus, to quote the words of the Prime Minister, provision is made for 'one homogeneous army.'

It remains to say a word about the Navy. To-day there is the nucleus of a Colonial Navy in the waters of the Southern Pacific. Such a fleet would have been regarded as unthinkable under the old colonial system—nay, it would have been impossible. With all the autonomy conceded by the Mother Country to the American Colonies—and it was not inconsiderable—there was one thing she would never concede—the shipping trade. Under the Navigation Acts the colonies were sternly excluded from the mercantile marine. All the carrying trade had to be done in British ships-it was a close preserve of the Mother Country. Great Britain had long guarded her admiralty of the seas with jealous care. You will find sound lawyers in the seventeenth century, like Selden, gravely arguing that British sovereignty extends far beyond British territorial waters. 'The King of Great Britain,' said Selden, 'is Lord of the Sea flowing about as an inseparable and perpetual appendage of the British Empire.' As we know, the Lords of the Admiralty recently notified neutral countries that the North Sea is out of bounds; we have proclaimed a kind of naval protectorate over its broad waters. That seems a startling development to us and only justified by the exigencies of war. But in the seventeenth century, and indeed later, an Englishman would not have hesitated to put forward such claims even in time of peace. Our frigates when they met a foreign ship above Cape Finisterre forced her to dip her ensign and lower her topsails in acknowledgment of our supremacy, and the ship which was rash enough to dispute our maritime prerogative received a cannon-shot across her bows. In such circumstances the Mother Country was not disposed to allow her colonies to develop a mercantile marine of their own which might open the doors to free trade with other countries. followed that if a mercantile marine was forbidden to the colonies, so also was a Colonial Navy. Admiralty jurisdiction was never regarded as falling within the sphere of colonial courts, and, needless to say, a colonial legislature could not legislate for merchant shipping on the high seas; even to-day such legislation is only possible by an Imperial enabling Act. The Navy was, as it still is, a matter of high prerogative. Thus long after the withdrawal of the colonial garrisons the White Ensign continued to police the seas of the Dominions. Until about six years ago little was heard of Colonial Navies.

What was the secret of the change? It may be told in one word—Germany. The oft-quoted preamble to the German Naval Law of 1900 said this:

In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet of such a strength that even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest Naval Power, for as a rule a great Naval Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us.

The answer of the British Admiralty was to do the very thing the German Government assumed we could not do. Our Fleet, till then dispersed over the Seven Seas, was gradually concentrated in home waters. In 1902 there were 160 British ships on foreign and colonial stations; in 1912 there were only 76. We had to take account of the possibility of a surprise coming like a thief in the night. As a strategist of high authority has put it: 'We must be prepared at one average moment for the enemy at his selected moment.' There in a sentence is the secret of our policy of concentration. To-day we know that it has been our salvation. But the effect of it was to impoverish the colonial stations. The Dominions suddenly realised how much they had owed to this Imperial insurance of their commerce and this Imperial guardianship of their shores—given, be it remembered, by the Mother Country without any corresponding contribution or cost.

Australia had, indeed, done something as early as 1884 to provide for a system of naval defence, and had entered into an agreement with the Imperial Government, by which she undertook to contribute an annual subsidy to the maintenance of an auxiliary squadron in Australian waters. She stipulated, however, that those vessels were not to be employed outside the Australasian waters, even in time of war, without the consent of the Colonial Governments. 'Cash contributions without control,' said one of her representatives, 'are not in harmony with colonial nationalism.' This was to raise profound questions of constitutional law, foreign policy, and naval strategy. Australia began to substitute a contribution of men for a subsidy of money, and not only to maintain ships but to provide them, the question became inexorable. Sir Wilfrid Laurier went further, and declared that, as regarded Canada, 'it was for the Parliament of Canada, if she created a Canadian Navy, to say not only where but when it should go to war.' Happily that extreme doctrine of a kind of colonial neutrality has found little The modern conditions of naval strategy make unity of control absolutely imperative in time of war, and the fate of the Dominions may be decided by a battle in the waters of the North Sea. In a remarkably powerful Memorandum of October 1911—one of the most important documents that has ever issued from Whitehall-the Admiralty, in reply to a request from Mr. Borden, laid down the principles of Imperial strategy, and pointed out that 'in the general naval supremacy of Great Britain is the primary safeguard of the security and interests of the great Dominions.' Once that is destroyed in home waters nothing could save them. Long ago, as long ago as 1764, long before Captain Mahan wrote his memorable book, an English Secretary of State grasped this fundamental truth: 'It is upon the superiority of the fleets of Great Britain,' wrote Halifax, 'that the defence and security of her colonies ever have, and ever must, principally depend.' Canada and Australia, while pursuing different policies of contribution, eventually united in support of this cardinal truth, and the Naval Defence Acts of the two Dominions provide that in case of emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the ships and crews of the Dominion. Such ships were already subject to the code of discipline laid down in our own Naval Discipline Act, which, by an enabling Act, known as the Colonial Naval Defence Act, can be adopted, subject to such adaptation as they think fit, by the Dominion Governments. By a recent Act (1911) the ships were placed at the disposal of the Admiralty, and subject to our Naval Discipline Act, the King's Regulations, and the Admiralty Instructions without any modification at all.

Space will not permit me to enter into the profoundly interesting questions raised in the debates on the Canadian Naval Aid Bill, whose fate is still uncertain. They resolve themselves into a single question-which is the better policy: to contribute ships which shall become, whether in peace or war, an integral and permanent constituent of the Imperial Fleet, as New Zealand has done; or to raise local navies which, except in emergency, shall remain exclusively under colonial control—the policy pursued by Australia? The Admiralty has left the question to each Dominion to decide for itself. In Canada it is still undecided. But in his superb speech, a historic speech, of the 5th of December 1912 in the Canadian Parliament, Mr. Borden advanced very cogent reasons for the policy of contributing ships to the home fleet instead of the particularist policy of a local navy. pointed out that it would be twenty-five or fifty years before Canada could hope to lay down the expensive shipbuilding plant and to develop the high technical skill necessary to construct a local navy. In memorable, and indeed moving words, he reminded his audience that no local navy could hope to do for Canada what the Imperial Navy did-to police the high seas, to ensure her commerce, to protect her subjects in distant ports.

It is profoundly true. The British Navy is a World Navy. It is, and must be, mobile; its ultimate mobilisations and dispersions are a pressure-gauge of international relations; thanks to its unceasing vigil our ships are in every port, our flag is on every sea, our bills of exchange are honoured at sight. Vessels post o'er land and sea to carry the golden grain which is the life of the people.

Unity of control and freedom of movement is, therefore, the prime condition of an Imperial Fleet. The policy of concentration has its marginal disadvantages, as the raids of that chartered libertine of the Indian Ocean, the *Emden*, disagreeably remind us. But we can afford to ignore that. We have still sufficient

ships, though not more than sufficient, to satisfy the second law of naval supremacy, the law of local superiority, which consists in the power to send in good time, or to maintain permanently in some distant theatre, forces adequate to defeat the enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been obtained in the decisive theatre. That superiority the Australian ships have already established in New Guinea and Samoa.

We are going, and are destined to go, in Burke's memorable phrase, through great varieties of untried being. changes lie ahead of us. It will be far more difficult to make peace than it was to make war. Political changes, economic changes, constitutional changes will convulse Europe-perhaps for a generation. The old order changeth, and in the new everything will be subjected to a searching scrutiny. But over the uncharted seas and unplumbed depths upon which we shall have to voyage there will shine a beacon whose rays were never more brilliant than now—the beacon of Imperial loyalty. Everywhere -in the dark hinterlands of the African Protectorates, in the great client-states of India, among the tribal clans who salute King George as the paramount Chief of Zululand, under the Southern Cross, and beneath the Northern snows, there is but one unwavering answer.

Such is our Imperial system—flexible, expansive, voluntary, forged by links which are truly light as air but strong as iron. It depends, as the reader will have seen, entirely upon the unsolicited support of willing peoples. It is, indeed, itself a symbol of the growth of our Empire-an Empire which, whatever its failings, was never founded upon pedantry or conceived by art. We have very little literature of an Imperialist character. Literature is self-conscious—and the founders of our Empire were never self-conscious. Neither were they doctrinaires. We have no theory of Empire. We do not talk of 'a place in the sun,' nor of the 'terror' of an Imperial name. Our Government's anxiety has been not to incite its pioneers but rather to restrain them. The metaphor of 'the weary Titan' is not idle. Empire The words of the preamble to the has been thrust upon us. India Act of 1793, in which Parliament disclaimed designs of territorial aggrandisement, were literally true. Our Government has often, perhaps too often, disavowed the acquisitions of its sons. Its Empire has grown out of the adventurous spirit of its children-here a trading company, there a religious communion, in one place a planter, in another an explorer, and slowly, reluctantly, with great searchings of heart, the Mother Country has accepted the responsibilities thus thrust upon her. She shall not pass away.

J. H. MORGAN.

## LAISSER-FAIRE OR PROTECTION?

#### A STUDY IN HALF-TRUTHS

Now that Party strife has ceased, killed by real warfare, it is fortunately possible to discuss the subject of Protection simply as a problem in economics, and not as a Party matter. The present occasion for 'reconsidering creeds and philosophies' is peculiarly opportune, for three reasons: we can do so without being accused of Party bias; the enormous expense of the War will almost inevitably necessitate a tariff for purposes of additional revenue; and, in any case, a kind of Protection is already forced upon us, owing to the stoppage of a large body of imports previously derived from Germany, and the diminution of other imports from countries now at war or affected by it. Free Traders, no less than Protectionists, recognise the desirability of 'capturing German trade,' and the home manufacture of goods previously imported no longer shocks Free Trade susceptibilities. The economic aspects of this are well worth studying. We are not for ever to be debarred from discussing a scientific subject because it once formed the field of political controversy, and proved unpopular for Conservative vote-catching.

I may say that I have been a close student of this subject ever since Mr. Chamberlain reintroduced it in 1903. On the whole, nothing has struck me more forcibly with regard to it than the truth of a certain epigram in a volume by Professor Chapman. 'Theories,' he says, 'tend to crystallise into formulae expressing half-truths.' Most true is this of the whole Tariff discussion of recent years, which has been buried under a mass of such formulae, with the greatest possible confusion of thought in consequence. To clear up this confusion now, it is necessary to go back to beginnings, and analyse the original theories which have since crystallised into such confused shapes. We must open our eyes and take a fresh look at things, and we shall find that they assume an astonishingly new aspect. For example, supposing we had never heard of a Tariff question, of Free Trade and Protection, would it strike us, on the face of it.

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that it was a desirable thing in itself to send millions upon millions of valuable goods out of the country when millions of people in the country would be only too thankful to receive them? And yet our export trade, the sending away of those goods, has appeared to the majority of Tariff Reformers as the most desirable thing to aim at. It will be within the recollection of all who followed the Tariff controversy that the words 'export' and 'import' were harder worked than any others. The discussion centred on them. To find out why this was so, we must go back.

Protection as an economic theory suffers from having made a false start. The earlier Protectionism, indeed, was based on the very natural and deeply rooted human instinct that it is more patriotic to use goods made at home by our people than those made abroad by foreign people. But the first attempts to give a scientific basis to this belief resulted in the theory known as 'Mercantilism,' and it is this theory which, notwithstanding its complete refutation by Adam Smith, has bred such lamentable confusion of thought ever since. The essence of the theory was that the wealth of nations consisted in gold. That country was richest which could accumulate most gold in it. It was further argued that international payments were very largely made in gold. The conclusion derived from such a theory is obvious. Export all you can, in order to bring as much gold into the country as possible; import as little as you can, to avoid having to send gold out. Aim in particular at a 'favourable balance of trade,' a phrase which has amazingly survived, in order to obtain a perpetual influx of gold, a perpetual balance on the right side, so to speak. That was the Mercantilist theory in a nutshell, and though the theory itself is almost forgotten-in fact, has never even been heard of by many of the contestants of to-daythough it was exploded over a hundred years ago, and has been further shattered by almost every economist of note ever since, nevertheless, its fragments still survive. They survive in our exaggerated respect for 'exports' in particular and foreign trade in general. The phrase 'excess of imports,' constantly used of late years, is only another rendering of the older but still used 'unfavourable balance of trade,' and is directly attributable to Even more direct was Mr. Seddon's famous Mercantilism. statement that England was sending 160 millions of golden sovereigns abroad every year in payment for her 'excess of imports,' which appeared to Mr. Seddon and some of his hearers as a very dreadful thing. In point of fact, a glance at a Blue Book was sufficient to refute that statement, and to show that. on balance, we usually import more gold than we export, which is not surprising; since England is collectively probably the largest owner of gold mines in the world, through the capital she has invested in them in all parts of the world.

Everyone will remember, too, the laborious efforts of amateur Free Trade statisticians to show how we 'paid for' our great import trade: so much by exported commodities, so much by shipping, so much by the interest due to us on capital invested abroad, etc., etc.—anything, in fact, but by gold. I am not sure, indeed, that some of these gentry did not end by convincing themselves that we really 'paid for' more than we got: a surprising conclusion, which, nevertheless, owing to the topsyturveydom of ideas on the subject, appeared to give them satisfaction; just as the apparently gratuitous receipt of some millions' worth of commodities for nothing struck terror into the hearts of the stoutest Tariff Reformers, and appeared to them as the direct calamity. As a Protectionist, I freely admit that one side was every bit as bad as the other. It is a real tragi-comedy that all this pother, this weary game of 'cross questions and crooked answers,' was about a theory abandoned by every responsible person with the most rudimentary knowledge of economics at least a hundred years ago.

Admitting, then, as every one must, the fallacy of the Mercantilist theory, how is it that Protectionism survives? It survives because its economic soundness never really depended on Mercantilism at all. The latter was merely a misdirected attempt to provide the necessary scientific basis. The old instinct that it is nationally right to use goods made at home, if possible, in preference to foreign goods, has a perfectly sound economic justification, notwithstanding the false start of Mercantilism. This we shall see later.

Before we come to Adam Smith's very complete refutation of the Mercantilist theory it is necessary to examine in greater detail two 'formulae expressing half-truths' which are derived from Mercantilism, and in particular have given rise to great confusion of thought. The first is the well-known phrase 'Exports pay for Imports.' The complete and original meaning intended to be conveyed by this phrase was 'Exports-i.e. goods and services—and not gold, pay for Imports.' This was a true and sufficient answer to the Mercantilist contention that imports drained gold out of the country in payment. But of late years its meaning has become curiously perverted. It has constantly been used to mean something to this effect: that as British goods and British services do the paying, all is well; with the corollary that if goods previously imported were made at home instead, we should stop having to pay for them, to the detriment of those formerly making the goods which did the paying. course, is ludicrously wrong; a good example of the danger of

half-truths. The whole truth is that goods and services 'pay for' or exchange for, via money or its equivalent, other goods and services the world over, whether we send our goods across a frontier and call them 'exports' or not. Thus, on the assumption that certain goods were made at home instead of being imported, the same amount of other goods or services would still be required to pay for them. The metaphor of 'paving' itself gives rise to confusion of thought. It is just as true to say that imports pay for exports as vice versa. So in this case to say that certain goods would still be 'required to pay for' other goods, previously imported but now made at home, gives a rather false impression: it suggests some sort of compulsory, and perhaps reluctant, payment. This, of course, is not the case. The additional goods now made at home create an additional purchasing power, which, as people are commonly willing to sell what they make for sale, is naturally exerted.

The frequent assumption, therefore, that the home manufacture of some commodity previously imported compels a corresponding decrease in production in some other direction, on the grounds that an 'import' no longer has to be 'paid for,' is simply childish. The only difference is in the people 'paid.' Nor does it even imply a cessation of a corresponding volume of exported goods. Why in the world should it? Is some Customs' official to come round and say 'England has ceased to import German pianos; you must therefore cancel your sales of Sheffield cutlery for export, and export no more!' The notion is absurd. The only 'export' which necessarily ceases or does not take place is the very intangible one of the 'service' rendered to 'abroad' by the investment of a certain amount of capital abroad, which is diverted instead to a home industry. Far from being reduced, there is every reason to expect an increase of our exported goods, for why should not the newly established industry itself develop an export trade? The thing has been done again and again in Protected countries.

In short, as a rather epigrammatic way of saying that trade is essentially barter, this famous phrase may have, or once have had, some value. As used of late years, however, it has merely served to introduce a mass of transparent absurdities.

The second 'formula' which I wish to discuss is really a sort of offspring of the first. It is this: 'Capital goes abroad in the form of exported commodities.' What this was originally intended to mean was 'not in the form of gold,' a sound enough answer to the Mercantilist ideas on the subject. But this formula also has been strangely distorted of late years and made to mean something quite different, something to this effect: Capital goes abroad in the form of exported commodities, which are made

by British labour. What a fine thing it is, therefore, that capital should go abroad! Obviously, the more we send the better, for thus the more British labour will be employed. is the half-truth. The whole truth is that capital goes to all industries, whether at home or abroad, in the form of commodities, since no one builds their factories, etc., out of gold. But again, the difference is, Who gets those commodities, that capital on which the employment of labour depends? industries and labour in this country to be maintained by those commodities, or industries and labour abroad? In many cases, of course, the latter is highly desirable and thoroughly sound policy-e.g. the development of many Colonial industries. What I object to, however, is the totally false assumption that, because home labour makes the exported commodities which represent foreign investments, foreign investments are therefore the only ones of vital interest to home labour; whereas, in actual fact. as regards this side of the matter (the manufacture of those commodities) British labour is equally interested in either case; while, other things being equal, the home investment is necessarily and obviously of greater benefit to labour in this country, since it is in this country that the labour is employed by it.

There is one other aspect of this matter which ought to be dealt with. The investment of capital abroad was discussed at some length by Mr. Chiozza Money (Elements of the Fiscal Problem). As his treatment of the subject is typical of much modern Free Trade writing, I will here criticise it. I may say that the very simple point that anyone should doubt the desirability of a foreign investment because it is a foreign investment, and not a home investment, seems hardly to have occurred to Mr. Money. He is almost solely concerned with showing that the imports received as interest 'do not deprive anyone here of labour.' 'They are, on the contrary,' says Mr. Money, 'part of the very fund of real wages that is distributed year by year.' They are 'an addition to the wealth of the country.' As the example chosen by Mr. Money is tea, we can well believe that its importation does not deprive tea-growers in England of As to competitive imports, however, that is employment. another matter, and I fail to see why the importation of, say, wheat grown by British capital should produce any different effect on home wheat-growing than that grown by American capital. Mr. Money is totally at variance with Adam Smith on this point, for the latter readily agreed that free importation of a commodity probably would cause unemployment in the home industry concerned. This, however, is not the real gist of the matter. The effect of imports is presumably the same whosever capital produces them; the real point is once more the inevitable half-

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truth that it is interest from foreign investments only which is 'part of the very fund of real wages,' 'an addition to the wealth of the country,' and so on. No mention is made of the fact that interest on home investments is exactly the same, while the capital, being at home, supports home labour. Is a pair of boots made at Leicester by British capital any less 'an addition to the wealth of the country' than a similar pair made by British capital in France, and received as an 'import'? Of course not! Then why disguise the fact? I do not suppose Mr. Money is purposely misleading, but tell the working-man that interest on foreign investments is such a splendid thing, while omitting to state that, however splendid, interest on home investments is just the same, and you naturally lead him to think that foreign investments are the only things that matter, which is misleading to a degree. He has been told again and again that 'capital goes abroad in the form of commodities'-which he helps to make; he is told that the interest received from this exported capital is 'part of the very fund of real wages,' 'an addition to the wealth of the country,' and all the rest of it. Is it any wonder that he views foreign investments with more than complacency? And yet every word is equally true of home investments, with, in their case, the immensely important distinction that the capital itself, which is what really does employ labour, is at home and employing home labour. There was never a more monstrous 'lie that is half a truth' than this; albeit uttered probably in good faith by people who have been content to accept 'formulae expressing half-truths,' without going to the root of the matter and discovering the whole truth. It is not too much to say that the labouring classes in general have been absolutely fooled in this matter of 'capital invested abroad' by pseudoscientific propaganda; whereas the truth, unconfused by false science, is so straightforward and obvious that anyone ought to be able to see it.

We now come to Adam Smith's refutation of the Mercantilist

heresy, and we shall find it simple and obvious enough.

His refutation lies in demonstrating that real wealth does not consist in money, of which gold is, so to speak, the architype, but in the things which money will buy. Gold, after all, is only a metal, which by convention we agree to accept as a medium of exchange. But we cannot eat it, or drink it, as Midas discovered. We cannot make machines, or factories, or clothes out of it; it will not minister to us as a doctor or lawyer or banker. It has its commercial uses, simply as a metal, just as other metals have; but to mistake gold, in the money sense, for real wealth is to mistake the means for the end. Wealth itself consists in commodities and services. Thus the doctor exchanges, via

money or credit, his services for bread and meat and housing. As between nations, this non-material form of wealth, which we call generically 'services,' assumes very great importance, as, for instance, the services to other countries of our shipping industry,


banking and financial services, and so on.

All this becomes so obvious when once pointed out that I need not elaborate it further. But meanwhile, what becomes of Mercantilism? Mistaking the means for the end, the Mercantilists encouraged exports in every way they could, by bounties on exports and so on, in order to bring what they considered wealth -i.e. gold-into the country. But, all unconsciously, it was the real wealth they were urging to leave the country. discouraged imports, believing these would drain wealth-goldout of the country in payment. But, again, it was the real wealth they were preventing from coming in. No refutation could be more complete.1

But Adam Smith found himself, as all Free Traders must, faced with another and more basic difficulty. Granted that his definition of wealth was right, and that of the Mercantilists wrong, did it follow that this country would be more wealthy, the distribution of wealth more even, and the amount of labour employed greater, by importing than by home manufacture? It was easy to see that the importation of cheaper foreign goods would injure the home industry concerned, and therefore render it and those in it relatively less wealthy, thus reducing the amount of employment in it. But would the ultimate total wealth in the country, the aggregate volume of employment in the country, be adversely affected? Would there be more employment under Free Trade than under Protection, or less?

Adam Smith endeavoured to show that, far from being decreased, the amount of employment in the country would be increased; and, in order to do this, evolved what I have called, for want of a neater description, 'The capital-tight frontier theory.' The industry of a country, he says, with perfect truth, is limited by and dependent on the amount of capital employed in it. Stripped of all technical jargon, this means that if my works or business, and everybody else's in the country, are run fully efficiently, I shall not economically be able to employ more labour without increasing my capital-i.e. my plant generally, or some part of it. Just as 'wealth' does not n ean money, but the things, material or not, which money will buy; so 'capital' does not mean an abstract conception of so many thousand pounds invested, which yield me an annual income, but real wealth used

I I am fully aware of the economic importance of gold as the basis of credit, especially in time of war; but it is impossible adequately to discuss banking and exchange matters within the scope of this article.



productively—i.e. to produce further wealth; e.g. a machine, a factory, or a farm. Trace capital to its ultimate point, and you will find it always and necessarily exists in some such concrete form. Even the capital of a doctor is analogous, and consists in his accumulated skill and knowledge. Keeping this conception of capital in mind, it is clear enough that we cannot employ the staffs of, say, two breweries, if there is only one in existence; or, as Adam Smith says, 'Industry is limited by capital.'

In order to show, therefore, while perforce admitting that foreign competition injured the home industry, that nevertheless the sum total of employment in the country would not be reduced, it was necessary for him to show, if possible, that the sum total of capital in the country would not be reduced. Consequently, he evolved his 'capital-tight frontier' theory, already referred to. This theory, or statement, practically was to the effect that the frontier of a country forms an impermeable barrier to the egress (or ingress) of capital. Why this, the most basic and most flagrant fallacy of 'national' Free Trade, has never yet been properly exposed, I do not profess to know. It was certainly not exposed by List, generally hailed as the apostle of scientific Protection, whose argument is little more than an elaboration of 'the infant industries' idea, conceded long ago even by orthodox Free Traders, headed by J. S. Mill. It has been touched on by such writers and economists as Professors Ashley and Nicholson, but they have certainly not driven home the fact that the Free Trade theory stands or falls by it; and as it is to-day patently wrong, Free Trade must fall.

Every individual [writes Adam Smith] endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he can, and consequently, as much as he can, in support of domestic industry.

From thence onwards, as anyone may see for himself who takes the trouble to read *The Wealth of Nations*, he assumes, not only that every individual 'endeavours' to do this, but does do this, until we reach his final conclusion:

Though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown out of their ordinary employment . . . it would by no means follow that they would thereby be deprived of employment . . . The stock (capital) which employed them in a particular manufacture before will still remain in the country to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The capital of the country remaining the same, the demand for labour will be the same.

Observe the 'capital-tight frontier'! But it needs little power of deduction to see that if the capital does not remain in the country the demand for labour will not be the same, on Adam Smith's own showing.

A word of explanation is here necessary. The capital we are concerned with in all these cases is not present capital, to any extent, but future capital. Obviously, the capital represented by the buildings, etc., of an industry or business must 'remain in the country'; equally obviously, if, ex hypothesi, that business is ruined, or even maimed or checked by foreign competition, this particular capital does not and cannot employ the same amount of labour as before. The capital of the country in respect to that business does not remain the same. It is depreciated: it may be reduced to mere old bricks and scrap iron and disused machinery. But considering capital as a whole, generically, we see that it is a sort of Phoenix, which is re-born from its own ashes. It is naturally regenerative. Every year so much is saved and added to the capital of a country, partly to repair the inevitable wastage and depreciation of old capital, partly as new capital to extend existing businesses or to start new ones.

It is of capital in this future or potential sense that Adam Smith is really thinking, though his language is not very plain: an error repaired by Mill; and it is in this sense we must consider it. Adam Smith's real argument is that, as none of this future capital will leave the country, but 'will remain to employ an equal number of people in some other way,' the sum total of labour ultimately will not be diminished, but rather increased;

as I shall show in the next paragraph.

The central conception of the Free Trade theory was that of 'Natural advantages.' Smith argued that if a foreign country could supply us with a commodity cheaper than we could make it, this proved that that country had a natural advantage over us for the manufacture of that article; and even if the advantage was only acquired, it would in either case still be better economy for us to give up the former manufacture to that other country which had the advantage, and to devote ourselves to some other industry in which the advantage lay with us. Thus both countries, and, with universal Free Trade, all countries, would obtain the maximum result at the minimum of effort. Meanwhile, as regards any given country; ours for example:

The general industry of the society, being always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest advantage.

The capital 'will still remain in the country to employ an equal number of people in some other way '—and presumably, since 'the other way' is supposed to be more advantageous, an even greater number of people will be employed.

The theory is beautiful in its simplicity, and works out like a sum in simple addition. Unfortunately, it all turns, if

we are to regard the existence of nationality, on the aforementioned 'capital-tight frontier.' It scarcely needs pointing out that if the (future) capital does not remain in the country the demand for labour in the country will not be the same. The same amount, or more, of labour will be employed, truly enough; but it will not be labour in this country. It will be labour whereever the capital goes to. This is the fatal flaw in the 'national' Free Trade theory, a flaw that absolutely shatters it. When we consider that to-day we have about one fifth of our whole capital invested abroad, the folly of relying on a system based on the supposition that capital will not go abroad at all is patent.

The real truth is that real Free Trade is incompatible with and definitely antagonistic to nationality, that preference for living in a certain part of the world rather than in another part, because it happens to be 'my country.' Even apart from sentiment, such factors as language and climate render Free Trade an impossible ideal. Be it clearly understood that, uninfluenced. capital will go anywhere, and where it goes labour must follow, or remain behind without that capital to employ it. It ought always to be borne in mind, too, that Adam Smith imbibed many of his ideas from cosmopolitan philosophers, Quesnay in particular; and the latter said that, for the proper conception of Free Trade, it was necessary to imagine the world as one vast commercial republic. Adam Smith, however, was at any rate a patriot, and by means of his 'capital-tight frontier' theory he endeavoured, as it were, to make of our country a microcosm of the globe. He wanted to show that Free Trade was right, and he wanted to adapt it to the idea of nationality. It doubtless appealed to him strongly, because of his passion for individual liberty, non-interference by the State, Laisser faire. Free Trade represented all these to him, and he made a gallant but mistaken attempt to reconcile it with nationality, which he also loved. Substitute the word 'world' for 'country' in all his argument, and all he says is true. For there is only one 'capital-tight frontier'-that of the globe, and as Mr. Balfour said in his fine speech at Bingley Hall, 'We have to-day mobile capital, international capital.' Had Adam Smith written: 'Though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown out of their ordinary employment, it would by no means follow that they would thereby be deprived of employment. . . . The stock which employed them in a particular manufacture before will still remain in the world to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The capital of the world remaining the same, the demand for labour will likewise be the same, though it may be exerted in different places (anywhere in the world), and for different occupations,' he would have written the truth, and we should not to-day be a Free Trade

country.

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In order to grasp the Free Trade argument in its completeness, it is necessary to examine also the converse case; not that of an industry more or less ruined by Free Trade, but of one established, or kept established, by Protection. J. S. Mill, who so thoroughly assumed the Free Trade mantle of Adam Smith, affords us the best example of the orthodox treatment of such a case, and incidentally reveals how rooted had become the 'capital-tight frontier' fiction by this time, notwithstanding that, apart from Free Trade dogmas, he was perfectly familiar with foreign investment on a large scale.

He commences by restating Adam Smith's dictum that the amount of industry in a country depends on the amount of capital

in it. He continues :

Yet in disregard of a fact so evident, it long continued to be believed that laws and Governments, without creating capital, could create industry. A Government would, by prohibitory laws, put a stop to the importation of some commodity; and when by this it had caused the commodity to be produced at home [good evidence, by the way, of the efficacy of Protection!] it would plume itself upon having enriched the country with a new branch of industry, and parade in statistical tables the amount of produce yielded and labour employed. Had legislators been aware that industry is limited by capital, they would have seen that, the aggregate capital of the country not having been increased, any portion of it which they, by their laws, had caused to be embarked in the newly acquired branch of industry must have been withdrawn or withheld from some other in which it gave, or would have given, employment to probably about the same quantity of labour.

Observe how absolutely the possibility of the requisite capital being 'withdrawn or withheld' from any foreign 'source or destination' is excluded! The 'capital-tight frontier' with a vengeance! From what British industry, I wonder, came the capital for, say, the German-owned Sanatogen works in Cornwall? Why should not the capital be 'withdrawn or withheld' from that vast sum of hundreds of millions which annually we invest abroad? Why? Because Adam Smith said that people did not invest abroad, and we have been content to believe it ever since with the facts staring us in the face! When Adam Smith wrote, his statement was more or less true, and there is an illuminative footnote in Mill to the effect that 'Foreign investments have ceased to inspire the terror that belongs to the unknown.' That was written in 1865, and how much of that 'terror' survives to-day? Yet Free Trade as a national system really depends on it, on a factor which everyone knows has utterly ceased to exist. It was that 'terror' which enabled Adam Smith to say, with truth in his day, that 'every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he can.' It was a form of natural Protection on which Adam

Smith counted, and for a long time it operated. It did, when Adam Smith wrote, constitute a comparatively 'capital-tight frontier.' That it does so no longer, and has long ceased to do so, hardly needs demonstration.

There are two further comments to be made on the above extract from Mill, which is the Free Trade case against Protection. Firstly, the obvious one, that if the capital in question were 'withdrawn or withheld' (usually the latter) from a foreign source or destination, additional labour would be employed, on Mill's own showing; and, secondly, as with my quotation from Adam Smith, that Mill's argument is sound enough if we regard the entire world as 'one commercial republic,' and do not care whether labour is employed in this country rather than in some other. Of course, regarding the world as one commercial unit, as the founders of Free Trade before Adam Smith intended it should be regarded, it is manifestly true that the capital drawn to one industry by Protection must have been 'withdrawn or withheld' from another somewhere else in the world, and in such a case no one would care. Having no national considerations to worry about, the only point of importance is that the sum total of employment in the world is not adversely affected. As, however, the world happens to be composed of different nationalities, it makes all the difference to us in England, for example, that capital should be withheld, say, from Germany, and employed in England; and this, on Mill's own showing, Protection can accomplish. It can enable a Government to 'plume itself upon having enriched the country with a new branch of industry, and parade in statistical tables the amount of produce yielded and labour employed.' Protection is above all a national idea. The cry 'Support home industries' is not economically wrong, as it would be if Free Trade were right. We have not merely a sentimental but an economic justification for doing so.

This strange obsession, in defiance of the most notorious facts, of 'the capital-tight frontier,' has led all the Free Trade economists, from Adam Smith to Professor Marshall, to disregard a most important distinction. In all their writings they always refer to the capital of a country as synonymous with the capital in a country; with the deduction that the capital of a country—i.e. owned collectively by the inhabitants—is necessarily a criterion of the amount of employment in it. This, however, is by no means the case. We get the apparent paradox that, as regards employment, it may be better for a nation to be less wealthy, in order that a wider distribution of wealth may be achieved.

To illustrate this, suppose an island, inhabited by a few rich men, with their families and servants, and let us suppose they actually import everything they require for their daily consumption. What they consume, as Mill says, supports no one but themselves; though in real life this is obscured by the fact that the goods received as interest on foreign-invested capital are not, as a rule, those actually consumed by their owners, but are exchanged for an equivalent value of other goods (and services) which the owners do consume. To return to our island: its imports will be large; its visible exports probably nil, and the employment in it trifling, consisting merely of a few domestics, gardeners, and so on. But outside that island, wherever the capital of its rich inhabitants may be, hundreds of thousands, perhaps, of men and women will be employed by that capital. In such a case, we see plainly that the mere wealth of the inhabitants is no test of the amount of labour employed in the island.

Now, let us suppose that some superior power decrees that some article shall no longer be imported into the island—say, wine. We will further suppose that the soil and climate of the island are not unsuited to viticulture, though, as a concession to Free Trade convictions, less so than somewhere else. The inhabitants, still desiring wine, decide to start a native industry, and some of their capital is 'withdrawn or withheld' from outside and devoted to this purpose. For this, labour is required, and we will imagine that the island contains a certain number of aborigines who can be utilised for vine-growing and the manufacture of wine. In short, the industry is started, and employment given to labour otherwise 'unemployed,' merely eking out a hand-to-mouth existence.

Now, because this home-made wine costs more than the imported, the aggregate wealth of the community is, pro rata, reduced. Yet some hundreds of people are employed who otherwise would not have been employed. In other words, more employment is given in our island, even though it is collectively less wealthy, because the prohibition or checking of a certain import has induced the capital-owning class to employ a part of their capital in it instead of outside it, thus forcing them to share their wealth among the inhabitants instead of among those of another country.

The considerations of vote-catching have hitherto prevented frankness on this point. No Conservative dared admit that goods made at home might, even at first, cost more. My object here is not merely to admit the possibility, but to condone and even extol it. If they do cost more, it is only the price paid by the nation for the extra employment given in the country, and probably a very trifling price for a very great gain. An extra penny a pound for sugar, say, would not grievously afflict

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many people; but it might be just enough to launch the beetsugar industry in this country, to rehabilitate agriculture in many districts, to start sugar refineries, to encourage the manufacture of sugar machinery, and to employ thousands. It is worth it. Of course, just as taxation is unremunerative beyond a certain point, so beyond a point it would not pay to insist on the home manufacture of certain articles, such as the instance taken by Adam Smith, of growing grapes for wine under glass in Scotland. With taxation, we find that up to a point the duty-e.g. on imported tobacco-may be increased and yield an increasing revenue. Beyond that point the rise in price diminishes the consumption of tobacco to such an extent that even the higher duty yields a lower gross revenue. So with protective duties. Up to a point, even if the home-made goods cost more, the extra price paid for them by the other inhabitants does not reduce employment in those industries using them enough to counterbalance the gain in employment in the new industry. instance, owing to the rise in price of some such article, a certain industry is hampered, and reduces its staff, actually or potentially, by 100 men. But the industry making the protected goods may be employing 1000 men who, but for Protection, would not have been employed. On the other hand, the rise in price may be so great as seriously to cripple the original industry, so that it has to discharge more labour actually than the new industry can employ. Nevertheless, up to a point, a rise in price is nothing to be afraid of, but rather welcomed. Students of Professor Marshall's 'Marginal' methods of argument may find a good application for them here.2

By way of finally illustrating the inherent simplicity of this long-debated matter, once the Mercantilist mists are blown away, let me reduce the rival cases to their very simplest terms, and

present them in the form of a sum in simple arithmetic.

Let us suppose that in England there are just two industries; say, a carpenter's and a blacksmith's. The carpenter's wife, we will suppose, wants a blouse of French silk. The carpenter, therefore, 'exports' a table to France, which we will value at 5 units, and 'imports' 5 units value of silk. England's position is that she has simply 'swapped' the one for the other, and the addition to her wealth is just 5 units value of silk.

The Government now decides to make silk in England. Its importation is forbidden, and an English silk industry is started.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The argument that unless Protection does bring higher prices, it can be of no use, is quite unsound. What industries ask for first is not higher prices, but more customers. Given these, they can generally lower prices. Now, 'more customers' is just what Protection gives, by diverting potential home customers from the foreign to the home industries.

The carpenter's wife insists on another blouse; but now it has to be English silk. Again the carpenter parts with a table, but this time it goes to the English silk industry, instead of to the French one. England's position now is that she has both silk and table, which latter she would have lost had the silk been imported. In other words, England has gained 10 units of value instead of 5. Now, what is the orthodox and only Free Trade answer to the apparently obvious moral of this? Simply our old friend 'the capital-tight frontier'; for there is no other. It has to be assumed that all the available capital of the country is already locked up and fully employed in the country. On our assumption, for the sake of simplicity, that there are only two industries—a carpenter's and a blacksmith's—and no more capital available, clearly, if it is wished to establish a new industry. this can only be done by 'withdrawing or withholding,' as Mill puts it, capital from one of these two; in this case, the blacksmith's. Consequently, by establishing a silk industry, we merely 'rob Peter to pay Paul.' By what the country gains in silk it loses in horseshoes. Including the blacksmith's production in our account, the national gain in either case would be as follows .

Under Free Trade.

5 units of French silk (but loss of a table) 5 units of horseshoes

Total 10 units

Under Protection (the Free Trade view of it, that is).

5 units of English silk (but no horseshoes)

5 units of table

Total 10 units.

Even this does not do the Free Trade case, such as it is, full justice; for we have to assume that, owing to 'natural' or other advantages, silk can be manufactured more economically, more cheaply, in France than in England: that therefore the capital withdrawn or withheld from the blacksmith's industry produces a smaller return in English silk than it would have done in horseshoes. Thus the sum would stand:

Under Protection (the Free Trade view).

4 (say) units of English silk (in place of 5 units of horseshoes) 5 units of table.

Total 9 units.

i.e. actually a comparative loss of 1 unit to the country, and all that that involves in the way of employment, etc., as compared to the state of affairs under Free Trade.

This last is the absolute essence of the true Free Trade contention, and is easily answered. Let us grant, for the moment, that English silk, at first at any rate, cannot be produced as cheaply as French silk; but assume also that it is not necessary to disestablish and disendow our blacksmith in order to start an English silk industry: that the capital is, in fact, 'withdrawn or withheld' from a foreign 'source or destination'; let us assume that the frontier is not 'capital-tight,' and that this new capital is additional to that already in the country.

How would the sum stand then? We should get:

Under Protection.
5 units of table
5 units of horseshoes
4 units of English silk

Total 14 units.

i.e. a gain over the Free Trade position of at any rate 4 units; which, translated, means the addition of so much industry and employment as is required for the manufacture of goods at home which previously were imported. But even the above desirable result makes a concession: that English silk cannot be made as cheaply as French silk. That concession, however, as regards imported manufactures in general, I am by no means prepared to make. It is common knowledge that in the bulk of manufacturing industries, as between the chief manufacturing countries of the world, there is no insuperable 'natural' advantage. Adam Smith's example of growing grapes under glass in Scotland is not analogous. Cheapness is, in most manufactures, simply a matter of a large enough production and a good enough organisation3: for example, the Ford Motor Company, of America. Its raw materials are probably no cheaper than ours; the cost of its labour is certainly far higher. But it has an output of about 900 cars a day, and an organisation that is unequalled, and it can undersell any car of the same quality throughout the world. Thus, assuming that our requisite capital is additional to that already within the country, and not simply withheld from another home investment, there is no reason, in the great majority of cases, why we should not, by making the goods ourselves, realise the full 15 units of value; or even more, if it ultimately proves, as it may, that we can manufacture at a lower price than we previously paid for the imported commodity?

And why should we not assume this? There is every reason, on the contrary, why we should. Indeed, it appears to me almost axiomatic that the capital required to establish or extend a protected industry in this country would be withheld from a foreign

3 See note on page 711.

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and not from a home destination. For this reason: there are only two places where capital can be invested—at home or abroad: Now, things pursuing the inside the country or outside it. normal course of events under Free Trade, as at present, a certain amount of capital is invested at home year by year, which bears a fairly fixed ratio to the amount of industry in the country. The rest perforce goes abroad; to how large an extent is not always realised. The last figures I have available (from The Economist) are for the year 1909, when for 18,000,000l. invested at home, 163,000,000l, went abroad, in the proportion of 74,000,000l. to our Colonies, and 89,000,000l. to foreign countries. Now, supposing that the necessity or opportunity arises to manufacture at home certain goods previously imported: such a necessity as is brought about by the checking of some import by means of Protection, or its stoppage, by reason of the present War. From what destination is the capital withheld? Surely from a foreign one. For an additional demand for capital is made. In the ordinary course of events, this country could only, and would only, absorb a certain amount of capital, and the rest would go abroad. But here is a fresh demand. The normal demands would be met as before, but the new one would be satisfied by capital which, for want of another outlet, would otherwise have had to go abroad from sheer force of circumstances, from sheer inability to find a sufficiently attractive opening at home. That appears to me the obvious deduction to draw. Even supposing, however, that some of the fresh capital required would, in any case, have found a home investment; and there is no very clear reason why, under Free Trade, the normal demand should be affected one way or the other; even supposing this, it is surely reasonable, with the vast annual amount of our foreign investments, and the equally vast possibilities of foreign-owned capital being attracted to this country, to suppose that some, a fairly large proportion, even if not all, of the fresh capital should be 'withdrawn or withheld' from beyond that 'capital-tight frontier' on which Adam Smith based his case. And, if it is, it does follow, pro rata, that, for every penny of it, more labour is employed than otherwise would have been. As Mill puts it, 'Every increase of capital gives, or is capable of giving, additional employment to labour; and this without assignable limit.' Let us make a bid for this additional employment. Granted nationality on the one hand, and the international and cosmopolitan nature of capital on the other, there is no sound economic reason why we should not do so. Our doing so will not, as some 'Tariff Reformers' have appeared to believe, introduce either the millennium, or even, indefinitely, 'work for all,' since population always tends to increase up to

the limits of what capital can support. It will, however, raise the level of employment higher than it would be under unaided Nature and Free Trade; just as irrigation, while unable to produce an unlimited amount of crops, does bring, so to speak, abnormal fertility to otherwise barren acres.

My last point is that of revenue, which is one we are likely to have to consider seriously, whatever our Free Trade convictions may be. It has been customary among Free Trade politicians to cry down the revenue-producing powers of a tariff, from obvious political motives. There is, for example, their famous dilemma, that Protection and a revenue from a tariff are irreconcilable one with another. This, of course, is not the case, since a wise Protectionist tariff does not aim at the total exclusion of foreign goods; in order to preserve a certain amount of healthy competition. Thus the goods which are kept out afford Protection, while those that come in afford revenue. As to whether 'the foreigner pays the duty,' that deeply pondered-over but essentially trivial election cry, everyone knows that sometimes, by being able and content to accept lower profits, he does pay the duty, and sometimes he does not. It depends on the economic position of the article in question. These political catch-words, however, need not detain us. Nobody will deny that Protection affords protection, and I trust I have shown that, given nationality, this is economically justifiable; and, after all, the giving of Protection to home industries is the main object. But, as regards revenue from a tariff, which is a subsidiary, though highly important object, I cannot better describe the revenue-producing powers of a tariff than in the words of that eminent Free Trade economist, J. R. McCulloch, which should be a sufficient answer to those who deny the efficacy of a tariff to produce revenue on one or other of the above grounds, or because, as they say, the cost of collection would swallow up the greater part of the revenue. Writing of facts which had come under his own close observation, McCulloch says:

The net Customs revenue derived from duties on imports amounted in 1845 to no less than 21,706,197l., and notwithstanding the exorbitant duties on tea, tobacco, and a few other articles (which would be more productive if reduced by half), it would be easy to show that no equal amount of revenue was ever raised in any country or period of time with so little inconvenience, and that there are no grounds for believing it could be so advantageously collected in any other way.

If we compare the volume of imports (roughly one sixth) in 1845 with that of to-day, we shall better be able to appreciate the enormous revenue which this country might derive from a Protectionist tariff, apart altogether from the benefits conferred by Protection itself, which, by increasing the wealth in the country, would provide even further sources of revenue.

Since the above was written, events have compelled our Free Trade Government to abandon in practice many positions which in theory they are still pledged to hold. They will probably be compelled to abandon others, even more vital to the Free Trade cause. For example, we have it on the authority of the Bradford Dyers' Association, and of practically every authority concerned, that the enormously valuable aniline dye industry, hitherto chiefly a German property, cannot be started in this country on a sound financial basis without a Government guarantee of Protection of some sort after the War is over; the reason being that capitalists, whose co-operation is necessary, will not 'divert' their capitals to a sufficiently large extent in this direction without this guarantee. And no one can fairly blame them. Investing money from purely altruistic motives is apt to be an expensive hobby.

The same state of affairs almost certainly exists with regard to the sugar-beet industry, a magnificent agricultural and industrial opportunity of which we have not yet seen fit to avail ourselves; thereby losing a whole year's start, at any rate; since crops happen to grow at a certain period of the year.

As regards the aniline dye industry, an alternative method of Protection has been proposed, and has found favour with such Free Traders as Lord Cromer (letter to The Times, January 23. 1915)—namely, the system of subsidies, or bounties. Cromer considers it the lesser evil. While agreeing that it would probably be less of a shock to Free Trade sensibilities. I personally consider it a far more crude, and far less economic, method of applying Protection. It is a process of 'robbing Peter to pay Paul,' pure and simple. This is not necessarily bad, assuming Paul to be a deserving case; but it is not the best way of relieving Paul. However that may be, the fact remains that even such eminent Free Traders as Lord Cromer (and the Bradford Dyers' Association probably includes a few also) are all agreed that to 'capture' - and keep-this industry, some form of Protection is imperative. Whether the Government will promise it or not still remains to be seen. It seems a choice between doing so and failing to acquire the industry. The same, I think, is true of sugar beet, and probably of most of the other industries which we desire to capture and to keep; or even merely to keep, in some cases.

Another noteworthy departure from the principles of Laisserfaire—which is the psychologic basis of Free Trade—is the control recently assumed by the Government over future issues of capital. Especially is it noteworthy in the distinction drawn between home (or British) and foreign investments. This action of the Government is about as clear a recognition as we are likely

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to get from Free Traders that, in contradistinction to the views of Adam Smith, a Government can, with benefit to the nation, 'direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals,' and that, in the opinion of our present Free Trade Government, this action is not 'folly and presumption,' as Adam Smith described it.

Without attempting to catalogue the Government's lapses from Free Trade economic grace, it is only right to put to ourselves this question. If, now that war has enlarged facts so that even the most purblind pedant amongst us has to see them, we find that every vital principle demanded by a certain theory has to be jettisoned in practice, and the principles of the opposite theory substituted, are we not justified in the deduction that the practice and the opposite theory are right, and the old theory wrong? It is vain for Free Traders to plead that these lapses are only emergencies of the War. War has altered the degree of these matters, but not their basic principles. An aniline dye industry will not cease to be a valuable national acquisition after the War is over; and it would have been valuable before the War. Doubtless it would be particularly valuable now, because our dyers are actually deprived of certain products which their industry requires. But the supplying of these products is. nationally, the least part of the matter. The really important thing is the extra employment opened up for capital, and therefore for labour, in this country, both directly and indirectly. Such a process is like a transfusion of life blood, which extends its vivifying effects throughout the whole corporate body.

DOUGLAS GRAHAM.

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## SEA FREIGHTS AND THE COST OF FOOD

THE fluctuation in the rate of freights upon foodstuffs, general merchandise, and raw materials carried from oversea is always of first importance to the industrial population of Great Britain, but during the present critical period through which we are passing the interests of the whole population are more directly affected, and the matter is therefore one of national concern.

A strong agitation has been raised in favour of Government intervention with the view to cheapen the cost of sea freight upon all cargoes carried in British vessels destined to the United Kingdom. Meanwhile the recent important debates in the House of Commons, which brought forward many points of great interest, have done much to enlighten the general public upon this very difficult and complicated question, and the decision of the Government not to take any of those drastic measures that have been persistently urged has met with general approval.

That there would be a general advance in the price of foodstuffs during the period of the War was natural and expected. We are at war with a first-class naval Power, but although there have been substantial increases in prices, the doleful predictions of those who upon every conceivable occasion urged that, should Great Britain be involved in hostilities with a great naval Power, bread would soar to famine prices, and our population be reduced to a state bordering upon starvation, have happily been falsified. Upon the outbreak of war, and as an immediate consequence, international commerce was greatly hampered, and, in fact, most seriously restricted by financial difficulties. These disturbances in the world's commercial relations grievously affected the ramifications of our great shipping industry. In the course of time, however, confidence was re-established and international financial operations again became possible.

When the War broke out shipowners were among the first to feel the effects of the alarming situation with which we were. confronted. Our merchant ships were scattered in all parts of the world; enemy cruisers were to be met with on every sea, and the danger of capture and destruction was imminent and great, as was quickly proved by the number of British vessels that were

overtaken and sunk by the Emden and other German cruisers. Immediately preceding the declaration of war the freight markets were in a state of severe depression, and signs were not wanting that the shipping industry was on the eve of a long period of unremunerative employment. Added to the unprofitable freights a serious strike had broken out in the ranks of sea-going engineers, and many loaded ships were hung up for a considerable period in the home ports owing to the shipowners being unable to concede the demands of the Engineers' Union for a higher scale of wage. Some of the first vessels offered to and accepted by the Admiralty for transporting coal, etc., to the British Fleets were actually on passage home from the Mediterranean in ballast, being unable to secure homeward freights from the Black Sea, etc., and in many cases these vessels were being brought home to lay up pending a revival of the freight markets. The opinion was general in shipping circles that the industry was in danger of suffering a like period of depression to that experienced after the Boer War-a depression that lasted from 1902 to 1910. During these years many of our steamship companies were in serious financial straits. So low were freights that no adequate return was available upon the large amount of capital invested in the industry, approximately 150,000,000l. being sunk in tramp steamships alone. Owners were not only unable to declare dividends but seldom were in a position to make any provision for the rapid depreciation of their ships. This depression came to an end in 1910, and was followed by a general revival in freights, which enabled shipowners to augment their fleets by the purchase of new ships, and when the present War broke out the newly acquired tonnage was of incalculable value in providing the Admiralty with ships of recent construction, possessing the latest and most approved facilities for convenient and rapid loading and discharging, and in every way competent to perform the indispensable services of transports for the Royal Navy.

Our shipowners have always prided themselves upon the fact that by their own unaided efforts they have built up our mercantile fleets. They have received little Government assistance; on the contrary, the general complaint is that the industry has been considerably hampered by excessive legislation. It must be remembered, however, that shipping is one of the most dangerous of our national industries, and that shipping legislation has been mainly exercised with the view of minimising the risks and improving the conditions of labour of those employed in the

It may not be generally understood that as a rule each ship is a distinct limited liability company. A steamship manager who controls a large fleet of vessels is really running a number of


separate and distinct companies, for whose management he is responsible. Thus while the shareholders in one company may secure a good return upon the invested capital owing to successful voyages, other ships under the same management, owing to exigencies of freight markets, may be sailing at a loss.

The attacks which have been made upon shipowners have naturally been deeply resented in shipping circles. To blame shipowners for forcing up freights is unreasonable and absurd. Freights are ruled by supply and demand. If the demand for ships from any part of the world is greater than the available free tonnage, then freights will advance until the supply is adjusted to the demand. It may be that the Argentine is short of tonnage and is paying a higher proportion of freight than that ruling from India, Australia, Canada, etc., but the price of grain will be adjusted by imports from other parts of the world, and while some shipowners will benefit by the increased freight from the Argentine, others may be carrying cargoes home from other parts of the world without profit.

Although some ships have greatly benefited by the present high freights, many are still locked up in the ports of the Baltic, Azof, and Black Seas, and must remain idle until the end of the War or until the fleets of the Allied Powers are able to relieve them.

It should be clearly understood that the ships of our mercantile marine, with the exception of those engaged in some important general and regular lines, are free from any rings, conferences, combinations, etc., nor have any extraneous means been adopted to raise freights since the outbreak of war. The bulk of the cargoes from distant grain ports are carried by tramp steamers. These vessels are free to engage in employment from any part of the world, and each voyage is a separate venture, the success or failure of which depends entirely upon a variety of circumstances. A shipowner sends his ships where he expects the best combination of outward and homeward employment, and this is the secret of successful steamship management, but his calculations are often upset by circumstances over which there is no control.

The present high standard of freights cannot fail to return handsome profits to the shareholders who have capital invested in ships that are free to take full advantage of the present position, but the profits earned under the existing abnormal conditions are nothing approaching what they would be were such freights obtainable under anything like normal conditions. The high level of freights now general is largely the result of a number of disabilities, many of which were quite unforeseen, and which have added enormously to the cost of navigation; in fact, the diffi-



culties which have confronted shipowners since the outbreak of war have been of a character little understood by those not closely in touch with the industry.

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In the early days of August last our ships were trading under policies of insurance covering them only against the ordinary perils of the sea. For many years shipowners have taken energetic steps to persuade the Government to adopt a scheme of State insurance against King's enemy risks, and under such a scheme shipowners would have been contributors. precautionary measure been adopted, the State would have held in reserve large accumulated funds to meet contingent losses. However, the reasonable proposals of shipowners did not receive Government favour, and they worked out a scheme themselves through the medium of their Protecting and Indemnity Associations for mutually sharing the losses not covered under the ordinary policies of insurance. Upon the outbreak of war it was fortunately discovered that the Imperial Defence Committee had foreseen the difficulties which would follow hostilities, and there was already in existence a scheme prepared by that Committee, under which the State agreed to combine with the shipowners and to share the risks provided for through the Protecting and Indemnity Associations. Under this scheme the State undertakes 80 per cent. of the risk in return for 80 per cent. of the premiums paid by shipowners to their Associations for this purpose, thus leaving 20 per cent. to be borne by the shipowners themselves.

The Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association estimates that the total value of ships employed since the outbreak of war (excluding those taken as Government transports, upon which the State assumes all risks) has been about 120,000,000l., and it is probable that the war insurance has cost shipowners at least 3 per cent. on the ships valued at this figure.

A heavy charge has therefore fallen unexpectedly upon the shipping community, which has materially added to the working costs. As an instance, in the case of one firm managing a fleet of eighteen large tramp steamers, already the sum of 14,000l. has been paid in premiums to cover King's enemy risks since the outbreak of war. This is, of course, over and above the premiums payable to cover ordinary perils of the sea.

The scarcity of crews to man the ships has also proved a problem of more than ordinary difficulty. The withdrawal of the men of the Royal Naval Reserve for service in the ships of the British Fleet, and also a proportion of the 30,000 alien sailors who found constant employment in our merchant ships, has not only caused a serious shortage but has also raised the standard rate of wages from 51. 10s. per month current in July last to

71. 10s, per month, which is the wage now demanded and paid by tramp steamers.

Some 1500 merchant vessels have been requisitioned to comply with the demands of the Admiralty, representing about 20 per cent. of our total mercantile marine and about 10 per cent. of the world's tonnage. These ships are the largest, finest, and most modern of our merchant vessels, and have the highest speed and

best equipment for rapid loading and discharging.

The withdrawal of this great fleet of cargo steamers from the world's trade was bound to have an immediate effect upon the freight markets. So serious a reduction in the competition for the transport of cargoes to and from all parts of the world would in any circumstances have caused a great rise in freights, but under the prevailing sensitive conditions the advance was certain to be of an exceptional character, and although freights appear to have reached the top, it is doubtful if there will be any appreciable fall unless circumstances arise to facilitate despatch in loading and discharging both in United Kingdom ports and abroad, for ships are quite unable to perform the same amount of service under the existing abnormal conditions as they are capable of rendering in normal times.

There has, of course, been a serious and continual shrinkage of available tonnage owing to the number of merchant vessels sunk by enemy cruisers, submarines, and mines, and the usual perils of the seas. No less than 466,000 tons of British shipping have been withdrawn from British registers owing to these causes, besides the British vessels interned in enemy ports and those that are unable to leave the Baltic and Black Seas. Considerable time will be necessary to replace this shortage, owing to the delay in the shipbuilding yards due to the depletion in the ranks of skilled labour and the large amount of Government work now under construction in private shipbuilding yards and engineering shops. Where Government work is under way, orders for private account have to be set aside. The setting back of the dates of delivery of new tonnage has caused a great demand for secondhand ships, which are now changing hands at most extravagant and previously unheard-of prices.

Probably the greatest difficulty which shipowners have to face, and which has undoubtedly been one of the main factors in influencing the freight market, is the great congestion upon railways, on quays, and in warehouses. The delay in loading and discharging cargoes has been most pronounced, and has been the source of much irritation and loss to all connected with the import and export trade, besides prolonging the length of voyages

when ships are urgently required.

These delays are naturally not confined to the ports of our own country, but are met with in French and Italian ports and in CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



all countries which are directly or indirectly affected by the War. In the case of the North French ports, voyages have in some cases taken four or five times as long as under normal conditions.

These delays have made it impossible to fix the position of steamers, upsetting calculations as to dates of loading and sailing. Docks and harbours are congested with cargo lying waiting for steamers which are hopelessly behind their expected loading dates, and general confusion has resulted as regards the shipment and delivery of merchandise. On the 29th of January the London docks were so congested that forty vessels were lying at Gravesend waiting for discharging berths. These delays are mainly due to the movements of troop trans, the carriage of immense quantities of munitions of war, the witndrawal of large bodies of men from their regular employment through enlistment, gaps thus caused being inadequately filled by men of inferior quality and unskilled in handling heavy traffic. According to the Railway Gazette over 70,000 of the most active employees have been withdrawn from the railway service, many of whom were in operating departments and whose places cannot be readily filled. Shortage of barges, rolling stock, carts, and horses are all contributory causes.

The unfair and exaggerated charges levelled against shipowners as being wholly responsible for the advance in the price of foodstuffs were the subject of debate in the House of Commons on the 12th of February. These accusations, made with much acrimony and persistency, did not meet with the approval of the Prime Minister, for during the course of his speech there is no trace of reflection upon the shipping interest. In dealing with the difficulties of transport and the rise in freights, the Prime Minister said:

In the case of wheat, it has no doubt been a factor of considerable importance, but by no means the main factor, and I am not sure that an exaggerated value has not been attributed to it in some quarters. Let me take one or two illustrations. Experts in these matters are accustomed to take what is called No. 1 Manitoba wheat as the standard. The price in Liverpool of that quality rose between July 1914, just before the war, and January of the present year from 36s. 3d. to 57s. 11d. a quarter-in round figures, by 22s. Of that 22s. no less than 18s. 6d. is to be attributed to the increased price in New York, and only 3s. 6d. to the increased freight. If you take Argentine wheat, there undoubtedly the rise in freights has been a more substantial factor. But the Argentine crop, for reasons to which I have already referred, has not come forward, and it is the American crop which dominated the market during the whole of this time. I am not at all sure, if the Argentine crop had been forthcoming at an earlier date, whether the Argentine grower would not have got quite as much as the shipowner of the increased price to the British public. Though I do not in the least minimise the importance of the question of freights, it is desirable that we should realise that it has not been the determining factor, but only a contributory cause. The determining factor in the market has been the price in the Chicago and New York markets. These high prices in America may be, and I suspect are, due-to a large extent beyond the legitimate causes, curtailed supply and increased demand-to speculation. The market there is in a very sensitive-what I believe they call a nervous and jumpy-condition.

I do not know that there are any means by which the Governments of the world can control the speculations of the market. As a rule, speculation provides its own remedy. At any rate, after next June, when, so far as we can anticipate, there is no great likelihood of any substantial shortage in the wheat supplies of the world, the era of feverish speculation will come to an end.

American speculation in wheat is no new feature, and has been carried on to an cormous extent since the outbreak of war. More favourable conditions for gambling in wheat could hardly have been found, with urgent demands for purchase from European Governments, added to the buying for private account, and it is therefore small wonder that prices in Chicago and New York advanced by leaps and bounds.

It was not in the nature of things to expect otherwise. Our country is so dependent upon imported foodstuffs that during a national crisis of such magnitude we are at the mercy of grainexporting countries, and have reason to congratulate ourselves that wheat has not risen beyond the present inflated values.


As the Prime Minister has so recently told the nation, he attributes the rise of 22s. per quarter in the price of wheat in Liverpool between July 1914 and January of this year, as to 18s. 6d. to the increased price in New York, and only 3s. 6d. to increased freight. The Government are in possession of all available information and statistics, so that this statement may be taken as substantially correct, and it is, in fact, also borne out by independent investigations.

Those who urge the Government to fix the maximum price for food should remember that we depend upon imported food and cannot, therefore, control prices. Germany can fix maximum prices, because that country only imports to a limited

If the advice of those who urged the provision of national granaries, as a guarantee against high prices during war times, had been listened to, matters would have been different.

It is most important to bear in mind that the rise in freights did not follow closely upon the declaration of war, owing to the difficulties in international finance, and the general uncertainty. As a matter of fact, freights continued at a low level for some considerable period, therefore high prices have been charged on cargoes of foodstuffs which were imported at normal rates of freight. The cargoes of grain upon which inflated freight rates have been paid are only now arriving in this country.





In order to fix maximum rates of freight, it would also be necessary to fix maximum rates of wages for the officers and men who man the ships, maximum prices of provisions, coal, etc.

We must not expect normal, or anything approaching normal, freights as long as the War continues. The markets are in a very sensitive condition and are subject to violent fluctuation. Merchants are eager to secure ships to transport merchandise to markets which are in urgent need of their goods and for which high prices are offered. Neutral countries are paying these high prices, and also high freight charges, therefore the carriage of foodstuffs to this country has to compete with neutral countries for its tonnage requirements.

The total tonnage of the mercantile steam fleets of the world is 45,403,877 gross tons, out of which Great Britain and her colonies possess 20,523,706 tons, or 45 per cent.

It is a splendid testimony to the enterprise of our shipowners when we remember that so small a proportion as 20 per cent. of our mercantile marine suffices for carrying on the whole of the transport services required by the Admiralty, and that we have been able to transport to the Continent the largest army which Great Britain has ever sent across the seas.

When the tonnage voluntarily offered has been insufficient for the nation's requirements the Admiralty has had recourse to the requisitioning of ships. While this action has secured the necessary amount of tonnage, it has led to undue hardships owing to the mode of selection leading to unequal demands upon individual owners. In many instances the greater proportion, and in some cases the entire fleet, under a particular management is doing Government service, at a reduced rate of remuneration out of all proportion to that which is being earned by ships free to take full advantage of the current market rates offering for outside business.

Shipowners have no wish to shirk their full share of this important service, but they rightly contend that there should be a distribution of responsibility so that the burden may fall equitably upon the whole shipping community. The Government have under their control 1500 vessels, representing one fifth of the whole of Great Britain's mercantile fleet, and there are sure to be difficulties in the way of effective management. These vessels are largely being employed as colliers, conveying coal to all parts of the world to recoal ships of war.

Shipowners are loud in their complaints as to the manner in which these ships are kept lying idle in port, often with small quantities of coal cargo on board, but we must remember that it is of supreme importance that an available and ample supply of coals may be instantly found to replenish the depleted bunkers of ships of our Navy, and the extra cost of transport is of no consequence compared with the need of meeting every emergency and having coal at the right place at the right moment.

The continual and unavoidable policy of commandeering ships for the Admiralty created a panic in the minds of merchants, who day after day saw the available supply of tonnage gradually dwindling as it was absorbed for Government purposes, and this has naturally led to a scramble for ships, with exporters bidding against each other for tonnage. This, of course, caused a rise in freight on outward cargoes, the effects of which in due course spread to all quarters of the world.

It must not be assumed from the remarks of the First Lord of the Admiralty that, because 'on the average during the last three months 8000 British vessels have been continuously at sea,' this fleet has been sailing under anything approaching favourable conditions. Greater care has had to be exercised in navigation, necessitating deviation from recognised courses to avoid capture, mines, and submarines, thus prolonging the length of the voyage. On our own coasts many lights have been extinguished, and during the long winter nights navigation for this reason has been seriously impeded.

Besides the withdrawal from general trading of the immense amount of tonnage necessary to fulfil the requirements of the British Admiralty, and British shipping withdrawn from trading from other causes, there has been a further diminution of available tonnage in consequence of the complete cessation of trading of the merchant fleets of Germany and Austria-Hungary, these fleets alone representing 14 per cent. of the merchant tonnage of the world.

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ny when taking in supplies at the
ement of a voyage but also at coaling
ante-war figures, at the principal foreign coaling depots will
distrate the enormous increase in the price which shipowners
have to pay for Welsh coal since the outbreak of r:

						Cur	Current Prices		
0	Prices in July 1914				July 1914	s. d.			
			8.	6	per ton	50	0 per to	n	
Gibraltar .					*	50	0 ,,		
Malta			4	6	,,	50	0 ,,		
Marseilles .			28	6	"	47	6 ,,		
Algiers			23	6	"	54	6 ,,		
Port Said .			29	0	"	64	0		
Suez · ·			39	0	,,	The state of the s	0		
Buenos Aires		. :	33	6	,,	54			
St. Vincent (Cape	Verde	e)	33	6	,,	54	6 ,,		
Too Polmas			30	0	,,	52	0 ,,		

These are very serious advances and, considering the large quantities of coal consumed upon a round voyage, must materially add to the working costs and reduce the margin of profit.

Lately the Government has put into service many of the interned enemy steamers. They are largely employed in carrying coal from the East Coast ports to London, but they are in full competition with British and neutral tonnage and command the same rates of freight. The entry of this new tonnage to compete in the freight market has not had any appreciable effect, nor has it eased the price of coal to the London consumer.

When a great demand arises for ships to carry cargoes from any particular part of the world, as has been the case recently with America and the Argentine, the great distances which separate the different grain-loading ports are responsible for the unequal distribution of tonnage. As shipowners often arrange voyages months ahead to place their tonnage in position to meet demands from the grain ports, should there be a failure of crops, as has been the case in Australia, or a poor export from India, combined with the dislocation of the world's trade through the upset in finances which followed the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, considerable delay must inevitably occur before ships can be worked into position to meet the extra demands from any other grain centre. The following table of distances between the chief

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London will nt service, at a reduced rate of remuneration out of all to that which is being earned by ships free to take San Fra age of the current market rates offering for outside

India (Bombay) we no wish to shirk their full share of this " (Calcutta) but they rightly contend that there should be United States (New Tonsibility so that the burden may fall

The resident of the Board of Tring community. The Govern-with the views of representative him 00 vessels, representing one fifth unprecedented rise in freights, and has a ptilined an adviser are sure mittee consisting of representatives of the principal railway. These docks in the kingdem to consider and advise upon the whote all question of consistent in the docks. The task before the committee is one of extreme difficulty.

British shipping is the envy of the world. The enterprise of our shipowners is a national asset that calls for admiration. During the long period of depression which the industry experienced at the beginning of this century, freights remained at so low a level that cargoes of grain were imported into this country from distant parts of the world at rates of freight which offered no adequate return upon the invested capital; but, notwithstanding this, our fleets were kept up to date and new tonnage put into the water. Everything was done to run ships on the most economical lines, and the industries of the nation greatly benefited by the cheapness of freight. expanded and new sources of employment opened out, our ships were capable and ready to fulfil the requirements. demand for larger ships was felt they were provided, and now that the call has been made for ships to undertake vital national services the ships are ready and are at the disposal of the country.

The onerous and dangerous duties which have fallen upon the mercantile marine are being efficiently discharged. The First Lord of the Admiralty in his speech upon the naval situation told the country that 'the Admiralty was deeply indebted to the shipowning world for all the aid and co-operation which they had received, and regarded the closest union and goodwill between the Admiralty and the mercantile marine as indispensable at the present time.' Such a testimony coming from so high a quarter should go far to silence criticism.

W. H. RENWICK.

Cardiff.

The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake to return unaccepted MSS.

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